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THE  INTERCHURCH  WORLD  MOVEMENT  REPORT  ON 

The  Steel  Strike 

OF  1919 

The  Commission  of  Inquiry  consisted  of 

Bishop  F.  J.  McConnell  D.  A.  Poling 

G.  W.  Coleman  Nicholas  Van  Der  Pyl 

Alva  W.  Taylor  John  McDowell 

Mrs.  Fred  Bennett  Secretary,  Heber  Blankenhorn    'J 

(   Bishop  W.  M.  Bell 
Advisory  |   Bishop  C.  D.  Williams 

With  the  technical  assistance  of  The  Bureau  of  Industrial  Eesearch. 


m 


' '  On  the  commission  arc  a  Methodist  and  an  Episcopal  Bishop, 
a  secretary  of  the  Presbyterian  Board  of  Home  Missions,  and 
other  persons  of  character  and  intelligence.  Their  conclusions 
are  entitled  to  respectful  consideration." 

Philadelphia  Record. 

"A  challenging  document.  The  whole  question  of  industrial 
relationships  is  raised,  and  needs  to  be." 

Springfield  Republican. 

"The  report  of  men  whose  good  faith  is  not  questioned. " 

N.  Y.  Tribune. 

"Carries  the  impress  both  of  factual  truth  and  correct  judg- 
ment. "  N.Y.  Evening  Post. 


REPORT  ON  THE  STEEL 
STRIKE  OF  1919 


BY 

THE  COMMISSION  OF  INQUIRY, 
THE  INTERCHURCH  WORLD  MOVEMENT 

BISHOP  FRANCIS  J.  McCONNELL 

Chairman 

DANIEL  A.  POLING 

Vice-Chairman 

GEORGE  W.  COLEMAN  NICHOLAS  VAN  DER  PYL 

ALVA  W.  TAYLOR  JOHN  McDOWELL 

MRS.  FRED  BENNETT 
j  BISHOP  WILLIAM  MELVIN  BELL 
vtsory  -j  gjgjjQp  CHARLES  D.  WILLIAMS 

HEBER  BLANKENHORN 

Secretary  to  the  Commission 

With  the  technical  assistance  of 
THE  BUREAU  OF  INDUSTRIAL  RESEARCH,  NEW  YORK 


n 


NEW  YORK 
HARCOURT,  BRACE  AND  HOWE 

1920 


COPYBIGHT,    1920,   BY 
HABCOUBT,    BBACE  AND    HOWE,   INC. 


THE  QUINN   ft  BODEN  COMPANY 
RAHWAY.   N.  J, 


TO  THE  PRESIDENT 

[Following  is  the  essential  part  of  the  letter  addressed  by  the 
oflBcers  of  the  Commission  of  Inquiry  to  President  Wilson  in 
presenting  a  copy  of  the  Report.] 

Authorized  by  the  Interchurch  World  Movement  to  investi- 
gate industrial  unrest  in  general  and  the  steel  strike  in  par- 
ticular, the  Commission,  of  which  the  undersigned  are  Chairman 
and  Vice-Chairman,  respectively,  has  gone  forward  with  its  work 
for  a  little  more  than  seven  months.  The  publication  of  its 
completed  report  has  been  authorized.  It  is  the  very  earnest 
desire  of  the  Commission  that  since  this  report  ventures  to  suggest 
certain  actions  by  the  Federal  Government,  it  should  come  first 
to  the  President  of  the  American  people. 

The  Commission  finds  in  the  iron  and  steel  industry  condi- 
tions which  it  is  forced  to  describe  as  not  good  for  the  nation. 
It  fails  to  fin(J  any  federal  agency  which,  with  promise  of  early 
result,  is  directly  grappling  with  these  conditions. 

Unless  vital  changes  are  brought  to  pass,  a  renewal  of  the 
conflict  in  this  industry  seems  inevitable.  The  report  suggests 
the  appointment  of  a  special  commission  to  bring  about  imme- 
diately free  and  open  conference  between  employee  and  employer. 
This  commission  to  go  forward  on  the  precedents  of  the  presi- 
dential commission  for  the  bituminous  coal  industry,  named  by 
you  after  a  strike,  and  of  the  anthracite  commission,  appointed 
to  avert  a  strike.    .    .    . 

The  conviction  has  grown  upon  this  Commission  that  it  should 
not  fail  to  recommend  a  practical  suggestion  of  peace  for  an 
industry  drifting  toward  unrestricted  warfare.  As  Christians 
we  can  do  no  other. 

Frajtcis  J.  McCoNNELL,  Bishop  Metho- 
dist Episcopal  Church, 
Chairman,  Commission  of  Inquiry. 
Daniel  A.  Poling,  Associate  General 
Secretary,  Interchurch  World  Move- 
ment, 
Vice-Chairman,  Commission  of  Inquiry. 

[The  White  House  received  the  copy  of  the  Report  on  July  27, 
1920.] 


CHEONOLOGY  OF  THE  INVESTIGATION 

Establishment  of  an  independent,  representative  Commission  of 
Inquiry   by  the  Industrial   Relations   Department  of  the 
Interehurch  World  Movement         .        .        .       Oct.,  1919. 
Personnel:  Bishop  Francis  J.  McConnell  (Methodist) 
Dr.  Daniel  A.  Poling  (United  Evangelical) 
Mr.  George  W.  Coleman  (Baptist) 
Dr.  Alva  W.  Taylor  (Disciples) 
Dr.  John  McDowell  (Presbyterian) 
Dr.  Nicholas  Van  der  Pyl  ( Congregationalist) 
Mrs.  Fred  Bennett  (Presbyterian) 

Advisory  ^ 
Bishop  William  Melvin  Bell  (United  Brethren) 
Bishop  Charles  D.  Williams  (Protestant  Episcopal) 

Field  investigation        ....       Oct.,  1919— Feb.,  1920. 

(Mediation  effort,  Nov.  28,— Dec.  5, 1919.) 
Report  adopted  unanimously  by  the  Commission  of  Inquiry 

March  29-30,  1920. 
Report  received  by  the  Executive  Committee  of  the  Interehurch 

Movement May   10 

Recommended  for  publication  by  Sub-committee  of  Executive 

Committee June  25 

Personnel:  Dr.  Hubert  C.  Herring,  (Congregationalist); 
Bishop  James  Cannon,  Jr.,  (Methodist  South) ;  Mr.  Warren  S. 
Stone  (Congregationalist). 

Adopted  unanimously  by  the  Executive  Committee  of  the  Inter- 
ehurch Movement June  28,  1920 

'  The  advisory  members  did  not  take  part  in  the  active  field  investiga- 
tion but  signed  the  report  after  full  examination  of  it  and  the  evidence 
on  which  it  was  based. 


CONTENTS 


PAGE 

Letter  to  President  Wilson iii 

Chronology  of  the  Investigation v 

List  of  Sub-Reports 1 

1.    Introduction 3 

Inauguration  of  Inquiry 6-7 

Scope  and  Method 8-10 

Siimmarized  Conclusions 11-16 

Recommendations 16-19 

II.    Ignorance 20 

Gary  Testimony 23-26 

Espionage 27-30 

Bolshevism 31 

W.  Z.  Foster's  Red  Book  . 34-35 

National  and  Local  Strike-Leaders         ....  37-38 

British  Experience 41-42 

III.    The  Twelve-Hour  Day  in  a  No-Conference  Industry  44 

Nimiher  on  Eight-Hour   Day 48-49 

Tables  of  Hours 52-53 

Diary  of  Carnegie  Workman 60-64 

Senate  Committee  Testimony 67-68 

Testimony  of  Clergymen  re  Seven-Day  Week         .        .  70-71 

Engineer's  Findings 77-78 

Americanization 82-84 


IV.     Wages  in  a  No-Conference  Industry      ....  85 

U.  S.  Steel's  Wage  and  Salary  Budget  ....  87-91 

Comparison  v?ith  Minimum  Standards  ....  92-95 

True  Average  Annual  Earnings 97 

Open  Hearth  Schedule 98 

Family  Budget— A.  R.  C 100-101 

Comparisons  with  Other  Trades 102-103 

U.  S.  S.  C.  Housing 104 

Investigator's  Findings 105-107 

Tables  of  Hours,  Wages  and  Budgets     ....  108-109 

Typical   Cases 110-118 

V.    Grievances  AND  Control  IN  A  No-Conference  Industry  119 

Carleton  Parker's  Conclusions 125 

U.  S.  S.  C.  Finance  Committee  Resolution  .        .        .  126 

Diary  of  Gary,  Ind.,  Worker 129-131 

Homestead  Nationality  Report 133 

"•  Typical    Grievances 138-141 

Senate  Testimony 141-143 

vii 


viii  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

VI.    Organizing  fob  Confeeence 144 

List  of  24  Unions  in  National  Committee     .               .  145-146 

John  Fitzpatrick 147 

Foster's  "Boring   from  Within" 156-159 

Testimony  on  Attitude  of  Slavs 161-164 

Fitzpatrick's   Position 165-167 

Organizing  of  National  Committee 169-170 

Attitude  of  New  Recruits 171 

Attitude  of  International  Unions 172 

Attitude  of  National  Committee 176 

Causes  of  Failure 177-183 

Size  of  U.  S.  Steel  Corporation 184-185 

Appendix  to  Section  VI 189 

Report  of  National  Committee 189-196 

VII.    Social  Consequences  of  Arbitrary  Control       .       .  197 

Consequences   for   Employers 197 

Consequences  for  Communities 197 

Contents  of  Sub-Reports 198-199 

Conclusions   (a  and  b) 199 

Causes  of  Steel  Corporation's  Policy     ....  200 

Excerpts   from  IMinutes   of   Steel   Corporation    .        .  200-205 

Analysis  of  Minutes 206-207 

Mr.  Gary's  Testimony 210 

Discharge  for  Unionism 211-213 

Affidavits    of    Discharge 213-218 

Blacklists 219-220 

Espionage 221-224 

Testimony  of  Federal  Official 225-226 

Agents — provocateurs 230 

Spying  on  Commission  of  Inquiry 233-234 

Abrogation  of  Civil  Liberties 235-237 

Uses  of  Armed  Forces 240-242 

Pulpit  and  Press 242-243 

Concluding 245 

Christian  Findings 246-250 

Appendix  A — 

Standards  of  Living 255 

Ogburn   Budget 256-257 

Chapin    Budget 257-258 

N.  Y.  Factory  Commission's  Budget       ....  258 

N.  Y.  Board  of  Estimate's  Budget 259 

U.  S.  Bur.  of  Labor  Statistics  Budget  ....  262-263 

Appendix  B — 

Wages  in  Iron,  Steel  and  Other  Industries  .        .        .  264 

Average  Hourly   Earnings 265-266 

Wages  in  Pittsburg  District 267-268 

Sources  of  Data 269 

Appendix  C — 

Classification  According  to  Skill 270-271 

Index  273 


KEPOKT  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE,  1919 

MAIJST  SUMMARY 

Note. — This  volume  presents  the  Summary  of  industrial  facts 
as  drawn  from  all  data  before  the  Commission  and  adopted  as  the 
Report  of  the  Commission.  On  it  a  sub-committee  of  the  Com- 
mission based  the  Findings,  from  the  Christian  viewpoint,  which 
are  printed  at  the  conclusion  of  the  book. 

Another  volume  will  be  required  for  the  supporting  reports  and 
exhibits  by  the  staff  of  field  investigators :  George  Soule,  David 
J.  Saposs,  Miss  Marian  D.  Savage,  M.  Karl  Wisehart,  and  Robert 
Littell.  Heber  Blankenhorn  had  charge  of  the  field  work  and 
later  acted  as  Secretary  to  the  Commission. 

The  principal  sub-reports,  frequently  quoted  in  this  Summary 
and  awaiting  full  publication,  deal  with  the  following  topics : 

Civil  Liberties. 

Welfare  Work,  Pensions,  Etc. 

Discharges  for  Unionism. 

The  Press  and  the  Strike. 

The  Pulpit  and  the  Strike. 

The  Strike  in  Johnstown. 

The  Strike  in  Bethlehem. 

Pamily  Budgets  and  Living  Conditions. 

Intellectual  Environment   of  Immigrants. 

Rank  and  File  View. 

Under-cover  Men. 

History  of  the  National  Committee. 

The  Steel  Corporation's  Labor  Policy. 

The  Negro  in  the  Steel  Industry. 


MAIN   SUMMARY 

I 

INTEODUCTION 

STJMMAEIZED  CONCLUSIONS.      RECOMMENDATIONS 

The  steel  strike  of  SeptemlDer  22,  1919,  to  January  7, 
1920,  in  one  sense,  is  not  over.  The  main  issues  were  not 
settled.  The  causes  still  remain.  Moreover,  both,  causes  and 
issues  remain  uncomprehended  by  the  nation.  The  strike, 
although  the  largest  in  point  of  numbers  in  the  history  of  the 
country  up  to  the  first  date,  exhibited  this  extraordinary 
phase;  the  basic  facts  concerning  the  work  and  lives  of  the 
300,000  strikers  were  never  comprehensively  discovered  to 
the  public. 

The  strike's  real  issues  were  swallowed  up  in  other  issues, 
some  just  as  real  as  the  actual  causes  of  the  strike,  some 
unreal  but  in  general  quite  characteristic  of  American  indus- 
trial development. 

Moreover  the  little-known  working  conditions,  which 
caused  the  strike,  persist  in  the  steel  industry.  Also  the 
engulfing  circumstances,  nationally  characteristic,  persist. 

The  following  report,  therefore,  in  attempting  to  analyze 
and  publish  the  facts,  though  belated,  finds  peculiar  justifi- 
cation in  a  central  phase  of  the  strike  and  of  conditions  left 
after  the  strike.  If  the  steel  industry  is  to  find  a  peaceable 
way  out  of  its  present  state,  it  must  do  so  on  the  basis  of 
a  general  understanding  of  such  facts  as  are  here  set  forth. 
If  the  country  is  to  find  peaceable  ways  out  of  the  present 
industrial  tension  it  must  find  them  through  an  enlightened 

9 


4  EEPORT  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

public  opinion  based  upon  a  more  general  understanding  of 
those  national  conditions  and  trends  here  analyzed. 

In  the  months  after  the  close  of  the  strike  no  effort  was 
being  made  to  settle  the  issues  raised  by  the  strike  in  the 
steel  industry  through  reasoned  public  discussion  of  the  basic 
facts.  Employers  and  employees  began  to  wait  for  "  the  next 
strike  " ;  they  and  the  public  wondered,  careless  rather  than 
fearful,  whether  "  the  next  strike  "  would  come  in  months 
or  years,  and  whether  it  would  be  "  without  violence  "  as  in 
1919  or  with  guns  and  flame  as  at  Homestead  in  1892.  The 
steel  industry  continued  in  the  same  state  as  in  the  past,  a 
state  of  latent  war.  It  was  expected  that  the  next  outbreak 
would  be  precipitated  as  was  the  last,  by  efforts  for  work- 
men's organization  and  collective  bargaining.  Meanwhile  the 
civil  liberties  of  entire  communities  were  subordinated  to  the 
"  necessities  "  of  this  state  of  war  and  the  situation  in  the 
steel  industry  continued,  in  a  peculiar  way,  to  threaten 
the  industrial  peace  of  the  nation. 

Eank  and  file  strikes  of  such  spontaneity,  intensity  and 
duration  as  to  slow  up  the  industry  of  the  whole  nation  char- 
acterized the  period  succeeding  the  steel  strike.  Labor  unions 
which  had  been  striving  toward  internal  reform  by  democra- 
tizing their  organizations  and  by  defining  their  responsibili- 
ties to  the  public ;  employers  who  were  working  toward  plans 
for  industrial  cooperation;  those  few  government  agencies 
and  social  institutions  which  had  been  at  work  on  the  nation's 
after-war  industrial  problem — all  felt  a  set-back.  Conditions 
of  industrial  disorganization  set  in,  directly  related  to  events 
in  the  steel  industry. 

Put  tersely,  the  public  mind  completely  lost  sight  of  the 
real  causes  of  the  strike,  which  lay  in  hours,  wages  and  con- 
ditions of  labor,  fixed  "  arbitrarily,"  according  to  the  head 
of  the  United  States  Steel  Corporation,  in  his  testimony  at 
a  Senatorial  investigation.     It  lost  sight  of  them  because  it 


INTEODUCTION  5 

was  more  immediately  conceiiied  with  the  actual  outcome  of 
the  great  struggle  between  aggregations  of  employers  and 
aggregations  of  workers  than  it  was  with  the  fundamental 
circumstances  that  made  such  a  struggle  inevitable.  This 
investigation  and  report  deal  primarily  with  the  causative 
facts, — with  abiding  conditions  in  the  steel  industry — and 
only  secondarily  with  conflicts  of  policies  and  their  influence 
on  national  institutions  and  modes  of  thought. 

Out  of  the  first  set  of  undisputed  facts,  these  may  be  cited 
in  the  beginning: 

(a)  The  number  of  those  working  the  twelve-hour  day  is 
69,000.  (Testimony  of  E.  H.  Gary,  Senate  Investiga- 
tion, Vol.  I,  p.  157.) 

(b)  The  number  of  those  receiving  the  common  labor  or 
lowest  rate  of  pay  is  70,000.  (Letters  of  E.  H.  Gary 
to  this  Commission.) 

This  means  that  approximately  350,000  ^  men,  women  and 
children  are  directly  affected  by  the  longest  hours  or  the 
smallest  pay  in  that  part  of  the  industry  owned  by  the  United 
States  Steel  Corporation,  which  fixes  pay  and  hours  without 
conference  with  the  labor  force. 

Since  this  corporation  controls  about  half  the  industry,  it 
is  therefore  a  reasonably  conservative  estimate  that  the  work- 
ing conditions  of  three  quarters  of  a  million  of  the  nation's 
population  have  their  lives  determined  arbitrarily  by  the 
twelve-hour  day  or  by  the  lowest  pay  in  the  steel  industry. 

This  nub  of  the  situation,  the  Commission  found,  was 
subordinated,  and  after  the  strike  remained  subordinate,  to 
the  industry's  warfare  over  collective  bargaining.  Both  sides 
were  enmeshed.  The  huge  steel  companies,  committed  to  a 
non-union  system  (and  offering  no  alternative)  and  the  masses 

1  The  average  American  family,  the  so-called  statistical  family,  con- 
sists of  five  persons. 


6  EEPOET  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

of  workers,  moving  as  workers  do  traditionally,  seemed  both 
to  be  Helpless.  Espionage  replaced  collective  bargaining  or 
cooperative  service. 

Inauguration  of  Inquiry: 

The  data  for  this  report  were  obtained  by  and  for  an 
independent  Commission  of  Inquiry  appointed  at  the  request 
of  the  Industrial  Relations  Department  of  the  Interchurch 
World  Movement  of  North  America  after  a  National  Indus- 
trial Conference  in  New  York  on  October  3,  1919.  The  Con- 
ference rejected  a  resolution  condemning  one  party  to  the 
strike  for  refusing  to  adopt  the  principle  of  collective  bar- 
gaining but  unanimously  supported  a  resolution  directing 
a  thorough  investigation  of  the  strike  and  publication  of  the 
reports  of  the  investigators. 

Those  parts  of  the  evidence  obtained  directly  by  the  Com- 
mission were  secured  through  personal  observation  and 
through  open  hearings  held  in  Pittsburgh  in  November,  sup- 
plemented by  inspection  trips  in  Western  Pennsylvania, 
Ohio,  Indiana  and  Illinois.  More  technical  and  detailed  data 
were  obtained  by  a  staff  of  investigators  working  under  a 
field  director  from  the  Bureau  of  Industrial  Research, 
New  York.  Other  evidence  was  obtained  directly  by 
the  Bureau  of  Industrial  Research,  by  the  Bureau  of  Ap- 
plied Economics  in  Washington,  by  a  firm  of  consulting 
engineers,  and  by  various  other  organizations  and  tech-' 
nical  experts  working  under  the  direction  of  the  Com- 
mission. 

The  results  are  presented  in  a  Main  Report  with  sub- 
sidiary supporting  reports.  Pertinent  phases  of  other  in- 
vestigations and  surveys,  including  governmental  studies,  the 
recent  findings  of  the  Senate  Committee  on  Labor,  evidence 
on  the  limitation  or  abrogation  of  civil  rights,  before  and 
during  the  strike,  have  been  collected  and  analyzed.     The 


INTRODUCTION  7 

relation  of  "  welfare  work  "  to  the  workers  was  determined, 
chiefly  hy  the  analysis  of  available  statistics. 

A  detailed  analysis  was  made  of  the  relation  of  the  press 
and  of  the  pulpit  to  the  strike,  fields  hitherto  neglected ;  and 
a  similar  analytical  study  was  made  of  companies'  "  under- 
cover men  "  and  "  labor  detective  agencies."  A  body  of  over 
five  hundred  afiSdavits  and  statements  from  striking  and  non- 
striking  steel  workers  was  collected  and  analyzed. 

The  chief  effort  at  intensive  study  was  limited  to  the  Pitts- 
burgh district,  including  Johnstown  and  Youngstown.  The 
evidence  may  be  said  to  center  in  the  plants  of  the  United 
States  Steel  Corporation  and  particularly  its  plants  in  the 
Pittsburgh  district. 

Difficulties  in  obtaining  evidence  were  expected; — ^they 
exceeded  expectations.  In  certain  quarters  the  Commission 
of  clergymen  were  charged  with  being  "  Bolshevists  "  and 
"  anarchists  "  ;  their  investigators  were  rebuffed  as  "  Reds  " ; 
one  was  "  an  ^sted."  Formal  action  was  finally  necessary 
to  combat  the  circulation  in  written  form  of  charges  whose 
only  basis,  apparently,  was  that  any  persons  had  ventured  to 
make  any  investigation.  In  other  quarters  great  courtesy  was 
accorded,  coupled  with  inability  to  furnish  the  desired 
statistics.  Moreover  the  lack  of  up-to-date  and  available 
statistics  which  should  have  been  possessed  by  union  officials, 
the  over-supply  of  unverified  complaints  from  strikers  and 
the  reluctance  to  impart  any  information  on  the  part  of  the 
companies  combined  to  lengthen  unduly  the  period  of  field 
investigation.  The  Commission's  effort  was  in  itself  a  reve- 
lation of  the  lack  of  authoritative  means  for  acquainting  the 
public  with  industrial  information  at  a  time  of  industrial 
crisis. 

At  one  period,  investigation  was  delayed  by  an  effort  of 
the  Commission  to  settle  the  strike.  The  Commission,  hav- 
ing been  urged  to  do  so  in  a  manner  impossible  to  refuse, 


8  EEPOET  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

actually  formulated  a  plan  of  mediation  which  was  formally 
accepted  by  the  leaders  of  the  strike  but  was  definitely  re- 
jected by  the  Steel  Corporation. 
Scope  and  Method'. 

The  scope  of  the  inquiry  was  delimited  by  applying  two 
simple  questions: 

(a)  What  workers  constituted  the  bulk  of  the  strikers  ? 
The  answer  is  not  disputed :  the  backbone  of  the  strike 

consisted  of  the  mass  of  common  labor  and  the  semi-skilled, 
constituting  roughly  three-quarters  of  all  employees,  and 
mostly   "  foreigners." 

By  "  foreigners "  the  steel  industry  means  not  all  im- 
migrants or  sons  of  immigrants,  but  only  the  "  new  immigra- 
tion," consisting  of  the  score  of  races  from  southeastern  or 
eastern  Europe.  About  half  of  these  "  foreigners "  had 
citizenship  papers. 

In  many  places  all  the  skilled  struck ;  in  a  few  places  the 
skilled  went  out  and  many  unskilled  stayed  in  the  mills. 

The  foreigners  had  never  been  organized  before;  hitherto 
they  had  been  looked  upon  by  the  unions  as  potential  strike 
breakers,  "  stealing  Americans'  jobs  and  lowering  the  Ameri- 
can standard  of  living." 

(b)  What  was  the  chief  factor  on  the  employers'  side? 
The  answer  is  not  in  dispute :  the  U.  S.  Steel  Corporation 

was  the  admittedly  decisive  influence. 

Whatever  the  Steel  Corporation  does,  the  rest  of  the  in- 
dustry will  ultimately  do;  whatever  modifications  of  policy 
fail  to  take  place  in  the  industry  fail  because  of  the  opposition 
of  the  Steel   Corporation. 

Throughout  the  report  great  emphasis  is  laid  on  Mr.  Gary's 
testimony,  partly  because  he  was  almost  the  sole  spokesman 
for  the  industry  during  the  strike  and  partly  because  officials, 
corporation  and  "  independent/'  referred  investigators  to  Mr. 


INTRODUCTION  9 

Gary  and  often  limited  their  own  testimony  to  reading  ex- 
tracts from  Mr.  Gary's  statements  or  approving  his  policies. 

The  scope  of  the  inquiry,  therefore,  included  chiefly  repre- 
sentative cross-sections  of  the  mass  of  low-skilled  "  foreign- 
ers "  in  the  Pittsburgh  and  Chicago  district  plants  of  the 
Steel  Corporation. 

Of  the  Corporation's  268,000  employees,  80,000  are  miners, 
railworkers  and  dockmen,  ship  crews  and  shipyard  workers, 
who  were  untouched  by  the  strike  and  are  therefore  excluded. 

The  method  was  to  carry  the  inquiry  to  the  steel  workers 
themselves,  strikers  and  non-strikers.  Effort  was  made  to  get 
beyond  the  debates  of  Mr.  Gary  and  Mr.  Gompers.  The 
statements  and  affidavits  of  500  steel  workers  carefully 
compared  and  tested,  constitute  the  rock  bottom  of  the 
findings,  the  testimony  of  the  leaders  on  both  sides  being 
used  chiefly  to  interpret  these  findings. 

Effort  was  made  to  keep  in  mind,  that  a  strike  is  not 
merely  a  call  to  strike,  it  is  a  walk-out,  frequently  without  a 
call.  Everything, — Mr.  Gary,  Mr.  Gompers,  the  Corpora- 
tion's labor  policies,  Mr.  Foster's  record, — was  viewed  in 
the  light  of  whether  or  not  it  had  or  had  not  a  relation  to 
the  separation  of  300,000  men  from  their  jobs. 

The  Commission  and  its  investigators  went  to  the  steel 
workers  with  two  main  questions: 

A.  Why  did  you  strike  ?     (Or  why  refuse  to  strike  ?) 

B.  What  do  you  want  ? 

Answers  to  A.  were  found  to  deal  with  things  that  existed, 
— schedules  of  hours,  wages,  conditions,  grievances,  physical 
states  and  states  of  mind. 

Answers  to  B.  were  found  to  deal  with  a  method  (hitherto 
non-existent  in  the  steel  industry),  for  changing  A.;  the 
strike  leaders  called  it  collective  bargaining  and  the  right  to 
organization;  the  steel  employers  called  it  the  closed  shop 
and  labor  autocracy. 


10  REPORT  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

Therefore,  the  first  half  of  the  inquiry  concerned,  prima- 
rily, conditions  of  labor. 

The  second  half  concerned,  primarily,  methods  for  chang- 
ing the  conditions  revealed  by  the  first  half. 

The  second  line  of  inquiry  was  found  to  stretch  back  with 
decisive  effect  over  the  first  half;  in  short,  the  key  to  the 
steel  industry,  both  before  and  during  the  strike  and  now 
was  found  in  following  to  its  furthest  implications  this 
question :  What  means  of  conference  exist  in  the  steel  mills  ? 
Both  sides  agreed  that  the  occasion  of  the  strike,  leaving 
aside  for  the  moment  its  relation  to  any  fundamental  cause, 
was  the  denial  of  a  conference,  requested  by  organized  labor 
and  refused  by  Mr.  Gary. 

The  inquiry  into  the  means  of  conference  was  pursued 
through  the  three  possible  forms  of  conference:  (a)  through 
individuals ;  (b)  through  shop  committee  or  company  unions ; 
(c)   through  labor  unions. 

The  complete  scope  of  this  phase  of  the  inquiry  might 
be  restated  as  follows: 

(A)  Investigation  of  a  system  of  denial  of  organization  and 
collective  bargaining  (the  policy  of  the  Steel  Corpora- 
tion). 

(B)  Investigation  of  a  system  or  systems  of  non-union  collec- 
tive bargaining  (existent  in  certain  "independent''  plants 
where  strikes  had  once  existed  or  were  feared). 

(C)  Investigation  of  a  movement  for  collective  bargaining  and 

organization  of  the  traditional  trade  union  kind  (ini- 
tiated by  the  American  Federation  of  Labor  and  fought 
by  the  Steel  Corporation). 

Inquiry  B.  was  not  sufficiently  completed  to  be  presented 
in  this  report,  except  as  a  sidelight  on  the  main  conditions. 
The  plans  in  operation  or  attempted  in  the  Pueblo  plant  of 
the  Colorado  Fuel  and  Iron  Company,  the  Midvale-Cambria 


mTRODUCTION  11 

Company,  the  Bethlehem,  Inland  and  International  Harvester 
plants,  etc.,  did  not  suggest  to  the  dominant  factor,  the  Steel 
Corporation,  any  modification  of  its  policy. 

Summarized  Conclusions: 

SuflBcient  data  were  analyzed  to  warrant  the  following  main 
conclusions  concisely  stated  here  and  discussed  at  length  in 
this  report  and  the  sub-reports. 

1.  The  conduct  of  the  iron  and  steel  industry  was  deter- 
mined by  the  conditions  of  labor  accepted  by  the  191,000 
employees  in  the  U.  S.  Steel  Corporation's  manufacturing 
plants. 

2.  These  conditions  of  labor  were  fixed  by  the  Corporation, 
without  collective  bargaining  or  any  functioning  means  of 
conference;  also  without  above-board  means  of  learning 
how  the  decreed  conditions  affected  the  workers. 

3.  Ultimate  control  of  the  plants  was  vested  in  a  small  group 
of  financiers  whose  relation  to  the  producing  force  was 
remote.  The  financial  group's  machinery  of  control  gave 
it  full  knowledge  of  output  and  dividends,  but  negligible 
information  of  working  and  living  conditions. 

4.  The  jobs  in  the  five  chief  departments  of  the  plants  were 
organized  in  a  pyramid  divided  roughly  into  thirds;  the 
top  third  of  skilled  men,  chiefly  Americans,  resting  on  a 
larger  third  of  semi-skilled,  all  based  on  a  fluctuating  mass 
of  common  labor.  Promotion  was  at  pleasure  of  company 
representatives. 

5.  Eates  of  pay  and  other  principal  conditions  were  based  on 
what  was  accepted  by  common  labor;  the  unskilled  and 
semi-unskilled  force  was  largely  immigrant  labor. 

6.  The  causes  of  the  strike  lay  in  the  hours,  wages  and  con- 
trol of  jobs  and  in  the  manner  in  which  all  these  were 
fixed. 

7.  Hours:  Approximately  one-half  the  employees  were  sub- 
jected to  the  twelve-hour  day.  Approximately  one-half 
of  these  in  turn  were  subjected  to  the  seven-day  week. 


12  EEPORT  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

Much  less  than  one-quarter  had  a  working  day  of  less 
than  ten  hours    (sixty-hour  week). 

The  average  week  for  all  employees  was  68.7  hours;  these 
employees  generally  helieved  that  a  week  of  over  sixty 
hours  ceased  to  be  a  standard  in  other  industries  fifteen 
to  twenty  years  ago. 

Schedules  of  hours  for  the  chief  classes  of  steel  workers 
were  from  twelve  to  forty  hours  longer  per  week  than  in 
other  basic  industries  near  steel  communities;  the  Ameri- 
can steel  average  was  over  twenty  hours  longer  than  the 
British,  which  ran  between  forty-seven  to  forty-eight  hours 
in  1919. 

Steel  jobs  were  largely  classed  as  heavy  labor  and  hazard- 
ous. 

The  steel  companies  professed  to  have  restored  practically 
pre-war  conditions;  the  hours  nevertheless  were  longer  than 
in  1914  or  1910.  Since  1910  the  Steel  Corporation  has 
increased  the  percentage  of  its  twelve-hour  workers. 
The  only  reasons  for  the  twelve-hour  day,  furnished  by  the 
companies,  were  found  to  be  without  adequate  basis  in  fact. 
The  increased  hours  were  found  to  be  a  natural  develop- 
ment of  large  scale  production,  which  was  not  restricted 
by  public  sentiment  or  by  organization  among  employees. 
The  twelve-hour  day  made  any  attempt  at  "  Americani- 
zation "  or  other  civic  or  individual  development  for  one- 
half  of  all  immigrant  steel  workers  arithmetically  impos- 
sible. 
8.  Wages:  The  annual  earnings  of  over  one-third  of  all  pro- 
ductive iron  and  steel  workers  were,  and  had  been  for  years, 
below  the  level  set  by  government  experts  as  the  minimum 
of  subsistence  standard  for  families  of  five. 
The  annual  earnings  of  72  per  cent,  of  all  workers  were, 
and  had  been  for  years,  below  the  level  set  by  government 
experts  as  the  minimum  of  comfort  level  for  families  of 
five. 

This  second  standard  being  the  lowest  which  scientists  are 
willing  to  term  an  "  American  standard  of  living,"  it  fol- 


INTRODUCTION  13 

lows  that  nearly  three-quarters  of  the  steel  workers  could 
not  earn  enough  for  an  American  standard  of  living. 
The  bulk  of  unskilled  steel  labor  earned  less  than  enough 
for  the  average  family's  minimum  subsistence;  the  bulk 
of  semi-skilled  labor  earned  less  than  enough  for  the  aver- 
age family's  minimum  comfort. 

Skilled  steel  labor  was  paid  wages  disproportionate  to  the 
earnings  of  the  other  two-thirds,  thus  binding  the  skilled 
class  to  the  companies  and  creating  divisions  between  the 
upper  third  and  the  rest  of  the  force. 
Wage  rates  in  the  iron  and  steel  industry  as  a  whole  are 
determined  by  the  rates  of  the  U.  S.  Steel  Corporation. 
The  Steel  Corporation  sets  its  wage  rates,  the  same  as  its 
hour  schedules,  without  conference  (or  collective  bargain- 
ing), with  its  employees. 

Concerning  the  financial  ability  of  the  Corporation  to  pay 
higher  wages  the  following  must  be  noted  (with  the  under- 
standing that  the  Commission's  investigation  did  not  in- 
clude analysis  of  the  Corporation's  financial  organization)  : 
the  Corporation  vastly  increased  its  undistributed  financial 
reserves  during  the  Great  War.  In  1914  the  Corporation's 
total  undivided  surplus  was  $135,204,471.90.  In  1919  this 
total  undivided  surplus  had  been  increased  to  $493,048,- 
201.93.  Compared  with  the  wage  budgets,  in  1918,  the 
Corporation's  final  surplus  after  paying  dividends  of 
$96,382,027  and  setting  aside  $274,277,835  for  Federal 
taxes  payable  in  1919,  was  $466,888,421, — a  sum  large 
enough  to  have  paid  a  second  time  the  total  wage  and 
salary  budget  for  1918  ($452,663,524),  and  to  have  left 
a  surplus  of  over  $14,000,000,  In  1919  the  undivided  sur- 
plus was  $493,048,201.93,  or  $13,000,000  more  than  the 
total  wage  and  salary  expenditures.^ 

1  Detailed   figures   on  the   Corporation's   surpluses,  accumulation  of 
which   was  begun   in   1901,  are: 

1913— Total  undivided  surplus  $151,798,428.89 

1914— Total  undivided  surplus  135.204,471.90 

1915— Total  undivided  surplus  180,025,328.74 

1916— Total  undivided  surplus  381,360,913.37 

1917— Total  undivided  surplus  431,660,803.63 

1918— Total  undivided  surplus 466,888,421.38 

1919— Total  undivided  surplus  493,048,201.93 


14  ITEPOnT  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

Increases  in  wages  during  the  war  in  no  case  were  at  a 
sacrifice  of  stockholders'  dividends. 

Extreme  congestion  and  unsanitary  living  conditions,  prev- 
alent in  most  Pennsylvania  steel  communities,  were  largely 
due  to  underpayment  of  semi-skilled  and  common  labor. 
9.  Grievances:  The  Steel  Corporation's  arbitrary  control  of 
hours  and  wages  extended  to  everything  in  individual  steel 
jobs,  resulting  in  daily  grievances. 

The  Corporation,  committed  to  a  non-union  system,  was 
as  helpless  as  the  workers  to  anticipate  these  grievances. 
The  grievances,  since  there  existed  no  working  machinery 
of  redress,  weighed  heavily  in  the  industry,  because  they 
incessantly  reminded  the  worker  that  he  had  no  "  say " 
whatever  in  steel. 

Discrimination  against  immigrant  workers,  based  on  ri- 
valry of  economic  interests,  was  furthered  by  the  present 
system  of  control  and  resulted  in  race  divisions  within  the 
community. 
10.  Control:  The  arbitrary  control  of  the  Steel  Corporation 
extended  outside  the  plants,  affectiug  the  workers  as  citi- 
zens and  the  social  institutions  in  the  communities. 
The  steel  industry  was  under  the  domination  of  a  policy 
whose  aim  was  to  keep  out  labor  unions.  In  pursuit  of 
this  policy,  blacklists  were  used,  workmen  were  discharged 
for  union  affiliation,  "  under-cover  men "  and  "  labor  de- 


This  report  does  not  go  into  the  long  dispute  over  the  Corporation's 
financing,  a  controversy  which  blazed  up  during  the  strike  but  not  as  a 
part  of  the  issue.  A  typical  criticism  printed  about  this  time  was  the 
following  from  the  Searchlight,  commenting  on  Basil  Manly's  analysis 
of  Senate  Document  259,  (a  report  from  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury)  : 

"  On  the  basis  of  the  Steel  Corporation's  public  reports,  its  net  profits 
for  the  two  years  1916  and  1917,  '  after  the  payment  of  interest  on  bonds, 
and  other  allowances  for  all  charges  growing  out  of  the  installation  of 
special  war  facilities,'  amounted,  according  to  Mr.  Manly,  to  $888,931,511. 
The  bonds  of  the  corporation  represent  all  the  money  actually  invested 
in  the  concern,  for  the  common  stock  is  '  nothing  but  water.' 

"  Of  course  out  of  the  net  income  the  Steel  Corporation  had  to  pay  its 
taxes  to  the  federal  government,  but  the  hundreds  of  millions  that  re- 
mained represented  earnings  on  '  shadow  dollars.'  " 


INTKODUCTION  15 

tectives "  were  employed  and  efforts  were  made  to  influ- 
ence the  local  press,  pulpit  and  police  authorities. 
In  Western  Pennsylvania  the  civil  rights  of  free  speech 
and  assembly  were  abrogated  without  just  cause,  both  for 
individuals  and  labor  organizations.  Personal  rights  of 
strikers  were  violated  by  the  State  Constabulary  and  sher- 
iff's deputies. 

Federal  authorities,  in  some  cases,  acted  against  groups 
of  workmen  on  the  instigation  of  employees  of  steel 
companies.  In  many  places  in  Western  Pennsylvania, 
community  authorities  and  institutions  were  subservient 
to  the  maintenance  of  one  corporation's  anti-union 
policies. 

11.  The  organizing  campaign  of  the  workers  and  the  strike 
were  for  the  purpose  of  forcing  a  conference  in  an  in- 
dustry where  no  means  of  conference  existed;  this  specific 
conference  to  set  up  trade  union  collective  bargaining,  par- 
ticularly to  abolish  the  twelve-hour  day  and  arbitrary  meth- 
ods of  handling  employees. 

12.  No  interpretation  of  the  movement  as  a  plot  or  conspiracy 
fits  the  facts;  that  is,  it  was  a  mass  movement,  in  which 
leadership  became  of  secondary  importance. 

13.  Charges  of  Bolshevism  or  of  industrial  radicalism  in  the 
conduct  of  the  strike  were  without  foundation. 

14.  The  chief  cause  of  the  defeat  of  the  strike  was  the  size  of 
the  Steel  Corporation,  together  with  the  strength  of  its 
active  opposition  and  the  support  accorded  it  by  employers 
generally,  by  governmental  agencies  and  by  organs  of  pub- 
lic opinion. 

15.  Causes  of  defeat,  second  in  importance  only  to  the  fight 
waged  by  the  Steel  Corporation,  lay  in  the  organization 
and  leadership,  not  so  much  of  the  strike  itself,  as  of  the 
American  labor  movement. 

16.  The  immigrant  steel  worker  was  led  to  expect  more  from 
the  twenty-four  International  Unions  of  the  A.  F.  of  L. 
conducting  the  strike  than  they,  through  indifference,  self- 
ishness or  narrow  habit,  were  willing  to  give. 


16  EEPOET  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

17.  Racial  differences  among  steel  workers  and  an  immigrant 
tendency  toward  industrial  unionism,  which  was  combated 
by  the  strike  leadership,  contributed  to  the  disunity  of  the 
strikers. 

18.  The  end  of  the  strike  was  marked  by  slowly  increasing 
disruption  of  the  new  unions;  by  bitterness  between 
the  "American"  and  "foreign"  worker  and  by  bit- 
terness against  the  employer,  such  as  to  diminish  pro- 
duction. 

The  following  question  was  definitely  placed  before  the 
Commission  of  Inquiry:  Were  the  strikers  justified?  The 
investigation's  data  seem  to  make  impossible  any  other  than 
this  conclusion: 

The  causes  of  the  strike  lay  in  grievances  which  gave  the 
workers  just  cause  for  complaint  and  for  action.  These  un- 
redressed grievances  still  exist  in  the  steel  industry. 

Recommendations: 
I.  Inasmuch  as — 

(a)  conditions  in  the  iron  and  steel  industry  depend  on  the 
conditions  holding  good  among  the  workers  of  the  U.  S. 
Steel  Corporation,  and — 

(b)  past  experience  has  proved  that  the  industrial  policies 
of  large-scale  producing  concerns  are  basically  influenced 
by  (1)  public  opinion  expressed  in  governmental  action, 
(2)  labor  unions,  which  in  this  case  have  failed,  or  (3) 
by  both,  and — 

(c)  permanent  solutions  for  the  industry  can  only  be  reached 
by  the  Steel  Corporation  in  free  cooperation  with  its 
employees,  therefore — 


INTKODUCTION  17 

It  is  recommended — 

(a)  that  the  Federal  Govermnent  be  requested  to  initiate 
the  immediate  undertaking  of  such  settlement  by  bring- 
ing together  both  sides ; 

(b)  that  the  Federal  Government,  by  presidential  order  or 
by  congressional  resolution,  set  up  a  commission  repre- 
senting both  sides  and  the  public,  similar  to  the  Com- 
mission resulting  from  the  coal  strike;  such  Commis- 
sion to — 

1.  inaugurate  immediate  conferences  between  the  Steel 
Corporation  and  its  employees  for  the  elimination  of 
the  12-hour  day  and  the  Y-day  week,  and  for  the 
readjustment  of  wage  rates ; 

2.  devise  with  both  sides  and  establish  an  adequate  plan 
of  permanent  free  conference  to  regulate  the  conduct 
of  the  industry  in  the  future; 

3.  continue  and  make  nation-wide  and  exhaustive  this 
inquiry  into  basic  conditions  in  the  industry. 

II.  Inasmuch  as — 

(a)  the  administration  of  civil  law  and  police  power  in 
Western  Pennsylvania  has  created  many  injustices 
which  persist,  and — 

(b)  no  local  influence  has  succeeded  in  redressing  this  con- 
dition, therefore — 

It  is  recommended — 

(a)  that  the  Federal  Government  inaugurate  full  inquiry 
into  the  past  and  present  state  of  civil  liberties  in  West- 
em  Pennsylvania  and  publish  the  same. 


18  EEPORT  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

III.  Inasmuch  as — 

(a)  the  conduct  and  activities  of  "  lahor-detective  "  agencies 
do  not  seem  to  serve  the  best  interests  of  the  country, 
and — 

(b)  the  Federal  Department  of  Justice  seems  to  have 
placed  undue  reliance  on  cooperation  with  corporations' 
secret  services,  therefore — 

It  is  recommended — 

(a)  that  the  Federal  Government  institute  investigation  for 
the  purpose  of  regulating  labor  detective  agencies;  and 
for  the  purpose  of  publishing  what  government  depart- 
ments or  public  moneys  are  utilized  to  cooperate  with 
company  "  under-cover  men." 

IV.  It  is  recommended  that  the  proper  Federal  authorities 
be  requested  to  make  public  two  reports  of  recent  in- 
vestigations of  conditions  in  the  steel  industry,  in  mak- 
ing which  public  money  was  spent,  and  to  explain  why 
these  and  similar  reports  have  not  hitherto  been  made 
public,  and  why  reports  which  were  printed  have  been 
limited  to  extremely  small  editions. 

(Reference  is  made  specifically  to  Mr.  Ethelbert  Stewart's 
report  on  civil  liberties  in  Western  Pennsylvania,  made  to  the 
Secretary  of  Labor ;  to  Mr.  George  P.  West's  report  made  to  the 
War  Labor  Board;  to  the  Testimony  of  the  Senate  Commit- 
tee's strike  investigation,  2  vols.,  printed  in  an  edition  of  1,000 
only;  and  to  Senate  Document  259.) 

V.  It  is  recommended  that  the  Industrial  Relations  De- 
partment of  the  Interchurch  World  Movement  continue 
and  supplement  the  present  inquiry  into  the  iron  and 
steel  industry  with  particular  reference  to — 


INTRODUCTION  19 

1.  Company  unions  and  shop  committees; 

2.  Social,  political  and  industrial  beliefs  of  the  immi- 
grant worker; 

3.  Present  aims  of  production  in  the  industry. 

4.  Conduct  of  trade  unions  with  reference  to  democracy 
and  to  responsibility. 

VI.  It  is  recommended  that  immediate  publication,  in  the 
most  effective  forms  possible,  be  obtained  for  this  report 
with  its  sub-reports. 


11. 

IGNORANCE:  BOLSHEVISM 

As  a  preliminary  to  the  whole  report,  analysis  of  the  data 
gathered  in  the  inquiry  warrants  the  following  conclusions 
on  two  salient  and  inter-related  phases  of  the  strike: 

The  steel  companies  had  no  adequate  means  of  information 
on  the  usual  conditions  of  employment,  previous  to  the 
strike,  nor  on  the  motives  of  employees  in  joining  the 
unions  during  the  organizing  campaign;  they  therefore 
placed  undue  reliance  on  information  obtained  from 
secret  and  mercenary  sources. 

The  public  purveyors  of  information  on  normal  steel  condi- 
tions and  on  the  causes  of  the  strike  failed  to  ascertain 
and  publish  the  facts.  Ignorance  of  the  facts  was  so 
general  that  it  was  possible  for  one  interpretation  of  the 
strike  to  obtain  wide  acceptance,  viz.  the  companies' 
explanation  that  the  strike  was  a  plot  of  Bolshevists,  sup- 
ported mainly  by  "  radicals  "  who  were  largely  aliens. 

Evidence  on  this  interpretation  of  the  strike  as  a  Bolshevist 
plot  failed  entirely  to  substantiate  it.  On  the  contrary, 
it  tended  to  show  that  this  conception  was  without  foun- 
dation in  fact. 

Concerning  the  basic  facts  of  normal  steel  employment 
conditions,  not  only  were  the  public  and  the  companies  un- 
informed but  the  strikers'  leaders  were  also  uninformed.  It 
is  not  unusual  for  strikes,  like  presidential  elections  and  wars, 
to  be  fought  out  on  extraneous  issues,  with  little  elucidation 
of  fundamental  facts.  In  most  such  cases,  however,  some  of 
the  basic  facts  finally  do  come  to  the  surface.    In  this  strike, 

20 


IGNORANCE:  BOLSHEVISM  21 

so  far  as  the  public  was  concerned,  lack  of  information  re- 
mained so  general  that  it  was  possible  to  set  up  straw-man 
explanations  and  keep  public  attention  diverted  to  knocking 
them  down. 

It  was  necessary  for  this  Commission  to  consider  such 
questions  as  the  following:  Was  there  any  substantial 
general  knowledge  of  the  customary  organization  of  the  steel 
industry,  its  hours,  its  wages,  its  workers  and  their  modes 
of  living  ?  Did  the  government  have  the  basic  facts  regard- 
ing employment  in  the  industry,  and  did  it  make  use  of  the 
facts  it  had  ?  Did  the  United  States  Steel  Corporation,  in 
normal  times,  possess  adequate  means  of  ascertaining  the 
truth  about  living  conditions  and  the  desires  of  its  workers  ? 
Was  the  Corporation  subject  to  misinformation?  Were  the 
press  and  the  pulpit  in  possession  of  the  facts  ?  Within  steel 
communities,  are  the  facts  about  steel  workers'  lives  obvious 
and  immediately  accessible  to  the  rest  of  the  community? 

As  to  the  allegation  that  the  strike  was  plotted  and  led  by 
"  Reds  "  or  syndicalists  or  Bolshevists,  that  it  was  supported 
mainly  or  entirely  by  alien  "  radicals,"  and  that  its  real 
objects  were  the  overthrow  of  established  leaders  and  es- 
tablished institutions  of  organized  labor  and  perhaps  the 
overthrow  of  the  established  government  of  the  country,  it 
was  necessary  to  consider  such  questions  as:  What  sort 
of  facts  were  essential  to  determine  the  problem  ?  Who 
offered  this  allegation  and  with  what  proof?  Why  was  this 
allegation  made?  Did  the  allegation  seriously  affect  the 
strike?    What  were  its  effects  on  the  public? 

Analysis  of  the  data  collected  proved  that  neither  the 
United  States  Steel  Cor^Doration,  nor  organized  labor,  nor 
governmental  agencies  have  considered  it  their  normal  busi- 
ness to  ascertain  the  current  facts  regarding  conditions  of 
employment,  etc.,  in  the  steel  industry  and  to  take  the  public 
constantly  ipto  their  confidence  on  such  facts.     The  Corpora- 


22  EEPORT  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

tion's  annual  report  is  made  public,  but  the  facts  therein 
which  deal  with  labor  are  confined  to  a  few  lines  and  are  not 
illuminating.  Organized  labor  has  never  understood  the 
business  of  gathering  facts  about  any  industry  nor  the  advisa- 
bility of  presenting  such  facts  to  the  public.  The  govern- 
ment's bureaus  for  collecting  such  statistics  as  hours,  wages, 
working  conditions,  costs  and  profits,  are  ridiculously  in- 
adequate, are  almost  invariably  undercut  by  Congress  in 
appropriations,  and  are  not  primarily  concerned  with  pop- 
ularizing such  facts  as  they  possess.  What  might  be  con- 
sidered as  a  prime  business  of  any  government,  i.e.  the 
discovery  and  current  publication  of  fundamental  facts  of 
the  country's  basic  industries  was  not  considered  the  national 
government's  business  in  relation  to  the  steel  industry. 

In  normal  times,  the  Steel  Corporation  had  no  adequate 
means  of  learning  the  conditions  of  life  and  work  and  the 
desires  of  its  employees.  Company  officers  admitted  that 
they  had  no  real  way  of  reaching,  or  of  keeping  in  touch 
with,  the  mass  of  workers  who  became  involved  in  the  strike, 
that  is  the  foreign-speaking  unskilled  workers  and  the  lower 
half  of  the  semi-skilled,  constituting  up  to  80  per  cent,  of 
the  force  in  representative  plants.  Even  such  machinery  of 
contact  as  is  provided  in  "  modern  employment  management  " 
systems  had  not  been  installed  very  long  in  the  steel  plants 
and  was  not  developed  beyond  the  point  of  keeping  in  con- 
tact at  the  moment  of  hiring  and  firing.  With  the  employ- 
ment managers  were  usually  joined  one  to  four  welfare 
workers  of  limited  training  who  were  little  concerned  with 
interpreting  the  difficulties  and  desires  of  the  "  foreign " 
steel  worker  because  they  were  powerless  to  efi'ect  changes. 
The  President  of  the  Carnegie  Steel  Company  declared  to 
the  Commission  that  there  was  "  no  real  way  of  getting 
hold  of  the  foreigner."  The  head  of  the  Corporation's  Sani- 
tation,  Safety  and  Welfare  Department,  Mr.   C.   L.   Close 


IGNORANCE:  BOLSHEVISM  23 

agreed  with  this  statement.  Neither  seemed  to  think  that  this 
inability  was  due  to  a  lack  of  machinery  and  it  was  apparent 
that  steel  officials  generally  relied  on  some  other  method  for 
information  than  an  openly  organized  system  of  studying 
the  minds  and  needs  of  the  workers.  A  suggestion  that 
companies  might  foster  and  enlist  the  aid  of  organizations 
of  the  workers  themselves  for  the  purpose  of  insuring  such 
information  was  commented  on  by  company  officers  with 
surprise  not  to  say  suspicion.  Mr.  Gary  gave  the  clearest 
testimony  in  confirmation  of  his  subordinates,  though  that 
was  not  his  immediate  purpose.  He  told  the  Senate  Com- 
mittee that  his  men  were  "  contented."  He  said  he  knew 
this  to  be  the  case  and  that  he  had  adequate  means  for  know- 
ing it ;  that  there  was  "  no  cause  "  for  the  strike  and  that 
"  the  men  were  not  complaining ;  the  workmen  had  found 
no  fault;  we  are  on  the  best  of  terms  with  our  men  and 
have  always  been,  with  some  very  slight  exceptions,  very  in- 
consequential exceptions."  Then  he  volunteered  the  follow- 
ing, (quoted  in  full  from  the  Senate  Testimony,  Volume  I, 
pages  161  and  162)  : 

Senator  Walsh.  "  How  did  you  personally  know  that  hun- 
dreds and  thousands  of  your  men  were  content  and  satisfied  ?  " 

Mr.  Gary.  "  Senator,  I  know  it  because  I  make  it  my  par- 
ticular business  all  the  time  to  know  the  frame  of  mind  of  our 
people.  Not  that  I  visit  every  man ;  I  do  not  do  that ;  of  course, 
I  could  not  do  that;  not  that  there  could  be  something  done  or 
something  said  in  the  mills  that  I  would  not  know;  but,  in 
the  first  place,  my  instructions  regarding  the  treatment  of  the 
men  are  absolutely  positive,  given  to  the  presidents  at  the  presi- 
dents' meetings  regularly — plenty  of  my  remarks  to  the  presi- 
dents have  been  printed  and  can  be  exhibited  if  necessary — 
and  because  I  am  inquiring  into  that;  and  we  have  a  man  at 
the  head  of  our  welfare  department,  Mr.  Close,  who  is  here, 
who  is  around  among  the  works  frequently,  and  all  the  time, 


24  KEPORT  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

more  or  less,  trying  to  ascertain  conditions;  because  public 
writers,  unbeknown  to  us,  have  been  among  our  works  mak- 
ing inquiry  and  reporting  and  writing  articles  on  the  subject; 
and  because  we  come  in  contact  with  the  foremen  and  often 
with  the  men,  going  through  the  mills,  Mr.  Farrell  and  myself, 
and  others  from  time  to  time;  because  we  have  a  standing  rule, 
and  have  had,  that  if  any  of  our  men  in  any  department  are 
dissatisfied  in  any  respect  they  may  come  singly  or  they  may 
come  in  groups,  as  they  may  choose,  to  the  foremen  and  ask 
for  adjustments,  make  complaints,  and  if  necessary  they  may 
come  before  the  president  of  the  company,  or  they  may  come 
to  the  chairman  of  the  Corporation.  Now  then,  sometimes  there 
have  been  complaints  made.  For  instance,  to  mention  a  some- 
what trivial  circumstance,  some  three  or  four  years  ago — not 
to  be  exactly  specific  as  to  date — one  of  our  presidents  tele- 
phoned to  the  president  of  our  Corporation,  who  is  in  general 
charge  of  operations,  that  a  certain  number  of  men — it  may 
have  been  a  thousand  or  it  may  have  been  two  thousand  men — 
in  a  certain  mill  had  all  gone  out,  and   his  report  was  that 

there  was  no  reason  for  their  going  out " 

Senator  Sterling.  "  When  you  speak  of  *  one  of  our  presi- 
dents,' you  mean  the  president  of  a  subsidiary  company  ?  " 

Mr.  Gary.  "  Yes ;  the  president  of  a  subsidiary  company. 
And  he  said,  '  It  is  very  easy  for  me  to  fill  this  mill,  and  I 
will  proceed  to  do  it.'  The  president  of  the  Corporation  came 
to  me  immediately  and  reported  this.  I  said,  '  Tell  him  to  wait 
and  to  come  to  New  York.'  He  came  the  next  morning  and  he 
made  substantially  that  same  statement  to  me.  I  said,  '  Have 
you  taken  pains  to  find  out;  has  anybody  spoken  to  you? '  *  No,' 
he  said,  'I  have  not  received  any  complaint  whatever.'  I  said, 
*  Are  you  sure  no  complaint  has  been  made  to  anj^one  ? '  He 
said,  '  I  will  find  out.'  I  said,  *  You  had  better  do  so  before 
you  decide  what  you  are  going  to  do  or  what  you  propose  to 
do.'  He  went  back;  got  hold  of  the  foreman.  A  committee 
of  men  had  come  to  the  foreman  and  said  that  they  thought 
three  things,  if  I  remember,  were  wrong — not  very  important, 
but  they  claimed  they  were  wrong.     And  the  president  came 


IGNORANCE:  BOLSHEVISM  25 

back  the  second  time  and  reported  that;  and  I  said,  'Well, 
now,  if  they  state  the  facts  there,  isn't  the  company  wrong  ? ' 
'  Well,'  he  said,  '  I  don't  consider  it  very  important.'  I  said, 
*  That  is  not  the  question.  Are  you  wrong  in  any  respect  ?  It 
seems  to  me  you  are  wrong  with  respect  to  two  of  those  things, 
and  the  other  not.  Now,  you  go  right  back  to  your  factory 
and  just  put  up  a  sign  that,  with  reference  to  those  two  par- 
ticular things,  the  practice  will  be  changed.' " 

The  foregoing  revelation  of  Corporation  practice  must  be 
analyzed  from  the  standpoint  of  Mr.  Gary's  machinery  for 
getting  information  about  his  workmen.  Mr.  Gary's  sys- 
tem is;  1)  To  give  instructions  to  the  subsidiary  com- 
pany presidents ;  as  to  whether  the  presidents  carry  out  those 
instructions,  he  "  is  inquiring  into  that."  2.)  He  has  one 
man,  head  of  a  busy  and  complex  department,  who  is  "  more 
or  less  trying  to  ascertain  conditions."  3.)  Public  writers 
write  articles  on  his  steel  works.  4.)  Mr.  Gary  and  Mr. 
Farrell  sometimes  go  through  the  mills  and  "  come  in  con- 
tact with  the  foremen  and  often  with  the  men."  5.)  Mr. 
Gary  knows  his  system  is  adequate  because  of  "  a  standing 
rule  "  that  anybody  in  the  plant  is  privileged  to  come  to  him 
with  complaints.  He  did  not  cite,  nor,  so  far  as  the  Com- 
mission has  been  able  to  ascertain  has  anybody  in  his  office 
cited,  any  example  of  any  workman  or  committees  of  work-' 
men  coming  to  him.  In  short,  it  would  appear  that  he  gets  no 
information  under  "the  standing  rule."  Finally,  he  gives 
in  full  the  circumstances  of  how  he  learned  of  the  desires 
of  one  thousand,  "  it  may  have  been  two  thousand,"  whose 
grievance  was  so  vital  to  themselves  that  they  went  on 
strike. 

That  is,  these  one  thousand,  or  two  thousand,  workmen 
whose  complaint  was  just,  or  two-thirds  just,  according  to 
Mr.  Gary  himself,  after  weeks  or  months  of  effort  to  obtain 
redress,  took  the  desperate  venture  of  quitting  their  jobs. 


26  EEPORT  OX  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

That  they  might  never  get  the  jobs  back  again  was  likely,  as 
the  president  of  the  subsidiary  company  told  Mr.  Gary  that 
he  could  easily  fill  their  places.  The  livelihood  of  more 
than  five  thousand  men,  women  and  children  (if  the  strikers 
numbered  one  thousand)  of  over  ten  thousand  men,  women 
and  children  (if  the  strikers  numbered  two  thousand)  was 
vitally  involved.  Without  redress,  and  without  jobs,  this 
population  would  have  had  to  move  from  their  community, 
perhaps,  and  would  certainly  have  had  to  seek  new  ways 
of  earning  a  living  except  for  Mr.  Gary's  casual  intervention 
in  deciding  to  ask  them  what  they  wanted. 

"Why  it  is  normally  impossible  for  steel  workers  to  get 
their  lesser  grievances  considered  by  officers  in  power  is  con- 
sidered in  another  section  of  this  report.  The  greater  griev- 
ances, concerning  hours  and  wages,  are  admittedly  outside 
the  province  of  the  Corporation's  theoretical  committee  sys- 
tem. In  practice,  grievances  which  drive  workers  out  of  the 
steel  industry  are  effectually  stopped  from  getting  higher 
than  the  first  representative  of  the  company  reachable  by 
the  workers, — the  foreman.  Is  it  not  clear,  therefore,  that 
the  Steel  Corporation  disposes  of  the  work  and  livelihood  of 
its  260,000  employees  without  learning  how  such  disposal 
really   affects   them  ? 

The  Corporation  relies  upon  other  means  of  information 
than  a  system  of  open  and  cooperative  machinery  operating 
within  the  mills.  Mr.  Gary's  testimony  on  this  subject  is 
brief:  (Senate  Testimony,  Volume  I,  Page  177:) 


Senator  Walsh.  "Have  you  a  secret  service  organization 
among  your  employees  at  any  of  the  subsidiary  plants  of  the 
Steel  Corporation  ?  " 

Mr.  Gary.  "  Well,  Senator,  I  cannot  be  very  specific  about 
that,  but  I  am  quite  sure  that  at  times  some  of  our  people  have 
used  secret  service  men  to  ascertain  facts  and  conditions." 


IGNORANCE:  BOLSHEVISM  27 

It  was  not  the  original  intention  of  the  Interchurch  Com- 
mission to  gather  evidence  on  the  widespread  charges  of 
"  company  spy  systems,"  "  industrial  espionage,"  etc.  Steel 
workers  and  their  spokesmen  asserted  that  such  spy  systems 
were  the  ever-present  instruments  resulting  in  an  ever-present 
fear, — some  workers  called  it  "  terrorization," — evident 
among  the  rank  and  file  of  steel  workers.  For  one  thing,  it 
would  have  seemed  impossible  to  get  such  secret  evidence. 
For  another  thing,  the  Commission  doubted  its  importance. 
But  it  became  apparent  that  some  officials  of  some  steel  com- 
panies were  so  accustomed  to  look  upon  their  secret  service 
reports  as  the  basis  on  which  their,  or  any  company's,  labor 
policy  would  have  to  be  formed  that  they  showed  no  hesitancy 
in  producing  information  about  them  from  their  secret  files. 

The  Commission's  investigators,  asking  the  officers  of  a 
company  in  the  Pittsburgh  district  for  information  concern- 
ing their  machinery  for  ascertaining  their  workers'  needs, 
encountered  this:  "Bring  in  the  labor  file."  The  labor 
file,  this  company's  basis  for  a  labor  policy,  consisted  of  the 
secret  service  reports  of  various  detectives  and  of  "labor 
agencies."  Here  were  hundreds  of  misspelled  reports  of 
"  under-cover  men,"  "  operatives  *  X,'  '  Y,'  and  '  Z,"  con- 
tracts for  their  services,  official  letters  exchanged  between 
companies  giving  lists  of  strikers,  commonly  known  as 
"  black  lists."  In  some  instances  original  pencilled  scraps 
of  paper  contained  secret  denunciations  of  workers,  which 
denunciations,  raised  to  the  dignity  of  typed  documents, 
were  then  circulated  to  other  companies  and  even  to  the 
Federal  Department  of  Justice.  The  names  of  independent 
concerns  and  of  subsidiary  companies  of  the  Steel  Corpora- 
tion appear  on  letterheads  showing  how  this  information  or 
misinformation  was  passed  along. 

A  detailed  study  of  this  file  and  of  the  spy  system  is 
given  in  another  section  of  this  report.     It  is  sufficient  to 


28  EEPOET  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

note  here  that  no  small  part  of  the  labor  policy  of  this  com- 
pany was  founded  on  the  inaccurate,  prejudiced  and  usually 
misspelled  reports  of  professional  spies. 

In  Chicago  one  labor  detective  agency  had  operatives  at 
work  during  the  strike  in  the  South  Chicago  district,  where 
a  subsidiary  of  the  Steel  Corporation  and  independents  have 
plants.  This  concern  was  investigated  by  agents  of  the  War 
Department,  its  offices  were  raided  by  the  State's  Attorney 
and  one  of  its  responsible  heads  was  indicted  for  intent  to 
"  kill  and  murder  divers  large  numbers  of  persons  "  and  to 
create  riots.  A  published  statement  that  these  operatives  had 
been  employed  in  behalf  of  the  Steel  Corporation  among 
others  was  put  before  the  President  of  the  Illinois  Steel  Com- 
pany, the  Corporation's  big  Chicago-Gary  subsidiary,  who 
declared  it  untrue.  The  statement  was  put  before  the  head 
of  the  raided  concern  who  declared  that  his  operatives  were 
working  for  the  Illinois  Steel  Co. 

The  Commission  of  Inquiry  had  not  expected  to  ask 
Mr.  Gary  whether  the  head  of  the  United  States  Steel  Cor- 
poration made  use  of  such  detectives'  reports.  However, 
one  such  report,  received  by  Mr.  Gary,  was  produced  by  him. 
This  document  dealt  with  the  present  investigation  of  the 
steel  strike,  the  activities  of  the  Interchurch  World  Move- 
ment and  its  Commission  of  Inquiry.  The  same  curious  il- 
literacy, characteristic  of  the  labors  of  these  "  under-cover 
men,"  characterized  the  "  report "  on  the  Commission  of 
Inquiry.  Mr.  Gary  made  this  document  the  primary  sub- 
ject of  discussion  when  conferring  with  a  committee  of  Com- 
missioners whose  business  with  him  was  nothing  less  than  a 
plan  of  mediation  designed  to  end  the  whole  strike.^ 

*  That  is,  the  committee  men  representing  the  Interchurch  Commis- 
sion visiting  Mr.  Gary  by  appointment  were  first  asked  by  Mr.  Gary's 
secretary  if  they  had  seen  the  secret  document  which  he  handed  them. 
They  replied  that  they  had. 

Mr.  Gary's  secretary  expressed  surprise  and  he  wondered  "  where  it 
had  come  from." 

A  Conunissioner  noted  that  "  The  report  is  anonymous."     The  sec- 


IGNOKANCE:  BOLSHEVISM  29 

It  is  undeniable  that  labor  policies  in  the  steel  industry 
rest  in  considerable  part  on  the  reports  of  "  under-cover 
men "  paid  directly  by  the  steel  companies  or  hired  from 
concerns  popularly  known  as  "  strike  busters."  The  "  opera- 
tives "  make  money  by  detecting  "  unionism  "  one  day  and 
"  Bolshevism  "  the  next.  The  importance  of  the  espionage 
system  as  revealed  by  this  evidence  lies  in  the  light  it  sheds 
on  the  atmosphere  of  war  normal  to  the  steel  industry,  and 
this  atmosphere  is  due  to  the  dominant  policy  of  preventing 
organization  among  the  workers,  even  organization  for  above- 
board  study  of  the  men's  conditions  of  labor  and  thought. 
This  state  of  latent  warfare  is  now  so  customary  that  the 
highest  company  officers  can  consider  it  a  matter  of  routine, 
consonant  with  their  practice  and  dignity,  to  examine  with 
judicial  solemnity  the  reports  of  anonymous  spies. 

For  the  country  at  large,  the  source  of  information  about 
conditions  in  the  steel  industry  and  the  progress  of  the  strike, 
was,  of  course,  principally  the  press.  The  wide  discrepan- 
cies between  the  facts  now  disclosed  and  most  of  the  press 
reports  at  the  time  are  the  subject  of  exhaustive  analysis 
elsewhere.  The  findings  are  that  most  newspapers,  tradition- 
ally hesitant  in  reporting  industrial  matters,  failed  notably 
to  acquaint  the  public  with  the  facts,  failed  to  take  steps 
necessary  to  ascertain  the  facts,  failed  finally  to  publish 
adequately  what  was  brought  out  by  the  brief  investigation  of 
the  U.  S.  Senate  committee.^ 

Within  the  steel  communities  themselves  the  facts  about 
the  organization  of  the  steel  industry  are  not  known.  Even 
in  the  case  of  the  American  workers,  the  conditions  of  their 

retary  agreed  that  "the  copy  which  they  had  was  also  anonymous  and 
they  had  no  idea  where  it  came  from." 

Then  the  whole  matter  of  the  weighty  business  in  hand  had  to  wait 
while  Mr.  Gary  read  excerpts  of  the  "  anonymous "  report  and  cross- 
examined  the  Commissioners  as  to  whether  the  persons  named  in  the 
report  were  Bolshevists  or  I.W.W.'s  or  some  other  kind  of  radical. 
(The  secret  report  is  analyzed  elsewhere.) 

1  A  notable  exception  to  the  general  rule  was  shown  by  a  series  of 
articles  during  the  strike  carried  by  the  New  York  World. 


30  EEPOHT  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

jobs,  their  hours,  rates  of  pay,  methods  of  promotion  and 
attitude  to  the  companies  are  not  common  knowledge.  Even 
in  normal  times  it  is  difficult  to  get  American  skilled  steel 
workers  to  discuss  their  jobs.  These  men  say  when  pinned 
down,  "How  do  I  know  who  you  are?  Even  in  the  mill 
I  can't  talk  about  conditions.  If  I  talk,  I  may  find  myself 
transferred  to  a  worse  job  or  laid  off.    I  can't  afford  to  talk." 

In  the  case  of  the  "  foreigner,"  the  facts  lie  behind  the 
further  screen  of  physical  and  mental  segregation.  The 
unskilled  foreign-language  steel  workers  congregate  in  com- 
munities of  their  own.  In  the  narrow  valleys  of  the  great 
Pittsburgh  and  Mahoning  Valley  districts,  they  are  for  the 
most  part  crammed  into  old  houses  and  tenements  fringing 
the  great  plants.  The  worker's  life  is  to  hurry  from  his 
segregated  home  to  the  plant  and  then  hurry  back  and 
sleep.  Not  even  on  street  cars  is  there  much  communication 
between  the  "  foreigner  "  and  the  ordinary  American  citizen. 

Within  these  bounds  of  physical  segregation  there  are 
twenty  or  thirty  distinct  mental  worlds,  belonging  to  as  many 
different  races.  What  influences  move  those  worlds  is  an  un- 
answered question  to  most  good  Americans  and  for  the 
most  part  an  unasked  question.  To  this  lack  of  understand- 
ing and  sympathy  much  of  our  popular  distrust  of  the 
"  foreigners "  can  be  traced.  Physically  powerful  men, 
with  dark  or  dirty  faces,  with  heavy  brows  or  long  mus- 
taches, in  whose  former  home  lands  strange  political  events 
are  going  on,  these  men  are  feared  because  nothing  is  known 
about  them.  A  few  years  ago  East  Youngstown,  the  dis- 
trict's "  hunkie  "  town,  was  a  scene  of  riot  and  wholesale 
burning  during  a  strike.  But  what  caused  that  strike  and 
what  moved  those  "  foreigners  "  to  violent  outbreak  are  still 
unknown  to  the  good  Americans  who  live  on  the  hill  tops. 

The  employment  managers,  welfare  workers  and  other 
mill  officials  who  try  to  make  it  their  business  to  know  at 


IGNORANCE:  BOLSHEVISM  31 

least  a  little  something  of  what  is  going  on  in  the  "  foreign- 
er's "  head,  say  frankly  that  they  cannot  follow  hira,  they 
cannot  speak  his  twenty  or  thirty  languages  nor  break  down 
his  suspicion  of  "  bosses." 

The  situation,  then,  during  the  strike,  and  existent  now, 
is  that  the  fundamental  facts  about  the  steel  industry  and 
especially  about  the  masses  of  unskilled  foreign  workmen 
are  not  known  and  that  this  ignorance  breeds  a  public  fear 
akin  to   panic. 

"  Bolshevism  "  : 

The  second  preliminary  phase  of  the  report  concerns  the 
charge,  widely  current,  that  the  strike  was  a  product  of 
Bolshevism.  The  evidence,  from  steel  company  officials, 
strike  committee  records,  local  and  national  governmental 
cfBcers  and  from  observations  by  the  Commission  and  its  in- 
vestigators is  completely  adequate  for  forming  a  judgment. 

A  stranger  in  America  reading  the  newspapers  during  the 
strike  and  talking  with  steel  masters  both  in  and  out  of 
steel  communities  must  have  concluded  that  the  strike  repre- 
sented a  serious  outbreak  of  Bolshevism  red  hot  from  Rus- 
sia. The  chief  memory  that  American  citizens  themselves 
may  have  a  few  years  from  now  may  well  be  that  the  strike 
was  largely  the  work  of  Reds.  "  '  Reds '  hack  of  the  Steel 
Strike  "  was  a  frequent  headline  in  September.  As  late  as 
January  4,  1920,  an  article  in  The  New  York  Times  con- 
tained the  following: 

"  Radical  leaders  planned  to  develop  the  recent  steel  and  coal 
strike  into  a  general  strike  and  ultimately  into  a  revolution  to 
overthrow  the  government,  according  to  information  gathered 
by  federal  agents  in  Friday  night's  wholesale  round-up  of  mem- 
bers of  the  Communist  parties.  These  data,  officials  said,  tended 
to  prove  that  the  nation-wide  raids  had  blasted  the  most  men- 
acing revolutionary  plot  yet  unearthed." 


32  EEPORT  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

Data  on  the  strike  as  a  Bolshevist  manifestation  were 
analyzed  with  the  following  questions  in  mind: 

1.  Who  started  this  explanation? 

2.  Why  was  it  offered  ? 

3.  Was  there  Bolshevism  in  the  strike?     Was  there  radi- 
calism ? 

The  allegation  was  not  offered  by  the  strikers  nor  by  the 
government.  It  was  traced  chiefly  to  two  sources:  first,  the 
newspapers ;  and  these  led  to  the  second  and  main  source,  the 
steel  companies. 

The  following  efforts,  among  others,  were  made  to  obtain 
from  oflScials  of  the  steel  companies  their  evidence. 

First,  the  commission  addressed  to  Mr.  Gary,  after  long 
discussions  with  him  personally  and  after  considering  particu- 
larly his  statements  that  men  still  out  were  "  Bolsheviki,"  a 
letter  which  formally  asked  him  to  furnish  the  evidence  on 
which  he  based  that  judgment.  The  Commission  at  the  time 
felt  confident  that  Mr.  Gary  could  furnish  considerable  evi- 
dence and  that  any  discussion  would  turn  on  whether  or  not 
the  evidence  he  produced  proved  the  case.  But  Mr.  Gary 
produced  nothing. 

Second,  Mr.  H.  D.  Williams,  President  of  the  Carnegie 
Steel  Company,  the  largest  subsidiary  corporation,  when  asked 
for  the  evidence  referred  the  Commission  to  "  Margolis'  testi- 
mony before  the  Senate  Committee."  When  told  that  the 
Margolis  testimony  established  no  connection  between  Bol- 
shevism and  the  leaders  of  the  strike,  Mr.  Williams  expressed 
surprise.  He  admitted  that  he  had  not  read  the  transcript 
of  the  testimony  but  was  sure,  however,  that  the  newspapers 
had  said  so.  Anyway,  he  said,  there  were  many  other  things 
that  could  be  produced  to  prove  the  point.  Eleven  subse- 
quent calls  for  this  evidence  were  made  on  Mr.  Williams' 
office  but  without  result. 


IGNOEANCE:  BOLSHEVISM  33 

Third,  the  Commission's  desire  for  evidence  on  this  point 
was  explained  to  Mr.  E.  J.  Buffington,  President  of  the  Illi- 
nois Steel  Company,  and  he  was  asked  for  the  facts  on  which 
he  endorsed  Mr.  Gary's  Bolshevist  theory  of  the  strike.  He 
expressed  wonder  at  the  Commission's  inability  to  find  such 
proofs.  He  did  produce  a  photograph  of  a  poster,  saying, 
"  Look  at  that."  The  poster  consisted  of  photographs  of 
strike  scenes,  showing  among  other  things  the  dead  body  of  a 
union  organizer,  Mrs.  Fanny  Sellins.  This  poster  was  signed 
by  A.  F.  of  L.  officials  and  was  headed  "  Abolish  Garyism." 
When  doubt  was  expressed  as  to  the  conclusiveness  of  this 
exhibit  as  proving  the  Bolshevist  origin  of  the  strike,  Mr. 
Buffington  was  certain  that  he  had  seen  other  "  evidence," 
but  he  produced  none. 

Of  the  many  interviewed,  no  steel  company  official  pre- 
sented to  the  Commission  any  evidence  of  Bolshevism.  In 
declaring  on  December  5  that  the  workmen  who  "  followed 
the  leadership  of  Fitzpatrick  and  Foster  were  Bolsheviki," 
Mr.  Gary  insisted  to  the  Commission  that  the  strike  aims  were 
"  the  closed  shop,  Soviets  and  the  forcible  distribution  of 
property."  Mr.  Gary  warned  the  Commissioners  to  remem- 
ber that  any  statement  that  they  might  make  about  the  U.  S. 
Steel  Corporation  and  the  strike  should  be  "  gravely  con- 
sidered "  inasmuch  as  "  the  foundations  of  the  United  States 
Government  were  involved." 

Mr.  Buffington,  in  supporting  Mr.  Gary's  position,  said : 
"  The  organizers  were  all  subversive.  They  said  things  to 
make  the  labor  forces  want  more  than  fair  wages ;  made  'em 
want  to  share  the  profits." 

Mr.  Gary  was  finally  asked  in  the  course  of  one  of  these 
discussions  if  he  did  not  ireally  mean  that  "  labor  was 
getting  too  strong."     To  this  he  gave  general  assent. 

In  addition  to  the  efforts  above  cited,  the  Commission  care- 
fully examined  the  organization  of  the  strike,  and  the  union 


34  REPORT  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

literature,  listened  to  speakers,  consulted  Federal  and  State 
officials,  and  in  every  way  sought  to  get  at  the  bottom  of  the 
Bolshevist  theory.  The  line  of  inquiry  included  such  ques- 
tions as:  What  induced  the  nevt^spapers  in  many  states  in 
the  first  week  after  September  22  to  print  on  their  front 
pages  extensive  extracts  of  a  pamphlet  called  "  Syndicalism  " 
by  Wm.  Z.  Foster  ?  Why  was  "  radicalism  "  charged  ?  Were 
ideas  of  political  radicalism  as  inextricably  mixed  with  ideas 
of  industrial  radicalism  in  the  actual  situation  as  they  were 
in  the  published  charges?  Was  there  industrial  radicalism, 
that  is,  ulterior  strike  aims  for  something  beyond  orthodox 
trade  union  demands  on  hours,  wages,  conditions  and  organi- 
zation ? 

The  first  facts  persistently  brought  up  were :  Mr.  William 
Z.  Foster,  Secretary-Treasurer  of  the  National  Committee  for 
Organizing  Iron  and  Steel  Workers,  and  his  "  Eed  Book," 
the  above  mentioned  tract  on  "  Syndicalism."  The  two  must 
be  separated.  The  "  Red  Book's "  actual  relation  to  the 
strike  is  undisputed.  No  copy  of  the  original  book,  out  of 
print  for  several  years,  was  found  in  possession  of  any  striker 
or  strike  leader.  A  reprint,  which  was  a  fac-simile  in  every- 
thing except  the  price  mark  and  the  union  label,  was  widely 
circulated  from  the  middle  of  September  on  by  officials  of  the 
steel  companies.  The  absence  of  the  union  label  indicated 
that  the  reprint  was  not  in  behalf  of  any  labor  organization. 
What  organization  bore  this  expense  of  reproducing  the  book 
was  not  investigated.  There  was  no  need  to  investigate  who 
distributed  it.  Steel  company  officials  openly  supplied  it  to 
newspapers,  to  preachers  and  investigators.  In  McKeesport, 
for  example,  it  was  mailed  to  all  the  pastors  in  the  city  who 
were  then  summoned  to  a  meeting  with  the  Mayor,  attended 
also  by  representatives  of  the  Sheriff,  the  State  Constabulary 
and  the  Steel  Corporation.  The  representative  of  the  Steel 
Corporation,  who  was  the  Superintendent  of  the  local  Cor- 


IGNORANCE:  BOLSHEVISM  35 

poration  plant,  came  well  supplied  with  '^  Red  Books  "  and 
read  extracts.  In  cities  like  New  York  and  Boston,  far 
from  the  strike  areas,  newspapers  carried  extracts  from  the 
book  as  the  principal  news  of  the  beginning  of  the  strike. 
The  book's  relation  to  the  strike,  therefore,  was  in  no  sense 
causative ;  it  was  injected  as  a  means  of  breaking  the  strike. 
Mr.  Foster,  however,  was  a  causative  factor  in  the  strike. 
Attempts  to  raise  the  question,  "  Was  Mr.  Foster  really 
sincere  in  recanting  Syndicalism,"  inevitably  raised  the  other 
question,  "  Was  Mr.  Gary  really  sincere  in  charging  Bolshe- 
vism." It  seemed  best  to  leave  such  analysis  to  speculative 
psychologists.  Instead  the  test  of  Mr.  Foster's  acts  was 
applied  to  Mr.  Foster's  mind.  In  two  other  sections  of  the 
report  this  analysis  is  made,  based  on  full  examination  of 
the  private  official  records  involved  and  on  reports  of  first 
hand  observers  both  of  the  strike  and  of  the  organizing  cam- 
paign. Only  the  conclusions  need  be  set  down  here  and 
these  are — 

That  the  control  of  the  movement  to  organize  the  steel  in- 
dustry, vested  in  twenty-four  A.  F.  of  L.  trade  unions, 
was  such  that  Mr.  Foster's  acts  were  perforce  in  har- 
mony with  old  line  unionism. 

That  Mr.  Foster  "  haraioniously "  combated  the  natural 
tendency  of  sections  of  the  rank  and  file  toward  in- 
dustrial unionism. 

That  a  mass  movement  involving  300,000  workers  and  twenty- 
four  national  unions  cannot  be  controlled  to  secret, 
opposite  ends. 

The  organizing  plan  was  the  same  and  was  directed  by 
the  same  two  men  as  that  of  the  stock  yards  employees  in 
1918.  That  campaign  was  carried  through  to  recognition 
of  the  unions  without  anyone  calling  it  Bolshevism.      The 


36  KEPOET  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

plan  rejected  the  opportunity  to  organize  along  the  line  com- 
monly called  the  One  Big  Union.  From  the  standpoint  of 
the  Industrial  Workers  of  the  World  and  the  other  One 
Big  Unionists,  no  group  ever  had  such  an  opportunity  to 
establish  the  new  kind  of  organization  as  did  the  National 
Committee  for  Organizing  Iron  and  Steel  Workers.  I.  W. 
W.s  throughout  the  campaign  spoke  with  contempt  of  the 
Committee's  plan  of  splitting  up  each  batch  of  union  re- 
cruits into  twenty-four  separate  craft  unions.  Despite  the 
fact  that  most  professed  industrial  revolutionaries  "  favor  " 
all  strikes  there  is  evidence  as  to  their  indifference  or  active 
opposition  to  this  one.  When  Mr.  Foster's  organization  was 
having  hard  sledding  in  organizing  Youngstown,  Ohio, 
Eugene  V.  Debs  visited  the  district  and  began  severely  criticis- 
ing the  whole  plan  in  public  speeches.  It  was  necessary  to 
send  a  committee  to  Debs  before  he  could  be  indued  to  drop 
the  subject.  In  the  Pittsburgh  District,  I.  W.  W.s  tried  to 
break  the  strike  a  few  days  after  it  had  been  started  by 
circularizing  the  mills  with  leaflets  declaring  that  the  old 
A.  F.  of  L.  plan  would  fail  and  that  the  A.  F.  of  L.  would 
not  support  the  strike. 

As  to  literature:  the  official  strike  pronouncements  and 
leaflets  were  confined  to  orthodox  texts.  Investigators  saw 
one  bunch  of  Communist  leaflets  but  these  had  been  con- 
fiscated by  strike  leaders  who  had  thrown  the  distributor  out 
of  a  hall  into  which  he  had  wormed  his  way.  Mr.  Foster 
refused  to  allow  in  an  official  strike  bulletin  even  the  mild 
advice  that  laboring  men  should  join  a  labor  party,  until  the 
chairman  of  the  National  Committee,  John  Fitzpatrick  him- 
self, ordered  it  put  in.  One  of  the  leaflets  ended  with  the 
supposedly  poetical  quotation :  "  Forward  to  bleed  and  die !  " 
The  Committee's  translator  rendered  this  into  Polish  to 
read,  "  Forward  to  wade  through  blood !  "  The  Polish 
leaflets  were  returned  by  local  Polish  organizers  with  this 


IGNORANCE:  BOLSHEVISM         87 

objection, — "  My  people  are  all  good  Catholics.  They  won't 
stand  for  advice  like  that." 

As  to  national  organizers:  there  were  socialists  among 
them  but  the  most  were  old  organization  standard  bearers  of 
the  A.  F.  of  L.  Moreover  in  the  Pennsylvania  district  the 
meetings  were  few,  police  were  on  the  platform  and  the 
power  of  the  organizers  was  greatly  lessened.  Most  organizers 
were  overworked  and  preoccupied  with  details.  These  A.  F. 
of  L.  veterans  could  not  get  over  their  surprise  at  being  de- 
nounced as  Bolshevists. 

As  to  local  leaders :  these  generally  followed  the  ideas  and 
methods  of  the  National  Committee  but  were  less  considerate 
of  A.  F.  of  L.  doctrine  and  more  influenced  by  the  feeling  of 
the  rank  and  file.  Finding  that  organization  by  shops,  de- 
partments and  plants  was  often  the  most  natural  to  their 
inexperienced  fellow- workers,  they  followed  that  plan  even 
though  the  result  was  industrial  unionism  in  miniature. 
They  had  no  labor  reputations  to  preserve  against  charges  of 
Bolshevism.  They  used  as  assistants  the  boldest  and  most 
energetic  spirits  and  these  were  frequently  readers  of  the 
only  sort  of  labor  papers  customarily  circulating  among  un- 
organized workers,  that  is,  socialist  and  I.  W.  W.  papers. 
The  local  leaders'  talk  ran  more  freely  to  downright  terms  and 
to  soaring  speculation  about  "  sharing  in  industrial  control." 
Their  sole  object  was  to  win  the  strike.  They  expected  to 
have  "  public  opinion "  against  them  anyway  and  so  they 
cared  less  about  exhibiting  to  the  public  a  conventionally 
conservative  front.  They  looked  to  their  followers,  men 
speaking  thirty  different  dialects,  and  did  not  mind  if  some  of 
the  followers  imbibed  ambitious  ideas  about  "  ending  the 
rule  of  the  bosses."  But  it  took  very  few  repetitions  of  these 
ambitions,  in  broken  English,  to  the  mill  bosses  to  spread  the 
fear  that  the  "  foreigners  "  had  revolutionary  intentions. 

The  investigators   searching  for  political  revolutionaries 


38  EEPORT  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

among  the  leaders  or  even  the  great  rank  and  file  became 
convinced,  from  the  attitude  taken  by  local,  state,  federal 
and  array  officials,  that  if  such  revolutionaries  existed  the 
authorities  would  surely  find  them. 

No  leaders  of  the  strike  were  convicted  of  "  radicalism  " 
in  court.  Hundreds  of  strikers  were  rounded  up  in  "  radical 
raids,"  but  none  tried  and  convicted.  In  McKeesport  in  one 
raid  79  workmen  were  taken,  three  were  detained  and  one  on 
final  examination  was  held  by  the  Federal  authorities. 
Federal  officers  testified  that  the  denunciations  which  had 
led  to  these  arrests  were  made  by  plant  detectives  or  "  under- 
cover men  "  of  the  steel  companies,  many  of  them  sworn  in 
as  sheriff's  deputies  during  the  strike.  In  the  Pittsburgh 
District  raids  and  arrests  for  Bolshevism  were  made  on  the 
sole  complaint  of  company  "  under-cover  men."  Meetings 
were  broken  up  but  most  of  those  arrested  were  released. 
The  testimony  of  Federal  authorities  in  two  districts  in 
December  was  that  after  the  raiding  and  arresting  at  the 
instigation  of  company  "  under-cover  men,"  no  striker  had 
been  held  by  the  Federal  authorities  on  any  charge  of  radical 
agitation  in  the  strike. 

In  the  Gary  district  in  October  out  of  16,000  strikers, 
seven  immigrants  were  turned  over  for  deportation  by  the 
military  officers  whose  agents  had  been  working  in  Gary 
since  May,  1919.  In  February,  1920,  these  seven  had  still 
not  been  ordered  deported.  None  of  these  was  arrested  on 
charges  of  radical  agitation  during  the  strike  but  for  being 
members  of  organizations,  such  as  the  I.  W.  W.  and  various 
Russian  societies  or  for  professing  Communist  beliefs.  That 
is,  the  arrests  might  have  been  made,  so  far  as  the  charges 
were  concerned,  at  any  time  irrespective  of  the  strike.  In 
view  of  the  undoubted  efforts  by  various  organizations  to 
spread  political  or  industrial  revolutionary  teachings  in 
America,  it  seemed  probable  that  some  of  the  workers,  if  not 


IGNORAN^CE:  BOLSHEVISM  39 

the  leaders,  among  300,000  strikers  would  utilize  the  strike 
as  a  platform  for  organizing  agitation  of  their  views.  De- 
spite this,  no  records  of  conviction  through  legal  process  on 
charges  of  such  agitation  were  discovered  by  investigators. 
(The  charges  on  which  many  hundreds  of  arrests  were  made 
are  considered  elsewhere.) 

Were  there  any  radicals  in  the  sense  of  rebels  against  their 
present  way  of  life?  The  steel  industry  was  full  of  them. 
They  wanted  big  changes.  But  the  changes  were  all  related 
definitely  to  the  right  to  organize,  the  twelve-hour  day,  the 
seven  day  week,  the  foremen's  ways,  the  company's  methods, 
or  some  other  definite  thing  which  they  were  sick  of.  It  is 
possible  that  the  workers  throughout  the  whole  steel  industry 
might  much  more  easily  have  been  organized  on  a  radical 
appeal.  But  the  Strike  Committee  were  opposed  in  prin- 
ciple to  any  such  appeal.  After  the  first  three  months  of  the 
strike  when  the  nerves  of  strikers  and  leaders  were  worn  by 
the  struggle,  Mr.  Foster  was  constantly  complaining  of  fight- 
ing the  "  radicals,"  meaning  those  who  wanted  to  have  a 
general  strike  called  or  the  whole  strike  called  off  in  order  to 
be  called  on  again  and  again  and  again.  But  that  kind  of 
"  radical  "  still  was  concerned  only  with  steel  matters,  not 
with  social  or  political  programs. 

The  upshot  of  the  matter  is  this:  the  methods  of  organi- 
zation used  in  the  steel  strike  were  old  fashioned  and  became 
ostentatiously  so  as  the  organizers  recognized  the  radical 
possibilities  of  the  strike  and  conscientiously  believed  that 
anything  other  than  tried  trade  unionism  would  be  bad  for 
the  steel  workers  in  their  newly  organized  state.  The  cry 
of  Bolshevism  was  not  only  a  fraud  on  the  public ;  it  was  a 
dangerous  thing  because  it  advertised  to  the  mass  of  immi- 
grant steel  workers,  who  went  down  to  defeat  under  old  flags 
and  old  slogans,  an  idea  and  untried  methods  under  which 
they  might  be  tempted  to  make  another  battle.     It  roused  in 


40  EEPOET  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

tlie  minds  of  hundreds  of  thousands  who  know  best  that  they 
are  not  Bolsheviki  a  distrust,  which  abides,  and  a  suspicion  of 
government  agencies  and  of  American  public  opinion  which 
seemed  to  lend  themselves  to  a  campaign  of  misrepresentation. 

The  evidence  justifies  the  following  observation  of  general 
significance:  I^ot  one  new  development  of  major  importance 
was  discovered  in  this  strike.  That  is,  in  the  light  of  indus- 
trial history  there  was  nothing  in  the  strike  which  deserves 
to  be  called  industrially  new,  or  revolutionary. 

It  was  an  old-fashioned  strike,  preceded  by  a  slightly  new 
mechanical  quirk  in  organizing.  It  ran  on  rather  unusually 
old-fashioned  lines,  especially  in  comparison  with  such  up- 
heavals as  the  coal  strike,  the  printers'  strike,  the  clothing 
strikes  of  recent  years  and  the  recent  aims  of  railroad  labor 
organizations.  The  steel  strike  had  old  style  methods  and 
aims,  it  was  attended  by  the  usual  futile  governmental  at- 
tempt to  avert  and  futile  Senatorial  effort  to  investigate.  By 
the  end  of  the  year  it  was  evident  that  the  strikers  were 
getting  an  old-fashioned  licking.  There  was  the  usual  crip- 
pling of  industry,  threatening  to  hang  over  into  the  months 
after  the  strike  was  called  off. 

As  the  strike  ended  there  was  in  steel  master  circles  the 
usual  after-strike  feeling  "  that  something  would  have  to  be 
done."  The  word  was  "  the  Corporation  is  going  to  do  some- 
thing." The  Corporation  in  January  raised  wages  10  per 
cent.  "  Independent "  small  concerns  began  trying  to  put  in 
the  eight-hour  day.  The  feeling  was  general  that  the  eight- 
hour  day  and  collective  bargaining  could  not  be  staved  off 
forever.  Corporation  subsidiaries  announced  more  extensive 
welfare  work,  company  stores,  etc.  The  latter  weeks  of  the 
strike  saw  Mr.  Gary  expressing  to  public-spirited  inquirers  his 
open-minded  desire  "  to  consider  any  well  thought  out  plan 
which  anyone  can  suggest "  for  bettering  conditions  in  the 
steel  mills.     (Another  section  of  this  report  considers  what 


IGNOEANCE :  BOLSHEVISM  41 

soundness  there  may  be  in  any  attitude  of  looking  outside  the 
industry  for  "  any  well  thought  out  plan.") 

That  the  whole  strike  seemed  extraordinarily  old-fashioned 
to  observers  in  England  is  evident  from  even  a  hasty  examina- 
tion of  such  conservative  papers  as  the  London  Times 
(October  28,  1919) : 

"  The  steel  workers'  strike,  which  is  the  rock  upon  which 
the  Industrial  Conference  split,  turns  on  the  question  of  recog- 
nizing unions,  an  issue  which  has  gone  into  the  Umbo  of  almost 
forgotten  things  here,  as  between  employers  and  employed.  .  .  . 
The  employers  in  America  have  evidently  something  to  learn 
in  these  matters.  They  have  been  apt  to  compare  with  some 
complacency  their  own  relations  with  labor  to  those  existing 
in  this  country  and  to  attribute  their  comparative  immunity 
from  labor  troubles  to  the  superior  atmosphere  of  the  United 
States  or  to  their  own  superior  management.  It  is  really  due 
to  the  simple  fact  that  the  Labor  Movement  in  the  United 
States  is  historically  a  good  many  years  behind  our  own.  But 
it  will  infallibly  tread  the  same  broad  course  with  certain  dif- 
ferences determined  by  local  conditions,  and  to  resist  the  in- 
evitable is  a  great  mistake.  There  are  many  different  elements 
present  in  the  States,  and  a  far  greater  tendency  to  violence 
is  one  of  them.'* 

Not  only  the  issues  but  the  attendant  circumstances  of  the 
steel  strike  seem  antique.  A  hundred  cases  could  be  cited. 
The  famous  "  Dorchester  Laborers'  case  "  which  happened  in 
1833,  was  also  a  first  attempt  at  organizing  common  labor, 
that  time  on  the  farm.  Farm  hands  at  Tolpuddle,  a  tiny 
English  village,  faced  with  a  cut  in  wages  from  8  shillings 
to  6  shillings  a  week  went  to  the  magistrate  who  interpreted 
to  them  the  noted  "  law  of  supply  and  demand."  "  We  were 
told,"  writes  their  leader,  the  Methodist  lay  preacher,  Love- 
less, "  that  we  must  work  for  what  our  employers  saw  fit  to 
give  as  there  was  no  law  to  compel  masters  to  give  a  fixed 


42  REPORT  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

sum."  Then  the  farm  hands  heard  of  trade  societies  in  the 
nearby  towns  and  they  were  visited  by  two  delegates  or  "  out- 
side agitators,"  who  formed  a  Friendly  Society  among  them 
and  "  instructed  them  how  to  proceed."  Among  the  instruc- 
tions were  the  directions  for  a  secret  oath.  The  union's  con- 
stitution read :  "  That  the  object  of  this  society  can  never  be 
promoted  by  any  act  of  violence,  but  on  the  contrary,  all  such 
proceedings  must  tend  to  injure  and  destroy  the  society  it- 
self." Within  four  months,  six  of  the  leading  members  were 
arrested  as  "  evil  disposed  persons  "  and  thrown  into  jail. 

Since  the  law  against  unionization  had  been  repealed  in 
1824  it  was  necessary  to  discover  some  other  under  which 
these  men  could  be  tried.  An  old  statute  intended  for  the 
suppression  of  seditious  societies  was  specially  invoked  and 
the  six  persons,  after  a  brief  trial,  were  sentenced  to  seven 
years'  transportation  to  Botany  Bay,  for  the  crime  of  having 
administered  an  oath. 

This  law,  Daniel  O'Connell  said,  "  has  only  been  raked  up 
to  inflict  an  enormous  punishment  on  unfortunate  men  who 
were  wholly  ignorant  of  its  existence  and  innocent  of  any 
moral  offence."  But  the  London  Times  of  that  age  declared 
that  "  The  real  gravamen  of  their  guilt  was  their  forming  a 
dangerous  union  to  force  up,  by  various  modes  of  intimida- 
tion and  restraint,  the  rate  of  laborers'  wages."  Other 
spokesmen  of  public  opinion  agreed  on  the  need  for  rigorous 
action  against  "  that  criminal  and  fearful  spirit  of  combina- 
tion." A  wave  of  panic  swept  the  country;  Lord  Howick 
tried  to  prove  in  Parliament  that  these  laborers,  who  worked 
all  day,  knew  they  were  doing  wrong  for  "  did  they  not  hold 
their  meetings  at  night? '^  The  first  great  procession  of  in- 
dustrial protest  ever  formed  in  England  marched  through 
London  to  present  a  petition  which  the  government  refused 
to  receive. 

In  western  Pennsylvania  in  1919  steel  workers  were  tried 


IGNORANCE:  BOLSHEVISM  43 

and  fined  in  cases  "where  the  major  allegation  was  "  smiling 
at  the  State  police." 

In  his  testimony  before  the  Senate  Mr.  Gary,  discussing 
the  cause  of  the  strike,  specifies  "  intimidation  "  on  pp.  151, 
153,  164,  174,  201,  et  al. 

In  the  course  of  the  strike  deputations  of  workers  sought 
the  government  with  petitions.  Attorney  General  Palmer, 
they  considered,  gave  them  the  government's  only  answer  in 
his  letter,  published  on  November  26,  commending  a  patriotic 
society's  efforts  to  run  labor  "  agitators  "  out  of  Pennsyl- 
vania. "  It  is  a  pity,"  the  Attorney  General  wrote,  "  that 
more  patriotic  organizations  do  not  take  action  similar  to 
that  of  your  order." 

Altogether,  analysis  of  all  data  seems  to  make  it  more 
profitable  to  consider  the  steel  strike  of  1919  in  the  light  of 
one  hundred  years'  industrial  history  than  in  the  glare  of 
baseless  excitement  over  Bolshevism. 


Ill 

THE  TWELVE-HOUE  DAY  IN  A  NO-CONFERE:N'aE 
INDUSTRY 

Analysis  of  the  data  gathered  in  this  inquiry  proves  that 
a  prime  fact  in  the  organization  of  the  steel  industry  and 
a  prime  fact  in  explaining  the  strike  may  he  formulated  as 
follows : 

Approximately  half  of  the  employees  in  iron  and  steel  manu- 
facturing plants  are  subjected  to  the  schedule  known  as 
the  twelve-hour  day  (that  is  a  working  day  from  11  to 
14  hours  long). 

Less  than  one-quarter  of  the  industry's  employees  can  work 
under  60  hours  a  week  "  although  in  most  industries 
60  hours  was  regarded  as  the  maximum  working 
week  "  ^  ten  years  ago. 

In  the  past  decade  the  U.  S.  Steel  Corporation  has  increased 
the  percentage  of  its  employees  subject  to  the  twelve- 
hour  day. 

The  mass  of  unskilled  and  semi-skilled  workmen,  mostly 
"  foreigners,"  in  the  twelve-hour  day  class  were  the  backbone 
of  the  strike. 

The  relation  of  a  prevailing  schedule  of  excessive  hours 
to  the  facts  that  no  means  of  conference  affecting  hours  and 
wages,  or  collective  bargaining  exist  in  the  plants  of  the  Steel 
Corporation,  and  that  the  Corporation's  workmen  hitherto 

* "  Conditions  of  Employment  in  Iron  and  Steel  Industry,"  Senate 
Document  110,  Vol,  I,  p.  xlii  { 1910) .  At  that  time  14.39  per  cent,  of  all 
steel  employees  worked  less  than  60  hours. 

44 


THE  TWELVE-HOUR  DAY  45 

were  unorganized,  is  analyzed  in  Section  V  of  this  Report, 
on  "  Control  in  a  No-Conference  Industry." 

What  is  true  of  the  Corporation's  hours  and  wages  is 
mainly  true  of  the  industry  of  which  it  constitutes  the  domi- 
nating half. 

Consideration  of  hours  is  inseparable  from  wages ;  the  next 
section  determines  what  proportion  of  the  twelve-hour  day 
men  fall  in  the  following  class: 

The  high  percentage  of  steel  workers  whose  earnings,  despite 
their  long  hours,  fall  from  5  to  25  per  cent,  below  the 
lowest  level  which  Government  experts  have  been  will- 
ing to  call  an  "  American  standard  of  living "  for  an 
average  family. 

It  must  be  clearly  noted  that  the  twelve-hour  day  schedules 
are  compulsory.  The  Steel  Corporation's  "  basic  eight-hour 
day  "  is  a  method  of  paying  wages  and  in  no  way  concerns 
hours.  The  twelve-hour  day  workman  cannot  knock  off  at  the 
end  of  eight  hours,  if  he  wants  to  retain  his  employment. 
Neither  can  he  escape  the  eighteen-hour  or  twenty-four  hour 
"  turn,"  usually  every  fortnight,  which  goes  with  most  of 
the  twelve-hour  day  schedules.  He  can  "  take  it  or  leave  it  " 
but  he  cannot  bargain  over  his  job's  hours. 

The  present  analysis  deals  with  the  length  of  hours  in 
the  industry  and  the  nature  of  the  long-day  jobs ;  whether  the 
hours  are  necessary;  what  excuses  for  such  schedules  are 
made  by  the  Corporation;  what  validity  attaches  to  these 
excuses;  what  amount  of  seven-day  work  persists;  and  what 
the  twelve-hour  day  means  to  the  worker  and  to  the  com- 
munity. 

Data  considered  were  drawn  from  the  U.  S.  Steel  Cor- 
poration, "  independent "  concerns.  Federal  bureau  reports, 
diaries  by  steel  workers  before  the  strike,  records  of  indepen- 
dent investigators,  the  testimony  before  the  Senate  strike  in- 


46  EEPOET  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

vestigating  committee,  hearings  before  this  Commission  and 
interviews  with  hundreds  of  strikers  and  non-strikers. 

Literature  on  the  subject  of  the  steel  industry's  hours, 
especially  on  the  twelve-hour  day  enforced  by  the  U.  S.  Steel 
Corporation,  has  accumulated  since  1907;  each  year  of  these 
records  is  punctuated  with  plans,  promises  or  expectations 
that  the  Corporation  was  about  to  abolish  such  hours.  Ten 
years  ago  the  practice  was  referred  to  as  "  notorious  " ;  the 
literature  includes  sardonic  references  even  by  steel  masters. 
For  example,  W.  B.  Dickson,  Chairman  and  Vice  President 
of  the  Cambria-Midvale  Co.,  and  former  director  of  the  U.  S. 
Steel  Corporation,  in  an  address  in  1919  to  a  scientific  body, 
spoke  of  the  spectacle  of  Mr.  Gary  as  chairman  of  a  com- 
mittee to  relieve  unemployment  (in  1916  in  New  York), 
when  the  "  large  proportion  of  his  men  were  working  twelve 
hours  a  day  and  are  still  doing  so." 

General  conclusions  to  be  drawn  from  this  literature  are, — 

that  the  development  of  large-scale  production  enter- 
prises under  absentee  financial  control  tends  inevitably 
to  sacrifice  the  labor  force  in  favor  of  utilizing,  to  the 
maximum,  the  costly  machines;  that  is,  trust  manage- 
ment lengthens  hours,  unless  combated  by — 

(a)  public  opinion   (generally,  in  legislation),  or 

(b)  organization  of  the  workmen    (generally,   in 
unions)  : — 

that  in  the  steel  industry  the  Corporation,  by  resisting 
public  opinion  and  by  preventing  organization  among 
its  workmen,  tends  persistently  to  lengthen  the  hours 
of  labor. 

Examination  of  government  statistics  assembled  in  this 
Inquiry  proves  that  hours  in  the  steel  industry  have  actually 
lengthened    since    1910    and    that   now   over   400,000    steel 


THE  TWELVE-HOUR  DAY  47 

workers,  or  a  population  of  about  two  million  men,  women 
and  children  are  more  or  less  directly  affected  by  this  un- 
restricted tendency  toward  lengthened  hours. 

In  the  following  discussion,  therefore,  the  frequent  quo- 
tation of  Mr.  Gary — necessary  because  he  was  almost  the  sole 
spokesman  of  the  industry  during  the  strike  and  is  the  only 
authorized  source  of  statistics  for  the  Steel  Corporation — 
must  not  be  misinterpreted  to  imply  that  Mr.  Gary  could  be 
personally  and  solely  responsible  for  the  labor  hours  of  which 
he  testifies.  Industrial  history  would  seem  to  indicate  that 
despite  the  "  good  deal  of  authority  and  power  "  which  Mr. 
Gary  ^  says  he  possesses,  the  effectiveness  of  personal  wills, 
once  they  have  committed  an  industry  to  a  labor  'policy  such 
a^  the  Corporations,  greatly  diminishes,  as  regards  hours 
and  several  other  matters. 

However,  the  Corporation  ended  the  strike  without  mak- 
ing any  promises  on  the  twelve-hour  day  and  the  Corpora- 
tion's statements  on  "  eliminating  "  the  seven-day  week  were 
found  to  be  inaccurate. 

The  term  "  twelve-hour  day  "  is  precise  only  where  the 
day's  work  at  the  blast  furnace,  open  hearth  and  other  more 
or  less  continuous  processes,  is  actually  divided  into  two  shifts 
of  twelve  hours  each.  But  in  many  plants  it  is  divided  into 
an  11-hour  day  shift  and  a  13-hour  night  shift,  or  a  10-hour 
day  and  14-hour  night.  Usually  the  shifts  alternate  weekly 
and  men  must  work  the  "  long  turn  "  of  18  hours  or  24  hours, 
— a  solid  day  at  "  heavy  "  labor.  In  some  plants  the  36-hour 
turn  is  still  not  unknown.  (The  7-day  week  of  12-hour 
turns  will  be  considered  later.) 

Consideration  of  the  number  on  the  12-hour  day  may  begin 
with  Mr.  Gary's  figure  of  69,000 ;  and  might  stop  there  since 
this  means  that  the  daily  hours  and  lives  of  over  350,000 
men,  women  and  children  are  directly  dominated  and  "  arbi- 

*  Senate  Testimony,  Vol.  I,  p.  216. 


48  KBPOET  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

trarily  "  *  ordered  by  the  Corporation's  12-hour  day.     The 
total,  however,  assignable  to  this  class  seems  to  be  larger. 
Mr.  Gary  testified  (Senate  Testimony,  Vol.  I,  p.  157)  : 

"Twenty-six  and  a  half  per  cent,  of  all  employees  work  the 
twelve-hoTir  turn  and  the  number  is  69,284." 

"  All  employees,"  however,  include  nearly  80,000  of  the 
Corporation's  metal  miners,  coal  miners,  railroaders,  ship 
crews,  dockers,  etc.,  not  concerned  in  the  strike  or  in  the 
12-honr  day.  Mr.  Gary  furnished  data  to  the  Commission, 
howerer,  enabling  correction  of  the  misleading  "  twenty-six 
and  a  half  per  c-ent" ;  the  total  of  all  Corporation  employees 
in  "  the  manufacturing  plants,"  that  is,  in  the  strike  areas, 
is  191,000.  Mr.  Gary's  "69,284  "  is  36  per  cent,  of  191,000. 
The  36  per  cent,  of  men  working  12  hours  or  over  fails  to 
account  for  a  large  number  working  11  hours  or  even  10 
hours,  and,  on  alternate  weeks,  13-  and  14-hour  turns; 
that  is,  a  large  number  properly  to  be  classed  as  12-hour  men. 
The  only  attempt  at  exact  analysis  of  hours  furnished  by  a 
Corporation  plant  to  the  Senate  Investigating  Committee  was 
the  following  given  by  Superintendent  Oursler  of  the  typical 
Homestead  works  (Senate  Testimony,  Vol.  II,  p.  482) : 

"21.2  per  cent,  working  eight  hours;  25.9  per  cent,  work- 
ing ten  hours;  16.4  per  cent,  working  eleven  hours;  36  per 
cent,  working  twelve  hours." 

The  "  16.4  per  cent,  working  11  hours  "  is  made  up  of  day 
shift  "  12-hour  men "  whose  hours  on  night  turn  will  be 
13;  ^  that  is,  a  proper  classification  is  36  per  cent,  plus  16.4 
per  cent,  or  52.4  per  cent,  on  the  12-hour  turn  at  Homestead. 

* "  Arbitrarily "  controlled  is  Mr.  Gary's  term  in  relation  to  fixing 
wages.    Senate  Testimony,  Vol.  I,  p.  226;  it  also  applies  to  hours. 

2  Mr.  Gary's  explanation,  letter  of  Feb.  13:  "  16  per  cent,  of  the  total 
employees  at  Homestead  work  11-hour  and  13-hour  turns  alternately 
weekly."     See  next  footnote,  quoting  letters. 


THE  TWELVE-HOUR  DAY  49 

This  does  not  equal  the  verbal  estimate  of  the  President  of 
the  Carnegie  Co.  (of  which  the  Homestead  works  is  a  part), 
made  to  the  Commission  of  Inquiry  in  November,  1919, 
whose  estimate  was  60  per  cent,  of  his  55,000  employees  on 
the  12-hour  turn. 

Moreover  the  Homestead  figures  seem  to  be  compiled  on  the 
same  method  of  classification  as  Mr.  Gary's  for  the  total  of 
the  Corporation's  manufacturing  plants:  the  Homestead  36 
per  cent,  agrees  exactly  with  Mr.  Gary's  36  per  cent. ;  the 
Homestead  21.2  per  cent,  on  "  the  8-hour  day  "  agrees  with 
Mr.  Gary's  22  per  cent,  on  "  the  8-hour  day,"  as  furnished  to 
the  Commission.  The  proper  classification,  indicated  for  the 
Corporation's  manufacturing  plants,  is  thus  52.4  per  cent, 
on  "  the  12-hour  "  turns. 

Hours  in  the  "  independent "  plants  comprising  the  other 
half  of  the  industry  are  approximately  the  same  as  the  Cor- 
poration's (with  a  few  notable  exceptions  such  as  the  Pueblo 
works  of  the  Colorado  Fuel  and  Iron  Co.,  which,  are  on  a 
three-shift  8-hour  basis,  and  Pacific  Coast  plants  which  are 
on  an  8-hour  basis).  The  only  exact  figures  obtained  for 
an  "  independent "  plant  were  for  a  department  in  the 
Youngstown  Sheet  and  Tube  as  follows : 

On    8  hours , 10  per  cent. 

On  10  hours.. 35  per  cent. 

On  12  hours.... .......   55  per  cent. 

The  Corporation's  figures  which  were  submitted  by  Mr. 
Gary  as  estimates,  not  as  exact  tabulations^  (admittedly  diffi- 

*The  Steel  Corporation's  lack  of  knowledge  of  how  its  decrees  affect 
its  workmen  extends  to  its  statistics  of  hours.  Mr.  Gary's  letters  to  this 
Commission,  again  and  again  replying  that  "we  have  no  compiled 
statistics"  showing  the  exact  data  requested,  indicate  thatthe  task  of 
determining  precisely  the  trend  of  steel  hours  is  left  to  outside  agencies, 
such  as  the  U.  S.  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics.  Even  the  apparently  abso- 
lutely precise  figures  supplied  by  the  Homestead  Superintendent,  cited 
above,  fail  to  total  up  precisely  100  per  cent.  Mr.  Gary's  explanation  of 
Mr.  Oursler's  testimony,  in  a  letter  to  this  Commission  dated  Feb.  13, 


50  REPOET  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

cult  to  compile  owing  to  the  widely  differing  methods  of 
time-keeping  in  the  Corporation's  300  plants)  are  borne  out 
by  more  comprehensive  statistics  from  more  impartial  sources. 
The  chief  of  these  sources  is  the  U.  S.  Bureau  of  Labor  Sta- 
tistics whose  figures  are  taken  from  the  company  pay  rolls 
of  representative  plants  all  over  the  country. 

Government  statistics  are  reckoned  on  the  basis  of  hours 
per  week ;  roughly  interpreted  these  mean  that  hours  avera- 
ging TO  to  72  weekly  mean  6  days  of  12  hours  each;  hours 
averaging  80  to  84  weekly  mean  7  days  of  12  hours  each; 
this  is  irrespective  of  how  the  shifts  are  actually  divided  in 
various  plants,  of  12,  11,  10%  or  10  hours,  alternating 
weekly  with  12,  13,  13-14  or  14  hours.  Taking  the  statistics 
for  the  center  of  the  industry,  the  Pittsburgh  District,  by 
departments  of  plants,  for  the  last  quarter  of  1918  and  the 
first  quarter  of  1919,  as  compiled  by  the  Bureau  of  Labor 
Statistics  (October,  1919,  Monthly  Keview),  we  have  for  the 
largest  department  in  the  industry : 

1920,  contains  the  following  interesting  comment:  "The  percentage  Mr. 
Oursler  quoted  of  16  per  cent,  for  employees  working  11  hours  is  cor- 
rect although  his  statement,  to  be  exactly  right,  should  have  read  '  16 
per  cent,  of  the  total  employees  at  Homestead  work  11-hour  and  13-hour 
turns  alternating  weekly.' "  So  far  so  good,  but  Mr.  Gary  went  on : 
"  The  percentage  given  of  36  per  cent,  is  not  correct  if  the  percentage 
was  intended  to  indicate  those  who  work  straight  12-hour  turns.  The 
number  of  these  straight  12-hour  turn  men  is  26  per  cent,  of  the  total. 
Thus  at  Homestead  26  per  cent,  of  the  total  men  work  straight  12-hour 
turns,  16  per  cent.  11  and  13-hour  turns,  alternating  as  explained  and 
the  balance  of  the  men  work  10  hours  or  less." 

Now,  statistically  analyzed,  Mr.  Gary's  letter  comes  to  this:  Supply- 
ing his  "26  per  cent."  of  "straight  12-hour  men"  (Avhatever  that  may 
mean)  for  Mr.  Oursler's  36  per  cent,  and  totaling  all  up  gives  only 
89.5  per  cent,  and  fails  to  account  for  the  remaining  10.5  per  cent,  at 
Homestead.  His  letter  indicates  plainly  that  the  two  classifications 
should  be  lumped,  that  is,  16  per  cent,  plus  "  26  per  cent.,"  or  42  per 
cent.;  the  remaining  10  per  cent.,  of  course,  is  in  Mr.  Oursler's  figures, 
making  52.4  per  cent,  as  the  true  total  of  12-hour  men. 

Mr.  Gary's  letter  of  Jan.  30  to  the  Commission  contains  estimates 
even  harder  to  reconcile  with  his  other  estimates.  This  letter  gives  the 
"standard  daily  service  or  turn"  as  "for  about  70,000 — 10  hours;  for 
about  68,000 — 11,  12,  13  hours."  This  attempts  to  limip  the  13-hour 
men  imder  the  68,000  but  Mr.  Gary  gave  the  Senate  Committee  (Vol. 
II,  p.  157 )  "  69,284  "  on  "  the  12-hour  turn,"  with  no  mention  of  the 


I 


THE  TWELVE-HOUK  DAY  51 

Stockers,  83.6;  larrymen,  82.6;  larrymen's  helpers,  82.3;  skip 
operators,  81.6;  blowers,  81.7;  blowing  engineers,  81.7;  keep- 
ers, 81.9;  keepers'  helpers,  81.8;  pig  machine  men,  83;  cinder- 
men,  81.8;  laborers,  82.     Average,  82.1. 

That  is,  the  whole  department,  the  largest  in  the  industry  is 
on  the  12-hour  basis,  7  days  a  week,  a  mathematical  average 
for  all  workers  in  the  department  being  11.7  hours  daily. 

Open  hearth  furnaces,  the  next  largest  producing  depart- 
ment, hours  per  week  by  occupations  are : 

Stockers,  78.8;  stock  cranemen,  76.6;  charging  machine  men, 
76.8 ;  melters'  helpers,  first,  78.9 ;  melters'  helpers,  second,  76.1 ; 
melters'  helpers,  third,  76;  stopper  setters,  75.8;  steel  pourers, 
75.7;  mold  cappers,  77;  ladle  cranemen,  76.1;  ingot  strippers, 
70.5;  laborers,  78.5.     Average,  76.4. 

That  is,  with  one  exception,  all  occupations  are  above  72 
hours,  or  the  12-hour  day,  on  a  6-day  week  basis,  and  the 

thousands  of  12-hour  men  whose  hours  on  alternate  weeks  are  Hi;  that 
is,  10  hours  by  day  for  one  week,  and  14  hours  by  night  for  the  next 
week.  It  would  be  a  highly  misleading  classification  to  lump  under 
the  10-hour  class,  for  example,  15,000  men  actually  working  10  hours 
one  week  but  subject  to  14  hours  the  next. 

At  the  same  time  that  Mr.  Gary  was  writing  to  the  Commission,  he 
made  the  following  admission,  as  quoted  in  the  statement  made  by  Dr. 
Devine  of  the  Federal  Council  of  Churches  to  the  presidents  of  the 
Corporation's  plants:  "the  proportion  (of  12-hour  men)  would  be  50 
or  60  per  cent.     Judge  Gary  said  that  this  might  be  correct." 

The  Corporation's  entire  statistical  reckonings,  as  furnished  to  the 
public,  are  on  the  wrong  basis.  The  hundreds  of  different  kinds  of  steel 
jobs  vary  so  in  hours-requirements  that,  for  its  own  benefit,  the  Cor- 
poration can  get  accurate  estimates  only  by  dropping  the  vague  "  alter- 
nating turns"  classification  and  by  adopting  the  long-established  gov- 
ernment bureau  classification  of  "  hours  per  week."  The  government's 
"  72  hours  per  week,"  for  example,  plainly  indicates  6  daily  12-hour 
"turns"  whether  the  turns  are  actually  divided  into  12  and  12,  11  and 
13,  10  and  14,  or  any  other  shifts;  likewise  "82  or  84  hours  weekly" 
indicates  the  7-day  week  of  12-hour  turns,  no  matter  how  divided.  Aa 
against  this  system  the  total  "  69,284  "  on  "  the  12-hour  turn  "  sounds 
very  exact  but  means  little  without  additional  information  as  to  (a) 
the  length  of  the  period  for  which  the  figure  is  given;  (b)  the  number 
outside  this  69,284  working  10  or  11  hours  but  subject  bi-weekly  to 
13  and  14. 


52 


EEPORT  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 


78.5  weekly  hour  average  of  laborers  (who  constitute  46 
per  cent,  of  the  whole)  is  nearer  the  12-hour  day,  1-day  week 
average. 

Take  the  same  departments,  from  the  latest  figures  for 
1919  in  the  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics,  giving  the  numbers 
employed  instead  of  percentages  and  affording  comparison 
of  other  districts  with  the  Pittsburgh  District. 


HOURS 


Blast  Furnaces 


No.  estab- 
lishments 

°^ 

^  a 

CD 

Average 

full  time 

hours 

Schedule  of  12-hour  day 

56 

60 

60-66 

66-72 

72 

72-78 

78 

78-84 

84 

24 

6315 

78.8 

456 

178 

29 

364 

483 

38 

702 

16 

4049 

All  under  72  hours  per  week  are  from  Great  Lakes  and  Mid- 
dle West  and  Southern  Districts  (except  one  laborer  at  60 
hours,  and  41  laborers  at  66-72  hours,  in  Pittsburgh  District). 
With  this  exception,  Pittsburgh  blast  furnace  workers  are  all 
twelve-hour  day  and  three-quarters  are  seven-day  week. 


Open  Hearth  Furnaces 


m   a) 
a;  g 

at 

0) 

it 

01 

Average 

full  time 

hours 

Schedule  of  12-hour  day 

56 

60 

60-66 

66 

66-72 

72 

73-78 

78 

84 

19 

4702 

73.8 

751 

80 

10 

38 

39 

1010 

24 

1913 

337 

In  this  table  the  only  men  60  hours  or  under,  in  the  Pitts- 
burgh District,  are  five  ingot  strippers  at  56  and  one  laborer  at 
60.  Practically  everything  60  and  under  is  Great  Lakes  and 
Middle  West  and  Pacific  Coast  Districts  (which  include  a  num- 
ber of  three-shift,  eight-hour  day  plants). 


THE  TWELVE-HOUR  DAY 


53 


The  only  available  late  figures  for  a  rolling  mill  depart- 
ment exhibit  78  per  cent,  of  the  employees  on  the  12-hour 
day,  almost  altogether  with  the  6-day  week. 


Rail  Mills 


No.  estab- 

No. of 
employees 

Hours 

lishments 

48 

50-60 

60 

72 

84 

5 

1170 

237 

3 

18 

900 

12 

None  under  60  in  the  Pittsburgh  District.  All  60-hour  and 
84-hour  men  were  laborers  in  this  district.  The  48-hour  men 
were  from  one  mill  in  the  Great  Lakes  and  Middle  West  Dis- 
trict. 

What  do  these  figures  for  principal  departments  mean  in 
relation  to  the  Corporation's  statistics  (keeping  in  mind  that 
half  the  industry  is  in  the  Pittsburgh  District  and  that  the 
influence  of  Corporation  practice  is  less  hampered  in  this 
District)  ?    They  mean  altogether — 

that  the  large  continuous-process  producing  depart- 
ments,— the  pace  setters  of  the  industry — ^were  being 
run  largely  on  a  12-hour  day  basis  and  largely  7  days 
a  week; 


that  the  resultant  hours  approximated  12  hours  daily 
for  about  half  the  employees; 

that  to  these  must  be  added  about  a  quarter  more,  mak- 
ing three-quarters  of  all  employees  whose  hours  per  week 
were  60  or  over,  that  is,  beyond  the  generally  accepted 
maximum  for  most  other  industries. 


54  EEPOET  ON  THE  STEEL  STEIKB 

These  long  hours  appeared,  in  the  course  of  the  Commis- 
sion's inquiry,  to  have  a  more  causative  bearing  on  the  strike 
than  "  Bolshevism."  Of  the  hundreds  of  strikers  and  nom 
strikers  interviewed  in  this  inquiry,  few  could  put  together 
two  sentences  on  "  Soviets  "  but  almost  all  discoursed  or, 
more  accurately,  cursed  "  long  hours." 

Comparisons  of  wider-sweeping  government  statistics,  also 
based  on  company  pay-rolls,  only  confirm  conclusions.  The 
average  of  hours  for  the  entire  industry,  including  great 
numbers  of  foundries  and  fabricating  plants  whose  hours 
average  less  than  those  of  the  plants  against  which  the  strike 
was  aimed,  was  68.7  hours  per  week  or  over  11%  hours  per 
day  on  a  6-day  mathematical  average.  (U.  S.  Bureau  of 
Labor  Statistics.    Monthly  Review,  Sept.,  1919.) 

Ten  years  ago  the  Labor  Commissioner,  at  the  order  of 
Congress,  made  the  exhaustive  survey  of  the  industry  (Senate 
Document  110,  four  vols.)  which  formed  the  standard  on 
which  to  make  comparisons.  In  May,  1910,  the  percentage 
of  employees  working  72  hours  and  over  per  week,  i.e.  at 
least  12  hours  a  day,  was  42.58  per  cent,  (ibid..  Vol.  I,  p. 
xlii).  How  much  the  1919  percentages  of  12-hour  men  may 
have  increased  over  that  42  per  cent,  cannot  be  exactly  de- 
termined. The  average  of  weekly  hours  for  the  industry  in 
1910  was  67.6;  for  1919  it  was  1.1  hours  higher.  The 
average  weekly  hours  for  the  Pittsburgh  District  in  1910 
and  1919  for  three  departments  for  which  1919  statistics 
were  available  were: 

Year  Blast  Furnaces  Open  Hearth    Plate  Mills 

1910  78.7  75.3  67.3 

1919  82.1  76.4  7L1 

These  increases  were  from  1  to  nearly  4  hours  weekly. 
They  are  insufficient  to  prove,  but  they  do  suggest,  that  if 
the  government  had  ordered  another  exhaustive  survey  of  the 


THE  TWELYE-HOUR  DAY  55 

iron  and  steel  industry  in  the  months  immediately  preceding 
the  strike,  it  would  have  found  conditions  materially  worse 
than  they  were  in  1910  when  strikes  due  to  lengthening  hours 
started  the  government  survey. 

The  requirements  of  the  war,  which  permitted  the  steel 
companies  free  rein  as  regards  hours,  ceased  with  the  armi- 
stice and  according  to  steel  company  officials  war  conditions 
were  largely  eliminated  ^  in  the  spring  of  1919.  By  the  sum- 
mer of  1919  then  there  could  be  no  legitimate  excuse  for  war 
conditions ;  yet  it  was  in  the  months  of  July,  August  and 
early  September,  1919,  that  the  steel  industry  was  speeded 
up  in  every  direction ;  and  for  these  critical  months  the  gov- 
ernment statistical  bureaus  have  published  no  figures. 

These,  then,  were  the  steel  hours  constituting  one  of  the 
"  relics  of  barbarism  "  referred  to  by  an  official  of  a  steel 
company,  who  told  an  independent  investigator  ^  that  his 
sympathies  in  the  strike  were  "  entirely  with  Judge  Gary  " 
but  whose  stand  on  hours  was  set  forth  in  a  letter  as  follows : 

"  At  the  greatest  personal  sacrifice,  both  in  friendship  and  in 
money,  for  the  past  twenty-five  years  I  have  waged  unceasing 
warfare  against  the  Steel  Corporation  on  the  question  of  the 
seven-day  week,  the  twelve-hour  day  and  the  autocratic  methods 
of  dealing  with  workmen." 

These  were  the  hours  which  must  be  compared  with  hours 
in  other  industries  of  the  coimtry.  The  steel  workers'  68.7 
hours  a  week  must  be  compared  with  the  street  railwaymen's 
56.4  in  another  "  continuous  industry  "  and  the  nearest  com- 
petitor to  steel  hours  in  the  list  of  principal  industries  com- 
piled by  the  Bureau  of  Applied   Economics,   Washington, 

D.   C. ;  ^  with  the  anthracite  coal  miners'   52-hour  weekly 
'  "  With  the  close  of  the  war  .    .    .  the  7-day  service  has  been  largely 

eliminated.     At  the  present  time  there   is  comparatively  little  of  it." 

Letter  of  Mr.  Gary  to  Commission,  Jan.  30,  1920. 
"  R.  S.  Baker  in  N.  Y.  Evening  Post,  Dec.  31,  1919. 
*  See  Sub-Report  for  charts  and  details. 


56  REPOET  ON  THE  STEEL  STEIKE 

schedule  and  the  bituminous  coal  miners'  52.9-hour  weekly 
schedule;  with  the  standard  48  hours  weekly  of  the  United 
States  Arsenals,  the  United  States  Navy  Yards,  the  railroad 
shop  men,  railroad  freight  firemen,  the  ship  yards ;  compari- 
son is  impossible  with  the  44  hours  weekly  of  the  building 
trades,  the  30  hours  average  for  passenger  firemen  on  the 
railroads. 

These  were  the  hours  which  must  be  compared  with  steel 
hours  in  England  ^  where  the  twelve-hour  day  had  largely  dis- 
appeared before  1914  and  where  the  elimination  of  the 
twelve-hour  day  was  directly  retarded  by  the  competition  of 
the  American  plants'  longer  schedules. 

These  were  the  hours  which  must  be  compared  with  what 
government  sanction  and  public  opinion  had  for  manys  years 
considered  a  standard  work  week, — 48  hours ;  the  steel  week 
averaged  more  than  20  hours  longer.  For  thousands  of  steel 
workers  the  "  normal "  work  week  was  nearly  twice  as  long 
as  the  44-hour  standard  customary  in  many  industries. 

These  were  the  hours  for  1919  which  must  be  compared 
with  the  industry's  own  hours  for  1914  and  1910.  Five 
years  ago  the  steel  week  was  2.4  hours  shorter ;  10  years  ago 
1.1  hours  shorter.  Steel  hours  have  lengthened  in  a  decade 
when  other  industries  were  shortening  hours.  This  in  spite 
of  Mr.  Gary's  statement  before  the  Senate  Committee :  "  The 
Chairman  of  the  Committee  will  bear  in  mind  that  we  have 
been  reducing  these  hours  from  year  to  year,  going  back  many 
years,  as  rapidly  as  we  could  "  (Senate  Testimony,  Vol.  I, 
p.  202).  The  emphasis  of  the  analyst  must  be  laid  on  the 
"  as  we  could."  Industrial  history,  as  noted  before,  indicates 
that  hours  inevitably  tend  to  lengthen  under  absentee  cor- 
poration control,  unless  restricted  by  public  opinion  or  by 
labor    organization.      Competition,    foreign    markets,    "  the 

1  General  average  of  steel  hours  in  England,  July,  1919,  47-48  hours 
weekly. 


THE  TWELVE-HOUR  DAY  57 

war,"  each  in  turn,  is  an  actual  cause  for  lengthening  hours, 
or  an  excuse  for  it  long  after  the  cause  is  gone.  Personal, 
will  alone, — or  "  as  we  could," — simply  has  not  worked  re- 
form. Whoever  ought  to  do  the  reforming,  it  is  a  matter  of 
record  that  in  England  the  abolition  of  the  twelve-hour  sched- 
ule was  initiated  and  pressed  by  trade  unions.  So  far  as 
the  twelve-hour  day  can  be  laid  to  choice,  the  responsibility 
is  flatly  put  by  "  independent "  steel  companies  on  the  Steel 
Corporation. 

The  twelve-hour  day  is  not  a  metallurgical  necessity ;  steel 
masters  are  not  caught  in  the  grip  of  their  gigantic  machin- 
ery. Thirty  years  ago  train  wrecks  burned  up  a  lot  of  pas- 
sengers because  of  the  "  deadly  car  stove  " ;  and  the  solidest, 
most  responsible  railroad  presidents  assured  the  legislatures 
that  coal  stoves  were  an  unescapable  necessity,  that  cars  could 
not  be  heated  by  steam  from  the  engine.  Do  steel  masters 
fail  to  end  tlie  twelve-hour  day  because  they  cannot?  The 
fact  that  the  eight-hour  day  has  replaced  the  twelve-hour  day 
in  England,  on  the  Pacific  Coast,  in  the  Pueblo  plant  of  the 
Colorado  Euel  and  Iron  Co.,  and  in  some  "  independent " 
plants  near  Chicago  and  Pittsburgh,  proves  that  it  is  not  a 
matter  of  necessity.  Metallurgists  agree  that  production  is 
better, — by  a  small  percentage,  but  better, — on  the  three-shift 
eight-hour  day.  Steel  engineers  do  not  dispute  that  three 
shifts  mean  more  steel  and  better  steel.  Only  one  process  is 
absolutely  "  continuous,"  requiring,  on  the  eight-hour  basis, 
three  shifts.  The  final  findings  of  the  1910  survey  of  the 
industry,  which  are  true  today,  read  (Senate  Document  110, 
Vol.  I,  p.  Ixii)  : 

"  The  blast-furnace  department  is  the  only  one  of  the  four- 
teen departments  where  there  is  any  metallurgical  necessity  for 
continuous  operation  day  and  night  throughout  seven  days  per 
"week.  .  .  .  Throughout  the  iron  and  steel  industry  .  .  .  the 
employees  were  expected  to  work  seven  days  wherever  the  de- 


58  REPORT  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

partment  in  which  they  were  working  was  running  seven  days 
and  the  occupation  in  which  they  were  engaged  required  con- 
tinuous work,  .  .  . 

"  The  large  proportion  of  Bessemer  converters,  open  hearth 
furnaces  and  rolling  mills  working  seven  days  or  turns  was  due 
to  the  fact  that  these  departments  were  in  continuous  operation 
in  some  plants,  although  no  real  necessity  for  this  condition  ex- 
isted, only  a  desire  to  increase  the  output  of  the  plant." 

Only  two  excuses  were  oifered  to  the  Commission  for  the 
twelve-hour  day:  labor  shortage  and  workmen's  preference. 
On  analysis  we  shall  see  that  both  are  baseless  and  that  the 
true  causes  concern  much  more  the  helplessness  of  disorgan- 
ized immigrant  labor.  First,  it  is  advisable  to  analyze  steel 
production  sufficiently  to  understand  the  kinds  of  jobs  these 
are  which  must  be  followed  twelve  hours  a  day. 

It  is  an  epigram  of  the  industry  that  "  steel  is  a  man 
killer."  Steel  workers  are  chiefly  attendants  of  gigantic 
machines.  The  steel  business  tends  to  become,  in  the  owners' 
eyes,  mainly  the  machines.  Steel  jobs  are  not  easily  char- 
acterized by  chilly  scientific  terms.  Blast  furnaces  over  a 
hundred  feet  high,  blast  "  stoves  "  a  hundred  feet  high,  coke 
ovens  miles  long,  volcanic  bessemer  converters,  furnaces  with 
hundreds  of  tons  of  molten  steel  in  their  bellies,  trains  of  hot 
blooms,  miles  of  rolls  end  to  end  hurtling  white  hot  rails 
along, — these  masters  are  attended  by  sweating  servants 
whose  job  is  to  get  close  enough  to  work  but  to  keep  clear 
enough  to  save  limb  and  life.  It  is  concededly  not  an  ideal 
industry  for  men  fatigued  by  long  hours. 

To  comprehend  precisely  what  the  twelve-hour  day  meant, 
the  Inquiry  gathered  data  from  steel  mill  officials  and  from 
the  workers  themselves.    Mr.  Gary's  testimony  was : 

"It  is  not  an  admitted  fact  that  more  than  eight  hours  is 
too  much  for  a  man  to  labor  per  day.  ...  I  had  my  own  ex- 


THE  TWELVE-HOUE  DAY  59 

perience  in  that  regard  (on  a  farm) ;  and  all  onr  officers  worked 
up  from  the  ranks.  They  came  up  from  day  laborers.  They 
were  all  perfectly  satisfied  with  their  time  of  service;  they  all 
desired  to  work  longer  hours  .  .  .  the  employees  generally  do 
not  want  eight  hours.  ...  I  do  not  want  you  to  think  that 
for  a  moment."     (Senate  Testimony,  Vol.  I,  p.  180.) 

Mr.  H.  D.  Williams,  president  of  the  Carnegie  Steel  Com- 
pany, said  that  he  had  worked  fourteen  hours  a  day  and  did 
not  feel  he  was  any  the  worse  for  it. 

Mr.  W.  B.  Schiller,  president  of  the  !N'ational  Tube  Com- 
pany, said  that  he  had  worked  the  twelve-hour  day  when 
young  and  that  it  never  did  him  any  harm. 

Mr.  E.  J.  Buffington,  president  of  the  Illinois  Steel  Com- 
pany, said  that  he  had  worked  the  twelve-hour  day  when  a 
young  man  and  he  rather  thought  it  did  him  good. 

This  official  attitude  is  important  despite  the  fact  that  it  is 
the  testimony  of  experience  undergone  twenty-five  to  forty 
years  before,  the  severity  of  early  work  being  tempered 
and  mellowed  in  recollection  by  decades  in  comfortable  office 
chairs.  Corporation  officials  do  regard  the  twelve-hour  day  as 
a  young  man's  "  experience,"  to  be  left  early.  Eor  the 
workers  who  do  not  rise  to  be  a  steel  corporation's  subsidiary 
president  but  who  are  held  for  years  to  the  twelve-hour  day 
a  phrase  has  been  coined  which  is  well  understood  by  them : 
"  Old  age  at  forty."  Especially  they  understood  it  when  a 
\  corporation  plant  made  the  rule  of  hiring  no  man  over  forty 
years  of  age. 

First,  what  exactly  is  the  schedule  of  the  twelve-hour 
worker  ?  Here  is  the  transcript  of  the  diary  of  an  American 
worker,  the  observations  of  a  keen  man  on  how  his  fellows 
regard  the  job,  the  exact  record  of  his  own  job  and  hours 
made  in  the  spring  of  1919,  before  the  strike  or  this  Inquiry, 
and  selected  here  because  no  charge  of  exaggeration  could  bo 
made  concerning  it.    It  begins : 


60  EEPORT  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

"  Calendar  of  one  day  from  the  life  of  a  Carnegie  steel  work- 
man at  Homestead  on  tlie  open  hearth,  common  labor: 

"5:30  to  12  (midnight) — Six  and  one-half  hours  of  shovel- 
ing, throwing  and  carrying  bricks  and  cinder  out  of  bottom  of 
old  furnace.    Very  hot. 

"  12 :30 — Back  to  the  shovel  and  cinder,  within  few  feet  of 
pneumatic  shovel  drilling  slag,  for  three  and  one-half  hours. 

"4  o'clock — Sleeping  is  pretty  general,  including  boss. 

"  5  o'clock — Everybody  quits,  sleeps,  sings,  swears,  sighs  for 
6  o'clock. 

"  6  o'clock — Start  home. 

"  6 :45  o'clock — Bathed,  breakfast. 

"  7 :45  o'clock — Asleep. 

"4  P.  M. — Wake  up,  put  on  dirty  clothes,  go  to  boarding 
house,  eat  supper,  get  pack  of  lunch. 

"  5  :30  P.  M.— Report  for  work." 

This  is  the  record  of  the  night  shift ;  a  record  of  inevitable 
waste,  inefficiency  and  protest  against  "  arbitrary "  hours. 
Next  week  this  laborer  will  work  the  day  shift.  What  is  his 
schedule  per  week  ?    Quoting  again  from  the  diary : 

"  Hours  on  night  shift  begin  at  5  :30 ;  work  for  twelve  hours 
through  the  night  except  Saturday,  when  it  is  seventeen  hours, 
until  12  Sunday  noon,  with  one  hour  out  for  breakfast;  the  fol- 
lowing Monday  ten  hours ;  total  from  5 :30  Monday  to  5 :30 
Monday  87  hours,  the  normal  week. 

"  The  Carnegie  Steel  worker  works  87  hours  out  of  the  168 
hours  in  the  week.  Of  the  remaining  81  he  sleeps  seven  hours 
per  day ;  total  of  49  hours.  He  eats  in  another  fourteen ;  walks 
or  travels  in  the  street  car  four  hours;  dresses,  shaves,  tends 
furnace,  undresses,  etc.,  seven  hours.  His  one  reaction  is  '  What 
the  Hell ! ' — the  universal  text  accompanying  the  twelve-hour 
day." 

What  kinds  of  job  are  these  twelve-hour  turns  ?  Here  are 
the  observations  of  his  own  successive  jobs  by  a  second 
worker,   also  an  AmericaUj   also  written  before  the  strike 


THE  TWELVE-HOUR  DAY  61 

began,  in  the  summer  of  1919  in  an  "  independent  "  plant  in 
the  Pittsburgh  district.  (Both  these  workers  were  distinctly- 
critical  of  labor  organizers.) 

"Job  of  labor  in  the  clean-up  gang  in  pit  of  open  hearth 
furnaces: 

"  The  pit  is  the  half-open  space  where  furnaces  are  tapped 
into  ladles  (pocket  shaped,  ten  feet  high,  swung  by  overhead 
cranes)  and  '  poured '  into  ingot  molds.  As  the  hot  metal  comes 
from  the  tap-hole  much  spills  and  when  partially  cool  must 
be  broken  with  picks  and  cleaned  out,  and  *slag'  and  *  scrap' 
separated  into  different  cars. 

"  The  job  is :  clean  up  cinder  when  ladle  is  dumped ;  break 
clay  covers  from  valve  pipes,  pile  pipes  at  side  of  pit,  repile 
pipes  on  flat  car.  After  pipes  have  been  moved  to  blacksmith, 
affix  chains  for  swinging  them  to  blacksmith's  door,  repile  in 
shop.  Get  straightened  pipes  back  to  pit  by  same  series  of 
steps ;  same  going  and  returning  for  broken  chains.  Affix  hooks 
to  ladles  when  crane  shoves  ladle  in  your  face.  Clean  out  all 
hot  cinder  and  scrap  under  all  furnaces,  take  cinder  by  hand 
or  barrel  to  cinder  boxes.  Clean  hot  overflow  metal  or  slag 
from  tracks.  Very  hot  work.  Tools  used,  pick,  shovel,  fork, 
crowbar,  sledge-hammer,  chains,  barrel.  Heavy  work,  but  con- 
sidered here  as  one  of  the  ^easier  jobs.'  Hours:  14  hours  on 
night  turn,  10  hours  on  day  turn;  long  turn  of  24  hours  every 
two  weeks. 

"Job  of  third-helper,  open  hearth  furnace: 

"With  other  helpers  he  makes  ^back  wall,'  which  means 
throwing  heavy  dolomite  with  a  shovel  across  blazing  furnaces 
to  the  back  wall,  to  protect  it  for  the  next  bath  of  hot  steel. 
Every  third-helper  makes  the  back  wall  on  his  own  furnace 
and  on  his  neighbor's,  sometimes  making  three  or  four  a  shift. 
You  march  past  the  door  of  the  furnace,  which  is  opened  in  your 
face  for  a  moment.  Heat  about  180°  at  the  distance  from  which 
the  shovelful  is  thrown  in;  each  shoveler  wears  smoked  gog- 
gles and  protects  his  face  with  his  arm  as  he  throws.  After  a 
back  wall  it  is  necessary  to  rest  at  least  15  minutes. 


63  REPOET  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

"  Second  and  first  helpers  work  '  hook  and  spoon  *  to  spread 
dolomite  for  the  front  wall.  Very  easy  for  a  new  man  to  get 
badly  burned  in  approaching  furnace  to  fill  his  spoon. 

"When  front  wall  and  back  wall  are  both  made  there  is 
usually  a  long  '  spell '  unless  the  adjoining  furnace  needs  atten- 
tion. A  man  may  have  four  or  five  hours  to  himself  out  of 
the  fourteen-hour  shift  or  he  may  work  hard  the  whole  turn. 
He  may  have  two  or  three  such  easy  days  or  he  may  have  a 
week  of  the  most  continuoiLS  and  exhausting  Icind. 

"  After  making  the  front  and  back  walls  the  third-helper 
wheels  mud  to  the  tap-hole  for  lining  on  the  spout;  it  takes 
40  minutes  to  one  hour;  temperature  around  spout  about 
110°. 

"  Scrap,  in  chunks  from  small  bits  to  thousand-pound  blocks, 
fall  from  charging  boxes  when  furnace  is  being  charged  and 
must  be  cleaned  up  by  second  and  third-helpers. 

"The  third-helper  fills  large  bags  with  coal  to  throw  into 
the  ladle  at  tap  time ;  easy  to  burn  your  face  ofE. 

"Helps  drill  a  *  bad '  hole  at  tap  time,  work  of  the  most 
exhausting  kind ;  also  must  shovel  dolomite  into  ladle  of  molten 
steel.  This  is  the  hottest  job  and  certainly  the  most  exposed 
to  minor  burns.  Temperatures  around  180°,  but  it  takes  only 
four  or  five  minutes.  Nearly  every  tap  time  leaves  three  or 
four  small  burns  on  neck,  face,  hands  or  legs.  It  is  usually 
necessary  to  extinguish  little  fires  in  your  clothing.  Altogether 
not  so  bad  as  heavier  lifting  parts  of  the  furnace  job  which  are 
most  hateful,  together  with  the  monotonous  exposures. 
"On  the  blast  furnaces.  Job  of  the  stove  gang: 
"  Six  to  ten  men  in  a  gang  keep  the  blast  furnace  stoves 
cleaned  (a  stove  is  an  oven  for  heating  the  blast  and  is  as  big 
as  the  blast  furnace  itself,  full  of  a  gigantic  brick  checker  work) ; 
as  stove  cools,  gang  cleans  out  hardened  cinder  in  combustion 
chamber  with  pick  and  shovel.  Men  go  inside  the  stove.  Ten 
minutes  to  one  hour  is  the  length  of  time  inside,  according  to 
degree  to  which  the  stove  has  been  allowed  to  cool.  Before 
going  in  the  man  puts  on  wooden  sandals,  a  jacket  which  fits 
the  neck  closely  and  heavy  cap  with  ear  flaps;  also  goggles. 


THE  TWELVE-HOUE  DAY  63 

Cleaning  out  the  flue  dust  not  so  hot^  but  men  breathe  dust- 
saturated  air. 

"  Hardest  job  is  '  poking  her  out/  ramming  out  the  flue  dust 
in  checker  work  at  top  of  stove.  Large  pieces  of  canvas  tied 
over  feet  and  legs  to  keep  heat  from  coming  up  the  legs;  two 
pairs  of  gloves  needed;  handkerchiefs  cover  all  head  except  the 
eyes.  Three  minutes  to  ten  minutes  at  a  turn  are  the  limit  for 
work  in  the  chamber  at  top  of  stove ;  very  hard  to  breathe.  Aver- 
age man  can  do  four  holes  each  trip. 

"Easy  days  with  couple  of  hours'  sleep  are  sandwiched  in 
betiveen  hard  ones,  after  which  the  men  leave  the  mill  exhausted. 
Hours:  12  hours  a  day. 

"  Joh  of  stove-tender  helper: 

"Learners'  job  following  stove  tender;  manipulates  large, 
clumsy  valves;  operations,  if  performed  in  wrong  order,  stove 
tender  will  break  his  stove  and  kill  himself.  Unless  tremen- 
dous pressure  is  first  *  blown  off '  the  opening  of  another  valve 
will  blow  the  opener  into  bits.  Hours:  day  shift,  10  hours; 
night,  13  hours." 

These  workers'  records  were  made  before  the  strike  began 
and  are  open  to  no  possible  charge  of  bias.  They  record  in 
exact  form  what  many  "  hunkies  "  tried  to  tell  investigators. 
As  actual  experience — as  opposed  to  theory — they  may  be 
contrasted  with  this  excerpt  from  Mr.  Gnary's  testimony  be- 
fore the  Senators  (Senate  Testimony,  Vol.  I,  p.  160)  : 

Mr.  Gary.  "  Nowadays  none  of  these  men,  with  very  few 
exceptions,  perform  manual  labor  as  I  used  to  perform  it,  on 
the  farm,  neither  in  hours,  nor  in  actual  physical  exertion.  It 
is  practically  all  done  everywhere  by  machinery  and  the  boy 
who  opens  the  door  I  think  touches  a  button  and  opens  the  door. 
And  this  work  of  adjusting  the  heavy  iron  ingots  is  done  by 
the  pulling  of  a  lever.  It  is  largely  machinery,  almost  alto- 
gether machinery.  That  is  not  saying  there  is  no  work  in  that, 
because  of  course  there  is,  and  I  would  not  belittle  it^  of  course. 


64  EEPOET  ON  THE  STEEL  STEIKE 

It  is  hard  work  to  work  hard  whatever  one  does,  and  to  the 
extent  one  does  work  hard  he,  of  course,  is  doing  hard  work." 

Mr.  Gary  submitted  to  the  Senate  Committee  "  photo- 
graphs of  open  hearth  laborers  at  leisure  "  and  asserted  that 
they  worked  but  half  the  time.  This  hardly  accords  with 
the  open  hearth  laborer  himself  who  worked  that  twelve-hour 
day  every  day  in  the  week  and  whose  daily  job  includes  such 
as  the  following,  and  this  is  described  as  "  not  the  worst  of 
his  daily  grind  "  (from  Carnegie  Steel  worker's  diary)  : 

"  You  lift  a  large  sack  of  coal  to  your  shoulders,  run  towards 
the  white  hot  steel  in  a  100-ton  ladle,  must  get  close  enough 
without  burning  your  face  off  to  hurl  the  sack,  using  every 
ounce  of  strength,  into  the  ladle  and  run,  as  flames  leap  to 
roof  and  the  heat  blasts  everything  to  the  roof.  Then  you 
rush  out  to  the  ladle  and  madly  shovel  manganese  into  it,  as 
hot  a  job  as  can  be  imagined." 

!N'or  are  the  above  at  all  the  extreme  hours  of  the  plant. 
In  the  millwright  department  of  the  Carnegie  Steel  Company 
everyone  in  the  department  works  fourteen  working  days  out 
of  every  fourteen  calendar  days,  on  the  thirteen-hour  night 
turn,  including  the  twenty-four-hour  turn  within  the  four- 
teen days.  Here  is  the  actual  schedule  of  the  above  quoted 
worker  when  employed  in  the  millwright  department  of  the 
Carnegie  Steel  Company  last  spring : 

"Five  nights  at  13  hours,   regularly ..,. .     65  hours 

Saturday  night,  regular 15  hours 

Sunday  double  turn,  regular  every  other  week 24  hours 

Total 104  hours 

"  Add  to  this  half  an  hour  each  night  for  dinner  means  three 
hours  more,  or  107  hours  under  the  plant  roof  in  the  168  hours 
in  the  week." 


THE  TWELVE^HOUR  DAY  65 

That  conditions  in  Corporation  plants  are  not  worse  than 
in  "  independents  "  is  shown  by  this  from  the  records  of  an 
investigator  for  the  Commission  (Youngstown,  Oct.  2Y, 
1919)  : 

"  Timekeeper  in  the  sheet  mill  department  of  a  large  '  inde- 
pendent '  stated :  that  among  the  men  whose  time  he  kept  there 
were  about  45  rollers  who  worked  eight  hours^  110  laborers  who 
worked  ten  hours  and  190  who  were  on  the  twelve-hour  basis, 
seven  days  a  week.  They  changed  every  week  from  day  to  night 
turn,  making  a  24-hour  shift.  These  latter  included  electricians, 
mill  hands,  engineers,  pipefitters,  cranemen,  loaders,  loader- 
helpers,  and  gasmen.  In  the  sheet  galvanizing  department  the 
men  worked  a  twelve-hour  day  with  no  rest  spells  and  no  lunch 
hour.  Their  rates  were  42,  42%,  and  44  cents.  So  many 
men  gave  out  under  the  strain  and  had  to  be  fired  for  not  being 
able  to  do  the  work  that  checks  for  these  men  gave  out  in  the 
time  department,  and  the  timekeeper  begged  the  foreman  not 
to  discharge  so  many.  There  were  about  100  men  in  the  de- 
partment, and  from  35  to  50  were  hired  and  fired  each  month." 

!N'one  can  dispute  the  demoralizing  eifects  on  family  life 
and  community  life  of  the  inhuman  twelve-hour  day.  As  a 
matter  of  arithmetic  twelve-hour  day  workers,  even  if  the 
jobs  were  as  leisurely  as  Mr.  Gary  says  they  are,  have  abso- 
lutely no  time  for  family,  for  town,  for  church  or  for  self- 
schooling,  for  any  of  the  activities  that  begin  to  make  full 
citizenship ;  they  have  not  the  time,  let  alone  the  energy,  even 
for  recreation. 

At  Johnstown  a  member  of  the  Commission  was  ap- 
proached by  a  man  of  middle  age  who  said  that  he  was 
determined  never  to  go  back  to  work  until  the  question  of 
hours  was  settled.  He  gave  as  his  reason  the  fact  that  his 
little  daughter  had  died  within  the  last  few  months ;  he  said 
he  had  never  known  the  child  because  he  was  at  work  when- 


66  REPOET  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

ever  she  was  awake,  or  else  he  was  asleep,  during  the  day 
time.  He  was  determined  that  he  would  know  the  other 
children  and  for  that  reason  felt  that  it  was  imperative  that 
he  should  have  the  eight-hour  day. 

This  man  was  an  American,  getting  good  wages  and  embit- 
tered, not  by  "  outside  agitators  "  but  by  the  facts  of  his  life 
as  he  found  them. 

When  the  Commissioners  spoke  to  President  Williams  of 
the  Carnegie  Company  about  this,  he  smiled  and  said  that  it 
was  very  evident  that  the  man's  case  was  an  exceptional  one 
and  not  to  be  taken  as  typical.  He  did  not  go  on  to  explain 
how  such  a  man  who  worked  from  eleven  to  thirteen  or  four- 
teen hours  a  day  or  a  night  could  secure  time  in  which  to  be 
a  normal  father  to  a  family  of  children. 

Insufficient  evidence  was  gathered  by  the  Commission  to 
pass  any  judgment  on  one  phase  of  the  twelve-hour  day — the 
resultant  rate  of  accidents.  The  accident  rate  in  the  steel 
industry  is,  of  course,  still  high.  After  the  various  criticisms 
of  its  policies  thirteen  years  ago,  and  after  engineers  had 
proved  to  the  companies  the  loss  entailed  by  accidents  and 
especially  after  compensation  laws  threatened  to  make  acci- 
dents pretty  costly  to  the  companies,  the  steel  companies 
began  installing  safety  devices;  the  Steel  Corporation  set  up 
a  Safety  Department  which  has  been  the  recipient  of  many 
medals.  Only  statistics  can  determine  to  what  extent  the 
safety  campaign  is  adequate.  Statistically  steel  still  ranks 
with  mining  for  fatal  accidents.  The  1918  report  of  compen- 
sable accidents  for  the  state  of  Pennsylvania  gives  the  four 
largest  hazardous  industries  as  follows: 

Number  Percent  of  Total 

Mines  and  quarries 23,161  33.13 

Metals  and  metal  products. ..   22,223  31.78 

Public  service   4,985  7.13 

Building  and  contracting. . . .     4,184  5.98 


THE  TWELVE-HOUR  DAY  67 

It  was  surprising,  in  view  of  the  reputation  which  the  Steel 
Corporation  had  been  accorded  for  safety,  to  find  so  large 
a  number  of  strikers  complaining  about  hazards.  They  de- 
scribed with  specificness  menaces  to  limb  or  life,  concerning 
which  they  had  complained  to  foremen  and  superintendents 
month  in  and  month  out  without  avail.  Without  adequate 
statistics  it  was  impossible  to  weigh  the  value  of  these  com- 
plaints just  as  it  was  inadvisable  to  pay  great  heed  to  the 
number  of  crooked-legged  men  always  seen  in  the  streets  of 
a  steel  mill  town. 

Here  is  a  specimen  of  such  complaints,  this  from  a 
worker's  testimony  before  the  Senate  Committee  (Vol.  II, 
pp.  728-9)  : 

Mr.  Colson — I  worked  in  the  mill  in  1913,  in  the  nail  mill. 
I  drew  17%  cents  an  hour.  I  enlisted  in  the  army  during 
the  trouble  in  Mexico  and  from  there  I  was  sent  to  West  Point 
Military  Academy  with  a  detachment  of  Engineers,  and  from 
there  to  Washington,  D.  C,  with  the  First  Battalion  of  Engi- 
neers. From  there  I  went  to  France  and  I  was  one  of  the 
first  fifty  men  that  got  off  the  boat — one  of  the  first  men  in 
France. 

The  Chairman — What  mill  are  you  in? 

Mr.  Colson — The  bloom  mill  at  the  steel  works  at  Donora, 
Pa.;  and,  so  far  as  safety  conditions  up  there  are  concerned, 
a  man  has  no  chance,  because  if  he  ever  slips,  his  hands  are 
greasy  and  the  steps  are  greasy,  and  there  is  no  rail,  and  there 
is  no  chance  for  your  life,  unless  you  jump  out  of  the  window 
and  kill  yourself. 

Senator  Sterling — Did  you  ever  know  of  anybody  slipping 
there  ? 

Mr.  Colson — ^Yes,  sir;  there  was  one  man  who  slipped  and 
fell  off  and  I  got  his  job.  I  took  his  place  as  millwriglit 
helper. 

Chairman — Why  did  you  go  on  strike? 

Mr.  Colson — I  went  out  with  them,  because  I  did  not  get 


68  REPORT  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

satisfaction  from  the  company  in  no  way.  I  had  to  get  down 
on  my  hands  and  knees  and  ask  for  a  job. 

Senator  McKellar — 'What  job  did  you  have  before  you  en- 
listed in  tlie  Regular  Army? 

Mr.  Colson — I  was  in  the  tool  room ;  and  they  said,  '  When 
you  come  back  we  will  give  you  a  good  job.' 

Senator  McKellar — And  when  you  came  back  you  got  44 
cents  an  hour? 

Mr.    Colson — And   longer  hours,  sir. 

The   Chairman — How  long  did  you  work? 

Mr.  Colson — Thirteen  hours  during  the  night  and  11  hours 
during  the  day. 

Ten  years  ago  the  Steel  Corporation  and  all  steel  com- 
panies were  under  fire  because  of  Sunday  work,  the  seven- 
day  week,  the  possible  365-day  year,  chiefly  the  work  on  the 
largest  single  department  of  a  steel  plant,  the  blast  furnace. 
During  the  strike  the  Steel  Corporation  flatly  asserted  that 
that  condition  had  been  reformed  before  the  war  and  that 
although  the  seven-day  week  was  resumed  during  the  war,  it 
was  quite  done  away  with  by  1919.  The  president  of  the 
Carnegie  Steel  Company  and  of  the  Illinois  Steel  Company, 
Corporation  subsidiaries,^  assured  this  Commission  that 
"  seven-day  work  is  all  done  away  with,"  or  where  it  persists, 
as  it  must  in  the  blast  furnace  department,  that  "  the  seven- 
day  week  work  is  a  thing  of  the  past " ;  that  is,  that  blast 
furnace  employees  got  one  day  off  in  seven. 

Mr.  Gary  testified  before  the  Senate  Committee  (Vol.  T, 
p.  179)  :  "  We  decided  to  eliminate  the  seven-day  week  if  we 
possibly  could  and  we  practically  eliminated  it.  At  times 
and  places  there  were  strikes,  because  the  compensation  was 
decreased." 

*  President  Schiller  of  the  National  Tube  Co.  said  that  the  7-day  week 
was  "  indefensible,"  that  his  company  had  none  of  it  but  that  "  most 
other  companies'  blast  furnaces  were  still  on  a  7-day  basis." 


THE  TWELVE-HOUK  DAY  69 

On  January  30,  1920,  in  a  letter  to  the  Commission,  Mr. 
Gary  said : 

"We  have  no  compiled  statistics  in  respect  of  employment 
at  blast  furnaces  which  you  ask  for. 

"  As  to  the  seven-day  week,  however,  beg  to  state  that  prior 
to  the  war  it  had  been  eliminated  entirely  except  as  to  main- 
tenance and  repair  crews  on  infrequent  occasions.  During 
the  war,  at  the  urgent  request  by  government  officials  for  larger 
production,  there  was  considerable  continuous  seven-day  serv- 
ice in  some  of  the  departments.  With  the  close  of  the  war 
this  attitude  was  changed  and  the  seven-day  service  has  been 
very  largely  eliminated.  At  the  present  time  there  is  com- 
paratively little  of  it.  We  expect  to  entirely  avoid  it  very 
shortly." 

Concerning  the  eighteen-,  twenty-four-  or  thirty-six-hour 
shifts  customary  with  the  twelve-hour  day,  especially  at  blast 
furnaces,  Mr.  Gary  could  find  for  the  Senate  Committee  only 
"  82  employees  working  a  continuous  twenty-four  hours  once 
each  month,"  and  "  344  working  continuous  eighteen  hours 
twice  each  month."     (Vol.  I,  p.  202.) 

Analysis  of  all  data  before  the  Commission  proved  that 
conditions  regarding  the  seven-day  week  work  are  radically 
different  from  the  impression  conveyed  by  Mr.  Gary. 

Moreover  the  evidence  showed  this  fact :  that  the  conditions 
concerning  seven-day  week  work  complained  of  and  proved  in 
1910  still  exist  in  the  steel  industry.  The  thing  in  the  situa- 
tion which  needs  explaining  is  not  so  much  whether  these  evil 
and  unnecessary  conditions  exist  today  as  why  they  exist, 
especially  in  the  face  of  the  Steel  Corporation's  asserted  de- 
sire to  better  them. 

The  Commission  of  Inquiry  composed  as  it  was  of  church- 
men, liable  to  a  biased  interest  in  the  observance  of  Sunday, 
for  that  very  reason  attempted  to  confine  its  studies  to  in- 


70  EEPOET  ON  THE  STEEL  STEIKE 

dustrially  important  facts.  Sunday  violation  by  sevenrday 
work  is  a  minor  consideration  compared  to  the  violation  of 
American  life  worked  by  the  twelve-hour  day  even  for  only 
six  days  a  week  throughout  an  industry.  The  seven-day  week 
on  blast  furnaces  and  the  avoidable  Sunday  work  will  go 
when  the  twelve-hour  day  is  eliminated  as  the  industry's 
basis.  The  Commission  tried  not  to  be  unduly  swayed  by 
the  testimony  of  local  preachers  and  priests  over  the  havoc 
wrought  in  their  congregations  by'  the  seven-day  week  worked 
by  members  of  their  congregations.  For  example,  part  of  the 
interrogation  of  the  Rev.  Charles  V.  Molnar,  pastor,  Slovak 
Lutheran  Church  at  Braddock,  Pa.,  by  the  Commission 
reads : 

"My  people  are  on  strike.  They  work  mostly  in  the  Edgar 
Thompson  Works.  Some  are  working  in  Eankin,  and  have 
some  members  in  Homestead  and  Duquesne,  but  most  of  the 
congregation  are  in  Braddock." 

Question — "  Are  practically  all  of  your  members  on  the 
twelve-hour  day?" 

Answer — "  Yes,  some  of  our  men  have  been  working  longer 
than  twelve  hours." 

Question — "Is  there  much  Sunday  work?" 

Answer — "Very  much;  that  is  what  we  suffer  from.  The 
men  would  be  very  glad  to  be  excused  from  Sunday  work,  but 
it  seems  impossible  to  accomplish  anything." 

The  testimony  of  a  Eoman  Catholic  priest  before  the 
Senate  Committee  was  even  more  emphatic.  When  asked 
about  "  the  number  of  times  that  persons  have  omitted  to  go 
to  church  "  (Senate  Testimony,  Vol.  II,  p.  544)  : 

Father  Kazinei — Well,  these  are  from  the  furnaces  in  the 
Braddock  mills.  There  are  nine  furnaces  there,  and  furnaces 
H  and  A  allow  the  men  to  go  to  church  every  second  Sunday. 
The  balance  of  the  nine  furnaces  do  not  allow  their  men  at 


THE  TWELVE-HOUR  DAY  71 

all  to  go  to  church.  Some  get  a  Sunday  off,  joerhaps,  once  in 
six  months ;  but  it  is  not  taking  care  of  their  souls. 

The  Chairman — Do  many  members  of  your  church  congre- 
gation work  on  Sunday? 

Father  Kazinci — Most  of  them  work  on  Sunday;  and  they 
do  not  see  the  inside  of  a  church  more  than  once  in  six  months, 
because  they  are  forced  to  work  on  Sunday. 

What  are  the  simple  statistical  facts  concerning  the 
"  elimination  "  of  seven-day  work  and  the  "  reduction  "  of 
hours  which  according  to  Mr.  Gary  have  been  the  object  of 
such  earnest  effort  by  the  Corporation  ? 

Beginning  by  re-stating  the  comparison  of  hours  in  1910 
when  private  institutions  and  governmental  agencies  began 
the  "great  drive"  against  such  hours,  with  hours  in  1919, 
we  have  (Figures  from  Senate  Document  110  and  October 
Monthly  Keview,  IT.  S.  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics)  : 

Average  steel  week,  1910 67.6  hours 

Average  steel  week,  1919 68.7  hours 

That  is,  ten  years  of  "  reduction  "  has  increased  the  num- 
ber of  hours.  In  this  time  several  "  independent "  concerns, 
such  as  the  Pueblo  plant  and  all  the  Pacific  Coast  plants  have 
adopted  the  eight-hour  day;  the  Corporation's  hours  have 
helped  overbalance  this  "  deficit  "  for  the  total  increase. 

Take  the  figures  for  1914  and  1919 : 

1914  1919 

Common   labor — hours  per  week....   70.3  74. 
Skilled    and    semi-skilled — hours    per 

week 57.  66. 

All  employees — hours  per  week 66.3  68.7 

In  each  classification  the  length  of  the  week  has  increased. 
Take  the  seventy-nine  separate  occupations  in  the  steel  in- 
dustry for  which  statistics  are  given  by  the  U.  S.  Bureau 


72  REPORT  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

of  Labor  Statistics  and  compare  1914  and  1919.  In  eighteen 
classes  hours  have  decreased;  in  four  remained  stationary; 
in  fifty-seven  of  the  seventy-nine  classes  hours  'per  week  have 
increased,  from  a  few  minutes  up  to  fourteen  hours  per  week. 
Blast  furnace  and  open  hearth  laborers  constitute  the 
great  bulk  of  the  eeven-daj  week  workers.  For  all  districts 
the  figures  are : 

1914  1919 

Blast  furnace,  common  labor 70.8  78.9 

Open  hearth,  common  labor 69.5  72.7 

In  one  case  an  increase  of  eight  hours  per  week  or  more 
than  an  hour  per  day  since  1914;  in  the  other  an  increase 
of  three  hours. 

In  the  Pittsburgh  District,  thus  eliminating  the  principal 
eight-hour  independents  and  confining  the  comparison  more 
to  Steel  Corporation  conditions,  the  figures  are: 

1914  1919 

Blast  furnace,  common  labor 73.1  82. 

Open  hearth,  common  labor 71.3  78.5 

Increases  of  nearly  nine  hours  in  one  class  and  over  seven 
in  the  other.  Statistics  from  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics 
Bulletin  218  (Oct.,  1917)  reveal  what  actual  successes  were 
accomplished  by  the  Corporation  in  "eliminating"  seven- 
day  work.  Seven-day  workers  in  blast  furnaces  were:  (p. 
17)  1911,  89  per  cent.;  1912,  82  per  cent.;  1913,  80  per 
cent.;  1914,  58  per  cent. ;  1915,  59  per  cent.  Open  hearths, 
during  the  same  period,  "  about  equally  divided  among  the 
seven-day,  the  seven-day  and  six-day  alternately  and  the  six- 
day  groups."  Even  before  the  war  seven-day  "  eliminating  " 
waited  on  what  "  steel  demand  "  decided.  The  best  year's 
figures  show  that  the  Corporation  never  achieved  even  a  half- 
reform. 


THE  TWELVE-HOUE  DAY  73 

For  1919,  after  the  war,  the  latest  figures  for  blast  fur- 
naces, referred  to  earlier  in  this  report,  mean  not  even  a  real 
attempt  to  reform.  The  figures  were  drawn  from  the  twenty- 
four  representative  establishments'  pay-rolls  and  of  the 
employees  in  the  blast  furnace  department,  totalling  6,315, 
exactly  4,049  were  on  the  flat  eighty-four-hour  week,  i.e. 
seven-day  week.  An  additional  756  were  on  twelve  hours,  six 
days  a  week,  plus  Sunday  work  rcmging  up  to  eleven  hours. 
The  Pittsburgh  section  of  the  twenty-four  plants  had  on 
schedules  below  seventy-two  hours  only  the  following:  1 
laborer  at  60  hours  and  41  laborers  at  66  to  72  hours.  All 
the  rest  of  these  Pittsburgh  blast  furnace  workers  in  twenty- 
four  representative  plants  were  on  the  twelve-hour  day  and 
all  but  485  of  the  5,290  were  on  this  twelve-hour-day  seven 
days  a  week. 

In  the  open  hearth,  where  there  was  no  metallurgical 
excuse  for  seven-day  work,  conditions  were  similar.  In  nine- 
teen representative  establishments  whose  open  hearth  em- 
ployes total  4,702,  2,750  were  on  the  six  and  one-half  or  the 
flat  seven-day  week,  all  on  the  twelve-hour  schedule. 

It  is  in  the  face  of  such  facts,  buried  in  statistics  usually 
unread  by  the  public,  that  Steel  Corporation  officials  from 
Mr.  Gary  down  assured  the  Commission  that  "  seven-day 
work  was  a  thing  of  the  past" 

Such  statements  were  maddening  to  the  strikers.  A  Home- 
stead worker  whose  evidence  happened  to  be  in  the  shape  of 
the  notebook  in  which  he  had  recorded  all  his  hours  and 
"  turns  "  for  eight  months  and  twenty  days  previous  to  the 
strike,  went  to  the  Senate  Committee  hearing  in  Pittsburgh 
to  read  what  the  notebook  showed.    It  showed : 

Hours   worked 2,930 

Number  of  24-hour  turns —  .....        18 

Number  of  days  off ,. . . .        17 


74  REPORT  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

That  is,  he  worked  the  twelve-hour  day  in  ten  and  one-half - 
hour  shifts  by  day  and  thirteen  hours  by  night  for  thirty- 
seven  weeks,  with  the  twenty-four-hour  shift  every  fortnight 
and  one  day  off  every  fortnight.  These  were  the  hours  of  his 
department  in  a  Corporation  mill ;  the  schedule  of  that  de- 
partment allowed  its  employees  seventeen  days  off  out  of  244. 

He  did  not  testify.  He  explained  to  an  investigator  that  he 
saw  what  he  feared  were  Corporation  "  spotters  "  in  the  room. 
He  ovmed  his  home  in  Homestead  and  he  said  he  could  not 
afford  to  testify  and  run  the  risk  of  being  blacklisted. 

Mr.  Gary  began  his  account  of  "  elimination "  to  the 
Senate  Committee  with  the  telegram  sent  by  him  to  the  presi- 
dents of  all  constituent  companies  on  March  18,  1910,  read- 
ing as  follows : 

"Mr.  Corey,  Mr.  Dickson  and  I  have  lately  given  much 
serious  thought  to  the  subject  matter  of  resolution  passed  by 
the  Finance  Committee  April  23,  1907,  concerning  Sunday  or 
seventh-day  labor.  .  .  .  The  object  of  this  telegram  is  to  say 
that  all  of  us  expect  and  insist  that  hereafter  the  spirit  of  the 
resolution  will  be  observed  and  carried  into  effect.  There 
should  and  must  be  no  unnecessary  deviation  v^ithout  first  tak- 
ing up  the  question  with  our  Finance  Committee.  ...  I  em- 
phasize the  fact  that  there  should  be  at  least  twenty-four  con- 
tinuous hours  interval  during  each  week  in  the  production  of 
ingots.  E.  H.  Gary." 

This  "  peremptory  order,"  putting  into  effect  a  resolution 
passed  three  years  before,  was  sent  the  day  after  the  Federal 
Labor  Commission  began  an  investigation  of  seven-day  work 
in  the  Bethlehem  plant  on  an  order  from  Congress;  which 
investigation  was  later  extended  to  Corporation  plants  and 
the  whole  industry. 

Following  this  telegram,  Mr.  Gary  told  the  Senate  Com- 
mittee, "  We  practically  eliminated  it/'  and  he  asserted  that 


THE  TWELVE-HOUR  DAY  75 

the  Corporation  had  now  sufficiently  recovered  from  the  emer- 
gencies of  war  practically  to  re-eliminate  seven-day  work.  To 
what  extent  the  Steel  Corporation  lived  up  to  this  peremptory 
order  even  in  peace  time  can  be  estimated.  In  1916  the  Lacka- 
wanna Steel  Company  in  its  petition  for  exemption  from  the 
one  day  rest  law  of  New  York  State  showed  plainly  what 
Professor  Commons  (who  qnotes  it  in  the  American  Labor 
Legislation  Review,  March,  1917)  calls  "the  futility  of  de- 
pending on  even  the  most  prosperous  of  the  tariff's  bener- 
ficiaries  " : 

"  We  are  advised  that  the  chairman  of  the  United  States 
Steel  Corporation  several  years  ago,  while  labor  conditions  were 
entirely  different  from  those  obtaining  at  the  present  time, 
gave  instructions  quite  peremptory  in  character  to  all  the  sub- 
sidiaries of  that  company  requiring  them  to  follow  out  the 
one  day  of  rest  principle  and  warning  them  that  any  devia- 
tion from  the  published  instructions  would  result  in  dismissal 
from  office.  We  have,  therefore,  directed  our  investigations  to 
these  subsidiaries  and  state,  without  fear  of  successful  con- 
tradiction, that  ihe  corporation  is  now  disregarding  the  one 
day  of  rest  in  seven  principle  which  it  so  strongly  advocated 
several  years  ago  and  which  it  in  the  past,  in  good  faith,  earn- 
estly strove  to  put  into  practice.  It,  too,  has  felt  the  shortage 
of  men,  and  owing  to  the  great  and  pressing  demand  for  its 
product  no  longer  observes  the  practice  which  its  chairman 
promulgated.  Having  taken  so  firm  a  position,  it  is  not  strange 
that  it  is  difficult  to  get  heads  of  subsidiaries  to  admit  that  the 
published  rule  has  become  a  dead  letter.  Wlien  labor  condi- 
tions become  normal  the  corporation  will  doubtless  return  to 
an  observance  of  the  rule.  So  far  as  we  can  ascertain,  the  rule 
was  only  observed  by  the  corporation  during  the  years  when 
the  employees  of  this  company  had  far  more  time  off  than  the 
one  day  of  rest  statute  requires." 

There  is  then  some  basis  for  estimating  the  probable  effi- 
cacy of  what  Mr.  Gary  told  the  Senate  Committee  (Vol.  I, 


76  EEPOET  ON  THE  STEEL  STEIKE 

p.  180)  when  he  assured  the  Senators  that  he  believed  in  the 
eight-hour  day  and  that  he  believed,  "  there  are  a  good  many 
employees,  I  do  not  say  the  majority  or  anything  like  the 
majority,  but  there  are  a  good  many  employees  v^ho  believe 
the  same  thing."  Mr.  Gary  asserted  that  the  Corporation 
was  "  very  carefully  considering  that  question."  He  added : 
"  If  we  can  make  it  practicable  to  develop  the  eight-hour  shift 
throughout  our  works  universally  and  the  men  are  willing  to 
accept  that  basis  we  would  be  very  glad  to  adopt  it  for  the 
reason,  if  for  no  other,  that  we  think  there  is  a  strong  public 
sentiment  in  favor  of  it  and  I  would  not  want  to  be  put  on 
record  here  or  any  other  place  as  against  the  eight-hour  day 
if  the  men  themselves  want  it." 

The  Steel  Corporation  oflFered  but  two  excuses  for  the 
twelve-hour  day  to  the  Commission. 

The  first  was  the  shortage  of  labor.  President  Williams  of 
the  Carnegie  Steel  Company  said  it  would  take  50  per  cent,  or 
26,000  more  workers  to  put  in  three  shifts  on  the  eight-hour 
day  in  the  Carnegie  Steel  Company  (which  employs  55,000 
men).  He  asked:  "And  if  we  could  get  the  labor,  where 
could  we  house  it?  It  would  take  20,000  more  houses." 
Steel  masters  in  general  agreed  with  this  viewpoint  except 
that  Mr.  Gary  wrote  the  Commission  that  only  16%  per  cent, 
more  men  would  be  required. 

On  the  other  hand  it  was  admitted,  even  by  the  steel 
masters  themselves,  that  one  of  the  reasons  why  the  industry 
faced  a  shortage  of  labor  was  "  because  you  can't  get  Ameri- 
cans to  work  the  twelve-hour  day."  The  labor  shortage  in  the 
industry  is  a  problem,  according  to  the  opinion  of  the  steel 
masters  or  of  their  employment  managers,  of  getting  Slavic, 
Greek,  Italian  and  Turk  labor  which  will  work  the  twelve- 
hour  day,  or  even  of  admitting  Chinese  coolie  labor  into  the 
country.  It  was  admitted  that  Americans  dislike  the  slavish 
character  of  common  labor  steel  jobs  as  being  "  hunkie  jobs." 


THE  TWELVE-HOUE  DAY  77 

Despite  this,  inasmuch  as  the  steel  mills  were  once  entirely 
manned  by  Americans,  it  was  admitted  that  a  great  many 
men  would  come  back  to  the  industry  if  the  twelve-hour  day 
were  eliminated. 

But  the  decisive  factor,  setting  aside  all  consideration  of 
the  moral  questions  involved  in  the  twelve-hour  day  and  in 
suggestions  of  flooding  the  steel  industry  with  Balkan  immi- 
grants or  coolie  labor,  lies  in  this  consideration  which,  ac- 
cording to  engineers,  disposes  of  the  labor  shortage  argu- 
ment against  the  eight-hour  day ;  the  steel  requirements  of  the 
country  could  be  met  by  utilizing  all  the  first-class  machinery, 
scrapping  the  rest  and  distributing  the  work  throughout  the 
available  labor  supply  and  throughout  the  year  on  a  three- 
shift  eight-hour  day  basis. 

Engineers'  findings  are:  that  the  steel  industry  being  run 
for  the  making  of  profit  and  not  primarily  for  the  making  of 
steel  as  the  country  needs  it,  favors  (a)  spells  of  idleness 
during  which  the  country  and  the  steel  workers  pay  for  the 
maintenance  of  idle  machinery,  and  later  (b)  spurts  of  long 
hour,  high  speed  labor. 

Here  is  an  analysis  of  steel  production,  made  in  1919  by 
W.  ]Sr.  Polakov,  who  compiled  coal  production  studies  for 
the  Council  of  National  Defense  during  the  war : 

"It  is  a  well-known  fact  that  during  1914  the  mills  were 
running  considerably  below  their  capacity  because  of  an  in- 
dustrial crisis  manifested  in  a  general  business  depression.  Pro- 
duction of  pig-iron  during  the  two  preceding  years  averaged 
thirty  million  tons,  even  at  that  time,  however,  utilizing  less 
than  75  per  cent,  of  the  productive  capacity  of  equipment; 
full  productive  capacity  of  blast  furnaces  in  1914  was  44,405,000 
tons  per  year.  The  fact  that  only  23,300,000  tons  were  'pro- 
duced in  1914  left  nearly  half  of  the  equipment  idle.  A  con- 
sumer of  iron  should  not  be  asked  to  pay  for  the  use  of  fur- 
naces in  which  his  iron  was  not  made  any  more  than  the  tenant 


78  REPORT  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

to  pay  rent  of  the  vacant  apartments  of  his  landlord.  Yet 
exactly  the  same  thing  was  being  done  when  the  overhead 
charges,  rent,  etc.,  amounting  to  $104,052,085,  were  distributed 
on  only  23,000,000  tons,  while  they  should  have  been  spread 
over  44,000,000  tons.  The  consumer  was  asked  to  pay  rent 
at  a  rate  of  $4.47  per  ton  instead  of  only  $2.17.  The  country, 
therefore,  had  to  pay  $2.30  more  for  each  ton  of  pig-iron  than 
it  was  worth  and  than  it  would  have  cost  if  production  had  not 
been  curtailed  by  the  companies.  Total  over-charges,  therefore, 
appear  to  be  about  $53,552,084. 

"  Similarly,  the  capacity  of  steel  mills  was  sufficient  to  pro- 
duce 45,000,000  tons  while  only  about  23,500,000  tons  were 
made.  Were  the  overhead  expenses,  rent,  etc.,  of  only  that 
portion  of  plant  and  equipment  that  was  actually  used  in  the 
production  of  steel  charged  to  consumer,  the  overhead  per  ton 
would  have  been  not  $9.95,  but  only  $5.17,  and  the  country 
would  not  have  had  to  pay  $112,350,000  to  the  steel  makers 
for  the  equipment  the  country  and  the  people  received  no 
benefit  from.  In  other  words,  the  expense  of  idle  plant  equip- 
ment was  charged  to  consumers  of  both  iron  and  steel,  and 
this  item  alone  cost  the  country  $175,009,084." 

The  second  excuse  offered  for  the  twelve-hour  day  was 
this :  that  the  workers  prefer  the  twelve-hour  day. 

This  was  urged  by  the  Corporation's  subsidiary  presidents 
before  this  Commission  just  as  solemnly  as  Mr.  Gary  urged 
it  before  the  United  States  Senate. 

Mr.  Gary  said  "  Let  me  tell  you,  the  question  of  hours 
has  been  largely  a  question  of  wishes,  of  desire  on  the  part 
of  the  employees  themselves." 

Steel  presidents  assured  this  Commission  that  in  a  few 
plants  where  the  three-shift  day  was  inaugurated  the  plants 
lost  their  men  "  because  the  foreigner  wants  to  work  the 
twelve-hour  day,  he  wants  to  make  as  much  money  as  he 
possibly  can."  They  united  in  telling  the  Commission  that 
"  if  the  Corporation  put  in  the  eight-hour  day,  the  '  inde- 


THE  TWELVE-HOUR  DAY  79 

pendents  '  would  steal  all  our  men,  because  they  want  to  work 
the  twelve-hour  day." 

They  stated,  what  there  is  little  reason  to  doubt,  that  some- 
times when  they  tried  to  put  in  a  rule  of  one  day's  rest  in 
seven,  blast  furnace  laborers  would  desert  to  a  seven-day  job 
or  go  to  a  neighboring  plant  and  work  for  that  extra  day  when 
they  were  supposed  to  be  "  off." 

This  whole  argument  is  based  on  what  Mr.  Gary  called 
"  compensation."  Mr.  Gary  himself  said,  "  Of  course  if  we 
should  immediately  limit  hours  to  eight  and  pay  for  the 
eight  hours  the  same  the  men  are  now  getting  for  ten  or 
twelve  hours  every  employee  would  favor  it."  (Senate  Testi- 
mony, Vol.  I,  p.  180.) 

There  seems  to  be  not  the  slightest  disposition  on  the  part 
of  the  Corporation  in  tackling  the  twelve-hour  day  evil  to  go 
at  their  problem  from  this  standpoint:  "What  is  a  wage 
necessary  for  an  American  standard  of  living?  Let  us  pay 
at  least  that  minimum  for  an  eight-hour  day."  Many  pages 
of  the  Steel  Corporation's  testimony  and  hours  of  discussion 
by  presidents  and  plant  superintendents  would  vanish  if  the 
Steel  Corporation  would  consent  to  such  a  basis  of  considera- 
tion of  its  problems.  Of  course  there  are  "  hunkies  "  who 
will  work  just  as  long  as  possible  for  all  the  money  they  can 
get ;  these  are  chiefly  the  immigrants  who  want  to  hurry  back 
to  Europe  to  live  in  comparative  leisure  for  the  rest  of  their 
days.  Are  these  men  to  be  favored  at  the  expense  of  the 
immigrant  who  has  become  an  American,  who  wants  to  stay 
here  with  his  family,  who  is  growing  up  to  American  speech 
and  ways  and  who  wants  to  keep  himself  and  his  money  here 
forever?  This  latter  is  the  immigrant  who  struck  by  the 
tens  of  thousands  against  the  twelve-hour  day;  but  he  looks, 
to  Mr.  Gary,  the  same  as  the  un-American  worker.  Mr. 
Gary  told  the  Senate  Committee  (Senate  Testimony,  Vol.  I, 
p.  183)  :  "  Some  of  the  men  prefer  to  secure  their  own  places 


80  EEPORT  ON  THE  STEEL  STEIKE 

of  residence  and  save  their  money  and  take  it  home — take  it 
abroad.  Of  course  this  is  not  objectionable  from  our  stand- 
point at  all."  But  is  it  not  emphatically  objectionable  from 
the  standpoint  of  American  citizenship? 

Mr.  Gary  propounded  his  question  of  pay,  what  he  called 
twelve  hours  wages  for  eight  hours  work,  as  if  it  could  not 
be  taken  seriously  by  practical  men.  It  is  taken  seriously 
by  his  entire  common  labor  force.  Witnesses  before  the 
Senate  Committee  and  scores  interviewed  in  this  Inquiry 
took  the  stands  set  forth  in  the  following  paragraph  from 
the  diary  of  the  Carnegie  Steel  worker  at  Homestead  in  the 
spring  of  1919 : 

"A  rumor  of  the  coming  eight-hour  day  is  commented  on 
as  follows:  Negro  laborer  says  he  doesn't  see  how  he  can 
get  along  with  only  eight  hours  as  long  as  family  groceries  stay 
up  so  high.  One  of  the  best  first-helpers,  pay  check  $175  to 
$200  every  fifteen  days,  mainly  tonnage,  says  it  would  be  fine; 
it  would  cost  money,  but  it  would  give  him  a  chance  to  get 
the  good  of  being  alive." 

There  in  a  nutshell  are  the  answers  given  by  the  two  main 
parts  of  the  labor  force.  The  upper  third,  consisting  of  the 
skilled  workers  and  upper  half  of  the  semi-skilled,  would 
willingly  accept  a  compromise  cut  in  wages  for  the  sake  of 
the  eight-hour  day.  The  other  and  greater  half,  especially 
the  common  labor  section,  feel  they  must  have  their  present 
pay  when  they  get  the  eight-hour  day.  That  the  Corporation 
recognized  some  reasonableness  in  this  stand  was  evidenced 
when  Mr.  Gary  announced  a  10  per  cent,  raise  for  all  com- 
mon labor  three  weeks  after  the  strike  was  called  off. 

This  Inquiry  hesitated  to  raise  the  issue  as  to  whether 
or  not  the  rates  of  pay  for  the  Steel  Corporation's  common 
labor  are  purposely  kept  low  in  order  to  force  men  to  submit 
to  the  inhuman  twelve-hour  day. 


THE  TWELVE-HOUR  DAY  81 

Progressive  steel  masters  have  fought  the  Corporation's 
twelve-hour  day  for  years.  They  instance  what  is  well 
known,  that  the  actual  work  delivered  toward  the  end  of  the 
twelve-hour  shift,  much  less  the  eighteen,  twenty-four,  or 
thirty-six  hour  shift,  is  nothing  compared  to  the  wear  and 
tear  on  the  workman  delivering  the  lahor.  The  following 
quotation  from  the  diary  of  the  Carnegie  steel  worker  is 
pertinent : 

"  The  twelve-hour  day  for  common  labor  is  impossible.  To 
deliver  heavy  muscular  effort  for  twelve  hours  cannot  be  done. 
The  last  six  hours  is  done  with  a  35  per  cent.  load.  After 
midnight  it  is  a  contest  to  see  who  keeps  out  of  the  boss's  way 
and  does  the  least  work." 

In  sum,  the  twelve-hour  day  is  the  most  iniquitous  of  the 
by-products  of  the  Corporation's  labor  policy;  which  is  to 
get  cheap  labor  and  keep  it  cheap.  The  Corporation  baits 
floating  labor  with  the  wage  possibilities  of  excessive  hours, 
does  nothing  to  combat  the  drainage  of  money  out  of  the 
country  by  the  smaller  fraction  of  the  incorrigibly  un-Ameri- 
can immigrant;  and  for  the  greater  bulk  of  immigrants  who 
want  to  be  Americans  it  imposes  un-American  hours.  In  the 
light  of  thirteen  years'  history  of  "  eliminating  "  the  seven- 
day  week,  the  conclusion  seems  unescapable:  that  the  Steel 
Corporation  moves  to  reform  only  when  it  has  to.  It  must 
be  added  that  if  the  twelve-hour  day  is  bad  for  the  country, 
the  government  is  to  blame  and  as  long  as  it  fails  to  tackle 
the  twelve-hour  day  it  imposes  upon  the  trade  unions  alone 
the  humane  task  of  moving  the  Steel  Corporation  in  the 
direction  of  reform. 

Moreover,  the  conclusion  is  unescapable  that  a  real  cause 
of  the  persistence  of  the  twelve-hour  day  and  the  seven-hour 
week  is  the  defenselessness  of  the  unorganized  immigrant 
worker.  Again  the  government,  as  much  as  the  Steel  Cor- 
poration, is  to  blame  and  again  the  Corporation  and  the 


83  REPORT  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

government  have  seen  fit  to  leave  the  field  of  reform  to  the 
trade  unions. 

In  the  twenty-eight  pages  of  the  Senate  Committee's  Re- 
port on  the  steel  strike  much  space  is  devoted  to  the  need 
for  Americanization.  Only  a  few  lines  were  devoted  to  the 
twelve-hour  day.  But  Americanization  is  a  farce,  night 
schools  are  worthless,  Carnegie  libraries  on  the  hilltops  are 
a  jest,  churches  and  welfare  institutions  are  ironic  while  the 
steel  worker  is  held  to  the  twelve-hour  day  or  the  fourteen- 
hour  night.  Not  only  has  he  no  energy  left,  he  has  literally 
no  time  left  after  working  such  schedules.  He  has  not  even 
time  for  his  own  family. 

The  facts  have  long  been  known.  The  National  Associa- 
tion of  Corporation  Schools,  the  chief  employers'  organization 
for  furthering  workers'  education,  at  its  1919  session  heard 
A.  H.  Wyman  of  the  Carnegie  Steel  Company  of  Pittsburgh 
cite  the  reasons  given  by  immigrant  workers  for  dropping 
out  of  the  nightly  English  classes  for  foreigners  in  the  South 
Chicago  public  schools : 

Fatigue   from  long  hours , 2T 

Change  of  jobs,  unable  to  get  to  school  by  7  P.  M. .... .  36 

Change  from  day  to  night  work 37 

Overtime   work    ,.  69 

Total   169 

That  is,  nearly  fifty  per  cent,  of  the  startlingly  small  group 
of  341  enrolled  out  of  the  tens  of  thousands  in  the  district 
dropped  out  for  reasons  connected  with  hours.  Mr.  Wyman 
did  not  mention  the  relation  of  steel  workers'  hours  to  the 
defeat  of  the  South  Chicago  Americanization  educational 
campaign ;  neither  did  anybody  else  in  the  audience  mention 
it.^ 

The  Committee  of  Senators  investigating  the  strike  heard 
*  Report  National  Association  of  Corporation  Schools,  1919,  p.  493. 


THE  TWELVE-HOUR  DAY  83 

testimony  directly  related  to  this  matter  of  Americanization 
of  which  the  following  is  typical  (Vol.  II,  p.  602)  : 

A.  Pido — Twenty-three  years  old,  an  immigrant  striker,  on 
the  stand. 

The  Chairman — "WHiat  is  the  reason  you  struck  this  time? 

Mr.  Pido — I  strike  on  eight  hours  a  day  and  better  condi- 
tions. 

Senator  McKellar — Wliat  sort  of  conditions  do  you  want 
better  ? 

Mr.  Pido — This  better;  I  think  that  a  man  ought  to  work 
eight  hours  today  and  have  eight  hours  sleep  and  eight  hours 
that  he  can  go  to  school  and  learn  something;  and  I  think  that 
an  education  is  much  better  than  any  money.  I  have  been 
going  to  night  school  in  Clairton  for  a  while. 

The  Chairman — Did  a  good  many  of  the  men  go  to  night 
school  ? 

Mr.  Pido — They  don't  have  any  chance.  They  work  12  hours 
a  day,  and  they  do  not  have  any  chance. 

The  Chairman — How  long  did  you  go  to  night  school? 

Mr.  Pido — I  went  about  twenty  nights  altogether. 

The  Chairman — Is  that  all  of  the  schooling  that  you  hare 
ever  had? 

Mr,  Pido — I  did  not  have  any  chance. 

The  Chairman — How  many  men  went  to  the  night  school? 

Mr.  Pido — Not  very  much.  There  were  about  twenty-three 
altogether. 

The  Chairman — Do  you  think  they  would  go  to  night  school 
if  they  had  an  opportunity? 

Mr.  Pido — I  think  they  would  if  they  had  a  chance  to  go, 
but  the  way  they  are  now  they  have  no  chance  to  go  to  school. 

Another  witness,  a  Slovak  priest  in  Braddock,  testified  aa 
follows : 

Father  Kazinci :  "  We  have  an  Americanization  course  in 
project  taking  place,  and  they  have  been  instructed  to  go  and 
attend  those  night  schools.     They  are  not  a  very  great  success, 


84  HEPOET  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

for  the  simple  reason  that  the  men  are  overworked,  working 
from  10  to  13  hours  a  day;  and  they  do  not  feel  like  going 
to  the  schools  and  depriving  their  families  of  their  own  com- 
pany and  society  even  after  those  hours,  those  long  hours. 
Sundays,  they  have  none,  for  most  of  them  go  off  to  work. 

"  The  men  are  worked  from  10  to  13  hours  a  day.  The 
conditions  under  which  they  are  living  are  bad  for  America. 
The  housing  conditions  are  terrible.  The  work  conditions,  the 
hours  of  work,  are  absolutely  impossible,  and  I  think  that  it 
tends  to  make  the  men  become  disgusted  with  the  country, 
and  they  will  say,  '  Well,  let  us  go  back  to  the  old  country ; 
perhaps  it  is  going  to  be  better  than  it  is  for  us  here.*  There 
is  no  hope  for  them  bettering  their  condition,  for  they  work 
from  the  time  the  whistle  begins  to  blow  in  the  morning  until 
they  are  whistled  out  at  6  o'clock  in  the  evening."  (Vol.  II, 
p.  544-6.) 

Americanization  of  the  steel  workers  cannot  take  place 
while  the  12-hour  day  persists.  Human  beings  un- Ameri- 
canized by  the  12-hour  day  in  such  scores  of  thousands  are 
a  stiff  price  paid  by  America  for  the  profits  of  steel  com- 
panies. 

Recommendations  along  the  following  lines  seem  unescap- 
able : 
That   the   12-hour   day   is    a  barbarism   without  valid   ex- 
cuse, penalizing  the  workers  and  the  country. 
That  the  church  and  every  other  American  institution  has 
a  duty  to  perform  to  the  immigrant  worker  and  that 
this  duty  cannot  be  fulfilled  until  the  12-hour  day  is 
abolished. 
That  effective  elimination  of  the  12-hour   day  must   and 
can  be  initiated  and  worked  out  only  by  (a)  the  IT.  S. 
Steel  Corporation  in  free  cooperation  with  its  workers, 
and  (b)  by  the  Federal  Government. 


IV 
WAGES  m  A  N"0-CONFERENCE  INDUSTRY 

Analysis  of  the  wages  paid  in  the  iron  and  steel  industry, 
together  with  comparisons  with  wages  in  other  industries  and 
with  two  recognized  standards  of  living,  results  in  the  fol- 
lowing conclusions  directly  bearing  on  the  causes  of  the 
strike : 

The  annual  earnings  of  over  one-third  of  all  productive 
iron  and  steel  workers  were,  and  had  been  for  years,  below 
the  level  set  by  government  experts  as  the  minimum  of  subsis- 
tence standard  for  families  of  five. 

The  annual  earnings  of  72%  of  all  workers  were,  and 
had  been  for  years  below  the  level  set  by  government  ex- 
perts as  the  minimum  of  comfort  level  for  families  of  five. 

This  second  standard  being  the  lowest  which  scientists 
are  willing  to  term  an  "  American  standard  of  living,"  it 
follows  that  nearly  thre-e-quarters  of  the  steel  workers  could 
not  earn  enough  for  an  American  stomdard  of  living. 

The  bulk  of  unskilled  steel  labor,  with  exceptions  here- 
after noted,  earned  less  than  enough  for  the  average  family's 
mirdmum  subsistence. 

The  bulk  of  semi-sMlled  steel  workers  earned  less  than 
enough  for  the  average  family's  minimum  comfort. 

Skilled  steel  labor  is  paid  wages  disproportionate  to  the 
earnings  of  the  other  two-thirds,  thus  binding  the  skilled 
class  to  the  companies  and  creating  divisions  between  it  and 
the  rest  of  the  force. 

41.6  per  cent,  of  the  payroll  goes  to  the  skilled,  who  number 
but  30.4  per  cent,  of  the  whole. 

85 


86  REPORT  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

30.6  per  cent,  of  the  payroll  goes  to  the  semi-skilled,  who 
number  31.5  per  cent,  of  the  whole. 

37.8  per  cent,  of  the  payroll  goes  to  the  unskilled,  who,  how- 
ever, are  38.1  per  cent,  of  the  whole.^ 

One-half  of  the  three-quarters  earning  less  than  an  Ameri- 
can living  wage  reached  even  their  wage  levels  only  because 
of  the  twelve-hour  day  with  its  "  14-hour  earnings." 

Wage  rates  in  the  iron  and  steel  industry  are  determined 
by  the  rates  of  the  U.  S.  Steel  Corporation.  The  Steel  Cor- 
poration sets  its  wage  rates,  the  same  as  its  hour  schedules, 
without  conference  (or  collective  bargaining)  with  its  em- 
ployees; it  decrees  them  arbitrarily. 

Mr.  Gary  testified  before  the  Senate  Committee : 

"  I  have  forgotten  how  many  times  we  increased  wages  dur- 
ing the  war,  but  repeatedly,  voluntarily — arhiirarily,  but  arbi- 
trarily in  favor  of  the  workmen."  (Senate  Testimony,  Vol  I, 
p.  226.) 

The  Commission's  data  on  wages  were  furnished  primarily 
by  the  U.  S.  Steel  Corporation.  The  Corporation's  Annual 
Reports,  together  with  more  recent  statistics  supplied  by  Mr. 
Gary  are  here  analyzed  through  the  media  of  the  standard 
government  survey  of  the  industry,  (Senate  Document  110, 
4  vols.),  the  analyses  of  the  U.  S.  Bureau  of  Labor  Statis- 
tics; and  are  checked  by  data  accumulated  by  the  Commis- 
sion's investigators.  Comparison  is  made  with  budgets  of 
expenditures  supplied  by  workers'  families  in  the  Pitts- 
burgh District  and  with  wage  rates  paid  in  similar  industries. 

In  relation  to  the  strike  these  wage  analyses  warrant  the 
following  conclusion: 

1  Figures  derived  from  analysis  of  the  wage  tables  In  Senate  Docu- 
ment 110.  The  proportion  between  the  different  classes  of  workers 
and  other  general  conditions  have  not  changed  vitally  since  then  (1910). 
The  percentages  have  been  carried  out  to  the  decimal  point,  although, 
of  course,  they  represent  no  such  precise  division  in  fact. 


WAGES  IN  NO-CONFERENCE  INDUSTRY         87 

Besides  the  skilled  workers  who  struck  principally  against 
arbitrary  (or  autocratic)  control  and  besides  the  mass 
which  struck  mainly  against  the  12-hour  day,  a  large 
proportion  of  the  unskilled  and  semi-skilled  struck  also 
against  wages  which,  statistics  indicate,  were  actually 
inadequate  to  maintain  an  American  standard  of  liv- 
ing. 

In  regard  to  the  Steel  Corporation's  financial  ahility  to  pay 
higher  wages  than  it  does  the  following  facts  were  noted : 

The  Corporation  increased  its  total  undivided  surplus  from 
$135,204,471.90  in  1914  to  $493,048,201.93  in  1919, 
that  is,  to  a  figure  larger  than  its  total  wages  and  salary 
budget  for  1919. 

Increases  in  wages  during  the  war  in  no  case  were  at  a  sacri- 
fice of  stockholders'  dividends. 

Net  earnings  per  ton  of  steel  in  1918  were  $14.39,  that  is, 
higher  than  the  average  since  1910,  ($13.03).  Net 
earnings  per  ton  of  steel  in  1917  were  $19.76. 

These  conclusions  being  true,  some  explanation  should  be 

made  of  what  would  then  seem  to  be  a  popular  illusion, — 

that  steel  is  a  highly  paid  industry.     The  most  recent  cause 

of  this  illusion  is,  perhaps,  Mr.  Gary's  testimony  on  wages 

before  the  Senate  Committee.     Mr.  Gary  began  his  wage 

list  with  "  rollers,  $32.56  per  day  "  (Senate  Testimony,  Vol. 

I  p.  156).     Although  it  became  quickly  apparent  (ibid.  p. 

159)  ^  that  there  was  only  one  roller  in  the  steel  business 

making  that  $32.56  per  day,  nevertheless,  the  public  at  large 

seems  to  have  accepted  Mr.  Gary's  flat  statement  that  "  the 

Corporation  has  been  in  the  van  all  the  time  "  ^  and  his 

applications  of  this  to  wages,  such  as  the  following : 

'  Mr.  Gary :  "  Senator,  I  believe  there  is  only  one  who  gets  as  high 
as  $32.56." 
=  P.  178. 


88  REPORT  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

Mr.  Gary :  "  I  wish  to  state  that  there  is  no  basic  industry 
in  this  country,  nor  in  the  world,  in  my  opinion,  which  has 
paid  larger  wages  to  its  employees  than  the  United  States  Steel 
Corporation,  and  perhaps  not  as  large.    .    .    . 

"  For  the  year  1914  in  manufacturing  the  wages  were  $2.93 ; 
July,  1919,  $6.27,  an  increase  of  114  per  cent,  ...  all  com- 
panies, 1914,  $2.88;  July,  1919,  $5.99,  an  increase  of  108 
per  cent;  unskilled  labor,  10  hours,  1914,  $2  per  day;  July, 
1919,  $4.62,  an  increase  of  131  per  cent.  Twelve  hours,  in 
1914,  $2.40;  in  July,  1919,  $5.88,  an  increase  of  145  per  cent, 
(p.  158). 

"  We  hare  stood  for  the  highest  wages,  anvariably.  We 
have  been  the  first  to  increase  wages  and  the  last  to  decrease 
them.''     (Senate  Testimony,  Vol.  I,  p.  175.) 

Altogether,  Mr.  Gary's  figure  of  $6.27  per  day  as  the 
average  for  the  "whole  industry,  his  figures  on  wage  increases 
in  hundred  percentages  and  exhibits  of  photographs  of  beauti- 
ful homes  owned  by  steel  "workers,  combined  to  leave  with 
the  public  the  impression  that  "  steel  may  be  mighty  hard 
labor  but  its  wages  are  mighty  big,"  and  that  "  whatever  else 
the  steel  trust  may  be,  it  pays  well."  It  might  not  be  unfair 
to  say  that  the  impression  is  general  that  the  Steel  Corpora- 
tion's reason  for  hiring  24  different  races  of  foreigners  was 
that  they  could  stand  the  hours,  not  that  the  kind  of  wages 
these  foreigners  would  take  had  anything  to  do  with  it 

Another  means  of  misleading  public  opinion  undoubtedly 
was  the  appearance  in  the  press  and  in  magazines  during  the 
strike  of  many  articles  such  as  the  one  entitled  "  Think  of 
the  '  Poor  Steel  Workers '  Who  Get  From  Four  Dollars  to 
Seventy  Dollars  a  Day  "  in  the  Current  Opinion  of  Janu- 
ary, 1920.  The  article  is  taken  from  the  N.  Y.  Sun  and  goes 
on  to  say: 

"  According  to  a  writer  who  has  been  investigating  condi- 
tions in  the  Pittsburgh  steel  mill  district  for  the  New  York 


WAGES  IN  NO-CONFERENCE  INDUSTRY         89 

Sun,  the  worker  on  an  ice  wagon  or  on  a  moving  van  in  any 
large  city  does  more  real  hard  work  in  a  day  than  the  aver- 
age mill  laborer  does  in  two  or  three  days.  .  .  .  Wages  of  from 
$8.26  to  $9  a  day  have  been  made  right  along  by  semi-skilled 
workers,  a  large  nimiber  of  whom  are  foreign  born.  For 
what  are  known  as  skilled  workers  in  the  steel  mills,  to  which 
positions  all  workers  may  aspire  and  many  of  which  are  held 
by  aliens,  the  average  daily  wages  are,  at  this  writing; 

Steel  rollers  $28.16 

Sheet  heaters 21.12 

Roughers    11.92 

Steel  pourers  12.84 

Vessel  men , 14.65 

Engineers,  manipulators,  etc 12.63 

Blooming  mill  heaters ,.  17.92 

Skelp  mill  heaters 18.18 

Skelp  mill  rollers 21.73 

Lap  welders  16.08 

Blowers 13.76 

Bottom  makers 12.91 

Regulators    13.52 

"It  is  stated  authoritatively  that  emploj^ees  of  the  United 
States  Steel  Corporation  now  are  the  highest  paid  body  of  men 
in  the  steel  industry  in  the  world." 

The  list  of  employees  given  above,  "  rollers,"  etc.,  consti- 
tutes a  fraction  of  1  per  cent,  of  all  employees.  Of  these  in 
turn,  the  "  aliens,"  or  immigrants  who  "  may  aspire "  to 
such  jobs,  constitute  a  fraction  of  1  per  cent.  It  was  "  stated 
authoritatively  " — on  behalf  of  steel  companies, — many  times 
during  the  strike  that  steel  workers  were  highly  paid,  on  the 
basis  of  such  citations  as  the  above. 

The  result  was  that  most  persons  had  the  imprecision  that 
"  wages  were  not  an  issue  in  the  strike."  Even  public 
spirited  citizens  who  conferred  with  Mr.  Gary  on  the  strike 


90  REPORT  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

remained  under  this  misapprehension.  Persons  "who  took 
the  trouble  to  mingle  with  strikers,  however,  found  every 
other  man  complaining  of  wages.  Half  the  strikers  inter- 
viewed by  the  Senate  investigating  committee  talked  of  "  low 
wages." 

It  is  entirely  possible  that  the  Steel  Corporation  heads 
sincerely  believe  their  workers  are  well  off^  financially.  'No 
such  analyses  as  the  following  were  obtainable  from  the  Cor- 
poration's statisticians. 

Analysis  shows  that  the  misconception  of  steel  as  a  high 
wage  industry  arises  from: 

(a)  The  existence  of  a  very  small  highly  skilled  and  highly 
paid  body  of  American  workers  prominently  visible  at 
the  top  of  the  industry. 

(b)  Failure  to  realize  that  the  amounts  earned  by  the  low- 
skilled,  (the  bulk  of  the  labor)  are  determined  chiefly 
by  the  extraordinary  long  hours  rather  than  by  a  high 
rate  per  hour. 

That  is :  steel  rates  are  the  same  or  lower  than  in  similar 
industries  if  earnings  are  compared  on  a  basis  of  equal  hours. 
As  regards  common  labor  steel  is  a  low  wage  industry.  Com- 
parison of  common  labor  earnings  in  steel  with  common 
labor  earnings  in  five  other  major  industries  in  the  Pitts- 
burgh district  for  the  latter  part  of  1919  on  the  basis  of  a 
common  standard  week  shows  steel  labor  the  lowest  paid  of 
the  six. 

"  This  class  (common  labor)  is  of  the  greatest  importance 
in  the  industry,  not  only  because  of  the  very  large  propor- 
tion employed,  but  even  more  because  their  wage  forms  the 
base  rate  of  the  entire  industry,  above  which  the  wages  of 
the  other  employees  are  graded."  (Senate  Document,  110, 
Vol.  I  p.  xxxix.)  This  finding  of  the  Labor  Department's 
famous  study  of  the  steel  industry  in  1910  is  admittedly  true 
today.     The  steel  wage,  as  well  as  the  organization  of  the 


WAGES  IN  NO-CONFERENCE  INDUSTEY         91 

steel  business,  (see  next  section  of  this  report)  is  pyramided 
on  a  broad  and  tremendous  base  of  common  labor,  restlessly 
drifting  and  with  a  high  turnover  while  the  industry  is  held 
together  by  the  tight  and  almost  unbreakable  skilled  organi- 
zation at  the  apex.  Yet  the  high  pay  rates  at  the  top  depend 
largely  on  the  rates  which  the  mass  at  the  bottom  are  will- 
ing to  take. 

True  understanding  of  the  wage  complaints  of  thousands  of 
steel  workers  depends  on  analyzing  the  huge  wages  budget 
of  the  Corporation  to  show  how  the  earnings  are  divided.  It 
is  no  comfort  to  the  underpaid  worker  to  learn  that  the 
Corporation  paid  in  wages  and  salaries  for  1918,  $452,663,- 
524. ;  and  for  the  first  eight  months  of  1919,  to  manufacturing 
employees,  $255,861,264.  The  following  figures  make  the 
matter  plainer  than  gigantic  totals,  though  the  figures  are 
based  on  the  totals,  which  include  many  salaries  in  the 
administrative  force,  admittedly  larger  than  the  run  of  pro- 
ducing employees'  wages.  (Reference  is  made  to  tables  in 
sub-reports.)  These  figures  are  maxima,  too  high  to  be  rep- 
resentative. The  figures  cover  approximately  the  union  or- 
ganizing period  of  a  year  before  the  beginning  of  the  strike, 
September  22,  1919. 

In  1918  the  the  Corporation's  wage  and  salary  budget  "  for 
the  manufacturing  properties,"  $344,907,626  went  to  the 
198,968  employees  as  follows: 

60,486  skilled  (30.4  per  cent,  of  all)  got  41.6  per 

cent.,   or $143,581,571 

62,675  semi-skilled  (31.5  per  cent,  of  all)  got  30.6 

per  cent.,   or    105,531,733 

75,807  unskilled  (38.1  per  cent,  of  all)  got  27.8 
per   cent,   or 95,884,320 

In  1919  the  Corporation's  wage  and  salary  budget  ($255,- 
861,264  for  eight  months)  went  to  191,000  employees  as  fol- 


92  EEPORT  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

lows :  (eight  months  budget  multiplied  by  50  per  cent,  for  an 
annual  basis) : 

58,064  skilled  (30.4  per  cent,  of  all)  got  41.6 
per  cent.,  or  $159,657,328 

60,165  semi-skilled  (31.5  per  cent,  of  all)  got  30.6 
per  cent.,  or  117,440,320 

72,771  unskilled  (38.1  per  cent,  of  all)  got  27.8 
per  cent.,  or  106,694,145 

That  is,  individual  average  earnings  were  not  higher  than 
as  follows,  since  the  above  totals  contain  administrative 
salaries : 

In  1918: 

Skilled  annual  earnings  averaged  under $2,373 

Semi-skilled  annual  earnings  averaged  under. .     1,683 

Unskilled  annual  earnings  averaged  under 1,265 

In  1919: 

Skilled  annual  earnings  averaged  under $2,749 

Semi-skilled  annual  earnings  averaged  under. .     1,952 
Unskilled  annual  earnings  averaged  under. . . .     1,468 

With  this  must  be  compared  what  the  workingman  is 
always  comparing  with  his  wage — his  cost  of  living.  Before 
taking  up  detailed  discussion  of  standards  of  living,  it  will 
be  convenient  to  set  down  here  brief  definitions  of  two  stand- 
ards, (disregarding  a  third  commonly  called  the  pauper  line, 
because  the  latter  has  not  been  defined  with  scientific  exacti- 
tude comparable  to) — (1)  the  minimum  subsistence  level,  and 
(2)  the  minimum  comfort  level)  both  for  families  of  five. 

These  standards,  derived  from  the  most  exhaustive  extant 
analysis  of  cost  of  living  statistics,  incorporated  in  govern- 
ment reports  and  used  in  government  wage  awards,  are  defined 
as  follows: 


WAGES  m  NO-CONFEKENCE  INDUSTEY         93 

1.  The  minimum  of  subsistence  level.  This  is  based  essen- 
tially on  animal  well-being,  with  little  or  no  attention  to  the 
comforts  or  social  demands  of  human  beings. 

2.  The  minimum  comfort  level.  This  is  somewhat  above 
that  of  mere  animal  subsistence,  providing  in  some  measure 
for  comfortable  clothing,  insurance,  a  modest  amount  of  rec- 
reation, etc.  This  level  provides  for  health  and  decency,  but 
very  few  comforts,  and  is  probably  much  below  the  idea  had 
in  mind  in  the  frequent  but  indefinite  expression,  "  the  Ameri- 
can standard  of  living." 

In  other  words,  these  standards  applied  to  families,  mean 
first,  the  level  at  which  a  wage-earner  can  keep  himself  and 
his  dependents  healthfully  alive;  second,  the  lowest  level  at 
which  scientists  would  be  willing  to  put  "  the  American 
standard  of  living."  (The  detailed  calculations  of  these  stand- 
ards, chiefly  on  the  basis  of  the  work  done  for  the  govern- 
ment by  Prof.  W.  F.  Ogburn,  the  best  known  American 
authority  on  costs  of  living  statistics,  will  be  set  forth  later 
in  an  appendix.) 

It  must  be  noted  that  as  standards  for  wages,  these  levels 
are  bitterly  protested  by  organized  labor.  The  whole  princi- 
ple of  limiting  wage  rates  to  their  relation  to  bare  standards 
of  subsistence  or  of  minimum  comfort  has  been  denounced 
again  and  again  by  Mr.  Gompers.  The  following  figures 
therefore  may  be  considered  simply  at  the  rock  bottom  of 
calculation  for  those  who  wish  to  grasp  the  meaning  of  exist- 
ing wage  rates,  not  as  representing  rates  which  organized 
labor  considers  just. 

For  1918,  Family  of  Five  (June) 

Minimum  of  subsistence  level , $1,386 

Minimum   of   comfort  level 1,760 

For  1919,  Family  of  Five  (August) 

Minimum  of  subsistence  level $1,575 

Minimum  of  comfort  level 2,024 


94  REPOET  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

These  figures, — which  are  hammered  down  to  the  most 
conservative  possible  levels — may  be  compared  with  the 
(highest  possible)  individual  averages  based  on  the  Corpora- 
tion's payrolls  above,  as  follows: — 

1918  1919 

Minimum  of  comfort  level $1,760  $2,024 

Minimum  of  subsistence  level , 1,386  1,575 

Unskilled  labor's  annual  average 1,265  1,466 

That  is,  in  1918,  the  unskilled  worker's  annual  earnings 
were  more  than  $121  below  the  minimum  of  subsistence 
level  and  more  than  $495  below  the  "  American  standard  of 
living  "  for  families. 

In  1919  the  unskilled  worker's  annual  earnings  were  mpre 
than  $109  below  the  minimum  of  subsistence  level  and  more 
than  $558  below  the  "  American  standard  of  living." 

Comparing  the  semi-skilled  earnings  and  the  minimum  of 
comfort  level: 

1918  1919 

Minimum  of  comfort  level $1,760  $2,024 

Semi-skilled  labor's  annual  average 1,683  1,952 

That  is,  in  both  years  the  semi-skilled's  annual  earnings 
Were  below  the  lowest  "  American  standard  of  living "  for 
families. 

These  two  groups,  unskilled  and  semi-skilled,  comprise  72 
per  cent,  of  all  manufacturing  iron  and  steel  workers. 

If,  leaving  average  annual  earnings  for  a  moment,  com- 
parison is  made  between  (a)  the  two  standards  of  living  cited 
and  (b)  the  wages  of  those  groups  of  workers  whose  highest 
earnings  just  fail  to  reach  these  standards,  the  following 
curious  and  significant  revelation  results.  That  is,  the  labor 
force  of  191,000  men  for  1919  can  be  classified  by  grada- 
tions upward,  beginning  with  the  group  earning  $3.36  a  day 
or  approximately   $1,000   a  year,   then   the  group   earning 


WAGES  IN  NO-CONFEEENCE  INDUSTRY         95 

$1,200,  then  $1,300,  etc.  The  level  at  which  $1,575  (the 
minimum  of  subsistence  standard)  appears  in  this  classifi- 
cation leaves  just  38  per  cent,  of  the  workers  below  it.  If 
the  classification  is  continued  on  upward,  through  $1,600 
annually,  $1,700,  $1,800,  etc.,  the  level  at  which  $2,024 
(the  minimum  of  comfort  standard)  appears  leaves  just  72 
per  cent,  of  the  workers  below  it.  But  38  per  cent,  marks 
the  limit  of  unskilled  labor  and  72  per  cent,  the  limit  of 
semi-skilled. 

That  is,  as  if  by  the  workings  of  a  law,  all  in  the  unskilled 
class  fall  just  short  of  the  level  of  living  to  which  common 
labor  ordinarily  feels  it  is  entitled  and  should  attain, — the 
level  of  a  healthful  animal  existence.  And  all  in  the  semi- 
skilled class  (workers  in  steel  jobs  usually  from  1  year  to  5 
years  or  more)  fall  just  short  of  the  level  of  living  to  which 
more  steady  workers  feel  they  ought  to  attain — the  level  of 
decency  and  at  least  a  few  comforts. 

Such  a  "  law  "  might  be  put  thus :  that  the  "  labor  market," 
if  left  only  to  "  supply  and  demand,"  uninfluenced  by  trade 
union  or  other  forces,  tends  to  leave  the  top  level  of  possible 
earnings  for  each  class  of  worker  just  out  of  reach.  Each 
class  of  worker  must  always  be  striving  for  the  level  of 
livelihood  which  seems  "  due  "  him  and  always  be  just  short 
of  it.    He  must,  therefore,  always  be  working  his  hardest. 

The  worker  is,  therefore,  by  the  workings  of  such  unre- 
stricted industrialism,  "  speeded  "  to  the  limit  by  the  hope 
of  attaining  the  standard  which  seems  surely  attainable. 
Employers  capitalize  the  situation,  partly  consciously, — "  if 
you  pay  'em  too  much,  they  won't  work  " — and  partly  un- 
consciously, by  making  each  wage  raise  just  enough  to  meet 
"  increased  costs  of  living."  Consciously,  employers  have 
utilized  this  "  law  "  to  speed  workmen  by  skilfully  adjust- 
ing reductions  in  piece-rates  of  payment  to  increases  in  out- 
put.   This  is  the  practice  of  "  increasing  output  by  '  shaving ' 


9e  EEPOET  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

rates,  a  method  raised  to  perfection  by  the  steel  trust,"  ^  as 
observed  by  Prof.  Carleton  Parker  in  1914. 

The  wage  averages  given  above,  it  should  be  noted  again, 
■were  based  on  the  money  actually  palid  out.  The  true  aver- 
ages for  each  class  of  work,  therefore,  could  not  be  over 
the  figures  given.  How  much  lower  than  the  given  averages 
the  true  averages  should  be  is  hard  to  determine.  It  depends 
mainly  on  the  extent  to  which  the  Steel  Corporation  has 
lumped  into  its  totals  for  wages  for  the  labor  force,  the  sums 
spent  for  salaries  for  the  great  office  and  administrative  or- 
ganizations. That  these  have  been  lumped  in  is  obvious ;  * 
but  to  what  extent  can  only  be  estimated.  Besides  the  adminis- 
trative salaries  which  must  be  paid  out  of  the  industry's 
productiveness,  there  are  such  items  as  the  thousands  of 
"  plant  police "  and  other  adjuncts  of  anti-union  policies, 
whose  pay  must  also  be  earned  by  the  productive  steel  workers. 
This  percentage  of  deduction  for  administrative  overhead, 
etc.,  should  be,  judging  by  the  only  statistics  available,  about 
9  per  cent.  In  1910  the  indicated  average  for  all  Steel 
Corporation  employees,  obtained  by  di^dding  the  given  total 
payroll  of  $174,995,130  by  the  218,435  employees,  was  $801 
per  man  annually.  But  the  actual  average  annual  earnings, 
as  determined  by  the  government's  exhaustive  survey  of  that 
year,  were  about  $726  per  man,  or  9  per  cent,  below  the 
Steel  Corporation's  indicated  average.  In  1919  the  Cor- 
poration's indicated  average,  obtained  by  dividing  the  given 
manufacturing  plant  payroll  by  the  number  of  manufacturing 
employees,  was  $2,009  per  man.     If  this  "  manufacturing 

*  "  The  Technique  of  American  Industry,"  Atlantic  Monthly,  Jan.,  1920. 

•  The  fact  is  plainly  indicated  by  analysis  of  the  figures  cited  by  Mr. 
Gary  to  the  Commission  in  the  letter  of  Jan.  30.  This  gives  $344,907,- 
626,  as  the  "  total  payroll  "  for  "  the  employees  of  the  manufacturing 
plants."  If  this  excluded  administrative  salaries,  etc.,  these  salaries 
should  raise  unduly  the  average  annual  wage  for  the  rest  of  the  Cor- 
poration's 70,000  employees.  Instead  the  average  for  the  remaining 
70,000  is  $200  lower  than  the  average  given  as  for  "  the  employees  of 
the  manufacturing  plants  "  alone. 


WAGES  IN  NO-CONFEEENCE  INDUSTEY         97 

payroll "  contains  the  same  proportion  of  overhead  as  the 
Corporation's  customary  "  total  payroll,"  as  seems  to  be  true, 
this  average  of  $2,009  should  be  9  per  cent,  too  high  as  a 
true  average.  But  the  $Y26  true  average  of  1910,  increased 
by  150  per  cent.,  (the  actual  increase  in  iron  and  steel  wages 
according  to  government  reports  ^)  would  be  $1,815  and  this 
is  also  just  9  per  cent,  below  the  Corporation's  indicated 
average.  This  would  mean  that  the  true  average  annual  earn- 
ings of  iron  and  steel  workers  for  1918  and  1919  would  be  as 
follows : 

1918  1919 

Unskilled $1,153  $1,335 

Semi-skilled 1,534  1,777 

Skilled  2,178  2,502 

That  is,  if  a  survey  were  made  of  company  payrolls,  it 
would  probably  indicate  the  above  as  the  actual  average 
earnings  of  steel  workers.^ 

These  facts,  then,  should  be  borne  in  mind  in  consider- 
ing the  following  recapitulating  table.  The  above  averages 
are  probably  much  truer  estimates  of  actual  annual  earn- 
ings than  the  averages  given  below  which,  on  the  com- 
panies' own  statistics,  are  maxima.  The  true  averages  for 
semi-skilled  and  unskilled  are  farther  below  the  standards 
of  living  than  this  table  indicates: 

1918  1919 

Skilled $2,373  $2,749 

Minimum  of  comfort   ,. 1,760  2,024 

Semi-skilled 1,683  1,952 

Minimum  of  subsistence  1,386  1,575 

Unskilled 1,265  1,466 

^  Increase  in  average  hourly  earnings  1910  to  1919  is  150  per  cent. 
Bulletins  U.  S.  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics  No.  218  and  Monthly  Labor 
Review,  November,  1919,  p.  192. 

*  An  increase  of  10  per  cent,  for  common  labor  with  proportionate 
adjustments  for  skilled  was  granted  by  the  U.  S.  Steel  Corporation 
at  the  close  of  the  strike.  This  was  immediately  met  by  tncreasea 
from  the  independent  companies. 


98  EEPORT  ON  THE  STEEL  STEIKE 

In  each  of  two  classes,  in  each  year,  the  average  earnings 
were  below  the  standard  of  living  which  each  class  normally 
feels  to  be  the  least  "  due  "  him.  How  far  one  class,  common 
labor,  was  below  the  minimum  comfort  or  lowest  "  American 
standard  of  living  "  was  striking. 

For  many  years  this  was  so  in  the  industry;  decency,  or 
comfort,  just  out  of  reach,  for  two-thirds  of  the  workers. 
Therefore  many  strikers,  who  looked  blank  at  mention  of 
"  Bolshevism  "  and  who  knew  little  even  of  the  A.  F.  of  L., 
insisted  on  talking  a  great  deal  about  wages  to  this  Com- 
mission's investigators  and  to  the  Senate  Committee. 

Such  were  the  hard  facts  of  which  all  but  skilled  steel 
workers  were  more  or  less  conscious  year  in,  year  out.  They 
realized  that  by  the  long  day,  and  its  overtime  they  could 
earn  considerable  sums,  but,  what  with  exhaustion  due  to 
overwork  and  what  with  lay-offs  due  to  shut-downs,  the  an- 
nual income  was  disappointing.  Though  they  were  laid  off, 
they  must  eat  and  their  families  be  kept  alive.  Iron  men, 
with  plants  running  full  time,  could  earn  much  more  than 
the  $24.32  (1918)  or  the  $28.19  (1919)  maximum  weekly 
averages  actually  paid  to  common  labor  in  those  years.  For 
example,  the  following  is  an  Open  Hearth  gang  actual  sched- 
ule for  a  Pittsburgh  District  plant,  July,  1919 : 

Hours:  ten-hour  day,  fourteen-hour  night 
(Alternate  6-day  and  7-day  week) 

Weekly  Rate 

Common  lahor    . , .  imskilled    $35.28    $     .42 

Pit    unskilled    36.12    43 

Third-Helper    ....semi-skilled   ...   45.00   (6  wks.  to  learn)        .45 

Second-Helper    ...skilled    45.00   (8  mo.-2y2  yrs.)  .      7.00  a  day 

First-Helper   skilled    69.00    10.07  plus 

tonnage 
($lor$2) 
17  (hours)  X  45  (cents)  X  6  (days)  =  night  week 
11         "         X  45        "        X  6       "       4-  (32  X  45)  =  day  week 

The  mathematics  of  overtime  for  the  semi-skilled  man  at  the  end 
illustrates  the  story.  This  Third-Helper  makes  his  total  on  his  "  night 
week,"  14  hours  for  6  nights,  by  multiplying  his  hourly  4.1  cents  by 
17  hours  by  6.  He  makes  his  "day  week"  total  by  multiplying  45 
cents  by  11  hours  by  6  plus  one  24  hour  turn,  or  (overtime  pay,  32  hours 
in  all),  $14.40. 


WAGES  IN  NO-CONFEEENCE  INDUSTRY         99 

If  this  semi-skilled  man  kept  this  up  for  52  weeks  ho 
would,  being  allowed  only  26  days  rest  in  all  that  year  of 
12-hour  days,  earn  $2,340  or  $216  over  the  minimum  of 
comfort  level  for  1919.  And  if  the  common  laborers  who 
Tnahe  up  49  per  cent,  of  Open  Hearth  employees,  worked 
this  12-hour  schedule  for  all  but  26  of  the  365  days  in  the 
year,  they  would  still  be  nearly  $200  below  the  lowest 
"  American  standard."  But  few  men  can  stand  it  and  few 
plants  run  without  a  lay-off, — many  are  "  down  "  from  8 
to  20  weeks  a  year,  and  the  years'  earnings  are  never  "  full 
time."  Thus  common  labor's  income  is  annually  below 
healthful  existence  for  families. 

It  is  these  possibilities  of  overtime  on  12  to  24-hour  shifts 
which  give  to  steel  jobs  the  reputation  of  "  high  pay  "  which 
they  actually  enjoy  among  a  considerable  class  of  husky 
unmarried  immigrant  workers.  This  touches  one  of  the 
real  reasons  why  the  12 -hour  day  has  persisted  in  the  steel 
industry:  30  per  cent  of  steel  workers  are  umnarried,  with 
no  responsibilities  and  with  the  strength  and  desire  to  pile 
up  as  much  as  they  can  for  a  few  weeks  or  months,  then 
''  lay  off  "  to  enjoy  life  or  take  an  "  easy  job  "  until  "  broke." 
From  this  30  per  cent,  the  steel  companies  recruit  their  12- 
hour  gang  in  considerable  part,  irrespective  of  whether  the 
development  of  such  intermittent  working  is  good  for  the 
industry  or  the  community.  The  long  overtime  constitutes 
the  bait  to  this  class  and  to  many  a  simple  foreign  laborer 
who  sees  what  one  day  can  bring  in  but  not  what  the  years 
do  bring  in,  to  him  and  his  class.  Moreover  68  per  cent,  of 
the  "  foreigners  "  are  married,  with  an  average  of  6.63  mem- 
bers to  each  household,  and  81  per  cent,  of  the  "  foreigners  " 
in  the  industry  are  paid  the  unskilled  or  semi-skilled  wage 
rates.  These  married  and  familied  "  foreigners  "  are  the 
ones  who  desire  to  keep  their  money  and  themselves  here,  to 
be  "  Americans ;"  and  these  are  the  immigrants  most  worth 


100  REPOKT  ON  THE  STEEL.  STKIKE 

while  and  yet  most  penalized  by  steel's  long  hours  and  un- 
American  wage  rates. 

It  must  be  noted  too  that  15  per  cent,  of  immigrant  steel 
workers  have  families  of  ten  members  or  over;  of  the  Croa- 
tians  37  per  cent,  have  families  of  10  or  over;  of  the  Mag- 
yars, 21  per  cent.  With  large  families,  with  the  unskilled 
jobs  where  the  "  lay  offs  "  strike  first  in  slack  times,  with 
the  communities  such  that  none  other  than  steel  jobs  are 
near,  with  the  work  such  that  "  old  age  at  forty  "  is  its  watch- 
word, the  average  immigrant  steel  worker,  after  a  dozen 
years  at  it,  often  finds  himself  contemplating  not  the  "  long 
overtime "  which  first  tempted  him  but  actual  conditioni 
nearer  the  following: 

This  is  the  official  family  budget  and  verbal  report  made 
by  the  Home  Service  Division  of  the  Pittsburgh  Red  Cross 
for  the  only  case  of  relief  growing  out  of  the  strike  that  had 
come  to  it  by  November  26,  1919.  (The  question  of  helping 
a  stAher  was  the  subject  of  very  serious  debate  by  the  Pitts- 
burgh Red  Cross.) 

Polish  worker  living  in  Braddock,  employed  by  American 
Steel  and  Wire  Company.  Father,  mother,  and  nine  children. 
Oldest  boy,  21,  was  making  about  $60  a  month,  went  into  army 
eervice. 

Father,  42,  common  laborer,  was  making  $80  to  $90  a  month 
on  the  average.  His  employment  was  irregular,  although  his 
foreman  reported  that  he  was  a  good,  steady  workman  and 
worked  every  day  there  was  a  job.  Last  summer  his  monthly 
earnings  went  up,  being  $129  in  July,  and  $118  in  August. 
There  is  no  record  of  the  family  ever  having  been  a  charity 
case. 

Another  boy  makes  about  $15  per  month,  and  some  of  the 
girls  occasionally  pick  up  some  money. 

The  father  went  on  strike;  since  the  strike  he  has  applied 


WAGES  IN  NO-CONFERENCE  INDUSTRY       101 

for  other  jobs  and  was  refused  them  because  he  belongs  to  the 
union.     At  length  he  got  a  Job  on  a  government  dam. 

Minimum  Budget  for  the  above  family  of  father,  mother 
and  eight  children,  worked  out  specially  with  reference  to  the 
special  needs  of  the  family  for  milk,  medicine,  etc.: 

Rent    $  20.00 

Food    101.65 

Clothing 43.00 

Fuel 3.00 

Spending  money   5.00 

Medicine 4.00 

Education .60 

Polish  tuition 1.50 

Insurance   2.00 

Recreation 1.00 


$180.75 
Family  income  in  normal  times. . . .     143.00 


Actual     relief     needed     before     the 
strike $  37.75 

Comment :  Almost  any  ordinary  workman's  family  has  a  hard 
time  to  get  along  at  present  prices.  The  worst  problem  is  hous- 
ing. Not  only  are  rents  high,  but  there  is  an  absolute  shortage 
of  fit  housing. 

In  this  case  the  "  decency  budget "  set  hy  local  authorities 
was  $2,168  a  year,  or  over  $700  more  than  the  average 
actual  earnings  of  common  labor  for  that  period;  and  over 
$1,000  more  than  the  average  earnings  of  the  father  himself. 

Before  making  detailed  comparisons  with  costs  of  living, 
reference  should  be  made  to  the  other  of  the  two  comparisons 
which  the  steel  worker  is  always  making  in  regard  to  his 
wages — the  comparison  with  the  wages  of  his  neighbor  miner, 
builder,  railroader,  etc.    Detailed  comparisons  of  hours  and 


102  KEPOET  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

wages  in  nine  industries  are  given  in  Appendix  B,  based  on 
the  "  earnings  per  full  week,"  not  on  the  actual  annual  earn- 
ings. With  this  is  a  comparison  of  weekly  earnings  in  six 
principal  industries,  besides  steel,  in  the  Pittsburgh  District, 
on  the  basis  of  a  common  standard-length  week.  The  earn- 
ings of  (1)  steel  workers,  (2)  bituminous  coal  miners,  (3) 
metal  trades,  (4)  railroad  employees,  (5)  building  trades, 
(6)  street  railwaymen,  (Y)  printers,  are  compared  on  the  basis 
of  the  same  week  for  all,  in  this  case  a  44-hour  week.^  In  the 
comparison  steel  earnings  due  to  overtime  for  the  customary 
excessive  hours  are  averaged  in,  but  even  so  the  following 
facts  are  brought  out: 

Comparative  earnings  for  4:4:-hour  week  at  prevailing  hourly 
rates  (Pittsburgh  District,  1919)  : 

Common  labor — 

Iron  and  steel $21.12 

Bituminous  coal 25.30 

Building  trades 

Building  laborers    $22.00 

Hod  carriers 30.80 

Plasterers'  laborers 30.80 

Average  for  laborers 27.85 

The  comparison  makes  it  plain  that  steel  common  lahor  has 
the  lowest  rate  of  pay  of  the  trades  for  which  there  are 
separate  statistics  for  laborers.  The  two  principal  factors  to 
be  considered  in  the  comparison  are,  of  course,  (a)  seasonal 
influences;   (b)  unionism. 

Excluding  laborers  the  main  comparisons  run  as  follows: 
(still  on  44-hour  week  basis)  : 

Iron  and  steel — 

Skilled  and  semi-skilled $38.32 

*  It  could  be  any  week  for  the  purposes  of  comparison,  44-hour  week, 
90-hour  week,  120-hour  week;  the  comparison  would  result  the  same. 


WAGES  IN  NO-CONFEEENCE  INDUSTRY       103 

Bituminous  coal  miners — 

Hand  miners •  .  34.50 

Machine  miners 41.67 

Metal  trades — 

Blacksmiths 30.80 

Iron  molders 33.00 

Eailroad  employees — 

Machinists 31.68 

Boilermakers 31.68 

Building  trades — 

Bricklayers 49.50 

Carpenters  . 39.60 

Painters    38.50 

Structural  iron  workers 44.00 

Street  railwaymen 23.76 

Printers — 

Newspaper  linotypers   38.50 

Newspaper  compositors 33.88 

Book  and  job 26.58 

With  this  should  be  noted  the  average  for  all  steel  workers 
— $32.02 ;  the  whole  comparison  makes  plain  why  steel  work- 
ers found  that  steel  rates  of  pay  were  not  "  high  "  when  com- 
pared with  similar  industries ;  that  "  high "  earnings  in 
steel  plants  were  due  principally  to  long  hours.  Steel  work- 
ers often  carried  the  comparisons  on  to  the  causes  of  differ- 
ences :  e.g.  to  comparisons  of  the  amounts  of  time  lost  by  un- 
employment in  steel,  building,  mining,  etc.;  and  to  the  fact 
that  the  building  trades,  street  railways,  railroads  and  mines 
were  more  or  less  completely  unionized  and  steel  not  at  all. 

A  first  and  foremost  item  in  living  costs,  conditioned  by 
wages,  is  housing.  This  Inquiry  for  adequate  reasons  did 
not  go  extensively  into  two  phases  of  housing:  (a)  the  Steel 
Corporation's  housing  provisions;  (b)  comparison  of  present 
conditions  with  findings  of  investigations  of  a  dozen  years 

o. 
(a)  The  Steel  Corporation  testimony  on  the  houses,  includ- 


104  EEPORT  ON  THE  STEEL  STEIKE 

ing  whole  towns,  built  for  workmen  and  leased  at  low  rentals, 
takes  up  over  ten  pages  in  the  Senate  Investigating  Com- 
mittee's record.  It  includes  the  millions  expended  for  this 
purpose  and  this  item  as  a  total  (Vol.  I,  p.  192)  : 

Dwellings  and  boarding  houses  constructed  and  leased 
to  eniployees  at  low  rental  rates , 25,965 

But  most  of  these  houses,  it  was  well  known,  were  for  the 
Corporation's  miners,  erected  in  hitherto  uninhabited  regions 
where  towns  had  to  be  built  before  mining  could  go  on. 
Inquiry  of  the  Corporation  determined  the  fact  that  less  than 
10,000  of  these  houses  were  available  for  steel  workers.  The 
facts  were  simple : 

Total  employees  at  manufacturing  plants 191,000 

Total  Corporation  houses  near  plants ,. ., 10,000 

Employees  not  company-housed , 181,000 

That  is,  181,000  steel  workers  had  just  as  much  chance  to 
get  a  Corporation-built,  low-rental  house  as  they  had  to  get 
Mr.  Gary's  Niew  York  mansion.  Moreover  most  of  the 
10,000  houses  were  occupied  by  "  American  "  workers. 

(b)  A  dozen  years  ago  the  Pittsburgh  Survey  revealed 
conditions  of  housing  of  steel  workers  which  shocked  public 
opinion  and  which,  Pittsburgh  authorities  state,  have  been 
improved  practically  not  at  all  since  then.  It  was  impossible 
to  conduct  another  such  exhaustive  housing  survey  in  this 
investigation  but  sufficient  observation  was  made  to  bear  out 
the  local  statement,  that  housing  was  as  bad  as  ever.  The 
U.  S.  census,  taken  in  January,  1920,  should  reveal  com- 
plete statistics  of  conditions.  The  census  takers  found  in 
Braddock,  for  example,  that  in  this  steel  suburb  of  Pitts- 
burgh 200  families  were  living  in  61  houses;  35  boarders 
were  in  one  house  where  three  different  persons  occupied  each 
bed  in  the  24  hours  of  each  day,  sleeping  in  eight-hour  shifts. 


WAGES  IN  NO-CONFEEENCE  INDUSTRY       105 

It  was  of  Braddock  that  Senator  Kenyon,  chairman  of  the 
Senate  Investigating  Committee,  was  quoted  as  saying: 
"  This  is  the  worst  place  I  have  ever  seen  and  I  have 
watched  the  living  conditions  of  many  immigrants." 

A  sub-report  ^  contains  the  detailed  findings  of  an  investi- 
gator for  this  Inquiry  who  spent  three  weeks  in  November, 
1919,  in  the  Pittsburgh  District  collecting  data  on  the  actual 
living  conditions  of  steel  workers'  families.  The  investi- 
gator obtained,  as  far  as  the  workers  could  supply  them,  data 
on  the  family  budgets  of  expenditures  for  rent,  food,  clothes, 
children's  education,  benefit  societies,  etc.  and  observed  the 
housing  conditions.  Questions  were  also  asked,  principally 
of  the  wives,  dealing  with  the  strike,  what  were  their  ideas 
of  its  causes,  whether  they  approved  the  strike.  Strikers 
and  non-strikers,  "  foreigners  "  and  "  Americans,"  were  in- 
terviewed. The  visits  were  haphazard,  including  neighbor- 
hoods in  Pittsburgh,  Braddock,  Homestead  and  Monessen, 
sometimes  with  an  interpreter,  sometimes  with  a  member  of 
the  strike  relief  committee  or  with  a  settlement  worker,  fre- 
quently alone.  The  neighborhoods  were  principally  those  of 
the  immigrant  semi-skilled  and  unskilled  workers  who  con- 
stitute the  bulk  of  steel  communities.  At  the  end  of  the 
investigation,  tabulation  of  the  results  proved  that  this  hap- 
hazard inquiry  had  achieved  a  representative  survey  inas- 
much as  the  average  of  income  for  the  families  visited  ap- 
proximated the  average  income  for  the  semi-skilled  and  un- 
skilled workers  for  the  whole  industry.  The  semi-skilled  and 
unskilled  actual  average  for  the  eight  months  of  1919  before 
the  strike  was  not  over  $128  monthly.  The  average  income 
of  the  forty-one  immigrant  strikers'  families  visited  was 
$132  a  month.  The  excerpts  from  the  investigators'  family 
reports,  given  herewith,  are  representative  of  the  forty-one 
immigrant  households. 

1  Family  Budgets  and  Living  Conditions,"  by  Marian  D.  Savage. 


These  families  ran  from  four  to  eight  members.  The 
tabulation  of  the  forty-one  immigrant  families  brought  out 
the  first  characteristic  of  steel  communities, — overcrowding; 

Living  in  1  room  ........ . . . . .     2  families 

Living  in  2  rooms 22  families 

Living  in  3  rooms , 14  families 

Living  in  4  rooms 2  families 

Living  in  5  rooms. ...,.., 1  family  (with  two 

boarders) 

Over  half  of  these  four  to  eight-member  families  lived  in 
"  apartments  "  of  two  rooms;  over  one-third  in  three  rooms. 
The  resultant  physical  and  moral  conditions  are  not  suffi- 
ciently portrayed  by  the  bare  figures.  An  excerpt  from  the 
report  reads : 

The  first  thing  which  strikes  the  attention  of  one  who  visits 
the  homes  of  the  strikers  is  the  shocking  overcrowding.  The 
majority  of  families  which  I  have  seen  live  in  only  two  rooms, 
and  only  four  of  them  have  more  than  three  rooms.  As  the 
families  are  composed  of  from  four  to  eight  people,  this  means 
that  the  air  space  necessary  for  hygienic  living  is  wholly  lacking, 
and  the  right  kind  of  home  life  is  made  impossible.  It  means 
that  frequently  a  bed  must  stand  in  the  kitchen  all  the  time, 
taking  up  space  greatly  needed  for  other  things.  In  a  few 
cases  the  crowding  is  due  to  the  presence  of  lodgers,  but  usually 
it  is  not.  In  one  case  I  was  told  that  the  family  had  tried  to 
find  an  apartment  with  three  rooms  instead  of  two,  but  had  been 
unable  to,  as  many  landlords  objected  to  having  such  a  large 
family  of  children  in  their  houses.  Such  a  policy,  of  course, 
means  that  the  largest  families  may  be  forced  into  the  smallest 
accommodations.  In  general,  however,  the  burden  of  paying 
rent  for  an  additional  room  seemed  too  great  for  the  family 
to  undertake.  In  many  cases  the  apartments  have  no  water  in 
them  and  several  families  are  forced  to  use  a  single  pump  in  the 
court  yard.  In  still  a  larger  number  of  eases  there  are  no  toilet 
arrangements  except  dilapidated  water  closet  sheds  in  the  yard. 


WAGES  IN  NO-CONFERENCE  INDUSTRY       107 

In  a  few  places  there  are  open  unsanitary  drains  in  the  court 
yard,  around  which  the  wooden  houses  are  built.  Many  of  the 
strikers  live  in  alleys  which  are  very  dirty  and  cluttered  with 
rubbish  collected  by  the  authorities  at  infrequent  intervals.  In 
one  place  in  Homestead  I  found  what  appeared  to  be  drainage 
water  flowing  down  the  middle  of  the  alley.  In  a  good  many 
cases  families  live  in  rear  houses  which  can  only  be  reached  by 
narrow  dark  passageways  or  ramshackle  wooden  staircases  lead- 
ing in  from  the  street. 

Although  the  wages  in  many  departments  of  the  industry  have 
more  than  doubled  in  the  last  five  or  six  years,  the  women  are 
quite  convinced  that  the  cost  of  living  has  risen  very  much 
higher  in  proportion,  so  that  they  are  worse  off  than  they  used 
to  be.  According  to  the  Associated  Charities  of  Pittsburgh,  a 
food  order  which  in  1914  cost  $5.88  in  New  York  City  (where 
prices  are  not  very  different  from  those  here),  in  1919  cost 
$11.10  in  Pittsburgh.  This  food  order,  though  intended  as  a 
minimum  standard  for  a  family  of  five  for  one  week,  is  not  con- 
sidered adequate  by  the  Pittsburgh  A.  C,  which  substitutes  a 
food  budget  of  $17.04  that  makes  it  possible  to  have  meat  twice 
a  week  instead  of  once.  Compared  with  this  minimum  standard, 
the  amount  spent  for  food  by  the  women  visited  seems  to  be 
enough  to  sustain  life,  but  in  most  cases,  especially  in  the  larger 
families,  to  do  little  more  than  that.  Considering  how  hard  and 
long-continued  the  work  of  a  man  in  the  steel  industry  is,  a 
food  budget  which  does  not  allow  him  meat  more  than  twice  a 
week  is  hardly  sufficient,  so  even  in  the  cases  where  somewhat 
more  than  $17.04  is  spent  for  food  for  a  family  of  five  every 
week  the  amount  seems  far  from  exorbitant. 

Out  of  forty-eight  families  from  which  data  could  be 
obtained  for  estimating  each  family's  budget  of  expenditures, 
twenty-eight  of  the  budgets  fell  below  the  minimum  of  sub- 
sistence level  for  1919  and  ten  below  the  minimum  of  com- 
fort level. 

Following  are  the  tables  of  hours,  wages  and  budgets  for 
the  immigrant  strikers  and  for  native-born  strikers : 


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P4     O 


Following  are  typical  excerpts  from  the  investigator's  note- 
books, giving  a  little  better  idea,  than  do  the  tables,  as  to 
what  such  budgets  means  to  strikers: 

Place — Braddock 
ISTationality — Slavish 

G is  a  laborer  in  a  blast  furnace.    Earned  $34.00  a  week. 

Worked  11  hours  on  day  shift,  13  hours  on  night  shift.  Has 
6  children.  Before  prices  were  so  high  he  could  save,  but  can- 
not now.  Groceries  cost  from  $48.00  to  $60.00  a  month,  and 
meat  Just  about  as  much.  The  rent  for  the  two  rooms  in  which 
the  family  lives  is  $10.00  a  month,  and  the  landlord  is  soon  to 
raise  it  to  $11.00.  A  "  tax  "  of  $5.09  also  has  to  be  paid.  The 
wife,  when  asked  in  the  presence  of  her  husband  if  she  wanted 
him  out  till  the  strike  was  won,  replied  that  she  did. 

Place — Braddock 
Nationality — Slavish 

earned  $4.62  a  day  and  worked  13  days  in  two  weeks. 


Has  two  children.  The  mother-in-law  lives  with  them  and  pays 
half  the  rent,  which  is  $10.00  a  month  for  the  two  rooms.  Food 
costs  from  $76.00  to  $88.00  a  month.  They  were  unable  to 
save  anything.  The  man,  who  seemed  more  intelligent  than 
most,  declared  vehemently  that  the  union  was  the  principal  thing 
he  cared  about — more  even  than  wages  and  hours.  His  wife  said 
little,  but  agreed  that  she  wanted  him  to  stay  out  on  strike. 

Place — Braddock 
Nationality — Slavish 

E.  is  a  laborer  in  rail  mill.  Earned  43  cents  an  hour  ($80 
in  two  weeks  when  working  14  turns) .  Worked  12  hours,  some- 
times on  day  shift,  sometimes  on  night.  Worked  7  days  a  week 
about  twice  in-  two  months.  Has  four  children.  Eent  for  their 
two  rooms  costs  $10  a  month.  Food  costs  about  $80  a  month; 
$5  a  month  was  paid  to  the  lodge  to  insure  man  and  his  wife. 
He  had  bought  a  $100  Liberty  Bond,  but  has  only  paid  $50  on 
it;  $10  a  month  was  deducted  from  his  pay  for  it.  He  cared 
more  for  shorter  hours  than  anything  else,  though  he  needed 
higher  wages,  too. 


Place — Braddock 
Nationality — Slavish 

S.  worked  in  engine  house  of  Carnegie  Steel  Co.  Earned 
48  cents  an  hour;  $77  for  15  turns  was  the  most  he  ever  earned. 
Worked  10  hours  a  day,  7  days  a  week.  Has  one  child.  Eent 
for  one  room  in  which  family  lives  is  $6  a  month.  Food  costs 
from  $60  to  $65  a  month;  $1.85  a  month  is  paid  to  the  lodge. 
Shoes  cost  on  an  average  $5  a  month.  The  wife  wants  the  man 
to  stay  out  on  strike  till  it  is  won.  She  cares  most  about  reduc- 
tion of  hours,  provided  the  weekly  pay  is  not  reduced. 

Place — Homestead,  Pa. 
Nationality — Russian 

K.  worked  as  an  open  hearth  laborer  in  one  of  the  Carnegie 
Steel  Mills,  11  hours  during  the  day,  13  hours  at  night.  Every 
second  Sunday  he  worked  also.  His  wife  said  that  when  he 
came  home  at  night  he  was  so  tired  that  he  just  lay  down  and 
slept.  As  one  of  the  neighbors  explained,  when  a  man  works 
as  long  as  that  "he  can't  see  his  babies,  he  can't  see  the  day- 
light— all  he  can  do  is  just  to  come  home  and  lie  and  sleep." 
Shorter  hours  seemed  more  important  to  him  than  anything 
else,  provided  the  weekly  wages  were  not  reduced.  He  could 
get  along  after  a  fashion  with  his  present  wages,  but  could  not 
stand  the  long  day.  His  wage  was  45  cents  an  hour,  and  $60 
or  $70  in  two  weeks,  according  to  whether  there  were  12  or  14 
turns.  This  amount  did  not  permit  any  permanent  saving,  how- 
ever. He  had  one  Victory  Bond  of  $100  which  he  was  forced 
to  sell  after  the  strike  began  in  order  to  live.  A  Liberty  Bond 
which  he  had  bought  last  year  he  had  been  obliged  to  sell  again 
last  fall  in  order  to  live.  He  had  nothing  in  the  bank  and  he 
had  not  been  able  to  afford  membership  in  any  lodge.  Rent 
for  the  three  rooms  in  which  he  and  his  wife  and  three  children 
lived  was  $15  a  month.  The  rooms  were  well  lighted  and  the 
kitchen  had  running  water.  He  was  obliged  to  pay  for  paper- 
ing and  painting  them,  however. 


Place — Homestead,  Pa. 
Nationality — Austrian. 

C.  worked  as  a  laborer  in  one  of  the  Carnegie  MiUs,  10  honrs 
on  the  day  shift,  12  hours  at  night,  6  turns  a  week,  and  earned 
from  $53  to  $58  in  two  weeks.  He  has  two  children.  The  fam- 
ily lives  in  three  rooms,  which  are  light,  pleasant  and  well  cared 
for.  Rent  is  $15  a  month.  The  wife  said  she  wanted  to  more 
somewhere  where  rent  was  cheaper,  but  could  find  no  other 
rooms.  I  was  unable  to  discover  how  much  food  and  clothes 
cost,  as  she  kept  no  record  of  them.  From  $3.25  to  $4  a  month 
was  paid  to  the  lodge,  according  to  the  number  of  members  who 
were  ill.  If  a  member  is  obliged  to  omit  three  monthly  pay- 
ments he  is  dropped  from  the  lodge.  The  man  was  ill  with  in- 
fluenza for  12  weeks  last  year  and  was  obliged  to  sell  the  $200 
Liberty  Bond  which  he  had  in  order  to  pay  expenses.  The  bond 
was  sold  to  the  storekeeper,  who  only  gave  $180  for  it,  much 
to  the  indignation  of  Mrs.  C.  Since  the  strike  began  C.  has  had 
to  sell  the  only  other  bond  which  he  had — a  $50  one,  on  which 
he  had  only  paid  $30.  The  family  have  no  other  savings,  and  the 
money  from  the  bond  is  almost  gone. 

Last  spring  the  family  bought  a  load  of  coal  for  $13,  but 
that  is  all  gone  and  they  have  nothing  but  wood  to  burn.  They 
cannot  afford  any  more  coal. 

I  asked  Mrs.  C.  if  she  wanted  her  husband  to  go  on  strike, 
and  if  she  now  wanted  him  to  stay  out.  She  said  she  did  not 
know  anything  about  the  strike  before  the  men  went  out  and 
knows  little  about  it  now.  She  does  not  want  her  husband  to 
return  to  work  while  the  strike  is  going  on  for  fear  he  might 
be  hurt.  She  does  want  better  conditions,  however.  Shorter 
hours  seem  to  her  more  important  than  anjrthing  else,  provided 
there  is  no  reduction  in  pay,  as  her  husband  is  very  tired  when 
he  comes  home — too  tired  to  do  anything  but  eat  and  sleep.  She 
also  feels  that  more  money  is  needed. 

I  asked  if  she  liked  living  in  Homestead.  She  replied  that 
she  had  lived  there  ever  since  she  came  to  America  thirteen  years 
ago  and  could  not  compare  it  with  other  places.    She  was  too 


young  when  she  left  Austria  to  know  much  about  conditions 
there. 

Place — Pittsburgh 
Nationality — Polish 

S.  is  45  years  old.  Six  children  in  the  family,  the  oldest  15 
years  old.  The  father  was  the  only  supporter.  He  was  a  laborer 
in  the  J.  &  L.  mill,  but  did  not  have  steady  work.  Worked  12 
hours  a  day  about  four  days  a  week  frequently.  Earned  on  the 
average  about  $25  a  week.  Was  able  to  save  nothing.  Paid 
$1  a  month  to  the  lodge.  He  owns  the  house — a  ramshackle 
wooden  building — lives  in  three  rooms.  According  to  the  wife, 
all  that  is  earned  goes  into  food.  Though  wages  were  quite  in- 
adequate, the  long  hours  seemed  most  serious  to  the  woman. 
When  asked  if  she  wanted  him  to  stay  out  till  the  strike  is  won 
replied,  "  Yes — what  a  question !  " 

Place — Pittsburgh 
Nationality — Polish 

P.  is  56  years  old.  Has  three  children,  one  of  them  is  a  boy 
who  is  now  earning  $10  a  week.  Has  worked  as  a  laborer,  putting 
screws  on  bolts  at  the  Oliver  Iron  &  Steel  Co,  for  10%  hours  a 
day,  5%  days  a  week.  He  earned  30  cents  an  hour.  Before 
the  strike,  he  was  sick  for  ten  weeks  and  hence  had  no  savings. 
He  paid  $1,05  a  month  to  the  lodge,  however.  Pent  for  the  two 
rooms  in  which  the  family  lives  is  $8.50  a  month.  The  man 
wants  a  permanent  union  most  of  all,  but  better  wages  and  hours 
are  both  very  important. 

Place — Pittsburgh 
Nationality — Lithuanian 

J.  has  six  children,  one  of  whom,  a  girl,  is  earning  $7.50  a 
week.  The  man  worked  as  a  laborer  at  the  J.  &  L.  mill,  12  hours 
a  day,  7  days  a  week.  (Since  the  strike  was  declared  the  week 
has  been  shortened  to  6  days  for  that  job.)  He  earned  $5.80  a 
day.  Pent  for  three  rooms  in  rear  building  costs  $9  a  month; 
85  cents  a  month  is  spent  for  schooling.     He  pays  50  cents  a 


114  EEPOET  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

month  to  the  lodge,  and  $1  more  when  a  member  dies.  He  was 
unable  to  save  anything  else,  because  he  was  forced  to  buy  at  the 
company  store,  where  prices  were  higher  than  elsewhere.  Some- 
times nothing  remained  of  his  wages  when  things  purchased 
there — clothes,  groceries,  etc. — were  deducted.  Those  who  re- 
fused to  trade  with  the  company  had  things  made  unpleasant  for 
them. 

Place — Homestead,  Pa. 
Nationality — Irish 

S,  has  two  children.  He  was  a  pipe  worker  in  the  Carnegie 
Steel  Mill,  with  10  hours  on  the  day  shift,  13  hours  on  the  night 
shift,  7  days  a  week.  Every  second  week  he  was  obliged  to  work 
from  7  A.  M.  on  Saturday  to  7  A.  M.  on  Sunday,  with  only 
one  hour  off  for  rest  and  food.  Then  he  had  to  begin  work  again 
at  3  P.  M.,  and  continue  until  7  the  next  morning — thus  work- 
ing 39  hours  out  of  48.  (Both  he  and  Mr.  C,  another  striker, 
complained  that  no  time  was  given  for  eating  meals  when  a  man 
was  on  a  12-hour  shift.  He  was  expected  to  snatch  a  bite  of 
food  as  he  worked.  Mr.  C.  said  he  was  obliged  to  work  15  hours 
every  Sunday,  and  often  did  not  get  time  to  eat  a  mouthful  dur- 
ing that  period.  This,  he  considered,  one  of  the  most  serious 
grievances.)  There  is  no  chance  for  advancement  in  tbe  plant. 
The  boss  brings  in  his  friends,  relatives,  or  people  who  have  pull 
with  him,  and  gives  them  the  better  positions  instead  of  advanc- 
ing others. 

Mr.  S.  earned  47  cents  an  hour,  and  from  $74  to  $75  in  two 
weeks.  He  was  discharged  from  the  Canadian  Army  about  a 
year  before  the  strike,  and  during  that  period  he  had  been  able 
to  save  nothing.  He  bought  one  $150  Liberty  Bond,  but  had 
only  paid  $100  on  it,  and  was  obliged  to  dispose  of  it  for  $90 
when  the  strike  began.  The  company  had  forced  him  to  buy 
it  and  deducted  $15  a  month  from  his  pay  for  it.  During  tbe 
strike  he  had  a  few  odd  Jobs,  but  for  the  most  part  they  had 
been  living  on  credit. 

They  pay  $15  rent  for  4  rooms.  This  rent  is  lower  because  of 
the  fact  that  the  house  is  close  beside  the  railroad  and  is  noisy 


WAGES  m  NO-CONFERENCE  INDUSTEY       115 

and  dirty.  The  landlord  threatened  to  raise  it  soon.  Groceries 
for  the  family  cost  from  $25  to  $30  in  two  weeks.  This  pur- 
chases a  very  small  and  inadequate  supply.  They  do  not  know 
how  much  meat  costs.  Horlich's  milk  for  the  small  baby  costs 
about  25  cents  a  day.  The  mother  thinks  it  necessary  to  pay 
this,  as  she  lost  another  baby  because  of  improper  feeding.  She 
says  that  she  can  spend  very  little  on  clothes.  She  has  had  only 
one  suit  in  six  years.  Friends  have  given  her  clothes  for  the 
children  to  help  out.  She  says  she  wishes  the  strike  had  never 
happened,  and  is  rather  discouraged  about  it.  Nevertheless,  she 
thinks  the  men  ought  to  have  better  conditions  and  wants  the 
men  to  win  out.  She  is  indignant  that  so  many  of  the  higher 
paid  men  are  still  at  work,  and  thinks  they  ought  to  come  out 
to  help  the  others. 

Place — Homestead,  Pa. 

Nationality — Slav  from  Austria-Hungary 

D.  did  repair  work  on  machines  and  furnaces,  working  13 
and  13  hours  a  day,  and  sometimes  36  hours  at  a  stretch.  Once 
he  objected  to  doing  overtime  work  when  he  was  very  tired  and 
•was  laid  off  for  a  week  as  a  penalty.  His  work  was  dangerous, 
yet  he  earned  only  45  cents  an  hour.    He  has  three  children. 

Eent  for  three  rooms,  a  parlor,  kitchen  and  bedroom,  is  $16. 
There  is  water  in  the  kitchen,  but  the  room  is  so  dark  that  the 
gas  must  be  kept  burning  all  the  time.  The  woman  cooks  with 
it,  and  also  heats  other  rooms  with  it  in  winter.  Groceries  cost 
$40  a  month,  meat  from  $25  to  $30,  milk  $4.50.  Shoes  for  the 
children  last  only  one  or  two  months  and  cost  from  $5  to  $6  a 
pair.  The  man  and  his  wife  both  belong  to  two  lodges,  and 
pay  from  $14  to  $15  a  month  to  them.  The  children  are  also 
insured,  and  20  cents  a  month  is  paid  for  them.  The  lodge  pays 
$5  a  week  in  case  of  sickness,  $1,000  in  case  of  death  of  the 
man,  $250  in  case  of  death  of  a  child. 

They  had  bought  bonds  worth  $450,  $350  of  this  they  had 
spent  before  the  strike  for  necessary  food  and  the  expenses  of 
the  baby's  christening.  The  remaining  $100  they  had  spent  dur- 
ing the  strike.    They  have  no  savings. 

I  asked  the  woman  if  she  thought  she  was  better  off  in  Amer- 


116  REPORT  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

ica  than  if  she  had  stayed  in  Austria-Hungary  and  she  said  she 
didn't  know.  She  had  lived  in  Homestead  for  fifteen  years  and 
could  not  afford  to  move  anywhere  else  in  order  to  get  better 
conditions.  She  knew  nothing  about  other  parts  of  America. 
Her  husband  said  he  has  his  first  citizenship  papers,  but  had 
not  yet  gotten  his  second.  He  told  me  indignantly  that  some 
strikers  had  applied  for  their  second  papers  in  Pittsburgh,  but 
had  been  refused  because  they  were  on  strike. 

The  wife  told  me  she  wanted  her  husband  to  stay  on  strike 
till  he  got  shorter  hours  and  better  conditions.  She  did  not 
"want  a  bad  name  on  her  children.'* 

Place — Homestead,  Pa. 
Nationality — Slavish 

V.  was  a  millwright  in  the  open  hearth  department,  working 
12  hours  a  day,  and  sometimes  7  days  a  week.  He  earned  45 
cents  an  hour,  or  from  $100  to  $105  in  two  weeks.  There  are 
seven  children  in  the  family. 

They  pay  $10  a  month  rent  for  two  rooms  in  a  rear  house. 
There  is  running  water  in  the  kitchen,  but  the  only  toilet  is 
in  the  yard,  which  also  has  open  drains.  They  have  tried  to  get 
a  better  apartment  with  three  rooms,  but  cannot  find  one,  for 
landlords  object  to  such  a  large  family  of  children  and  will  not 
rent  to  them.  Groceries  cost  them  about  $60  a  month,  meat 
about  $29  or  $30,  milk  $5.  One  of  the  daughters  works  in  the 
grocery  store,  earning  $10  a  week,  and  the  family  are  obliged 
to  trade  there,  so  she  will  not  lose  her  position.  Coal  costs 
them  $20  a  year — perhaps  more.  Monthly  dues  to  the  "so- 
ciety" which  pays  sick  benefits  and  death  benefits  are  $5  for 
the  man  and  his  wife,  $1.20  for  the  children.  The  children 
go  to  Slavish  school,  and  something  must  be  paid  for  their 
tuition  also. 

They  have  been  unable  to  save  anything  with  the  exception  of 
$800  in  Liberty  Bonds,  which  they  had  at  the  beginning  of 
the  strike.  These  have  all  been  sold  since  then,  with  a  loss  of 
$4  or  $5  on  each  one.  The  company  deducted  $50  a  month 
from  the  man's  pay  while  he  was  buying  his  bonds.    The  wife 


WAGES  IN  NO-CONFERENCE  INDUSTRY       117 

has  been  sick  a  good  deal  for  the  last  ten  years  and  her  illness 
has  cost  money. 

She  says  she  wants  her  husband  to  stay  out  on  strike.  Shorter 
hours  seem  to  be  most  important,  but  better  general  conditions 
are  also  necessary. 

Place — Homestead,  Pa. 
Nationality — Slavish 

E.  was  a  laborer,  working  12  hours  a  day  with  a  24-hour  shift 
every  other  Sunday  (one  hour  being  allowed  off  for  break- 
fast). He  earned  42  cents  an  hour,  or  $60  in  two  weeks.  He 
has  four  children. 

Rent  for  the  one  room  in  which  they  live  is  $4.50  a  month. 
Food  cost  $60  a  month  even  when  they  had  little  but  bread 
and  potatoes.  They  sometimes  had  meat,  but  never  any  cakes 
or  pies.  Three  years  ago,  when  wages  were  only  $1.60  a  day, 
they  could  buy  more  than  they  can  now  because  of  the  high 
prices.  The  shopkeepers  find  out  beforehand  when  a  rise  in 
wages  is  to  come  and  put  up  the  prices  at  once,  the  man  says. 
They  cannot  buy  any  clothes  without  going  hungry,  and  cannot 
afford  insurance  or  lodge  membership.  He  says  he  has  never 
been  able  to  save  anything.  He  was  forced  to  buy  a  $50  or  $100 
bond  of  each  loan,  but  had  to  sell  them  again  at  once.  He  told 
of  one  case  where  a  man  who  said  he  could  only  afford  a  $50 
bond  instead  of  the  $100  one,  which  the  boss  ordered  him  to 
take,  was  tarred  and  feathered  by  men  whom  he  was  sure  the 
company  had  stirred  up  to  do  it.  This  story  was  also  told  me 
by  two  American  strikers — Mr.  S.  and  Mr.  C. 

The  family  had  been  living  on  his  last  pay  ever  since  the 
strike  began.  Higher  wages  seem  as  important  to  them  as 
shorter  hours.  The  wife  said  she  wanted  him  to  stay  out  on 
strike. 

One  great  grievance  was  that  there  was  no  chance  to  get 
ahead  or  change  to  better  work.  He  had  tried  hard  to  get  a 
chance  to  do  more  skilled  work,  which  he  was  sure  he  could 
do  just  as  well  as  anyone,  but  though  he  had  worked  there  for 
thirteen  years,  he  was  never  given  a  chance.    The  foreman  kept 


118  EEPORT  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

people  back  because  they  were  hunkies  and  brought  in  his  rela- 
tives and  those  who  treated  him  to  booze  to  take  the  better  posi- 
tions.    If  anyone  complained  he  was  fired. 

The  man  lost  his  thumb  at  the  mill  and  was  out  for  three 
months  a  while  ago.    The  company  paid  him  $75. 

He  has  his  first  citizenship  papers  and  sends  his  children  to 
the  public  school. 

Place — Monessen,  Pa. 
Nationality — Russian 

T.  worked  as  a  pipe  fitter  in  the  machine  shop  of  the  Pitts- 
burgh Steel  Co.,  10%  hours  a  day,  7  days  a  week.  Sometimes 
as  often  as  twice  a  week  he  was  obliged  to  work  29%  hours  at 
a  stretch.  For  this  period  he  was  given  overtime  pay  for  only 
5%  hours.  He  earned  46c.  an  hour  or  about  $100  in  two 
weeks.    He  has  two  children. 

Rent  for  three  good  rooms  is  $18.  Food,  which  is  quite 
ample,  costs  $100  a  month.  Insurance  costs  $62  a  year.  He 
had  saved  about  $100  before  the  strike.  He  evidently  considered 
himself  much  more  prosperous  than  many  of  the  strikers.  His 
principal  objection  was  too  long  hours. 

During  the  organizing  campaign  a  company  official  had  asked 
him  to  go  around  and  find  out  what  "  Bolsheviks  "  there  were 
among  the  men,  and  what  men  had  joined  the  union,  so  they 
could  be  discharged.  He  refused  but  someone  he  knew  undertook 
the  job. 


GRIEVANCES  AND  CONTROL  IN  A  NO-CON- 
FERENCE INDUSTRY 

Analysis  of  the  data  gathered  in  this  Inquiry  on  the 
grievances  of  workers  and  the  companies'  methods  of  control 
of  employees  in  the  iron  and  steel  industry  warrants  the 
following  conclusions : 

The  Steel  Corporation's  "  arbitrary "  control  of  hours  and 
wages  extends  to  everything  in  individual  steel  jobs,  re- 
sulting in  daily  grievances. 

The  Corporation,  committed  to  a  non-union  policy,  is  as 
helpless  as  the  workers  to  prevent  these  grievances. 

The  grievances,  since  there  exists  no  working  machinery  of 
redress,  weigh  heavily  in  the  industry  because  they  in- 
cessantly remind  the  worker  that  he  has  no  "  say  "  what- 
ever in  steel. 

The  strike  was  the  workers'  revolt  against  the  entire  system 
of  arbitrary  control  and  for  trade  unionism. 

The  Steel  Corporation,  here  as  in  hours  and  wages,  is  the 
determining  factor  for  the  whole  industry.  "  Independent  " 
companies,  however,  have  shown  far  more  tendency  to  break 
away  from  the  Corporation's  methods  in  the  case  of  control 
than  in  the  case  of  wages  and  hours. 

This  section  deals  with  the  industrial  effects  of  a  policy  of 
"  no  conference,"  and  arbitrary  control ;  its  effects  on  the 
worker  in  relation  to  his  job,  especially  inside  the  mill ;  its 
inevitable  consequences  of  rebellion  and  the  means  taken  to 
soften  rebellion. 

Section  VII  will  deal  with  the  social  results  of  such  a  labor 

119 


120  EEPOET  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

policy;  the  means  taken  to  combat  rebellion  when  softening 
fails ;  the  effects  on  the  worker  in  relation  to  the  community ; 
the  effects  on  the  community  and  state ;  and  will  try  to  deter- 
mine to  what  extent  social  institutions  in  towns,  counties  or 
states,  i.e.  the  executive  government,  the  judiciary,  the 
church,  the  press,  etc.,  were  bent  to  the  business  of  maintain- 
ing one  corporation's  policy  of  "  not  dealing  with  labor 
unions." 

The  evidence  for  both  sections  is  drawn  principally  from 
public  records,  private  labor  files  of  companies,  interviews 
with  Corporation  oflBcials,  also  with  officers  of  "  labor  detec- 
tive "  concerns  and  from  affidavits  or  statements  from  over 
five  hundred  strikers  and  non-strikers. 

This  section  deals  mainly  with  conditions  before  the  strike, 
with  the  normal  conduct  of  the  industry,  with  the  problem 
raised  by  a  friendly  critic  of  Mr.  Gary  who  said : 

"  The  trouble  is  that  the  Corporation's  labor  policy  is  etill  in 
the  stage  of  detectives  and  toilets." 

That  is :  a  stage  of  arbitrary  control  naturally  causing  unrest 
which  is  met  with  espionage  on  the  one  hand  and  sanitation 
and  welfare  on  the  other. 

It  is  important  to  grasp  clearly  the  distinction  between 
the  two  aspects  of  control  in  this  or  any  other  industry.  The 
distinction  is  that  between  "  personnel  management "  and 
"  industrial  relations  " ;  the  one  confined  within  the  plant, 
conditioned  primarily  by  each  job's  requirements;  the  other, 
labor  policy  or  the  system  of  relations  between  the  labor 
force  and  the  owners.  The  first  aspect  concerns  the  job, — 
who  gets  it,  how  he  shall  do  it,  how  it  shall  be  safeguarded  if 
hazardous,  who  shall  meet  the  emergency  requirements  always 
fringing  the  job,  the  running  of  the  job  for  production.  The 
second  aspect  concerns  the  relations  of  the  workers  as  a  whole 
to  the  sum  of  jobs:  it  concerns  the  profits  of  work  (wages), 


GEIEVANCES  AND  CONTEOL  131 

the  length  of  work  (hours)  and  the  vesting  of  authority  over 
the  separate  jobs  (control  proper, — whether  autocratic  con- 
trol, trade  union  control,  shop  committee  control,  etc.).  The 
first  aspect  is  the  primary  concern  of  employment  managers, 
or  scientific  managers  or  production  engineers;  the  second 
aspect  is  concerned  primarily  with  who  shall  control  the  em- 
ployment manager  or  production  engineer  and  for  what  pur- 
poses. Each  function  tends  to  encroach  on  the  other  and  is 
generally  nullified  when  it  does.  In  the  steel  industry  the 
typical  employment  manager  is  helpless  when  he  tries  to  deal 
with  industrial  relations;  he  can  get  the  workers  a  day  off 
or  a  change  of  job,  but  he  cannot  influence  hours,  wages  or 
the  foreman's  authority.  Likewise  the  Finance  Committee 
of  the  Steel  Corporation  can  decree  hours  and  wages  but  is 
helpless  to  direct  workers  on  the  jobs.  But  always  the  second 
aspect  stretches  hack  with  decisive  ejfect  over  the  first.  In 
the  steel  industry  this  is  peculiarly  so. 

Section  VII  therefore  deals  with  the  more  important 
phase:  with  the  non-union  policy  of  the  Corporation,  the 
resultant  attitude  of  the  workers,  the  means, — such  as  espion- 
age, discharge  for  unionism,  blacklists,  police,  "  labor  detec- 
tives" etc. — used  to  combat  the  workers,  the  use  made  of  civil 
authorities,  courts,  press  and  pulpit,  particularly  during  the 
strike.  It  analyzes  the  actually  existing  alternative  to  "  the 
hind  of  conference  the  labor  unions  wanted.'^  But  before  the 
present  section's  analysis, — which  must  begin  at  the  opposite 
pole,  the  organization  of  the  jobs  for  production, — can  be 
grasped,  some  of  the  facts  concerning  the  other  greater  aspect 
of  control  must  be  set  down. 

The  character  of  the  control  in  the  Steel  Corporation  is 
plain :  it  is  arbitrary  control.  The  workers  called  it  "  auto- 
cratic." Mr.  Gary's  word,^  spoken  to  the  Senate  investigat- 
ing Committee,  was  "  arbitrarily,"  used  by  him  in  reference 

*  Senate  Teatimony,  Vol.  I,  p.  226. 


132  REPOET  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

to  fixing  wages,  but  applying  equally  to  the  whole  system. 
With  this  Mr.  Gary  coupled  his  recognition  that  there  was 
possible  at  least  one  other  system  of  control — by  conference 
— in  the  statements  that  "  his  workmen  knew  that  they  were 
always  free  to  come  to  him  or  any  plant  officer  or  to  send 
committees."  Coupled  with  this,  investigation  proved,  were 
the  facts  that  no  workers,  individuals  or  committees,  do  con- 
fer with  Mr.  Gary,  and  that  actual  conferences  with  plant 
officers,  higher  than  foremen,  fell  into  either  of  two  cate- 
gories: (a)  individual  or  committee  conferences  which  did 
not  deal  with  hours  or  wages  or  authority  of  control,  but  with 
comparatively  minor  matters;  or  (b)  conferences  by  tempo- 
rary committees  concerning  hours  or  wages,  of  such  a  rare 
character  as  to  prove  themselves  the  exception,  the  exhibition 
of  temerity,  almost  like  strikes.  The  few  instances  of  such, 
discovered  in  this  Inquiry,  are  detailed  in  a  sub-report. 

The  practice  of  Corporation  plants  was  by  no  means  uni- 
form, but  all  practice  conformed  to  the  Corporation's  policy, 
as  perfectly  understood  and  as  set  forth  by  Mr.  Gary,  for 
example,  publicly  to  his  own  officials  as  follows :  ^ 

"...  treating  the  whole  thing  as  a  business  proposition, 
drawing  the  line  so  that  you  are  just  and  generous  and  yet 
at  the  same  time  keeping  your  position  and  permitting  others 
to  keep  theirs,  retaining  the  control  and  management  of  your 
affairs,  Jceeping  the  whole  thing  in  your  own  hands,  but  never- 
theless with  due  consideration  to  the  rights  and  interests  of  all 
others  who  may  be  affected  by  your  management." 

In  practice,  it  was  found,  Corporation  steel  workers  wher- 
ever questioned,  recognized  that  the  control  of  "  the  whole 
thing "  was  absolutely  in  the  Corporation's  "  own  hands." 
Surprise,  that  the  inquirer  should  be  so  naive,  or  contemptu- 

*  Proceedings  of  meeting  of  presidents  of  subsidiary  companies  of 
Steel  Corporation.  Empire  Building,  New  York,  Jan.  21,  1919.  (Senate 
Testimony,  Vol.  I,  p.  242.) 


GEIEVANCES  AND  CONTROL  123 

ous  jeers  greeted  any  serious  question  concerning  the  "  right 
to  see  Mr.  Gary  or  the  Superintendent." 

A  number  of  "  independents  "  have  parted  company,  to 
slight  or  great  degree,  with  the  Corporation  in  the  matter 
of  installing  some  conferring.  This  is  considered  later,  but 
there  is  no  question  that  the  iron  and  steel  industry,  as  a 
whole,  will  change  its  manner  of  control  only  as  the  Cor- 
poration does. 

The  Corporation,  of  course,  has  been  assailed  for  many 
years  for  its  "  autocratic  methods  of  handling  workmen," 
and  in  one  instance,  after  due  self-investigation,  has  gone  on 
record  approving  the  policy;  Mr.  Gary  put  this  record  into 
the  Senate  investigation.^  This  was  the  "  Report  of  Com- 
mittee of  Stockholders,"  dated  April  15,  1912,  which  under 
the  heading,  "  Repression  of  the  Men,"  said  that  if  the  term 
"  repression  of  workmen  "  involved  "  the  question  as  to  what 
measures  the  Corporation  should  adopt  for  the  suppression  of 
organizations  that  in  the  past  have,  at  times,  proved  irrespon- 
sible and  incapable  of  self-control,"  then,  the  Committee  finds 
that  "  while  we  do  not  believe  the  final  solution  .  .  .  has 
been  reached,"  still,  "  we  do  believe  .  .  .  that  the  Steel 
Corporation,  in  view  of  the  practices  often  pursued  by  labor 
organizations  in  steel  mills  in  past  years,  is  justified  in  the 
position  it  has  taken." 

Repression  justified  and  the  whole  control  in  their  own 
hands  is  a  policy  so  long  practised  by  Corporation  officers 
that  they  rarely  really  question  it  except  when  disrupting 
strike  times  compel  them  to  discuss  it.  So  customary  is  it 
that  Mr.  Gary  cited  with  satisfaction  one  example  of  its 
workings,  quoted  elsewhere  from  the  Senate  testimony,  and 
reset  down  here  in  part :  ^ 

For  instance,  to  mention  a  somewhat  trivial  circumstance,  some 

three  or  four  years  ago — not  to  be  exactly  specific  as  to  date — 

'  Senate  Testimony,  Vol.  I,  p.  232-233. 
"  Senate  Testimony,  Vol.  I,  pp.  161-2. 


124  EEPOET  ON  THE  STEEL  STEIKE 

one  of  our  presidents  telephoned  to  the  president  of  our  Cor- 
poration, who  is  in  general  charge  of  operations,  that  a  certain 
number  of  men — it  may  have  been  a  thousand  or  it  may  have 
been  two  thousand  men — in  a  certain  mill  had  all  gone  out,  and 
his  report  was  that  there  was  no  reason  for  their  going  out  .  .  . 
And  he  said,  "It  is  very  easy  for  me  to  fill  this  mill,  and  I 
will  proceed  to  do  it."  The  president  of  the  corporation  came 
to  me  immediately  and  reported  this.  I  said,  "  Tell  him  to  wait 
and  to  come  to  New  York."  He  came  the  next  morning  and  he 
made  substantially  that  same  statement  to  me.  I  said,  "  Have 
you  taken  pains  to  find  out ;  has  anybody  spoken  to  you  ?  "  "  No," 
he  said,  "  I  have  not  received  any  complaint  whatever."  I  said, 
"  Are  you  sure  no  complaint  has  been  made  to  anyone  ?  "  He 
said,  "  I  will  find  out."  I  said,  "  You  had  better  do  so  before 
you  decide  what  you  are  going  to  do  or  what  you  propose  to  do." 
He  went  back;  got  hold  of  the  foreman.  A  committee  of  men 
had  come  to  the  foreman  and  said  that  they  thought  three 
things,  if  I  remember,  were  wrong — not  very  important,  but  they 
claimed  they  were  wrong.  And  the  president  came  back  the 
second  time  and  reported  that ;  and  I  said,  "  Well,  now,  if  they 
state  the  facts  there,  isn't  the  company  wrong?"  "Well," 
he  said,  "  I  don't  consider  it  very  important."  I  said,  "  That  is 
not  the  question.  Are  you  wrong  in  any  respect?  It  seems  to 
me  you  are  wrong  with  respect  to  two  of  those  things,  and  the 
other,  not.  Now,  you  go  right  back  to  your  factory  and  just 
put  up  a  sign  that  with  reference  to  those  two  particular  things, 
the  practice  will  be  changed." 

The  incident  represents  completely  the  Corporation's 
working  system  of  control; — the  un-asked-for  grievances  of 
thousands,  the  perilous  strike,  the  arbitrary  intervention,  and 
the  episode  ended  with  "  just  put  up  a  sign."  This  section's 
analysis  centers  on  the  post  where  signs  are  put  up  and  the 
foreman  who  had  ignored  a  committee.  But  the  causes  for 
such  a  system  of  industrial  control  must  be  sought  behind 
the  post  and  the  foreman. 


GEIEVANCES  AND  CONTROL  125 

Those  reasons  involve  a  phase  of  which  Mr.  Gary  seemed 
unconscious  and  which  indicates  that  personal  vsdll  or  per- 
sonal powers  of  arbitrary  intervention  may  after  all  be  less 
controlling  than  other  forces.  These  forces  molded  modem 
industrial  development  and  in  two  senses  they  left  the  Cor- 
poration comparatively  helpless.  In  the  first  place  the  trend 
of  development  forced,  or  at  least  made  easier,  the  Corpora- 
tion's first  choice  of  fundamental  non-union  policy.  The 
mere  concentration  of  private  financial  power  tended  to  oust 
collective  bargaining.  Professor  Carleton  Parker  put  the 
matter  as  follows :  ^ 

In  the  words  of  Mr.  A.  D.  Noyes     ..."  We  are  in 

the  presence  of  a  novel  and  striking  condition  of  things  in 
American  finance,  whereby  active  or  potential  control  of  a  very 
great  part  both  of  our  financial  institutions  and  our  industrial 
institutions  is  concentrated  in  the  hands  of  a  comparatively  small 
group  of  financiers." 

How  does  this  affect  the  labor  problem  in  America? 

First,  it  brings  the  most  complete  temperamental  and  geograph- 
ical divorce  of  management  and  worker  in  industrial  history. 

Second,  it  leaves  the  final  control  of  industrial  enterprises  in 
non-industrial,  and  in  the  end,  abstract  financial,  hands. 

Third,  it  means  that  the  only  information  from  the  industrial 
plants  which  these  boards  of  directors  care  for  or  understand 
is  that  of  statistics  of  output  and  costs. 

Fourth,  it  turns  over  the  formation  of  wage — and  labor — 
policies  to  men  supersensitive  to  the  stock  market,  a  market  no- 
toriously panicky  over  labor  disturbances. 

In  a  word,  it  turns  industrial  affairs,  one  of  whose  major  char- 
acteristics is  the  human  quality  brought  by  the  worker,  over  to 
a  group  of  financial  minds  whose  education,  environment,  and 
ambitions  make  it  impossible  for  them  to  obtain  an  accurate  per- 
spective of  the  human  side  of  industrial  production.  The  con- 
dition is  potential  for  clanger. 

*  "  The  Technique  of  American  Industry."  Atlantic  Monthly,  Jan. 
1920.     (Written  in  1914.) 


126  EEPOET  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

In  a  second  sense  the  helplessness  of  the  steel  masters  is 
daily  emphasized  by  their  inability  to  keep  from  creating 
grievances.  It  was  not  an  original  object  of  the  Corporation 
when  organized  in  1901  to  go  into  either  the  detective  busi- 
ness or  the  welfare  business.  It  was  going  to  make  money 
out  of  plants  which  were  to  make  steel  as  much  as  possible 
and  as  cheap  as  possible  and  it  deemed  the  best  way  of  keep- 
ing down  labor  costs  was  to  control  arbitrarily  hours  and 
wages.  Since  unions  try  to  cut  hours  and  increase  wages  the 
Corporation  adopted  the  anti-union  policy  which  was  not  so 
widespread  in  the  steel  industry  in  1901  as  the  Corporation 
has  made  it  now.  After  twenty  years  of  this  kind  of  control 
the  Corporation  finds  that  in  making  steel,  it  must  spend 
five  to  seven  millions  a  year  for  sanitation,  stock  participa- 
tion, pensions  and  welfare,  and  sums  for  watching  its  workers 
which  are  not  revealed  to  investigators. 

It  is  not  merely  that  the  Corporation  Executive  Committee 
on  June  17,  1901,  passed  the  resolution:^ 

"  That  we  are  unalterably  opposed  to  any  extension  of  union 
labor,  and  advise  subsidiary  companies  to  take  a  firm  position 
when  these  questions  come  up  and  say  they  are  not  going  to 
recognize  it,  that  is  any  extension  of  unions  in  mills  where  they 
do  not  now  exist  that  great  care  should  be  used  to  prevent  trouble 
and  that  they  promptly  report  and  confer  with  this  Corporation." 

But  on  the  basis  of  this  fundamental  labor  policy,  laid 
down  at  the  start  and  pursued  so  that  all  unions  were  elimi- 
nated from  the  Corporation's  mills,  the  Corporation  devel- 
oped its  whole  productive  organization,  trained  its  great 
staffs  of  executives,  superintendents  and  foremen,  organized 
the  jobs  and  picked  the  labor  force  until  now  it  makes  steel 
through  a  machinery  which  makes  trouble  too.  A  policy  or 
system  of  industrial  relations,  on  the  employing  side,  becomes 

'Minutes  Executive  Committee,  see  Senate  Document  110,  Vol.  Ill, 
p.  118  and  pp.  497-499. 


GEIEVANCES  AND  CONTROL  137 

visibly  a  body  of  executives  and  their  methods  of  action. 
The  Corporation's  executives  are  trained  anti-union  men  who 
convert  the  Corporation's  labor  policy  into  action  by  organ- 
izing labor  forces  which  shall  be  primarily  "  tractable."  * 
They  translate  the  1901  resolution  into  orders  such  as  the 
following,  for  handling  labor :  ^  "  Catch  'em  young,  treat  'em 
rough,  tell  'em  nothing."  The  Corporation's  executives,  in 
order  to  meet  the  Corporation  policy,  are  forced  to  grind  the 
faces  of  the  "  hunkies  "  and  to  trust  to  "  welfare  "  to  salve 
the  exacerbations. 

The  system,  of  course,  is  not  new.  It  was  typically  Ameri- 
can in  the  heyday  of  the  Captains  of  Industry;  but  no  big 
corporation  has  developed  it  so  drastically  or  clung  to  it  to 
so  late  a  date  as  has  the  Steel  Corporation. 

The  system,  in  which  both  sides,  employers  and  employees 
are  enmeshed,  is  subject  to  two  viewpoints  appallingly  dif- 
ferent: and  the  vie'O'point  of  the  employees  is  what  caused 
the  strike.  The  viewpoint  of  the  directors  of  the  Steel  Cor- 
poration is  based  on  examining  the  reports  of  millions  spent 
for  "  welfare,"  the  picture  books  of  company  houses,  clubs, 
hospitals  and  towns,  photographs  of  groups  of  smiling  old 
pensioners,  and  finally  the  Corporation's  annual  payroll,  as 
big  as  a  small  nation's  national  debt:  viewing  the  total  the 
directors  naturally  feel,  "  the  Corporation  does  a  tremendous 
lot  for  its  workmen."  The  viewpoint  of  the  workman  is 
based  not  on  totals  but  first  on  the  percentage  of  all  these 
things  touching  him  personally.  The  bulk  of  employees — 
the  unskilled  and  semi-skilled — ^have  had  simply  no  experi- 
ence of  the  company  houses,  "  welfare  "  and  pensions,  and 
their  percentage  of  stock  profits  do  not  impress  them.     But 

*  Letter  of  manager  of  Edgar  Thomson  works,  quoted  in  "  Inside  His- 
tory of  Carnegie  Steel  Co.,"  by  J.  H.  Bridge,  p.  81.  "My  experience 
(in  1875)  has  been  that  Germans  and  Irish,  Swedes  and  what  I  denomi- 
nate 'buckwheats'  (young  American  country  boys),  judiciously  mixed, 
make  the  most  effective  and  tractable  force  you  can  find." 

*  Quoted  by  R.  S.  Baker,  N.  Y.  Evening  Post,  Dec.  31,  1910. 


128  REPORT  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

in  the  second  place,  they,  as  well  as  the  skilled,  experience 
the  Corporation's  hours  and  wages,  about  which  they  have  as 
little  "  say  "  as  about  the  weather,  and  were  hitherto  hope- 
less about  getting  a  "  say  " ;  and  they  experience  daily  griev- 
ances about  which  they  cannot  help  trying  to  "  have  a  say." 
ISTow  if  the  system  is  such  that  the  grievances  are  excessive, 
and  if  the  grievances  seem  to  them  to  be  met  mostly  by 
detectives  and  "  welfare  "  in  place  of  machinery  for  redress, 
and  if  the  grievances  perpetually  remind  them  of  the  great 
grievance  of  no  control  over  hours  and  wages,  it  is  obvious 
that  the  workers  may  come  to  look  blackly  on  what  the  di- 
rectors regard  blandly. 

The  data  will  be  analyzed  first  as  to  the  causal  relation  be- 
tween the  customary  organization  of  the  steel  industry  and 
grievances. 

A  Pittsburgh  professor  of  economics,  an  admiring  student 
of  the  steel  industry,  described  its  organization  to  the  Com- 
mission as  "  highly  militarized."  Several  steel  masters 
agreed  that  his  description  was  fitting. 

"  The  general  staff  of  the  Carnegie  Company,"  he  said, 
"  is  one  of  the  most  efficient  in  the  whole  world  of  business. 
The  superintendents,  department  managers  and  foremen  are 
splendidly  loyal  efficient  officers  with  high  morale. 

"  Bound  to  them  are  the  non-commissioned  officers,  such 
gang  leaders  as  rollers,  blowers,  melters  and  the  other  top- 
skilled  Americans,  who  are  part  bosses,  part  workmen.  Alto- 
gether this  administrative  group,  almost  a  third  of  the  force, 
has  a  real  military  efficiency,  bound  to  the  company  by 
stock  participation,  bonuses,  loans,  house-rentals  and  pen- 
sions." 

The  "  army  "  under  this  group  is,  of  course,  almost  alto- 
gether made  up  of  low-skilled  "  foreigners."  They  are  the 
smallest  participants  in  the  Corporation's  stock  offers,  ton- 
nage bonuses,  company  houses  and  pensions.     Before  con- 


GRIEVANCES  AND  CONTEOL  129 

sidering  how  this  system  impinges  on  them,  let  us  view  it  in 
relation  to  the  skilled  Americans. 

The  first  characteristic  of  the  militaristic  system  is  pro- 
motion :  promotion  by  seniority.  From  the  upper  half  of  the 
semi-skilled  class  on  up  every  steel  worker  has  his  eye  on  the 
next  higher  job.  He  is  in  line  for  it,  but  he  has  no  guarantee 
that  he  will  get  it.  Seniority  is  a  custom  only.  The  man 
who  incurs  the  displeasure  of  the  Company  is  not  promoted. 
Let  him  be  suspected  of  "  agitating  in  the  mill  "  or  of  being  a 
"  trouble  maker  "  and  he  has  no  way  of  enforcing  his  com- 
plaint when  others  are  promoted  over  him.  Merely  making 
the  complaint  may  be  deemed  proof  of  being  "  undesirable  " 
and  cause  for  demotion.  In  the  absence  of  any  enforceable 
rule  favoritism  results  and  where  it  may  not  exist,  it  is 
suspected  by  the  workers.  The  following  from  the  diary  of 
a  steel  worker  at  Gary  in  the  summer  of  1919  is  paralleled  by 
many  other  statements  to  the  Commission's  investigators : 

"  Old  hand  here  tells  me : '  Superintendent  of  this  department? 
He's  the  cousin  of  the  general  superintendent.  His  assistant? 
Married  to  his  sister.  Boss's  assistant  on  this  floor  is  his  son- 
in-law.'  And  so  on  down  a  long  list  of  the  better  jobs.  It  is  the 
universal  impression  of  the  lower  ranks  that  favoritism  rules." 

There  is  then  an  inherent  grievance  touching  the  skilled 
worker's  most  precious  possession  under  this  system — his 
right  to  promotion. 

The  second  characteristic  is  "  speeding  up."  An  object  of 
this  militarized  organization  is  the  attainment  of  the  high- 
est production.  Tonnage  bonuses  are  the  commonest  method 
of  accomplishing  it.  Supplementary  is  the  incited  rivalry 
between  teams  or  crews,  between  furnaces,  between  depart- 
ments, between  plants.  The  "  record  "  made  by  a  rival  outfit 
is  the  unceasingly  applied  spur.  Against  "  speeding  up  "  the 
skilled  worker  feels  he  has  no  defense.     AU  the  while  he 


130  EEPORT  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

feels  that  his  success  in  attaining  unexampled  tonnage — and 
unexampled  bonus — may  be  the  excuse  for  a  cut  in  bonus 
rates.  He  feels  that  rates  are  "  shaved,"  as  it  is  called,  just 
to  "  speed  "  him  harder  by  egging  him  on  to  the  attempt 
to  regain  his  former  earnings'  total.  "  Speeding  "  is  most 
marked  as  a  grievance  in  the  Pittsburgh  District. 

Third,  because  of  their  obvious  relation  to  control,  the 
Corporation's  stock  sales,  loans,  bonuses  and  pensions  are 
viewed  as  a  grievance  by  many  highly  skilled.  They  grad- 
ually see  what  these  mean.  If  they  complain  on  any  score 
whatever  they  may  be  told  directly :  "  You  own  stock  in  the 
Corporation?  Well,  then  you  don't  want  to  damage  that 
stock's  price  by  making  trouble  for  the  Company.  This  com- 
plaint of  yours  makes  trouble."  Many  workers,  taking  Com- 
pany jobs,  living  in  Company  houses,  buying  at  Company 
stores,  obtaining  Company  loans,  holding  Company  stock, 
working  toward  a  Company  pension,  feel  "  all  sewed  up." 
Every  "  lay-off  "  they  ask,  to  recuperate  from  speeding  or 
long  hours,  depends  on  the  favor  of  a  Company  boss  and 
reminds  them  of  all  their  company  entanglements. 

Freedom  from  arbitrary  control,  then,  which  was  generally 
given  by  the  skilled  Americans  who  did  strike  as  their  object 
in  going  out,  seems  by  the  organization  of  the  steel  job  to 
be  denied  them.  In  Youngstown,  Johnstovra,  Wheeling, 
Cleveland,  as  well  as  in  many  Calumet  District  mills  where 
great  numbers  of  Americans  struck,  the  basis  of  their  peculiar 
grievance,  aside  from  long  hours,  was  the  system  of  absolute 
control.  These  men  earned  from  $8  to  $30  a  day.  Their 
willingness  to  imperil  this  and  all  their  prospects  indicated 
how  strongly  some  of  them  rebelled  against  having  no 
"  say." 

Add  to  this  the  eternal  and  increasing  grievance  of  exces- 
sive hours  and  the  state  of  mind  of  even  the  skilled  Ameri- 
can tended  to  become  more  violent  than  clear.     Here  is  a 


GRIEVANCES  AND  CONTEOL  131 

page  from  the  diary  of  the  Gary  worker,  made  in  August, 
1919,  recording  the  talk  of  a  group  of  skilled  workers : 

"  A  heater  who  works  eleven  hours  by  day  and  thirteen  by 
night,  making  $400  a  month,  says,  *  Why  shouldn't  we  get  the 
eight-hour  day  without  striking  for  it?  I'd  be  glad  to  give 
up  three  or  four  dollars  a  day  to  get  eight  hours.' 

"  An  engineer  many  years  on  the  job  says,  '  Count  me  in 
for  a  six-day  week  too,  like  a  civilized  man.  This  fourteen  hours 
a  night,  seven  days  a  week,  is  hell.' 

"  The  gang  boss  says,  *  Who  the  devil  is  this  man  Gary  to  tell 
our  representatives  to  go  to  hell.  Somebody's  going  to  get  him 
for  that.' 

"  Another  says,  '  Gary  thinks  we've  worked  his  old  twelve  and 
fourteen  hours  so  long  we'll  stand  for  anything.' " 

This  was  before  the  strike.  The  following,  one  of  many 
statements  made  by  skilled  men  during  the  strike,  was  ob- 
tained in  Youngstown,  October  25,  from  a  gray-haired 
stationary  engineer : 

"The  other  day  the  boss  called  on  me  and  told  me  I  was 
too  valuable  a  man  not  to  be  working  for  the  company,  that  aU 
the  places  were  filled  except  mine,  and  that  he  wanted  me  to 
come  back.  I  told  him  I  would  think  it  over.  The  next  day 
he  came  back  again  and  asked  me  how  much  was  owing  on  my 
house.  I  told  him  it  was  none  of  his  God  damn  business.  I  told 
him  there  was  not  a  cent  owing  on  my  house,  but  if  there  was 
my  wife  and  family  would  follow  me  into  the  street  before  I 
would  touch  any  of  his  dirty  money.  There  is  money  owing  on 
my  house,  but  I  would  not  give  him  the  satisfaction  of  knowing 
it.  I  would  rather  lose  it  than  go  back  to  work  before  this 
strike  is  won.  I  had  relatives  in  the  Revolutionary  War,  I  fought 
for  freedom  in  the  Philippines  myself,  and  I  had  three  boys  in 
the  army  fighting  for  democracy  in  France.  One  of  them  is  lying 
in  the  Argonne  Forest  now.  If  my  boy  could  give  his  life 
fighting  for  free  democracy  in  Europe,  I  guess  I  can  stand  it  to 


132  REPOET  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

fight  this  battle  through  to  the  end.  I  am  going  to  help  my 
fellow  workmen  show  Judge  Gary  that  he  can't  act  as  if  he  was 
a  king  or  kaiser  and  tell  them  how  long  they  have  got  to 
work !  " 

All  the  foregoing  analysis,  finally,  applies  to  only  about 
one-third  of  the  employees,  and  that  third  the  better  paid, 
shorter-houred,  better  treated,  the  skilled,  the  "  Americans." 
If  the  Corporation's  "  welfare,"  which  applies  principally  to 
this  third,  leaves  so  many  with  such  a  viewpoint,  it  becomes 
practically  negligible,  as  an  emollient  in  consideration  of  the 
two-thirds,  the  "  hunkies,"  particularly  if  the  Corporations 
system  of  production  and  control  creates  even  more  grievances 
among  the  immigrants  than  among  the  Americans. 

How  does  the  basic  organization  of  the  steel  industry  affect 

the  "  hunky  job  "  ?    Below  the  skilled,  who  form  the  apex  of 

the  pyramid,  comes  the  indefinable  mass  of  the  semi-skilled; 

beneath  these,  the  mass  of  the  unskilled,  mainly  classed  as 

common  labor.      The  loyalizing  forces   of   the   militarized 

organization  are  loose  among  the  semi-skilled  and  scarcely 

exist  at  all  among  the  unskilled.     The  bulk  of  both  sections, 

of  course,  is  recruited  from  the  fifty  nationalities,  more  or 

less,  making  up  the  foreigners,  mostly  Slavs.^     At  the  top 

of  the  semi-skilled  there  is  no  sharp  dividing  line  from  the 

skilled.    Heaters'  helpers,  melters'  helpers,  the  helpers  closest 

to  rollers,  blowers,  etc.,  hold  jobs  requiring  a  training  which 

takes  years ;  in  these  jobs  the  influence  of  possible  promotion, 

the  pull  of  seniority,  is  almost  as  strong  as  among  the  highly 

skilled  jobs.     In  the  jobs  below  these,  where  pay  and  skill 

are  less,  the  influence  of  possible  promotion  is  also  less,  and 

so  on,  down  through  the  "whole  range  of  jobs  beneath  the 

•  Some  idea  of  the  number  of  races  in  the  steel  industry  is  given  by 
the  following  table,  submitted  to  the  Senate  investigating  committee 
by  the  superintendent  of  the  Homestead  plant.  It  is  not  typical  of  the 
industry  in  two  respects:  (a)  the  small  proportion  of  Slavs,  Greeks 
and  Italians;    (b)   the  large  proportion  of  Americans,  due  to  the  un- 


GRIEVANCES  AND  CONTROL 


133 


hierarchy  of  the  skilled  and  the  upper  half  of  the  semi-skilled, 
the  prospect  of  promotion  becomes  more  and  more  remote, 
the  militarizing  influence  rapidly  lessens,  until  at  the  bottom 
the  whole  mass  of  common  labor,  the  broad  base  of  the  pyra- 
mid of  steel,  is  fluid.  The  jobs  are  not  clearly  defined,  the 
capabilities  for  the  jobs  are  largely  brawn,  and  the  holders  of 
the  jobs  can  be  and  are  switched  about.  'Not  but  that  even 
the  heavy  common  labor  jobs  in  steel  require  a  certain  degree 
of  training,  rather  knack,  but  the  "  know-how "  can  be 
learned  in  a  few  days  or  weeks  at  most,  and  if  not  learned 
the  job  can  still  somehow  be  done,  though  badly  and  with 


usual   number   of   negroes.     Fifty-four    races   are   given,   or    52   non- 
American.     (Senate  testimony,  Vol.  II,  p.  480.) 

Nationality  report.  Homestead  Steel  Works,  Howard  Axle  Works,  Carrie 
Furnaces,  Oct.  8,  1919. 


Nationality          1^ 

American 

Armenian 

fimiber 

6,799 

15 

42 

5 

25 

1 

3 

2 

1 

67 

20 

299 

2 

9 

6 

424 

1 

7 

7 

219 

267 

11 

1 

6 

574 

3 

443 

264 

1 

Per 

cent. 
39.45 
.10 
.29 
.30 
.17 
.01 
.02 
.01 
.01 
.46 
.14 

2.04 
.01 
.06 
.04 

2.89 
.01 
.05 
.05 

1.49 

1.82 
.07 
.01 
.04 

3.91 
.02 

3.02 

1.80 
.01 

Nationality 
Kreiner  (Slovanian) 
Lithuanian 

Numbt 

6 

.      238 

4 

.       130 

.    1,734 
1 
1 
1 

4 

.      432 

1 

18 

49 

.      628 

1 

4 

.      226 

.   2,373 

26 

48 

74 

11 

9 

53 

91 

Per 

!r  cent. 
0.04 
1  62 

Austrian    . 

Macedonian 

Mexican   

Negro : 

American 

British   

East  India    

West  India   

Norwegian 

Polish 

.03 

Arabian    . . 

.89 

Albanian    

Austro-Servian 

Belgian 

Bohemian 

Brazilian   .  - 

11.80 
.01 
.01 
01 

Bulgarian  , 
Canadian  . 

.03 

Horvat)  . . 

2  94 

Croatian    ( 

Portuguese 

.01 

Cuban  .... 
Dalmatian 
Danish    . .  . 

Porto  Rican   

Roumanian    

Russian    

Ruthenian   

Saxon  

Scotch    

Slovak  

Servian 

Spanish 

Swede 

.12 
.33 

4  28 

English  . . . 
Filipino    . . 

.01 
.03 

Finnish  . . . 
French    . .  . 
German    . . 
Greek    .... 
Hebrew  . . . 

(Magyar) 

1.54 

16.15 

.18 

.33 

.50 

Hindu  .... 

Swiss 

07 

Hollander  . 

Syrian    

06 

Hungarian 
Indian  . . .  , 

Turk   

Welsh 

Total    

.36 
.62 

Italian    . . . 
Japanese  . , 

.  14,687 

100.6 

134  EEPORT  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

bad  effects  on  the  clumsy  worker.  Every  sort  of  long,  hard, 
hot,  heavy  work,  from  shoveling  weighty  substances  into  the 
maws  of  white-hot  furnaces  or  sledging  to  pieces  still-hot 
masses  of  metal  or  slag,  to  picking  up  or  putting  down  or 
heaving  or  carrying  pipes,  hot  bricks,  planks,  great  iron 
hooks,  sheets  of  metal,  largely  with  an  accompaniment  of 
grease,  noise,  sweat  or  danger — these  make  up  the  steel  jobs 
and  the  dirt,  grease,  heat  and  long  hours  generally  increase 
the  lower  the  job  is  in  the  pyramid.  Finally,  the  pay-rate 
of  the  common  labor  at  the  bottom,  the  lowest  of  all,  of 
course,  is  the  base  from  which  all  other  wage  rates  are  ranked. 

The  semi-skilled  is  the  growing  group  in  the  whole  in- 
dustry. The  mechanizing  of  processes  in  the  past  two  de- 
cades has  revolutionized  the  industry,  each  new  machine  dis- 
placing skilled  men  at  the  top  and  unskilled  at  the  bottom. 
More  and  more  the  steel  job  tends  to  become  the  job  of  a 
machine,  each  new  machine  tending  to  abolish  either  the 
occupations  of  a  dozen  common  laborers  in  favor  of  one  semi- 
skilled man  or  of  a  few  skilled  men  in  favor  of  one  not  so 
skilled.  More  and  more  the  making  of  steel  requires  a  type 
different  from  either  the  brawny  Fafnir  who  used  to  wield 
the  "  peel "  or  the  versatile  brainy  man  who  could  do  many 
things  with  many  complicated  machines.  The  new  type  is 
the  slighter,  weaker  man  with  intelligence  a  little  above  the 
common  laborer,  who  can  handle  with  accuracy  a  few  levers 
on  some  crane,  charging  machine,  or  "  skip."  He  must  not 
have  too  much  brain  or  he  will  revolt  at  the  deadly  monotony 
of  moving  his  few  levers  on  his  one  machine  ten  to  fourteen 
hours  a  day  and  from  three  hundred  to  three  hundred  and 
forty  days  in  the  year. 

In  these  jobs,  of  the  lower  half  of  the  semi-skilled  and  all 
of  the  unskilled,  two  things  are  all-important:  the  disagree- 
ableness  of  the  job  and  the  length  of  time  the  worker  is  kept 
at  it.    The  lure  of  immediate  promotion  is  small,  one  or  two 


GRIEVANCES  AND  CONTEOL  135 

cents  more  an  hour,  no  change  in  the  length  of  the  day  and 
mainly  the  added  satisfaction  of  slightly  greater  security, 
inasmuch  as  it  is  always  forty-two-cent  common  labor  that 
gets  laid  off  or  fired  first  when  work  is  slack.  Hours  and 
wages,  then,  are  the  great  grievance  of  common  labor,  with 
denial  of  promotion  entering  in  according  to  the  job's  height 
in  the  scale  of  the  semi-skilled.  In  the  upper  half  of  the 
semi-skilled  the  lure  of  promotion  takes  hold  of  the  worker 
out  of  all  proportion  almost  even  in  comparison  with  the 
skilled  American  worker  higher  up ;  for  it  is  this  almost- 
skilled  worker,  of  five  to  fifteen  years'  experience  in  the  busi- 
ness, who  remembers  most  keenly  the  dirt,  heat  and  drudgery 
from  which  he  ascended  and  who  feels  most  poignantly  the 
failure  to  win  promotion  still  higher  if  the  discrimination 
against  him  is  based  solely  on  the  one  thing  he  cannot  get 
away  from, — his  race. 

For  common  labor,  then,  grievances  primarily  concern  too 
low  wages,  too  long  hours  and  the  arbitrariness  of  the  fore- 
man; he  feels  little  their  connection  with  the  company's 
labor  policy;  for  the  semi-skilled,  grievances  are  less  con- 
cerned with  wages,  more  with  hours  and  most  sharply  with 
discrimination  based  on  race  and  preventing  promotion,  and 
through  this,  a  great  deal  with  the  company's  labor  policy. 

Here  is  the  sum  of  grievances  and  the  life  and  progress 
of  the  immigrant  steel  worker  as  determined  from  hun- 
dreds of  interviews:  The  Slav,  Pole,  Serb,  Croat,  Russian, 
Greek,  Magyar,  Jew,  Roumanian  or  Turk  is  nine  times  out 
of  ten,  a  peasant,  taking  an  industrial  job  for  the  first  time. 
At  the  start,  only  as  the  wages  fail  to  keep  him  and  his 
family  as  he  wants  them  to  be  kept,  or  the  hours  break  down 
his  health,  does  he  care  much  about  "  controlling  "  cither 
wages  or  hours.  What  matters  most  to  him  is  that  if  the 
mill  is  shut  down  he  is  the  first  to  be  laid  off;  if  the  job 
is  unusually  hot,  greasy  or  heavy,  he  is  the  first  to  be  set  to 


136  EEPOET  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

it.  He  is  the  most  arbitrarily,  often  brutally,  shifted  and 
ordered  about ;  if  he  takes  a  lay-off,  he  is  the  most  likely  to 
pay  for  it  with  his  job;  if  he  is  late  a  few  minutes  he  is 
the  most  likely  to  be  heavily  docked  and  he  is  the  most  likely 
to  be  kept  beyond  his  hour  with  no  additional  pay.  If  there 
is  sickness  in  his  home  or  he  is  otherwise  kept  away,  his 
excuses  get  the  shortest  shrift.  If  he  is  the  butt  of  unusual 
prejudice  in  either  his  foreman  or  some  fellow- worker, 
evinced  in  profanity  or  the  penalties  of  always  the  nastier 
task,  he  knows  least  where  to  go  for  redress  or  how  to  speak  it. 

As  the  years  go  on  and  he  works  on  up,  the  right  to  his 
job,  the  fear  of  losing  it  or  of  being  shifted  become  more  im- 
portant and  he  is  the  one  to  value  most  his  security  in  pro- 
motion. He  finds  he  is  the  one  whose  personal  preference 
counts  least  and  the  bar  that  stands  out  strongest  in  his  mind 
is  not  being  an  "  American."  "  That  job  is  not  a  hunky's 
job ;  you  can't  have  it,"  is  the  answer  that  destroys  his  confi- 
dence in  himself.  He  can't  change  his  race ;  he  can't  change 
his  foreman  and  he  cannot  get  above  the  foreman.  By  this 
stage  in  the  progress  he  has  become  sufficiently  Americanized 
to  want  higher  wages  and  shorter  hours,  he  wants  better 
living  and  more  recognition  as  a  human  being  and  less  as  a 
hunky,  but  he  finds  himself  in  the  grip  of  a  system  which 
regulates  his  hours  by  whistle,  his  wages  by  bulletin-board, 
his  grievances  by  rebuff.  In  this  stage  the  union  organizer 
found  tens  of  thousands  in  the  steel  industry  to  whom  the 
strike  was  very  considerably  a  revolt  against  arbitrary  con- 
trol, as  it  was  principally  for  the  Americans  and  hardly  at  all 
for  the  common  laborer.  Of  the  "  foreigners,"  this  class  is  the 
one  left  by  the  strike  in  the  most  rebellious  frame  of  mind 
and  most  likely  to  answer  another  strike  call. 

It  is  entirely  possible  that  this  state  of  things  is  almost 
unknown  to  the  corporation  officials  who  assured  the  public 
and  the  Senate  investigating  committee  that  the  steel  workers 


GRIEVANCES  AND  CONTEOL  137 

were  "  satisfied  "  and  "  contented,"  and  that  "  there  was  no 
cause  for  the  strike."  It  has  been  pointed  out  elsewhere  that 
Mr.  Gary  has  admittedly  no  functioning  open  and  above- 
board  system  of  learning  what  his  workmen  think.  If  the 
Corporation  even  had  an  efficient  system  of  redressing  daily 
grievances,  leaving  totally  out  of  consideration  hours  and 
wages,  Mr.  Gary  would  inevitably  learn  these  things.  Most 
of  the  companies  now  have  employment  systems  which  are 
efficient  in  turning  out  statistics  concerning  the  labor  force 
gleaned  from  two  points  of  contact;  hiring  and  firing.  In 
between,  the  most  important  time  of  all,  these  systems  ad- 
mittedly have  no  contact.  The  employment  managers  rely 
on  the  foremen,  "  cooperate  "  with  the  welfare  workers  and 
fundamentally  are  powerless  to  do  anything.  Consideration 
of  wages  and  hours  is  clean  out  of  their  province,  and  as  more 
than  half  the  remaining  grievances  deal  with  the  foreman, 
who  is  their  co-worker,  they  are  a  futility  as  far  as  any 
redress  is  concerned  and  not  only  do  they  know  it,  but  the 
mass  of  steel  workers  know  it  too.  The  general  test  of  an 
employment  manager's  success,  in  the  estimation  of  his  super- 
intendent, is  whether  or  not  he  is  successful  in  keeping  com- 
plaints from  bothering  the  superintendent.  What  with  his 
powerlessness  and  with  the  prevalence  of  the  system,  the  em- 
ployment manager,  whatever  his  human  desires,  quickly  falls 
into  the  way  of  steel — to  refuse,  rebuff,  browbeat,  or,  finally, 
to  "  get-to-hell-out,"  that  is,  fire. 

Here  are  typical  statements  of  grievances  of  the  lesser 
skilled  taken  from  Inquiry  investigators'  notebooks  or  from 
Senate  Committee  testimony,  just  as  the  workers  disjointedly 
spill  them  out.  They  could  be  duplicated  to  the  point  of 
boredom. 

J W ,  a  Czech,   (Homestead)   was  a  miner  during 

his  first  two  years  in  this  country.  Learned  to  speak 
English  in  the  mines.    Is  married,  with  two  children,  owns  his 


138  EEPORT  ON  THE  STEEL  STEIKE 

own  home  and  has  his  first  citizenship  papers.  In  the  steel  mills 
he  is  a  pipe  fitter,  $8.50  a  day,  of  10y2  hours  day  shift  and 
14  hours  night  shift.  Thinks  the  hours  are  altogether  too  long 
but  the  pay  is  fair.  During  the  war  the  workers  were  paid,  he 
said,  for  every  hour  they  put  in;  now  they  are  paid  for  10  hours 
during  the  day  but  must  work  10%  hours.  At  night  they  are 
paid  for  12  hours  but  work  14.  Those  who  complained  were 
told  to  get-to-hell-out  if  they  did  not  like  it. 

W declares  that  the  workers  have  never  been  ahle  to 

learn  the  rate  of  pay  which  they  get.  The  foreman  does  not  tell 
the  worker,  who  must  wait  until  pay  day  to  see  how  much  he 

will  receive.      Once   W found   out   from  the   timekeeper 

what  his  hourly  rate  was  but  soon  after  it  was  announced  that 
the  rate  of  pay  was  increased  although  no  definite  rates  were 
posted.  When  he  applied  again  to  the  timekeeper  for  informa- 
tion he  was  refused. 

He  had  never  heard  about  the  I.W.W.,  until  the  present  strike 
when  the  newspapers  told  about  it  in  their  attack  on  the  union. 
He  believed  in  the  A.  F.  of  L.,  as  he  thinks  they  have  shown 
results  at  the  mines. 

M U ,    a    Czech,    (Homestead),    in    this    country 

eight  years  and  is  married  but  he  "  never  could  find  time  to  take 
out  citizenship  papers  since  he  would  have  to  go  on  a  week  day 
to  Pittsburgh,  which  would  mean  that  he  would  have  to  pay 
the  wages  of  his  two  witnesses  and  lose  his  own."  While  he  was 
out  on  strike  he  would  have  taken  out  papers  but  he  understood 
from  the  newspapers  that  the  strikers  were  not  granted  citizen- 
ship. He  owns  his  own  home  and  a  little  Company  stock.  He 
can  read,  write  and  speak  English  fluently.  Chief  grievance  the 
unbearably  long  hours.  He  wants  an  8-hour  day  with  present 
pay,  $8.50  a  day. 

This  man  feels  that  he  is  discriminated  against  because  he 
is  a  hunky.  Several  times  when  he  has  asked  for  promotion  he 
has  been  told  that  the  good  jobs  are  not  for  hunhies.  He  feels 
that  the  clean,  decent  jobs  are  for  Americans  only. 


GRIEVANCES  AND  CONTROL  139 

A — ; —   T ,   a   Czeclij   millwright's   helper,   47   cents   an 

hour.  During  the  war  he  worked  as  a  millwright  but  has  been 
demoted  since  and  feels  that  he  is  discriminated  against  because 
he  is  a  hunlcy. 

Would  be  willing  to  forego  a  raise  in  wages  if  the  hours  were 
shorter.  He  thinks  the  long  hours  the  worst  part  of  the  steel 
work. 

M (of  Donora)    feels  that  he  is  being  cheated  by  the 

Company  officials  in  regard  to  the  pay  for  tonnage.  He  says 
he  has  never  heen  able  to  find  out  how  much  tonnage  he  is 
entitled  to  and  that  the  rest  of  the  workers  feel  that  the  count 
is  not  accurate  but  they  have  no  means  of  checking  it. 

M is  a  Lithunian  who  speaks  English  fluently  and  reads 

and  writes  it;  electrical  craneman,  12  hours  a  day,  13  hours  at 
night,  at  50  cents  an  hour  and  tonnage.  "  The  hours  are  alto- 
gether too  long;  eight  hours  a  day  is  long  enough  for  any  man 
to  work." 

That  the  long  hours  are  unendurable  and  destroy  family  life 

is  the  grievance  of  J McG ,  born  in  Scotland,  (now  of 

Natrona).  He  works  10"!/^  hours  a  day  and  14  hours  night, 
alternating  each  week,  at  $5.50  a  day,  which  he  says  is  inadequate 
to  support  his  family. 

P Y ,  a  Lithuanian  (Vandergrift),  6  years  a  citi- 
zen, family,  rougher  at  $6  a  day  of  8  hours,  declares  that 
while  the  wages  are  insufficient  his  chief  grievance  is  discrimina- 
tion and  contempt.  The  foreigners  are  given  the  dirtiest  and 
hardest  jobs  and  are  lorded  over  by  the  skilled  American  workers. 
He  is  always  told  to  tvait  by  the  foreman  when  he  asks  for  a 
better  job,  although  his  hands  are  maimed  because  of  the  hard 
work  which  he  must  do.  In  the  meantime  young  Americans 
who  have  worked  in  the  mills  only  a  short  time  are  promoted 
over  him  to  the  better  jobs. 

W S ,  Russian-Pole  (Natrona),  in  America  six  years, 

first  papers  and  served  in  the  A.  E.  F.    Works  as  a  laborer,  $5.50 


140  KEPOHT  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

for  a  day  of  10  hours  and  14  hours  at  night,  alternating  each 
week. 

Although  he  was  in  the  Army  he  feels  that  he  is  now  being 
discriminated  against  and  is  very  bitter  about  it.  He  says 
that  the  Americans  call  him  a  "foreigner.''  He  was  unable  to 
get  his  old  work  back  when  he  came  out  of  the  Army  but  jfinally 
after  getting  to  the  superintendent  with  his  complaint  he  did 
receive  back  his  old  place. 

S G ,  a   Neapolitan,  water-tender  at   $7.50   for   a 

12-hour  day  (New  Kensington),  joined  the  union  because  the 
foremen  are  arbitrary  and  won't  listen  to  anyone's  grievances  and 
because  the  hours  are  altogether  too  long  for  any  man  to  work. 
He  has  never  heard  about  the  I.  W.  W.,  or  Socialism,  cannot 
tell  what  they  mean  and  knows  almost  nothing  about  the  A.  F.  of 
L.  Never  heard  the  term  "  closed  shop  "  and  does  not  know  what 
it  means.  Never  has  read  any  literature  on  trade  unionism  either 
in  Italian  or  English. 

K ,  a  Pole,  works  in  galvanizing  shop,  12-hour  day  for 

$5.00  (East  Vandergrift),  says  that  the  foreigners  get  the  hardest 
and  most  unpleasant  jobs  and  are  always  discriminated  against. 
Says  it  makes  no  difference  about  the  foreigner's  ability  or 
whether  he  speaks  English,  he  is  looked  down  upon  and  con- 
sidered fit  only  for  jobs  Americans  won't  take. 

Says  he  has  a  younger  brother,  born  in  this  country,  who 
had  a  knack  for  learning  and  was  sent  to  the  high  school  up 
on  the  hill  in  the  American  section.  But  the  other  children 
would  not  play  with  him  because  he  was  a  hunky.  Now  he 
is  at  work  in  the  mills. 

K complained  that  the  shop  is  very  unhealthy,  full  of 

acid  fumes  and  the  vapor  was  so  thick  a  person  could  not  be 
seen  a  few  feet  away.  Everybody  in  it  has  complained  again 
and  again  to  the  foreman  who  promises  relief  but  nothing  ever 
happens.  Nobody  dares  go  to  the  superintendent  for  fear  of 
angering  the  foreman. 


GEIEVANCES  AND  CONTROL  141 

L ,  a  Russian,    (Natrona)    naturalized,  laborer,  $5.50  a 

day,  10  hours  days  and  14  hours  nights,  declared  he  cannot 
support  himself  and  family  on  $5.50  a  day.  Complained  at  great 
length  about  the  hours  being  much  too  long.  Finds  it  does  not 
help  to  complain  to  foremen  or  superintendent  because  "  all  the 
higher-ups  have  offices  somewhere  else."  Unions  seemed  to  him 
the  only  way  of  getting  anything  done. 

Two  Poles,  (Yandergrift)  both  roughers,  8  hours  at  $5.50  a 
day,  complained  bitterly  that  the  foreigner  has  no  chance  at  the 
better  jobs,  that  they  are  looked  upon  with  contempt  and  con- 
sidered fit  only  for  the  dirty  and  heavy  work  that  Americans 
would  not  do.  They  feel  they  are  exploited  by  the  heater  and 
roller  who  can  rest  at  intervals  while  the  remainder  of  the  gang, 
the  foreigners,  must  work  steadily  and  even  snatch  bites  of  their 
lunch  while  working.  "Always  when  they  ash  for  better  jols 
they  are  told  to  wait." 

Again  and  again  investigators  found  this  attitude  of  the 
immigrant  worker  repeated  with  an  added  intensity  of  bit- 
terness by  the  son  of  the  immigrant,  the  native  born  "  for- 
eigner," speaking  English,  dressing  and  largely  living  like  an 
"  American."  In  the  steel  mills  he  is  a  "  hunky."  One  of 
these,  a  striker,  released  a  few  months  before  from  the  army, 
summed  up  the  attitude  of  many  when,  asked  what  his  job 
was  in  the  mills,  he  answered,  "  Oh,  the  same  as  the  other 
hunkies." 

It  is  the  same  story  on  examining  the  volumes  containing 
the  testimony  offered  by  the  Senate  Committee's  investiga- 
tion: 

George  Mikulvich,  a  Dalmatian,  in  the  coke  works  at  Clairton, 
complained  to  the  Senate  Committee  which  interviewed  a  group 
of  strikers  on  a  street  corner  that  the  "  reason  why  these  people 
went  out  on  strike  and  he  went  with  them  was  because  they 
want  to  work  shorter  hours  and  get  more  money  and  better 


142  EEPOET  ON  THE  STEEL  STEIKE 

conditions;  better  treatment  from  the  bosses  and  the  foremen." 
He  worked  on  shifts  of  12  Jiours  and  14  hours  for  42  cents  an 
hour  straight,  no  time  and  a  half  for  overtime,  and  none  in  his 
gang  got  overtime  pay. 

(Senate  Testimony,  Vol.  II,  p.  524.) 

George  Miller,  a  Serb,  thirteen  years  in  the  mill  at  Clair- 
ton,  a  naturalized  citizen,  was  inten-iewed  by  the  Senators  as 
follows : 

Mr.  Miller:  If  my  family  gets  sick  and  I  ask  my  foreman 
that  I  want  off  that  day,  because  my  woman  is  sick  at  home, 
he  say  "  All  right,"  and  he  will  go  around  and  get  another  man 
if  he  can,  and  if  he  cannot  he  will  let  me  off.  The  next  day 
I  will  come  back  and  there  will  be  a  man  in  my  place  and  I  say 
to  him  "  My  woman  is  better."  He  will  say  "  You  can  go 
home  and  stay  home    ..." 

There  is  not  enough  money  for  the  workmen.  We  work  13 
hours  at  night  and  11  hours  at  day,  and  we  get  42  cents  an 
hour. 

Senator  McKellar:    And  how  much  is  that  a  day? 

Mr.  Miller:  For  a  12-hour  day  it  makes  $4.20  and  for  the 
longer  day  it  makes  $5.04     . 

WTiy  did  we  strike?  We  did  not  have  enough  money  so 
that  we  could  have  a  standard  American  living     .      .      . 

I  have  a  wife  and  two  children 

And  take  all  I  make  and  I  can  not  put  one  penny  aside,  and 
if  my  family  gets  sick  and  I  call  a  doctor,  he  won't  come  down 
for  nothing,  and  I  do  not  make  enough  money  to  pay  a  doctor 
and  he  won't  come  for  nothing     . 

There  is  another  thing.    If  I  get  in  the  mill  but  three-quarters 

of  a  minute  late  in  the  morning,  they  take  off  an  hour,  off  of  me. 

Then  if  I  stay  five  minutes  over  the  hour  I  should  quit  in  the 

mill,  they  won't  give  me  an  hour  for  the  five  minutes  at  all. 

(Senate  Testimony,  Vol.  II,  pp.  524,  525.) 


GEIEVANCES  AND  CONTROL  143 

Frank  Smith,  a  Hungarian,  testified  as  follows  (Clairton)  : 

The  Cliairman:    How  long  have  you  been  in  this  country? 

Mr.  Smith:  Thirteen  years.  The  reason  that  I  am  not 
naturalized  is  that  I  have  never  stayed  long  enough  in  one 
place;  stayed  long  enough  to  get  my  papers. 

Senator  McKellar:    Do  you  expect  to  be  naturalized  ? 

Mr.  Smith:  Yes;  I  expect  to  be  naturalized,  of  course,  be- 
cause I  have  got  my  family  here,  my  woman,  and  I  have  five 
children;  and  I  have  that  family,  and  I  would  like  to  know 
how  a  man  is  going  to  make  a  living  for  himself  and  his  wife 
and  five  children  on  $4.75  a  day. 

The  Chairman:    How  many  hours  do  you  work? 

Mr.  Smith:  I  work  10  hours  a  day  and  I  get  paid  for  straight 
10  hours  time. 

The  Chairman:  And  how  many  days  in  the  week  do  you 
work? 

Mr.  Smith:  Seven  days — sometimes  six  days  and  sometimes 
seven  days. 

He  was  asked  about  treatment  by  the  corporation  on  joining 
a  union. 

Mr.  Smith:  Oh,  they  won't  allow  us  in  there  if  they  know 
that  we  are  union  men. 

The  Chairman:  And  you  want  the  right  to  belong  to  the 
union,  too? 

Mr.  Smith :    Yes,  sir ;  we  do.    This  is  the  United  States  and 
we  ought  to  have  the  right  to  belong  to  the  union 
We  were  all  for  the  United  States.     We  worked  day  and  night 
for  that. 

The  Chairman:  And  bow  many  of  you  contributed  to  the 
Red  Cross  and  the  Y.M.C.A.? 

Mr.  Smith:     Every  one  of  us  contributed  $3  to  them. 

(Senate  Testimony,  Vol.  II,  pp.  526,  527.) 


VI 

ORGANIZING  FOR  CONFERENCE 

In  this  section  are  analyzed  tlie  Commission's  data  on 
how  steel  workers  were  organized  as  trade  unionists,  the  plan, 
methods,  aims  and  personnel  of  the  organizing  campaign, 
the  object  and  conduct  of  the  strike,  its  successes,  if  any,  and 
the  causes  of  failure  inherent  in  the  organization,  if  any.  The 
evidence  was  drawn  from  union  records,  interviews  with  labor 
leaders  and  talks  with  the  rank  and  file  and  with  company 
officials  and  government  agents.  Findings  may  be  sum- 
marized thus: 

The  organizing  campaign  and  the  strike  were  for  the  purpose 
of  forcing  a  conference  in  an  industry  where  no  means 
of  conference  existed ;  this  specific  conference  to  set  up 
trade  union  collective  bargaining,  particularly  to  abolish 
the  12-hour  day  and  arbitrary  methods  of  handling  em- 
ployees. 
(No  interpretation  of  the  movement  as  a  plot  or  conspiracy 
fits  the  facts ;  that  is,  it  was  a  mass  movement,  in  which 
leadership  became  of  secondary  importance. 
The  strike  failed  in  its  object;  part  of  the  failure  was  due 
to  defects  in  the  labor  movement. 
In  analyzing  the  organization  resulting  in  the  strike  it  is 
necessary  to  draw  a  distinction  which  however  cannot  be 
clearly  kept  throughout  the  discussion ;  that  is,  the  distinction 
between  the  leadership  and  the  body  of  strikers.    The  leader- 
ship came  from  the  organized  labor  movement,  the  American 
Federation  of  Labor,  having  comparatively  few  footholds  in 
the  steel  industry.    The  labor  movement  initiated  the  organiz- 
ing campaign,  invited  by  the  steel  workers,  according  to  the 

144 


ORGANIZING  FOR  CONFERENCE  145 

labor  leaders,  invading  where  it  was  not  wanted,  according 
to  the  employers.  Both  statements  are  correct  and  neither 
lays  emphasis  on  the  principal  fact — the  isolation  of  the  mass 
of  immigrant  steel  workers,  unable  to  unite  their  thirty 
nationalities,  ignorant  of,  or  fearful  of,  the  ways  by  which 
workmen  act  to  change  their  conditions  of  labor.  These 
steel  workers  are  more  important  than  their  leaders,  in  analyz- 
ing causes  of  the  strike,  and  in  this  section  of  the  report 
the  emphasis  laid  on  the  leadership  must  be  clearly  grasped 
as  over-emphasis,  due  to  the  fact  that  it  is  organization  which 
is  being  analyzed.  Such  analysis  must  begin  with  the  list 
of  the  twenty-four  ^  participating  A.  F.  of  L.  unions,  whose 
officers  composed  the  National  Committee  for  Organizing 
Iron  and  Steel  Workers,  of  which  John  Fitzpatrick,  President 
of  the  Chicago  Federation  of  Labor,  became  chairman,  with 
William  Z.  Foster  as  Secretary-Treasurer.  The  list  whose 
relative  unimportance  compared  with  the  hundreds  of  thous- 
ands of  nameless  steel  workers  miust  not  be  forgotten  is  as 
follows : 

Blacksmiths,  International  Brotherhood  of;  J.  L.  Kline,  presi- 
dent, Chicago,  111. 
Boiler  Makers  and  Iron  Ship  Builders  of  America,  Brotherhood 

of;  L,  Weyand,  acting  president,  Kansas  City,  Kans. 
Brick  and  Clay  Workers  of  America,  The  United ;  Frank  Kasten, 

president,  Chicago,  111. 
Bricklayers,    Masons    and    Plasterers    International    Union    of 

America;  William  Bowan,  president,  Indianapolis,  Ind. 
Bridge  and  Structural  Iron  Workers,  International  Association; 

P.  J.  Morrin,  president,  Indianapolis,  Ind. 
Coopers  International  Union  of  North  America;  A.  C.  Hughes, 

president,  Newton  Highlands,  Mass. 
Electrical  Workers  of  America,  International  Brotherhood  of; 

J.  P.  Noonan,  acting  president,  Springfield,  111. 

1  The  list,  as  officially  furnished  to  the  Senate  Committee,  includes 
a  25th  union,  added  in  the  latter  months  of  the  organizing  campaign. 


146  EEPORT  OJT  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

Foundry  Emplo3^ees,  International  Brotherhood  of;  A.  E.  Linn, 
president,  St.  Louis,  Mo. 

Hod  Carriers,  Building  and  Common  Laborers'  Union  of  North 
America,  International;  D.  D'Allessandro,  president, 
Quincy,  Mass. 

Iron,  Steel  and  Tin  Workers  Amalgamated  Association  of; 
M.  F.  Tighe,  president,  Pittsburgh,  Pa. 

Machinists,  International  Association  of;  L.  H.  Johnston,  pres- 
ident, Washington,  D.  C. 

Metal  Polishers  International  LTnion;  W.  W.  Britton,  president, 
Cincinnati,  Ohio. 

Mine,  Mill,  and  Smelter  Workers,  International  Union  of;  C.  H. 
Moyer,  president,  Denver,  Colo. 

Mine  Workers  of  America,  United;  Frank  J.  Hayes,  president, 
Indianapolis,  Ind. 

Moulders'  Union  of  North  America,  International ;  J.  F.  Valen- 
tine, president,  Cincinnati,  Ohio, 

Pattern  Makers'  League  of  North  America ;  James  Wilson,  pres- 
ident, Cincinnati,  Ohio. 

Plumbers  and  Steam  Fitters  of  the  United  States  and  Canada, 
ITnited  Association  of;  John  R.  Alpine,  president,  Chicago, 
111. 

Quarryworkers,  International  Union  of  North  America ;  Fred  W. 
Suitor,  Barre,  Vt. 

Carmen  of  America,  Brotherhood  Railway;  M.  F.  Ryan,  pres- 
ident, Kansas  City,  Mo. 

Seamen's  Union  of  America,  International;  Andrew  Fureseth, 
president,  San  Francisco,  Calif. 

Metal  Workers'  International  Alliance,  Amalgamated  Sheet; 
J.  J.  H}Ties,  president,  Chicago,  111. 

Firemen,  International  Brotherhood  of  Stationary;  Timothy 
Healy,  president.  New  York,  N.  Y. 

Engineers,  International  Union  of  Steam  and  Operating;  Milton 
Snellings,  president,  Chicago,  111. 

Switchmen's  Union  of  North  America;  S.  E.  Heberling,  pres- 
ident, Buffalo,  N.  Y. 

Steam  Shovelmen  and  Dredgemen,  International  Brotherhood 
of;  W.  M.  Welsh,  president.  New  York  City,  N.  Y, 


ORGANIZING  FOE  CONFERENCE  147 

One  man,  it  was  generally  admitted  inside  and  outside  of 
this  heterogeneous  group,  stood  out  among  his  fellows  and  was 
so  far  as  personal  characteristics  went  the  central  dominating 
influence.  This  was  John  Fitzpatrick,  the  chairman.  His 
broad  human  qualities,  it  seemed  to  observers,  justified  his 
national  reputation.  An  uncalculating  idealism,  quite  sim- 
ple, but  quite  determined,  was  in  him. 

It  is  much  easier  to  give  an  accurate  surface  record  of  the 
strike  than  to  detail  the  underlying  essential  facts  which  are 
largely  facts  of  psychology.  A  list  of  all  committees,  a  chrono- 
logical history  of  all  the  organizing  mass  meetings,  trans- 
cripts of  executive  meetings  held,  copies  of  correspondence 
between  Mr.  Gompers  and  Mr.  Gary,  might  conceivably  shed 
no  light  on  the  fundamental  question: — 

What  made  300,000  steel  workers  leave  the  mills  on 
September  22nd  and  stay  away  in  greater  or  fewer  numbers 
for  a  period  up  to  three  and  a  half  months  ? 

It  cannot  be  too  strongly  emphasized  that  a  strike  does  not 
consist  of  a  plan  and  a  call  for  a  walkout.  There  has  been 
many  a  call  with  no  resultant  walkout ;  there  has  been  many 
a  strike  with  no  preceding  plan  or  call  at- all.  Strike  con- 
ditions are  conditions  of  mind. 

The  frame  of  mind  of  steel  workers  in  late  1918  and  early 
1919,  first  and  foremost,  as  detailed  in  other  sections  of  this 
report,  grew  out  of  their  conditions  of  labor,  things  with 
which  Mr.  Gompers,  Mr.  Fitzpatrick  and  the  strike  organizers 
had  little  to  do.  That  three  quarters  of  steel  employees,  who 
were  forced  to  work  from  10  to  14  hours  a  day,  developed  a 
frame  of  mind  of  more  or  less  chronic  rebellion,  largely  the 
physical  reaction  from  exhaustion  and  deprivation.  Re- 
bellious reactions  from  having  no  "  say  "  in  the  conduct  of 
the  job  was  also  chronic,  though  less  so.  These  were  funda- 
mental facts  in  steel  workers'  minds,  of  which  they  were 
constantly  reminded  by  endless  "  grievances  " ;  these  facts  Mr. 


148  EEPORT  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

Foster  was  thinking  of  when  he  said  that  if  the  steel  com- 
panies had  shortened  hours  and  granted  some  sort  of  repre- 
sentation, "  this  movement  would  never  have  had  a  show." 
In  this  respect  the  Finance  Committee  of  the  U.  S.  Steel 
Corporation  was  the  principal  organizer  of  the  strike. 

This  rebellious  state  of  mind  had  existed  a  long  time 
without  a  mass  strike.  The  high  labor  turnover  in  steel 
plants  ^  means  that  thousands  of  steel  workers  have  been 
going  on  "  individual  strikes "  for  several  years.  The 
"  labor  shortage  "  which  steel  companies  experience  is  a  per- 
sistent evidence  of  this  "  strike  "  frame  of  mind.  The  high 
rate  of  absenteeism  is  another  evidence.  Whetting  this 
state  of  discontent  were  two  other  psychological  factors,  both 
growing  out  of  the  war  and  previously  referred  to  in  this 
report.  Together  they  were  far  more  important  than  Mr. 
Gompers  or  Mr.  Foster  or  anybody  possibly  except  Mr.  Gary. 

The  first  factor  was  the  increased  consideration  accorded 
steel  workers,  by  foremen  daily  and  by  high  company  officials 
frequently,  in  the  course  of  the  national  war  effort.  The 
steel  worker  was  made  to  feel  that  he  was  mightily  helping  to 
win  the  war,  with  his  steel  shells,  steel  guns,  gun  carriages, 
ship  plates,  etc.,  etc.,  etc.,  in  short,  with  his  maximum  pro 
duction.  The  "  foreigner  "  foimd  himself  sworn  at  less  by 
the  foreman,  actually  conversed  with,  finally  promoted  to 
semi-skilled  or  even  skilled  jobs,  periodically  solicited  by  the 
plant  superintendent  himself  to  buy  Liberty  Bonds,  subscribe 
to  the  Red  Cross,  the  Y.  M.  C.  A.,  etc.  More  especially  the 
American  worker  read  in  his  newspaper  that  he  was  an  im- 
portant person,  that  President  Wilson,  General  Pershing  and 
other  great  men  were  relying  on  him  and  were  telling  him  so 
in  "  greetings,"  "  appeals  "  and  "  proclamations  "  in  which 
"  labor  "  and  especially  "  organized  labor  "  was  "  recognized  " 

^  Labor  turnover  in  Homestead  Steel  Works  for  1919  was  575  a  month 
or  6,800  a  year  to  maintain  the  force  of  11,500.  Testimony  of  Home- 
stead Superintendent,  Senate  Testimony,  Vol.  II,  p.  481. 


ORGANIZING  FOR  CONFERENCE  149 

in  a  fashion  hardly  recognizable  to  the  old  steel  worker. 
Most  important  of  all,  the  Government  was  putting  its  seal  of 
recognition  on  Mr.  Gompers  personally,  and  the  War  Labor 
Board  was  making  "  collective  bargaining  "  and  the  "  right 
to  organize  in  trade  and  labor  unions  "  the  text  of  business 
awards.  The  mistake  was  quite  natural  for  the  worker  to 
suppose  that  this  recognition  was  based  on  his  worth  as  a 
steel  maker,  not  on  the  coincidence  of  war  time  needs. 
Naturally,  on  November  11,  1918,  he  made  a  mistake  about 
the  armistice  which  seemed  to  him  to  have  no  connection 
with  this  recognition. 

The  data  before  the  Commission  show  that  at  the  beginning 
of  the  strike  steel  workers  in  great  numbers  had  the  liveliest 
expectation  of  governmental  assistance  in  getting  their  or- 
ganization "  recognized  "  by  the  Steel  Corporation.  Particu- 
larly the  "  foreigners,"  with  their  tradition  of  awed  respect 
for  constituted  authority,  talked  about  the  government  com- 
ing to  the  rescue ;  some  believed  "  Mr.  Wilson  will  run  the 
mills."  Months  before,  others  of  the  "  foreigners  "  had  been 
disillusioned ;  they  lost  the  skilled  jobs,  the  foremen  resumed 
swearing  and  reminded  them  in  so  many  words  that  they 
were  "  hunkies."  The  solicitous  superintendent  and  the 
published  proclamations  vanished.  Instead  there  was  rumor 
of  cuts  in  wages.  Once  again  the  vital  link  between  the 
steel  worker  and  the  steel  employer  was  the  wooden  board 
where  notices  were  posted.  During  the  strike  instead  of  Mr. 
Wilson,  Mr.  Palmer  came  and  the  Senate  Committee's  re- 
port. Thus,  in  two  aspects,  the  Federal  Administration  was 
an  organizer  of  the  strike. 

The  second  psychological  factor  growing  out  of  the  war, 
with  which  American  labor  leaders  had  even  less  to  do, 
sprang  from  events  in  Europe.  The  news  of  two  years 
happenings  there  deeply  influenced  all  labor,  of  course,  but 
the  evidence  indicates  peculiar  influence  on  steel  workers. 


150  EEPOKT  ON  THE  STEEL  STEIKE 

English  speaking  workers  were  impressed  by  what  happened 
in  England;  the  mass  of  Slavic  workers,  constituting  from 
30  per  cent,  to  70  per  cent,  in  many  mills,  were  stirred  by 
Eiissia. 

The  evidence  supports  no  sweeping  conclusions  about  exact 
effects  of  British  and  E/iissian  influence.  Weeks  of  care- 
ful interviewing  in  the  Pittsburgh  and  Chicago  districts  in- 
dicated that  it  was  results  rather  than  methods  which  "  got 
over"  to  the  American  worker  from  London  and  Moscow. 
The  inference  is  not  warranted  that  all  "  American  "  steel 
workers  become  converts  to  political  action  by  labor  and  all 
Slav  workers  to  a  dictatorship  of  the  proletariat.  "  Ameri- 
cans "  talked  about  British  labor  a  great  deal  but  they  were 
vague  on  the  details  of  organizing  labor  parties.  The  one  big 
thing  they  grasped  was  the  news  of  the  probability  or  pos- 
sibility of  a  labor  government  of  the  British  Empire,  how  to 
be  obtained  they  did  not  exactly  understand. 

Slav  workers  were  even  more  vague  about  Kussia.  A 
sub-report^  demonstrates  that  the  immigrant  leadership  in 
Eussian,  Slovak,  Serb,  Hungarian,  Polish  and  Roumanian 
communities  in  steel  areas  has  been  largely  conservative,  mid- 
dle-class, "  characteristically  bourgeois."  It  is  the  leadership 
of  priests,  editors,  small  business  men,  and  officers  of  benefit 
societies;  only  lately  has  there  been  much  labor  leadership, 
and  the  little  radical  labor  leadership  has  not  been  widely 
effective. 

One  or  two  nationalities,  Magyars  and  Finns,  for  example, 
are  politically  Socialist  by  tradition  and  the  Finns  are 
economically  of  radical  trend.  The  mass  are  principally  con- 
cerned with  "  bettering  themselves  "  in  the  fashion  usual  to 
pioneers, — better  houses,  better  food,  better  hours  and  wages, 
better  social  recognition,  especially  from  "  Americans."    But 

* "  Intellectual  Environment  of  the  Immigrant  Steel  Worker,"  by 
David  J.  Saposs. 


ORGANIZING  FOR  CONFERENCE  151 

they  came  from  Eastern  Europe  and  now  Eastern  Europe 
means  to  them  mainly  the  overthrow  of  autocracy.  They 
have  a  vague  idea  that  big  rich  people  who  run  things 
"  arbitrarily,"  even  in  mills,  are  coming  down  in  the  world. 
Russia,  moreover,  means  to  them  the  rise  of  workingmen  to 
power.  They  have  a  vague  idea  that  poor  people  who  have 
been  run  for  a  long  time,  on  farms  and  in  mills,  are  coming 
up  in  the  world  and  are  beginning  to  run  themselves. 

Communists,  looking  for  evidence  of  Lenin  as  an  organizer 
of  the  steel  strike,  found  little  to  please  them.  Two  students 
of  Lenin's  method,  one  a  Communist  enthusiast,  returned 
from  rather  hasty  investigations  of  the  Pittsburgh  strikers  in 
a  state  of  dejection.  They  reported  that  the  Slavic  workers 
"  were  mad  enough  but  didn't  know  anything."  They  laid 
the  blame  to  the  strike  leadership  and  to  the  lack  of  propa- 
ganda. They  recommended  breaking  down  the  influence  of 
A.  E.  of  L.  organizers,  Foster  especially,  and  "  a  campaign 
of  education  by  leaflets."  They  said  the  steel  workers  were 
not  ripe  for  "action"  (Communist)  but  would  be  particu- 
larly ripe  for  "  education  "  after  the  strike  was  lost.  One  of 
these  investigators  termed  Fitzpatrick  "'  a  menace  because  he 
wanted  to  lead  the  workers  away  from  economic  direct  action 
and  into  a  labor  party,  to  follow  the  losing  by-path  of 
bourgeois  political  action;  "  he  considered  Foster  "  worse  than 
useless  because  his  reputation  as  an  old  radical  spoiled  the 
true  picture  of  the  strike — the  worst  kind  of  an  A.  F.  of  L. 
strike." 

The  Commission's  own  investigators  noted  the  following 
fact  which  relates  to  the  above  gentlemen's  discouragement 
about  "  spreading  knowledge  of  proletarian  tactics :" 

Slavs  in  this  country  have  a  high  percentage  of  illiteracy; 
and  most  of  the  papers  of  large  circulation  which  they  can 
read  don't  even  print  "  labor  news,"  let  alone  revolutionary 
methods.    Radical  foreign  language  papers  to  "  counter-act " 


153  EEPOET  ON  THE  STEEL  STEIKE 

these  newspapers,  seem  to  be  few  in  number  and  without 
established  means  of  circulation.  There  is  plenty  of  evidence 
of  a  militant  minority,  informed  on  Russia,  among  the  im- 
migrant races,  just  as  there  is  in  any  "  American "  com- 
munity. But  these  militant  immigrants,  it  is  undisputed, 
had  no  connection  and  no  power  with  the  national  leaders  of 
the  strike.  The  "  Russian  idea  "  imbedded  in  the  minds  of 
the  great  majority  of  immigrant  workers,  as  revealed  in  many 
interviews,  was  this :  That  Russia  now  is  a  worker's  repub- 
lic. This,  of  course,  is  pretty  much  the  "  American  "  work- 
er's conception,  according  to  observers  who  have  talked  much 
with  the  rank  and  file  of  American  workers : — ^that  the  Rus- 
sian revolution  was  likely  a  bloody  business  and  Bolsheviks 
are  doubtless  dangerous  and  wild  but  the  Russian  Govern- 
ment is  a  laboring  man's  government  and  it  has  not  fallen 
down  yet.  Two  years  of  newspaper  reports  that  the  Russian 
republic  was  about  to  fall  seem  to  have  given  workingmen, 
even  here,  a  sort  of  class  pride  that  it  hasn't  fallen. 

The  above  represents  about  the  best  that  can  be  made 
in  the  direction  of  analyzing  out  the  ingredients  comprising 
"  foreign  influence "  on  immigrant  workers.  What  is  a 
common  sense  way  of  regarding  it  all?  When  Gen.  Smuts 
said  that  now  "  humanity  is  on  the  march  "  and  that  men 
everywhere,  workingmen  too,  feel  that  sweeping  social  read- 
justments are  necessary,  he  spoke  the  every-day  belief  of  sen- 
sible men  in  America.  Steel  workers  felt  that  in  this  period 
workers  everywhere  were  moving  to  get  rid  of  things  which 
chained  them, — czaristic  dynasties  in  some  lands,  in  others 
slavish  hours  of  labor  and  subjection  to  industrial  machines. 
This  is  a  rather  more  sensible  view  than  to  suppose  that 
several  hundred  thousand  immigrants,  many  of  them  illiter- 
ate, struck  in  1919  because  they  had  carefully  read  and 
mastered  rules  for  forming  Soviets.  Their  intention,  analy- 
sis seems  to  indicate,  was  to  reach  an  agreement  with  the 


ORGANIZING  FOE  CONFERENCE  153 

Steel  Corporation  about  hours,  wages  and  bosses,  rather  than 
to  send  armed  workers  to  seize  the  Allegheny  County  court 
house  or  the  Pennsylvania  railroad  station.  What  immi- 
grant and  native-born  learned  from  Europe  in  1919  was  that 
it  seemed  a  good  time  to  end  the  autocracy  which  they  knew— 
the  Corporation's  way  of  running  its  workers. 

Therefore,  from  all  these  causes,  the  length  of  hours  and 
arbitrary  control  inside  the  mills  and  the  deep  influences 
growing  out  of  war  events,  steel  workers  were  indlvidvxdly 
in  a  strike  frame  of  mind;  it  was  the  job  of  the  National 
Committee  for  Organizing  Iron  and  Steel  Workers  to  make 
a  machine  for  moving  these  individual  frames  of  mind  into 
mass  action.  Mr.  Foster,  its  Secretary-Treasurer,  could  never 
have  supplied  the  first  part  of  the  necessary  conditions  but 
he  did  furnish  the  second. 

The  overshadowing  importance  of  basic  states  of  mind  is 
only  emphasized  by  seeing  how  a  strike  machine  works.  The 
vital  thing  about  the  Fitzpatrick-Foster  campaign  organiza- 
tion was  that  it  dealt  in  psychological  factors.  It  wasn't  so 
much  the  system  of  organization  as  the  handling  of  states  of 
mass-mind  that  counted.  To  the  very  end  the  Foster  machine 
was  a  poor  thing  as  a  system  of  control;  the  strike  moved 
on  its  own  legs,  it  was  a  "  walkout  "  of  rank  and  file. 

Inspection  of  the  records  makes  this  plain ;  that  while  Mr. 
Foster's  disposition  of  organizers  and  his  series  of  mass 
meetings  brought  members  into  the  unions,  the  thing  that 
fetched  steel  workers  to  sign  up  in  big  numbers  was  the  in- 
fluence of  an  idea  which  Mr.  Foster's  men  skilfully  wielded. 
The  idea  was  not  culled  from  the  "  Red  Book  "  nor  from  Mr. 
Gompers'  speeches;  it  was  the  same  idea  which  is  the  back- 
bone of  most  American  political  campaigns,  the  idea  that 
"  this  thing  is  going  to  succeed — this  movement  is  getting 
somewhere — ^we're  winning."  The  fact  is  proved  in  such 
detail  that  it  makes  impossible  the  explanations  of  steel  com- 


154  EEPOET  ON  THE  STEEL  STEIKE 

pan  J  officials  that  "  the  men  joined  because  milk  drivers  and 
barkeepers  tricked  their  wives  into  signing "  or  "  the  men 
were  intimidated  into  joining."  Steel  officials  who  said  "  the 
organizers  promised  them  everything  "  came  a  little  nearer 
the  explanation. 

The  union  tabulations  show  how  this  psychology  of  success 
worked,  how  "  red  "  ideas  had  as  much  to  do  with  it  as  blue 
or  green.  The  two  great  jumps  in  tabulated  memberships 
came  first  when  the  strike  ballot  was  ordered  among  those 
already  signed  up  and  word  went  round  among  the  others, 
"  they  are  doing  something — they're  off."  During  the  strike- 
balloting  the  enrollment  jumped  50  per  cent.  Setting  a 
strike  date  brought  in  the  next  large  increment.  Likewise 
the  two  great  drops  in  active  membership  had  occurred,  first, 
after  the  "  flu  ban  "  in  the  Chicago  district  had  caused  the 
National  Organizers  to  be  withdrawn,  giving  the  rank  and  file 
the  idea  that  "  there  was  nothing  doing  after  all ;  "  and 
second,  after  the  congress  of  500  rank  and  file  workers  in 
Pittsburgh  on  May  25.  The  inexperienced  delegates,  eager 
for  a  strike,  found  that  they  were  not  empowered  to  call  one, 
and  immediately  the  whole  movement  sagged,  again  in  the 
belief  that  the  leadership  was  getting  nowhere. 

Herd  psychology  was  far  more  powerful  than  any  set  of 
trade  imion  doctrines  preached  in  meeting.  It  proves,  too, 
how  essential  to  such  a  movement  were  the  states  of  mind 
induced  by  long  hours,  arbitrary  control  and  aspirations  de- 
rived from  the  war.  This  business — of  gauging  the  feelings 
of  the  masses  in  the  mills — was  the  all-engrossing  duty  of 
Mr.  Fitzpatrick  and  Mr.  Foster,  a  task  of  which  the  public 
knew  nothing  and  which  Mr.  Fitzpatrick  did  not  promulgate. 

Conversely,  the  leaders'  greatest  difficulty,  beginning  in 
the  spring  and  almost  unmanageable  by  August,  was  in  with- 
standing the  mass-feeling  they  had  fostered.  The  "  situation 
nearly  got  away  "  from  them  several  times  in  Johnstown,  and 


ORGANIZING  FOE  CONFEHENCE  155 

in  places  in  Ohio  and  Indiana ;  that  is,  the  men  in  these  dis- 
tricts nearly  went  on  strike  before  other  districts  were  organ- 
ized. As  it  waS;  "  the  dam  broke  before  this  district  was 
more  than  half  worked,"  according  to  one  organizer  in  Pitts- 
burgh. The  movement,  before  getting  to  the  100,000  mark, 
reached  a  point  where,  by  the  working  of  the  very  idea  that 
built  it,  it  threatened  to  break  out  in  sporadic  strike-lets  or 
break  down  altogther.  That  point  was  when  Mr.  Gary  re- 
fused to  confer:  right  then  the  "  this-thing-is-succeeding " 
idea  began  to  change  to  "  this-thing-is-not-succeeding  "  along 
the  negotiating  line,  and  the  leaders  had  to  let  it  go  on  to  a 
strike  as  the  next  means  of  success  or  let  it  go  all  to  pieces. 

The  inside  story  of  the  strike  puts  out  of  consideration 
descriptions  of  it  as  a  "  plot "  or  "  dark  Bolshevik  conspir- 
acy." A  strike  movment  of  300,000  men  in  a  dozen  states  is 
about  as  secret  as  a  presidential  campaign. 

Conversely  again,  the  great  blow  to  the  strike  in  October 
and  [November  was  the  growth  of  the  feeling  that  "  this 
thing  is  not  succeeding."  The  steel  companies'  most  powerful 
single  weapon  was  creating  and  fostering  the  feeling  that 
"  it's  a  fizzle,  we're  making  steel,  strike's  all  over."  That 
feeling,  more  than  arrests  or  suppression  of  meetings  or 
"  Cossacks,"  wore  down  the  strike.  Mr.  Foster  built  up  the 
movement  from  the  idea  that  "  the  steel  trust  can  be  beaten." 
The  companies  won  out  by  restoring  the  idea  that  the  Steel 
Corporation  can't  be  beaten.  During  the  campaign  the  I.  W. 
W.  used  the  same  argument  as  the  companies,  with  this  dif- 
ference :  "  Don't  join  the  A.  F.  of  L. ;  the  A.  F.  of  L.  loses 
its  strikes." 

To  these  psychological  facts,  which  are  the  nub  of  the 
history  of  the  strike  movement,  many  details  can  be  added 
from  the  Commission's  evidence  by  examining  the  plan  of 
the  organization  movement,  the  industrial  situation  of  the 
period,  the  men  who  formed  the  National  Committee  and 


15G  REPOET  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

their  ideas  of  what  they  were  after.  Such  examination  must 
begin  with  Mr.  Foster  and  his  resolution  to  organize  the 
workers  in  the  steel  industry  passed  by  the  A.  F.  of  L.  con- 
vention at  St.  Paul,  June  17,  1918.  This  raises  at  once 
the  matter  of  "radicals  boring  from  within,"  over  which 
public  opinion  was  greatly  exercised  as  the  strike  began. 
Organized  labor,  however,  seemed  to  regard  "  boring  "  as  an 
old  story.  Its  explanation  may  shed  light  on  why  the  trade 
unions  have  not  "  ditched  Foster,"  as  many  "  friends  of 
labor"  expected  them  to  do  and  why  the  trade  unions  have 
no  intention  of  ditching  him. 

Mr.  Foster's  business  might  be  described  as  making  the 
labor  movement  move.  His  main  personal  characteristic  is 
intensity.  When  he  followed  the  sea  he  is  reported  to  have 
been  intensely  a  sailor  for  he  qualified  an  A.  B.  and  learned 
all  the  knots  on  a  4-sticker.  When  he  was  a  homesteader,  in 
the  Coast  mountains,  he  was  intense  enough  to  stick  at  it 
alone  for  five  years,  prove  his  claim  and  clear  twenty-two  acres 
of  land.  When  he  took  up  making  the  labor  movement  move, 
he  tried  it  first  as  a  very  intense  syndicalist,  an  I.  W.  W. 
outside  the  trade  unions.  Little  motion  resulting,  he  "re- 
pudiated "  syndicalist  methods  and  joined  the  Etailway  Car- 
men's Union  in  order  to  "  bore  from  within  "  the  A.  F.  of 
L.  In  the  steel  campaign  he  was  most  intensely  boring  from 
within  and  the  labor  movement  knew  it  and  let  him  bore. 
It  was  considered  that  his  boring  might  be  through  the  unions* 
but  was  certainly  against  the  anti-union  employers. 

That  is,  he  decided  that  the  labor  movement  turn  the 
A.  F.  of  L.  and  not  the  I.  W.  W.  and  that  his  job  was 
making  the  A.  F.  of  L.  move.  The  A.  F.  of  L.'s  first  job,  he 
conceived,  was  organizing  men.  He  saw  that  even  the 
strongest  A.  F.  of  L.  unions,  the  United  Mine  Workers,  had 
only  about  half  the  coal  miners  organized ;  perhaps  he 
noticed  that  Mr.  Gompers'  own  union,  the  Cigar  Makers,  had 


ORGANIZING  FOR  CONFERENCE  157 

its  industry  only  25  per  cent,  organized.  He  saw  the  stock- 
yards unorganized,  the  steel  industry  unorganized.  Instead 
of  merely  trying  to  sting  the  A.  F.  of  L.  into  moving  on 
the  stockyards,  he  thought  out  a  plan  of  action  which  was 
to  get  all  the  unions  having  "  claims  "  on  stockyard  trades  to 
unite  in  one  onslaught  instead  of  attempting  separate  attacks 
and  being  beaten  separately.  He  took  the  plan  to  Mr.  Fitz- 
patrick,  who  saw  its  possibilities,  the  A.  F.  of  L.  endorsed  it 
and  they  led  the  united  unions  triumphantly  through  the 
stockyards.     Then  they  turned  to  steel. 

In  each  case  besides  offering  the  plan,  Mr.  Foster  offered 
himself,  a  liability  from  one  viewpoint,  an  asset  according  to 
the  trade  unionists  backing  the  plan.  For  this  reason :  a  new 
kind  of  man  was  necessary:  a  large-scale  promoter  instead 
of  smaU  salesmen.  Mr.  Foster's  advent  in  the  steel  industry 
was  like  Mr.  Gary's.  Mr.  Gary  came  in  from  outside  to  help 
consolidate  the  efforts  of  separate  concerns.  Twenty  years 
later  Mr.  Foster  was  the  newcomer,  to  help  consolidate  the 
efforts  of  a  score  of  unions,  not  in  the  industry  but  trying  to 
get  in ;  his,  too,  was  a  large  scale  business  proposition.  The 
oflScers  of  A.  F.  of  L.  trade  unions,  it  is  alleged,  tend  to  be 
job  holders  rather  than  apostles;  they  are  more  expert,  it  is 
asserted,  in  figuring  out  the  scale  of  dues  for  their  own 
organizations  than  in  figuring  out  what  is  due  to  laborers 
outside  their  locals.  Some  of  the  unions  in  the  steel  drive 
were  stumped  to  the  end  by  the  following  problem:  how  to 
admit  recruits  at  the  $3  initiation  fee,  set  for  the  drive, 
when  their  union  constitutions  set  initiation  fees  at  from  5 
to  3000  per  cent  higher.  Mr.  Foster  flattered  himself  on  be- 
ing a  broad  gauge  executive,  able  to  look  past  such  details  and 
to  offer  a  prospectus  of  "  trust "  magnitude.  The  officials 
of  the  unions  flattered  him  by  regularly  nominating  and 
electing  him  Secretary-Treasurer  of  the  National  Committee, 
under  two  bonds,  inspected  by  three   auditors,  responsible 


158  REPORT  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

for  the  minutes  and  more  noting  than  noted  during  com- 
mittee meetings. 

Thus  the  supposition  that  "boring"  is  a  Machiavellian 
business  does  not  seem  to  fit  the  facts.  It  does  not  mean  join- 
ing the  Republican  party  and  boring  from  within  throughout 
a  campaign  in  the  confident  expectation  of  having  all  the 
Republicans  on  election  day  vote  the  Democratic  ticket.  It 
did  not  mean  a  campaign  among  the  steel  v^orkers  at  the  end 
of  which  they  voted  the  I.  W.  W.  ticket,  or  Mr.  Gary's 
ticket,  or  for  anything  but  "  strike  "  for  their  unions.  It 
does  mean  putting  inside  the  trade  unions  radically  minded 
men  who  will  make  more  trade  unionists.  It  does  in- 
volve the  possibility  that  after  all  the  unorganized  are 
gathered  into  the  old-line  trade  unions,  these  radically  minded 
organizers  may  convert  the  trade  unions,  if  they  can;  that 
is  the  trade  unions'  lookout.  Inside  the  unions  the  critics  of 
the  "  borer "  are  old  officials  who  feel  he  is  a  reflection  on 
them;  which  he  is.  To  Mr.  Foster  personally  the  steel 
organization  campaign  was  largely  a  matter  of  conciliating 
old  unionists  who  were  not  used  to  having  the  movement 
move.  Beyond  that,  his  task  was  persuading  the  twenty-four 
rival  unions  involved  to  obey  Marshal  Foch,  alias  Fitzpatrick. 

Let  this  analysis  of  Mr.  Foster  and  of  "  boring  "  be  dis- 
tinctly understood  in  its  relation  to  the  labor  movement  as  a 
whole ;  it  is  much  the  smaller  side  of  the  real  problem  which 
confronts  A.  F.  of  L.  trade  unions.  That  problem  is  indus- 
trial unionism  and  the  larger  side  of  it  is  not  "  borers " 
but  economic  conditions.  Ten  years  ago  "  boring "  was  a 
fairly  live  topic  in  the  conventions  of  both  camps — craft 
union  and  industrial  union — and  both  camps  are  now  little 
interested  in  it.  The  I.W.W.  official  decision  was  against  it 
on  the  ground  that  it  would  depopulate  the  I.W.W.  and  that 
industrial  unionists  inside  the  craft  union  would  become 
denaturized.     I.W.W.'s  in  1919  pointed  scornfully  to  Foster 


ORGANIZING  FOR  CONFERENCE  159 

as  a  "  horrible  example  "  of  the  emasculation  of  an  industrial 
unionist.  The  A.  F.  of  L.  decision  was  to  welcome  the 
"  borer  "  as  a  "  convert  from  heresy,"  welcome  to  enter  and 
act  like  other  craft  unionists.  And  there  the  American  con- 
troversy has  rested,  revived  occasionally,  as  during  the  steel 
strike  or  when  some  British  exponent  of  "  boring,"  like 
Tom  Mann,  is  elected  head  of  an  old  craft  union,  or  when 
William  D.  Haywood  proclaims  that  any  real  "  borer  "  must 
ultimately  bore  to  the  outside,  that  is,  must  get  out  of  the 
A.  F.  of  L. 

The  far  more  important  side  of  the  labor  movement's  in- 
dustrial union  problem  lies  in  those  economic  conditions 
which  latterly  have  exposed  weaknesses  in  craft  unions  and 
have  driven  them  to  essay  "  amalgamations  "  and  other  ap- 
proximations of  industrial  organization.  When  a  craft  union 
on  strike  sees  brother  unions  in  the  same  industry  sticking  to 
work  or  even  filling  the  strikers'  jobs,  that  craft  union  begins 
to  do  a  lot  more  thinking  about  industrial  unionism  than  a 
hundred  "  borers  "  could  inspire.  When  craft  unions  pro- 
mulgate ambitions,  as  did  the  A.  F.  of  L.  in  1919,  about 
"  sharing  control  and  democracy  in  industry,"  they  are  forced 
automatically  to  considering  industrial  union  problems. 

Neither  in  plan  nor  practice  was  the  work  of  the  National 
Committee  for  Organizing  Iron  and  Steel  Workers  industrial 
unionism. 

During  a  year  of  Committee  meetings  on  the  campaign 
there  was  never  discussion  of  "  general  policy  as  regards  ideas 
to  be  used  "  by  the  speakers,  except  once.  There  was  no  dis- 
cussion because  the  international  craft  unions  and  the  experi- 
enced organizers  they  supplied  all  knew  what  the  ideas  would 
be:  the  orthodox  pure  and  simple  trade  union  text  of 
"  organize."  Heresies  such  as  industrial  control  or  industrial 
unionism  or  political  organization  or,  least  of  all,  "  Soviets," 
never  were  an  issue  in  the  Committee ;  the  undisputed  gospel 


160  REPOET  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

was  "  organize  and  all  these  things  shall  be  added  unto  you/* 
with  no  speculation  as  to  what  "  all  these  things  "  might  turn 
out  to  be  in  actual  terms  of  hours,  wages  and  conditions  for 
steel  workers.  The  one  exception  was  a  reference  at  the  start 
in  1918  when  President  Gompers  warned  "  lest  the  move- 
ment be  turned  to  other  than  trade  union  ends."  Scenting 
the  bare  possibility  of  industrial  organization,  he  wanted 
early  to  make  it  plain  to  the  Committee,  meeting  for  the 
first  time,  that  his  endorsement  in  no  way  meant  any  personal 
leaning  toward  One  Big  Unionism.  But  the  twenty-four 
unions  had  no  doubt  about  what  they  wanted, — more  numbers 
for  each  of  their  separate  craft  organizations;  and  that  is 
what  they  got.  Mr.  Foster,  as  the  string  around  the  pack- 
age, might  have  been  a  very  red  string,  and  still  he  couldn't 
have  incarnadined  the  multitudinous  locals  from  Maine  to 
Mississippi  which  put  up  the  money  to  pay  the  organizers  to 
get  new  craft  unionists  in  steel  towns. 

Data  were  gathered  by  the  investigators  on  whether  the 
viewpoint  expressed  by  Mr.  Gompers  and  carried  out  by  Mr. 
Foster  resulted  in  the  same  harmony  among  the  newly 
organized  rank  and  file  as  among  the  ISTational  Committee- 
men. The  evidence  is  clear  that  it  did  not.  In  many  plants 
the  instinct  of  the  immigrant  recruit  was  to  associate  with 
his  shopmates  of  different  "  crafts  "  rather  than  with  his 
"  craft "  mates  from  other  shops.  He  fell  more  easily  into 
a  shop  or  plant  union,  which,  however,  would  have  been 
an  industrial  union.  Some  local  leaders  so  organized  him. 
Thus  an  internal  conflict  arose  which  had  serious  conse- 
quences (set  forth  elsewhere)  for  the  strike.  In  local  unions, 
the  artificial  harmony  of  the  twenty-four  International 
Unions  conflicted  with  the  "  inexperienced  "  immigrant  drift 
toward  real  industrial  unionism.  The  twenty-four  crafts 
smothered  this  drift.  The  end  of  the  strike  saw  different 
unions  pulling  out  of  the  National  Committee,  each  with  its 


OEGANIZING  FOR  CONFEEENCE  161 

separate  booty  of  recruits  and  even  the  specious  "  industrial  " 
effort  represented  by  the  Committee  openly  disrupted.  If 
Mr.  Foster,  as  a  former  industrial  unionist,  had  still  in  the 
back  of  his  head  a  hope  of  an  industrial  union  in  steel,  the 
outcome  was  a  joke  on  him  as  it  was  on  those  of  the  rank 
and  file  who  moved  with  the  drift. 

Ideas  of  industrial  control  and  the  ideal  of  One  Big  Union 
were  urged  at  different  times  from  the  outside  by  I.W.W.'s, 
by  Socialists,  by  "  friends  of  labor  "  in  publications  and  per- 
sonally. One  of  the  Committeemen  was  told :  "  Don't 
answer  the  Bolshevik  stuff  by  making  yourself  out  so  con- 
servative. It's  just  a  ruse  of  the  Steel  Corporation  to  make 
you  admit  you're  conservative,  so  that  those  foreigner  steel 
workers  will  distrust  you.  Those  Slavic  steel  workers  are 
radical  and  won't  respond  to  conservative  pleas." 

The  Commission's  investigation  of  Slavic  communities,  as 
referred  to  before,  indicates  that  the  ideas  influencing  immi- 
grant steel  workers  hitherto  have  not  been  radical.  When  the 
above  theory  was  repeated  to  a  national  strike  leader  he  dis- 
played no  interest  beyond  saying,  "  I  don't  think  Mr.  Gary 
is  that  smart."  Mr.  Foster's  comment  was :  "  That  advice 
sounds  like  one  of  those  intellectuals  who  are  always  telling 
Sam  Gompers  how  to  run  trade  unions.  The  trouble  with  all 
radicals  is  that  they  don't  know  the  labor  movement  or  the 
laboring  man  or  what  we're  up  against." 

At  the  Commission's  Pittsburgh  hearings  in  November, 
Mr.  Foster  was  asked  directly  whether  he  did  not  think  the 
Slavic  worker  brought  to  this  country  radical  leanings  in 
industrial  ideas.  He  replied  that  so  far  as  knowledge  of 
trade  unions  or  any  industrial  organization  was  concerned, 
"  they  brought  a  blank  in  their  skulls."  The  record  of  his 
conception  reads  as  follows : 

"  They  are  really  a  new  factor  in  American  trade  unionism. 
They  are  just  learning  unionism  since  the  war  started.     They 


162  EEPOET  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

are  just  breaking  into  it.  So  far  as  I  can  see  the  foreigner  wants 
more  money.  He  is  confronted  with  the  immediate  problem  of 
life.  His  idealism  stretches  about  as  far  as  his  shortest  working 
day.  The  percentage  of  them  that  have  any  vision  for  future 
conditions  is  very  small.  It  is  not  a  determining  factor  at  all. 
It  is  more  wages,  shorter  hours — the  regular  trade  union  de- 
mands are  the  things  that  count. 

"  Take  an  organization  like  the  brotherhoods — they  have  a 
vision  among  them  far  in  excess  of  anything  among  these  people. 
The  American  makes  the  best  type  of  union  man.  He  is  hard 
to  organize,  and  he  hasn't  got  that  collective  sense  so  highly 
developed  as  the  foreigner  has.  He  is  individualistic  and  critical, 
and  he  has  some  ten  or  twelve  excuses  why  he  shouldn't  belong 
to  an  organization ;  but  once  you  can  win  them,  once  you  can  get 
them  on  your  side,  you  have  a  splendid  type. 

"  The  foreigner  is  a  different  type.  He  has  that  group  idea 
very  strongly  developed.  In  his  own  country  individualism  plays 
a  small  part.  He  is  labeled  and  tagged  and  oppressed,  and  he 
is  classed,  and  his  psychology  is  pretty  simple  over  there.  He 
knows  what  he  is,  and  if  there  is  any  possible  chance  for  him  to 
do  anything  he  feels  that  it  is  as  a  group,  not  as  an  individual. 

"  He  comes  over  here  and  he  seems  to  respond  to  an  appeal 
better  than  Americans  do.  But  he  is  very  materialistic  in  his 
demands.  You  know  you  can  convince  the  Americans  and  you 
can  hold  an  organization  for  years  in  a  plant  without  getting  a 
cent  benefit  out  of  it  directly.  But  the  foreigner  you  can't  hold 
that  way.  He  comes  in  for  increase  of  wages  and  shortening 
of  hours.  He  comes  in  quite  readily,  but  if  you  don't  get  him  the 
results  he  drops  away  quite  readily  also. 

"  Then,  a  peculiar  thing  happens.  When  the  fight  occurs,  he 
is  a  splendid  fighter.  He  has  the  American  beaten  when  it  comes 
to  a  fight.  I  don't  say  that  in  criticism  of  the  American,  but 
I  think  it  is  due  to  the  position  he  occupies  in  industry.  The 
American  usually  holds  the  good  job,  and  he  has  a  home  half 
paid  for,  and  he  is  full  of  responsibility;  whereas  the  foreigner 
is  more  foot-loose;  has  a  poor  job  anyway,  and  he  doesn't  feel 
that  so  much  is  at  stake. 


ORGANIZING  FOR  CONFERENCE  163 

"  He  will  stick,  while  the  American  will  go  back  to  work. 
That  is  what  happened  in  the  mills  just  now.  When  the  fight 
occurs  the  foreigner  displays  a  wonderful  amount  of  idealism, 
a  wonderful  amount  of  stick-to-it-iveness,  that  is  altogether  dis- 
similar to  the  intensely  materialistic  spirit  he  shows  in  his  union 
transactions." 

Question :  "  There  has  been  a  difference  in  response  to  your 
appeals  in  the  district  here  between  the  unskilled  foreign  workers 
and  the  skilled  American  workers.  Could  you  give  any  further 
explanation, — other  than  what  you  have  given, — of  why  the 
skilled  American  in  this  district  was  slow  to  join  the  organ- 
ization ?  " 

Mr.  Foster :  "  The  reason  is  simply  this :  The  most  irre- 
sponsible elements  rally  first.  Mr.  Gary  rules  by  fear — pure  un- 
adulterated fear;  fear  of  losing  their  job;  the  fear  of  having 
their  life's  occupation  taken  away  from  them.  That  is  what 
keeps  them  from  joining  the  unions. 

"  If  Mr.  Gary  would  post  a  notice  in  his  mills  tomorrow  that 
every  man  could  join  a  union  if  he  saw  fit,  they'd  break  down 
the  doors  all  over  the  country  trying  to  join,  A  first-class  proof 
of  this  was  shown  by  what  occurred  to  the  railroads.  Our 
unions  fought  along  for  years  and  years  and  years  in  the  face 
of  no  response  at  all  from  the  workers.  There  was  violent 
opposition  on  the  part  of  the  company  to  trying  to  organize 
the  men,  but  as  soon  as  the  railroad  administration  took  the 
position  that  the  men  could  join  the  union,  a  million  and  a 
half  joined  in  practically  two  or  three  months.  The  great 
Pennsylvania  Railroad  was  organized  in  about  two  or  three 
months,  which  for  forty  years  they  had  worked  on  before  and 
couldn't  touch.    As  soon  as  the  fear  was  removed  they  flocked  in. 

"  When  we  came  into  the  Pittsburgh  district  we  were  con- 
fronted with  the  proposition  of  breaking  down  this  fear.  Those 
men  who  had  less  to  fear  were  first  to  respond.  They  are  the 
unskilled,  and  naturally,  the  foreigner.  They  don't  care  whether 
they  are  discharged  or  not. 

"  Here  is  what  usually  happens  to  a  plant.  At  first  the 
American  doesn't  like  to  say  he  is  afraid.     No,  he  won't  admit 


164  EEPOET  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

that,  but  he  says  the  union  can't  do  anything;  it  is  no  good. 
Naturally,  every  man  likes  to  develop  some  philosophy  to  pro- 
tect his  own  particular  brand  of  weakness. 

"  But  we  go  ahead  and  organize  those  who  will  come  in,  and 
we  get  more  and  more  into  the  union,  and  the  first  thing  you 
know  the  American  begins  to  prick  up  his  ears  a  little  bit,  and 
begins  to  be  not  quite  so  sure  about  the  union  being  a  failure. 
And  so,  as  we  go  into  the  mill  we  get  into  the  better  class  of  men, 
and  eventually  get  them  all.  We  get  the  very  best  of  them. 
But  it  is  a  question  of  time. 

*'  The  reason  we  didn't  get  them  here  was  because  our  or- 
ganization was  immature.  In  this  Pittsburgh  district  it  was 
due  to  the  fact  that  we  couldn't  hold  meetings  and  couldn't 
reach  the  men.  In  Johnstown,  where  we  had  a  free  hand,  we 
organized  them  right  off  the  bat,  and  right  up  to  the  ofiBce. 
We  had  the  office  help  in  our  organization  up  there. 

"  The  creation  of  an  organization  among  or  in  a  group  of 
workingmen  is  wonderful.  After  the  bonds  of  organization 
are  created  it  is  just  as  hard  to  break  them  as  to  create.'' 

Mr.  Foster's  testimony  is  cited  because  it  typifies  the 
statements  of  the  National  strike  leaders  investigated  by  the 
Commission.  It  is  borne  out  by  all  the  National  Committee 
records  accumulated  by  investigators.  Whether  its  reasoning 
is  based  on  fact  or  not,  it  seems  to  be  a  fair  statement  of  the 
ideas  actually  carried  out  in  the  campaign,  and  so  far  as  the 
strike's  failure  rested  with  ideas,  these  were  the  ideas 
responsible. 

What  ideas  were  responsible  for  the  actions  of  the  leaders 
in  the  next  phase  of  such  a  movement — the  attempt  to  ac- 
complish something  for  the  men  when  organized,  by  forcing 
a  conference  with  the  employers?  This  phase,  from  mid- 
summer, 1919,  on,  is  the  story  of  continued  attempts  to 
arrange  a  conference  or  to  mediate,  attempts  made  by  the 
Amalgamated  Association  of  Iron,  Steel  &  Tin  Workers,  then 
by  the  National  Committee,  then  by  Mr.  Gompers,  then  by 


ORGANIZING  FOR  CONFERENCE  165 

President  Wilson,  then  during  the  President's  National  In- 
dustrial Conference  and  last  by  the  Commission  of  Inquiry 
of  the  Interchurch  World  Movement.  All  these  attempts 
were  successfully  defeated.  It  seemed  as  if  the  public 
approved  the  denial  of  anything  which  might  eventuate  in 
"  the  kind  of  conference  the  labor  unions  wanted."  What 
kind  of  conference  was  this?  What  exactly  was  in  Mr. 
Fitzpatrick's  mind  in  writing  to  Mr.  Gary  ? 

Mr.  Fitzpatrick  himself  gave  the  Commission  the  clearest 
possible  picture.  The  personal  element  was  the  first  element 
in  it.  Mr.  Fitzpatrick  showed  the  most  downright,  unquali- 
fied, belief  in  the  idea  that  "  if  only  both  sides  could  get 
together  around  a  table,  it  could  all  be  straightened  out." 
Personalities  as  a  stumbling-block  did  exist  strongly  in  the 
minds  of  both  sides.  Mr.  Gary  objected  to  conference  partly 
because  of  "  the  character  of  the  leadership."  He  reminded 
the  Commission  that  "  Mr.  Foster  is  a  slick  one."  Mr.  Buf- 
fington  told  the  Commission  that  "  Mr.  Fitzpatrick  is  a  bad 
lot."  Mr.  Fitzpatrick,  in  a  discussion  of  general  conditions, 
said,  "  When  I  think  of  those  trust  magnates  and  the  condi- 
tions their  workers  live  in  and  work  in  and  die  in — ^why 
their  hearts  must  be  as  black  as  the  ace  of  spades."  But 
he  seemed  to  think  more  deeply  that  "  it  could  aiU  be 
straightened  out "  if  he  could  convince  the  other  side  that 
labor  leaders  were  not  bad  men  and  that  their  plans  were  not 
bad. 

What  Mr.  Fitzpatrick  wanted  was  what  he  got  at  the  end 
of  the  1918  campaign  to  organize  the  stockyards  of  Chicago. 
Then  he  began  attempting  to  arrange  a  conference  with  Mr. 
Armour,  the  leader  of  the  packers.  Mr.  Armour's  offices  were 
on  the  seventh  floor  of  a  Chicago  building,  Mr.  Fitzpatrick's 
on  the  sixth.  The  efforts  reached  the  point  where  Mr. 
Armour's  secretary  acted  as  messenger,  reporting  to  Mr.  Fitz- 
patrick, "  John,  he  won't  meet  you  " :  and  on  being  persuaded 


166  KEPORT  ON  THE  STEEL  STEIKE 

to  go  back  again,  reporting  as  a  finality,  "  John,  he  says 
you're  a  very  fine  man  and  he  has  nothing  against  you,  but 
he  won't  deal  with  union  labor  and  he's  very  busy." 

Just  as  happened  later  in  the  Steel  Industry,  Mr.  Fitz- 
patrick  set  a  stockyard  strike  date  and  President  Wilson 
intervened  to  effect  a  conference.  The  President  promised 
to  do  everything  in  his  power  to  obtain  that  conference,  just 
as  he  tried  later  to  approach  Mr.  Gary.  Meanwhile  Mr. 
Fitzpatrick  gave  the  President  "  two  hours,  two  weeks,  or 
two  months  "  to  get  the  conference,  extending  the  strike  limit 
indefinitely.  The  President  ordered  the  five  big  packers  and 
the  union  leaders  to  meet  in  the  office  of  Secretary  of  Labor 
Wilson. 

"  There,"  Mr.  Fitzpatrick  said,  "  we  all  sat  in  a  circle, 
about  twenty  of  us,  Armour  and  the  packers  on  one  side 
and  our  fellows  on  the  other  side,  and  the  Secretary  in  the 
middle  on  a  kind  of  pedestal.  It  was  war-time  and  the 
Secretary  made  a  most  eloquent,  patriotic  speech.  At  the 
end,  Armour's  lawyer  got  up  and  began  to  argue  against 
conferring  with  union  men.  I  saw  he  was  simply  cutting 
the  ground  out  from  under  the  speech  and  out  from  under 
everything,  so  I  just  stood  up  and  said,  '  Gentlemen,  it  all 
seems  to  turn  on  whether  or  not  Mr.  Armour  is  going  to 
meet  anybody,  and  I  want  to  say  right  here  that  I  am  now 
going  to  shake  hands  with  Mr.  Armour.'  So  I  just  walked 
across  that  circle,  had  to  walk  about  twenty  feet,  over  to 
where  Armour  was  sitting,  and  I  stuck  out  my  hand.  He  got 
red  and  looked  up  at  me  very  funny  and  then  he  stood  up 
very  courteously  and  shook  hands  and  said,  '  Of  course  I'll 
shake  hands  with  Mr.  Fitzpatrick.'  And  then  I  went  right 
on  down  that  line  of  packers  and  shook  hands  with  every  one 
of  them,  and  the  lawyer's  argimient  and  the  whole  confer- 
ence went  bust  for  twenty  minutes. 

"  If  the  argument  had  gone  on,  we  would  have  just  got 


ORGANIZING  FOE  CONFERENCE  167 

nowhere.  But,  after  that  twenty  minutes  of  mix-up,  we  sat 
down  and  quickly  arranged  a  conference  between  the  packers 
and  union  labor." 

There  was  the  picture  in  the  mind  of  the  leader  of  the 
steel  strikers.  His  ideal  was  to  overcome  the  personal  re- 
fusal of  Mr.  Gary  to  deal  with  labor  leaders  personally  and 
to  bring  about  a  peace  meeting  which  should  be  first  a  simple 
meeting  of  men ;  and  then  what  ?  Mr.  Fitzpatrick  explained 
to  the  Commission  his  next  idea. 

"  Suppose  Mr.  Gary  had  met  us  and  had  said,  ^  Let  us 
negotiate.'  I  wouldn't  have  been  able  to  do  it,  I  don't  know 
steel.  Then  we  should  have  said,  '  All  we  want  to  do,  Mr. 
Gary,  is  to  tell  you  with  whom  to  confer  to  carry  out  the 
details.'  And  these  men  would  have  been  Mr.  Gary's  own 
employees,  with  the  union  leaders  somewhere  nearby  to 
advise." 

There,  frankly  set  forth,  is  the  union  leaders'  position, 
under  Mr,  Gompers'  tenets.  To  Mr.  Fitzj^atrick  it  was  a 
very  simple  proposition.  He  was  undeniably  surprised  that 
the  Government  did  not  support  it  and  that  public  opinion 
did  not  enforce  it. 

He  might  be  surprised  if  reminded  that  in  this  frankness 
he  had  put  his  finger  on  two  points  which  often,  rightly  or 
wrongly,  leave  pure  and  simple  trade  unionism,  with  so  little 
support  in  "  public  opinion  "  and  with  such  opposition  from 
the  employer.  "  To  tell  him  with  whom  to  confer  "  typifies 
in  many  minds  all  that  goes  with  the  phrase  "  labor  autoc- 
racy." The  second  point,  "  I  don't  know  steel,"  typifies  all 
the  repugnance  in  the  mind  of  the  employer  conveyed  by  the 
phrase,  "  dealing  with  outsiders."  So  far,  A.  F.  of  L.  unions 
have  answered  the  two  objections  in  but  one  way,  by  saying 
that  if  you  won't  confer,  we'll  make  you  confer,  we'll  strike. 
That  is,  union  labor's  tactic  simply  accepts  the  gauge  of 
"  autocracy  of  labor  "  and  sets  to  to  fight  it  out  against  an 


168  EEPOET  ON  THE  STEEL  STEIKE 

"  autocracy  of  capital."  Certain  unions  outside  the  A.  F. 
of  L.,  and  atroad,  have  begun  to  formulate  another, — not  a 
substitute  but  an  additional, — answer: — the  acceptance  of 
responsibility  for  production,  the  learning  of  the  problem  of 
production  for  public  service  and  the  clarified  demand  for  a 
decisive  share  in  control  and  in  earnings. 

What  part  had  this  limited  "  force  against  force  "  doctrine 
of  the  A.  F.  of  L.  in  the  responsibility  for  the  failure  of  the 
strike?  What  were  the  causes  of  failure?  It  would  be  a 
serious  mistake  to  consider  causes  within  the  labor  organiza- 
tion without  reference  to  other  causes  which  were  more  im- 
portant, for  example,  the  active  opposition  waged  by  the 
U.  S.  Steel  Corporation.  And  before  analysis  of  either  set 
of  causes  can  be  made,  the  character  of  the  new  steel  workers' 
organizations  and  of  the  twenty-four-headed  leadership  must 
be  clearly  grasped. 

The  respective  positions  of  the  organized  steel  workers,  the 
^National  Committee  and  the  twenty-four  International 
Unions,  may  be  summarized  as  follows : 

The  raw  recruits,  particularly  the  immigrant  workers,  wanted 
to  strike  soon  after  they  had  joined  up,  since  they  could 
conceive  of  both  protection  and  "  results  "  only  in  a 
universal  walkout. 

The  twenty-four  old  unions  willingly  put  money  into  a  cam- 
paign for  new  members  but  hesitated  greatly  over  back- 
ing a  strike  in  behalf  of  the  new  steel  locals,  which  might 
possibly  jeopardize  their  old  membership  outside  the 
steel  industry. 

The  ISTational  Committee  tried  to  unify  the  twenty-four  Inter- 
nationals for  (a)  the  organizing  drive  (in  which  it  had 
difficulties)  ;  (b)  the  strike  (in  which  it  was  partly 
successful)  ;  (c)  the  concerted  conduct  of  business  in 
the  industry,  through  the  establishment  of  a  Steel  De- 


ORGANIZING  FOR  CONFERENCE  169 

partment  in  the  A.  F.  of  L.   (in  whicli  it  was  easily 
beaten) . 

The  facts  are  detailed  with  greater  exactness  than  has 
usually  been  attained  in  histories  of  strikes,  in  the  sub-report 
on  "  The  National  Committee,"  based  on  the  Committee's 
minutes.  It  is  the  story  of  a  conciliating  body,  made  up 
principally  of  representatives  of  the  Internationals  rather 
than  of  the  International  presidents  themselves,  which  per- 
suaded and  cajoled  the  twenty-four  unions,  all  rivals  for  the 
booty  of  new  recruits,  into  subordinating  their  differences  and 
contributing  a  modicum  of  cooperative  effort.  The  Com- 
mittee struggled  with  ancient  jurisdictional  disputes  between 
the  Steam  Shovelmen  and  the  Stationary  Engineers  over 
the  disposition  of  cranemen ;  between  the  Amalgamated  Asso- 
ciation of  Iron,  Steel  and  Tin  Workers  and  the  Hod  Carriers' 
Union  over  the  disposition  of  common  laborers;  it  argued 
unceasingly  with  constituent  unions  whose  constitutions  and 
by-laws  threatened  to  bar  out  steel  recruits.  It  tried  to  im- 
press the  wishes  of  the  newly  organized  rank  and  file,  clamor- 
ing for  action,  upon  the  absentee  officialdom  of  the  Inter- 
national Unions  and  the  conservative  A.  F.  of  L.  overlords. 
As  an  administrative  machine  the  Committee  never  attained 
a  remarkable  degree  of  perfection.  "  This  organization,"  one 
of  the  strike  officers  said,  "  has  as  much  cohesiveness  as  a 
load  of  furniture." 

The  first  meetings  of  the  embryo  N'ational  Committee  were 
held  June  17-20,  in  St.  Paul,  Minn.,  coincident  with  the 
1918  convention  of  the  A.  F.  of  L.  Organization  meetings 
were  convened  in  Chicago  August  1  and  August  16,  at  which 
W.  Z.  Foster  was  elected  temporary,  then  permanent  Secre- 
tary-Treasurer, in  active  charge  of  the  organizing  drive,  and 
John  Fitzpatrick  succeeded  Mr.  Gompers  as  Chairman.  It 
was  decided  to  make  the  campaign  simultaneously  nation- 


170  REPORT  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

wide;  to  use  a  uniform  application  blank  and  a  universal 
low  initiation  fee  of  $3,  of  whicli  $1  should  go  to  the  ^National 
Committee's  fund,  the  other  $2  to  the  International  Unions ; 
to  obtain  from  each  union  a  $100  initial  contribution  as  an 
organizing  fund  ($2,400  to  organize  an  entire  industry!)  and 
as  many  experienced  organizers  as  could  be  donated.  Organi- 
zation was  to  be  through  mass  meetings,  at  which  applicants 
would  be  signed  up,  the  applications  then  "  segregated " 
according  to  crafts,  and  the  segregated  applicants  then  organ- 
ized into  separate  locals  or  inducted  into  locals  already 
existent  in  separate  localities,  thenceforward  to  be  dues-pay- 
ing members  subject  to  the  laws  of  the  International  to 
which  they  were  assigned.  The  industry  was  divided  into 
the  following  "  Districts  " :  Chicago,  Bethlehem,  Johnstown, 
Pittsburgh,  Youngstown,  Cleveland,  Wheeling,  Steubenville, 
Buffalo,  Pueblo  (Colo.)  and  Birmingham  (Ala.)  ;  in  each 
was  formed  a  "  Steel  Workers'  Council,"  a  Poster  idea,  re- 
sulting in  the  most  effective  organizing  means  outside  the 
National  Committee. 

Inspection  of  the  records  demonstrates  how  the  three  main 
parties  to  the  movement  reached  their  differing  positions. 

(a)  Rarik  arid  file  of  new  recruits. 

With  the  first  mass  meetings  in  September,  1918,  the  rank 
and  file  began  to  indicate  their  general  attitude  and  their 
need, — protection.  At  the  I^ational  Committee  meeting  of 
September  28,  delegates  reported  "  splendid  mass  meetings  at 
South  Chicago,  Gary,  Hammond,  Joliet  and  Bethlehem."  A 
delegate  reported  1,500  signed  up  at  one  Chicago  meeting. 
A  delegate  from  Gary  reported  "  fifteen  boilermakers  dis- 
charged for  union  affiliation." 

From  September,  1918,  to  September,  1919,  the  new 
unionists  with  increasing  power  urged  action, — and  the  only 
action  they  understood  was  serving  "  demands  "  and  striking. 
At  the  January  4  meeting  reports  were  heard  on  "good 


ORGANIZING  FOR  CONFERENCE  171 

movements  on  foot  at  the  steel  plants  at  Bethlehem,  Coates- 
ville,  Sparrows  Point,  Steelton,  Johnstown,  Butler,  Mones- 
sen,  Wheeling,  Youngstown,  Buffalo,  Cleveland,  Lorain,  Mil- 
waukee, Gary,  Indiana  Harbor,  Joliet,  South  Chicago, 
Minnesota,  Pullman,  Pueblo."  The  Secretary  "  announced 
that  beyond  all  question  the  steel  industry  is  being  organ- 
ized." The  South  Chicago  workers  asked  "  whether  or  not  it 
was  advisable  for  them  to  begin  wearing  the  union  button." 
Apparently  even  that  much  show  of  "  action  "  was  urged  by 
the  rank  and  file  but  the  Committee  advised  holding  buttons 
"  in  abeyance  for  the  time  being,"  Discharges  of  workmen 
for  union  activity  began  to  be  reported  from  the  Pennsylvania 
districts. 

At  the  March  8  meeting  "  hundreds "  of  Johnstown 
workers  were  reported  as  "  discharged  point  blank " ;  affi- 
davits were  read  of  union  men  discharged  "after  ten  to  thirty- 
five  years  service."  Similar  "  obstructionist  "  tactics  had 
been  reported  from  Youngstown.  On  May  25  a  congress  of 
583  rank  and  file  delegates  from  eighty  steel  centers,  un- 
trained in  trade  union  practice,  clamored  their  abuses  and 
urged  a  strike  which  they  thought  themselves  empowered  to 
call.  The  Internationals'  representatives  counselled  modera- 
tion. At  the  July  11  meeting  the  reports  read  that  "  in 
Johnstown,  Youngstown,  Chicago,  Vandergrift,  Wheeling 
and  elsewhere  great  strikes  are  threatening.  The  men  are 
letting  it  be  known  that  if  we  do  not  do  something  for  them 
they  will  take  the  matter  into  their  own  hands.  W^here  they 
are  not  threatening  to  strike  they  are  taking  the  position 
that  they  will  pay  no  more  dues  until  they  can  see  some 
results  from  their  efforts."  From  then  on  until  September 
the  records  show  a  long  tussle  between  the  erupting  rank  and 
file  and  the  International  officers — with  the  National  Com- 
mittee as  buffer — ^Avhile  demands  were  served,  a  strike  ballot 
taken  and  a  strike  date  set.     In  the  last  tense  debates  over 


172  EEPOET  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

postponing  the  date  it  was  the  impact  of  many  telegrams  like 
the  following  which  forced  the  issue  (meeting  of  September 
17): 

W.  Z.  Foster,  303  Magee  Bldg.,  Pittsburgh,  Pa. 

We  cannot  be  expected  to  meet  the  enraged  workers,  who  will 
consider  us  traitors  if  strike  is  postponed. 

Organizers  Youngstown  District. 

The  rank  and  file  through  the  local  leaders  thus  over-rode 
the  Internationals,  the  A.  F.  of  L.  and  President  Wilson's 
request  to  wait  for  the  October  Industrial  Conference. 

(b)  The  IntermdioTwls. 

The  position  of  the  twenty-four  International  Unions  is 
indicated  with  similar  clearness  from  the  earliest  Committee 
meetings.  Few  of  the  International  Presidents,  nominally 
members  of  the  Committee,  ever  attended  the  meetings  per- 
sonally and  at  one  meeting  there  were  demands  that  the 
unions'  representatives  be  at  least  a  vice-president,  rather 
than  a  powerless  organizer.  They  agreed  to  the  financing 
plan — pro-rata  distribution  of  expenses  in  ratios  of  each 
union's  total  votes  in  A.  F.  of  L.  conventions — but,  from 
September,  1918,  on,  many  of  the  Internationals  had  to  be 
"jacked  up"  persistently  for  moneys  pledged.  In  organ- 
izers they  contributed  in  all  about  100 ;  at  the  May  25  con- 
gress of  rank  and  file,  resolutions  were  passed  that  "  there  is 
sadly  lacking  a  sufficient  number  of  labor  representatives  " 
for  the  campaign  and,  "Whereas,  without  straining  their 
resources  all  the  various  cooperating  unions  could  easily  in- 
crease "  their  organizers  and  "  financial  assistance,"  the 
Internationals  were  urged  to  "  double  the  number  of  organ- 
izers now  in  the  field  in  this  work."  Other  resolutions  called 
on  Mr.  Gompers  and  the  A.  F.  of  L.  "  to  lend  their  assist- 
ance." 


ORGANIZING  FOR  CONFERENCE  173 

Particularly  this  conference,  and  the  local  leaders  per- 
sistently, called  on  the  Internationals  to  back  up  the  National 
Committee's  "  free  speech  fight "  in  western  Pennsylvania. 
Committee  meetings  from  November,  1918,  on,  were  much 
concerned  with  Pennsylvania's  "  time  honored  tactics  of  sup- 
pressing the  right  of  assembly."  In  Pittsburgh,  McKees- 
port,  Braddock  and  Homestead,  the  Secretary  reported,  mass 
meetings  were  forbidden  flatly  or  the  money  for  rented  halls 
was  returned  "  under  pressure  of  the  steel  interest "  and  the 
meetings  "  cancelled."  The  minutes  of  November  25  wax 
indignant : 

In  Rankin,  the  hall-owner  having  more  than  the  usual  share 
of  independence,  the  city  officials  were  unable  to  make  him 
abandon  the  meeting.  A  lick-spittle  Board  of  Health  was  called 
into  service  and  gotten  to  arbitrarily  close  the  hall. 

The  November  25  meeting  of  the  Committee  adjourned  to 
go  before  the  City  Council  of  McKeesport  to  demand  "  the 
right  of  organized  labor  to  have  a  hearing  in  McKeesport." 
They  were  rebuffed :  the  minutes  add  that  "  after  this  dis- 
gusting evidence  of  subserviency  to  the  Steel  Corporation  " 
the  Committee  called  on  the  A.  F.  of  L.  and  all  the  Interna- 
tionals to  hold  "  a  meeting  as  soon  as  possible  in  Pittsburgh  " 
to  test  the  right  of  assembly  and  settle  the  "  free  speech 
fight." 

No  such  meeting  resulted:  the  A.  F.  of  L.  took  verbal 
action  at  its  June  convention  and  some  International  presi- 
dents promised  to  "  fight  it  out  in  McKeesport "  personally. 
The  records,  however,  indicate  no  change  in  western  Penn- 
sylvania's administration  of  its  laws  of  assembly,  etc.,  as  a 
result  of  "  concerted  action  "  by  the  Internationals  and  the  A. 
F.  of  L. 

The  last  and  by  far  the  most  important  positions  taken  by 
the  Internationals,  at  variance  with  the  new  steel  rank  and 


174  ITEPOET  ON  THE  STEEL  STEIKE 

file,  concerned  the  strike — both  as  to  calling  the  strike  and  as 
to  supporting  it.  It  was  natural  that  Internationals,  such  as 
the  Machinists,  with  old  established  locals  in  a  dozen  other 
industries,  should  hesitate  to  burden  these  with  a  strike  in 
behalf  of  their  new  machinist  locals  in  steel.  They  were 
divided  between  the  desire  to  keep  the  steel  locals,  with  their 
revenues,  and  the  fear  of  possible  consequences  in  carrying 
through  to  the  limit  what  they  had  inaugurated.  At  the 
May  25  congress  it  was  the  Internationals'  representatives 
who  quickly  asserted  their  authority  over  the  impatient  rank 
and  file.  At  the  critical  July  20  meeting  where  the  advisa- 
bility of  a  strike  ballot  was  debated,  some  of  the  Inter- 
nationals, especially  the  Amalgamated  Association  of  Iron, 
Steel  and  Tin  Workers  and  the  United  Mine  Workers,  op- 
posed the  ballot  and  all  impressed  on  the  Committee  that 
only  the  Internationals  were  authorized  to  take  strike  votes. 
After  the  locals'  balloting, — resulting  in  a  98  per  cent,  vote 
for  a  strike — tense  meeting  followed  meeting  of  the  National 
Committee.  On  September  4  President  Gompers  warned  the 
Committee  "  of  the  great  power  of  the  ste^l  trust,  its  ruth- 
lessness  and  the  glee  with  which  it  would  deal  Labor  a  heavy 
blo\/."  He  advised  "  caution "  and  called  a  meeting  of 
the  twenty-four  presidents.  Another  message  was  sent  to 
President  Wilson,  in  the  west,  who  telegraphed  back  his  fail- 
ure to  influence  Mr.  Gary.  At  the  September  9  meeting  for 
the  twenty-four  presidents,  those  present  were  divided,  some 
urging  "  caution,"  some  seeing  "  no  way  out,"  and  all  worried 
about  financing  so  huge  a  strike.  By  a  vote  of  14  to  4  it 
was  decided  to  send  a  last  telegram  to  President  Wilson. 
The  President's  answer  "  contained  no  assurance  of  a  con- 
ference "  and  the  Committee  set  the  strike  date.  But  when 
the  President  appealed  to  Mr.  Gompers  for  a  postponement, 
Mr.  Gompers  (minutes  of  September  17)  wrote  to  "  the 
International  presidents  requesting  them  to  postpone  action 


ORGANIZING  FOR  CONFERENCE  175 

until  after  the  Industrial  Conference  of  October  6,  if  possible 
to  safeguard  the  unions'  interests  while  doing  so."  Mr. 
Gompers  did  not  notify  Mr.  Fitzpatrick  and  Mr.  Foster  of 
his  action  in  writing  to  the  presidents  on  the  Committee. 
"  In  consequence  (of  Mr.  Gompers's  letter)  a  number  of 
delegates  came  to  the  conference  (of  September  17)  with 
definite  instructions  as  to  how  to  vote  on  the  postponement." 
Eight  Internationals,  it  was  re^^aled,  either  had  instructed 
to  vote  for  postponement  or  had  telegraphed  against  the 
strike. 

In  opposition  came  a  flood  of  telegrams  and  protests  from 
local  leaders  urging  that  "  it  would  be  absolutely  dangerous 
for  our  organizers  to  meet  the  men  if  the  strike  is  called  off." 
The  Committee  sent  telegrams  to  the  absent  International 
presidents  "  requesting  them  either  to  come  to  Pittsburgh 
or  to  give  their  delegates  the  powers  to  act  as  the  needs  of 
the  situation  would  seem  to  indicate."  The  debate  lasted  over 
a  day  and  the  consensus  of  those  present  was  that  if  post- 
poned the  steel  workers  would  "  make  short  work  of  the 
organizations  "  and  strike  sporadically.  Some  of  the  Inter- 
national representatives  wavered ;  the  vote  was  for  the  strike, 
12  to  3. 

The  record  concerning  the  actual  support  of  the  strike  by 
the  Internationals  is  not  clear.  The  Stationary  Engineers 
and  the  Switchmen,  two  of  the  twenty-four  Internationals, 
did  not  call  their  members  out  of  the  steel  plants  and  yards, 
but  a  number  of  Switchmen's  locals  did.  The  Amalgamated 
Association  of  Iron,  Steel  and  Tin  Workers,  after  a  month, 
began  ordering  its  men  back  into  "  independent  "  plants,  and, 
after  the  strike,  withdrew  from  the  Committee,  taking  away 
70,000  to  90,000  members^  all  of  whom  were  recruits  from 
the  drive.  The  United  Mine  Workers  had  their  own  strike  of 
^November  on  hand.  Locals  of  the  Internationals  all  over  the 
country  contributed  to  the  strike  relief  fund  but  the  bulk  of 


176  EEPOET  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

this  fund  camje  from  the  Jewish  clothing  unions,  one  of 
which,  the  Amalgamated  Clothing  Workers,  an  industrial 
union  fought  hy  the  A.  F.  of  L.,  sent  a  check  for  $100,000 
to  the  A.  F.  of  L.  for  the  steel  strikers. 

Thus  the  brunt  of  the  strike  lay  on  the  steel  workers  who 
had  forced  it,  not  on  "  the  organized  labor  movement  of 
America  "  which  had  initiated  the  drive. 

(c)  The  National  Committee. 

The  position  of  the  National  Committee,  in  relation  to 
the  rank  and  file,  has  been  indicated  except  in  one  matter. 
The  Committee  attempted  to  carry  the  temporary  and  arti- 
ficial unity  of  the  twenty-four  Internationals  into  permanent 
organization  in  two  directions.  One  was  in  setting  up  Dis- 
trict Steel  Councils,  designed  to  maintain  united,  or  quasi- 
industrial,  action  in  dealing  with  separate  plants.  In  most 
districts  the  weight  of  organizing  and  striking  was  carried 
chiefly  by  these  councils;  some  of  them  survived  the  strike. 
The  other  Committee  effort,  specifically  authorized  by  the 
May  25  congress,  was  toward  setting  up  a  national  council, 
or  Iron  and  Steel  Department  within  the  A.  F.  of  L.,  like 
other  trades  departments  in  the  A.  F.  of  L.  The  A.  F.  of 
L.  convention,  on  the  recommendation  of  an  administration 
committee,  gave  short  shrift  to  this  project. 

With  the  foregoing  analysis  in  mind,  it  is  possible  to  sum- 
marize the  principal  causes  of  the  failure  of  the  strike,  list- 
ing all  but  laying  chief  emphasis  (in  this  section)  on  the 
apparent  defects  in  the  labor  organization.  To  clarify  the 
issue  it  is  necessary  to  view  the  strike  in  two  aspects:  first, 
as  the  struggle  of  300,000  newly  organized  workers  against 
the  Steel  Corporation, — a  limited  aspect;  second,  the  larger 
warfare  of  which  the  strike  was  a  part, — the  after-war  battle 
for  power  between  organized  employers  of  the  nation  and 
organized  labor,  or  as  it  has  been  termed,  "  between  the 
money  trust  and  the  labor  trust," 


OEGANIZING  FOR  CONFERENCE  177 

In  the  narrower  aspect,  the  first  cause  of  failure  was  the 
size  of  the  Steel  Corporation.  The  United  States  Steel  Cor- 
paration  was  too  big  to  be  beaten  by  300,000  workingmen. 
It  had  too  large  a  cash  surplus,  too  many  allies  among  other 
businesses,  too  much  support  from  government  officers,  local 
and  national,  too  strong  influence  with  social  institutions  such 
as  the  press  and  the  pulpit,  it  spread  out  over  too  much  of 
the  earth — still  retaining  absolutely  centralized  control — to 
be  defeated  by  widely  scattered  workers  of  many  minds, 
many  fears,  varying  states  of  pocketbook  and  under  a  com- 
paratively improvised  leadership.  The  "  independent  "  steel 
companies  gave  the  Corporation  solid  speechless  support ;  not 
a  spokesman  was  heard  but  Mr.  Gary.  In  the  crucial  west- 
em  Pennsylvania  districts  two  decisive  factors  were  the  Gov- 
ernor of  Pennsylvania,  who  sent  in  the  State  Constabulary, 
and  the  Sheriff  of  Allegheny  County,  who  controlled  an  army 
of  deputies.  In  a  dozen  towns  the  burgesses  and  police  chiefs 
are  salaried  employees  of  the  steel  companies.  It  is  im- 
possible to  pass  over  such  facts  as  illustrating  the  size  of  the 
steel  interests. 

The  second  cause  was  the  successful  use  of  strike  breakers, 
principally  negroes,  by  the  steel  companies,  in  conjunction 
with  the  abrogation  of  civil  liberties.  As  a  fighting  proposi- 
tion the  strike  was  broken  by  the  successful  establishment  of, 
first,  the  theory  of  "  resuming  production  "  and,  second,  the 
fact  of  it.  Production  was  maintained  without  any  inter- 
ruption in  some  plants.  On  this  basis  the  companies  created 
a  belief  that  it  was  being  resumed  everywhere.  Then  by  the 
use  of  strike  breakers  they  spread  the  actual  resumptions  and 
reinforced  the  theory.  Negro  workers  were  imported  and 
were  shifted  from  plant  to  plant:  in  Gary  the  negroes  were 
marched  ostentatiously  through  the  streets;  in  Youngstown 
and  near  Pittsburgh  they  were  smuggled  in  at  night.  "  Nig^ 
gers  did  it,"  was  a  not  uncommon  remark  among  company 


178  EEPORT  ON  THE  STEEL  STEIKE 

officers.  Besides  the  comparatively  small  bands  of  avowed 
strike  breakers,  shifted  from  plant  to  plant,  it  is  evident  that 
the  great  numbers  of  negroes  who  flowed  into  the  Chicago 
and  Pittsburgh  plants  were  conscious  of  strike  breaking.  For 
this  attitude,  the  steel  strikers  rightly  blamed  American 
organized  labor.  In  the  past  the  majority  of  A.  F.  of  L. 
unions  have  been  white  unions  only.  Their  constitutions 
often  so  provide.  Through  many  an  experience  negroes  came 
to  believe  that  the  only  way  they  could  break  into  a  unionized 
industry  was  through  strike  breaking.  The  recent  change  in 
A.  F.  of  L.  official  attitude  toward  negroes  has  not  had  time 
to  be  effective.  At  Youngstown,  for  example,  one  lone  negro 
machinist  striker,  who  stuck  to  the  end,  was  never  admitted 
to  the  striking  machinists'  local. 

Through  strike  breakers  the  companies  played  on  one  of 
the  two  great  fears  which  always  contend  in  workers'  minds 
in  time  of  strike.  One  fear  is,  "  My  job,  somebody  will  get 
my  job."  The  other  fear  is,  "  What  will  my  neighbors  say 
if  I  go  back  ?  "  "  Resuming  production  "  makes  the  first  fear 
overbalance  the  second.  Fears  of  other  communities  were 
played  on.  In  Pittsburgh  the  strikers  heard,  "  They  are 
going  back  in  Chicago."  In  Chicago  they  feared,  "  They  are 
going  back  in  Pittsburgh."  Committees  of  strikers,  some- 
times sponsored  by  mill  officials  or  by  Chambers  of  Com- 
merce, went  from  Milwaukee  to  visit  Chicago,  and  from 
Chicago,  from  Cleveland  and  from  Wheeling  to  inspect  Pitts- 
burgh. The  newspapers  kept  reporting  resumptions  every- 
where ;  other  businesses  were  getting  steel  and  were  declaring 
they  were  getting  all  they  wanted. 

In  their  efforts  to  counteract  this,  in  the  pivotal  Pittsburgh 
district,  the  strikers  were  in  the  main  denied  the  rights  of 
picketing  and  of  assemblage.  The  local  leader  could  not 
reach  them;  he  feared  to  visit  strikers'  homes  lest  he  be 
arrested  for  "  intimidation."     To  counteract  the  newspapers 


OEGANIZmG  FOR  CONFERENCE  179 

they  had  only  their  strike  bulletin,  no  local  labor  press. 
Constabulary  and  sheriff's  proclamations  kept  them  scattered. 
Separated,  the  great  fear  undermined  them.  By  mid- 
November  over  half  had  forgotten  the  pure  and  simple  trade 
unionist  doctrine, — "  organize  and  all  these  things  shall  be 
added  unto  you," — and  had  gone  back  convinced  that  "  this 
thing  is  not  succeeding."  Mr.  Foster's  dictmn  that  "  no 
worker  is  vs^orth  his  salt  who  isn't  willing  to  eat  his  hide  in 
a  strike  "  turned  out  to  be  "  a  counsel  of  perfection." 

The  third  cause  was  the  disunity  of  labor,  limiting  this 
consideration  to  the  twenty-four  unions  involved  and  to  the 
steel  workers  themselves.  The  skilled  workers  feared  the 
semi-skilled,  the  semi-skilled  feared  the  common  labor :  in  the 
vast  hierarchy  of  steel  jobs  each  feared  being  put  in  a  lower 
rank  even  if  the  strike  were  won.  The  Americans  feared 
that  the  "foreigners"  were  pushing  into  the  skilled  jobs; 
the  foreigners  feared  that  the  Americans  were  going  back  in 
the  mill  to  conspire  "  to  keep  the  hunkies  down."  Americans 
in  the  Pittsburgh  district,  who  stayed  at  work,  justified  them- 
selves on  the  ground  that  "  the  organizers  had  not  appealed  to 
them,  only  to  the  '  foreigners.'  "  The  foreigners  felt  the 
newspaper  criticisms  that  the  strike  was  one  of  "  un-American 
aliens."  The  strike's  end  saw  the  racial  split  deepened,  many 
immigrants  feeling  that  they  had  been  "  let  down  "  by  the 
American  labor  movement.  Many  immigrants  told  their 
leaders,  "  When  you  '  Americanize '  the  Americans  and  the 
negroes,  we'll  strike  again." 

Among  the  twenty-four  unions,  besides  the  fights  over  seg- 
regating recruits,  there  came  up  in  devastating  form  the  un- 
solved problem  of  the  "  sacredness  of  contracts."  The  Amal- 
gamated Association  of  Iron,  Steel  and  Tin  Workers,  which 
had  had  agreements  with  certain  "  independent "  mills, 
finally  "  remembered  "  these  contracts  and  began  "  living  up 
to  them.".     The  Amalgamated  was   acrimoniously  charged 


180  REPOET  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

with  choosing  between  its  contracts  with  employers  and  its 
contracts  with  fellow  unions ;  its  choice  was  called  "treason." 
Rather,  the  difficulty  was  the  recrudescence  of  an  old  dilemma 
hitherto  unsolved  by  A.  F.  of  L.  unions  in  mass  action. 

Moreover  there  was  no  unity,  at  all  comparable  to  that 
among  the  steel  companies,  as  between  the  steel  unions  and 
the  A.  F.  of  L.  The  A.  F.  of  L.  sent  out  the  strike  fund 
appeal  and  Mr.  Gompers  battled  for  the  strike  in  the  Indus- 
trial Conference  in  Washington,  but  from  the  start  the  knowl- 
edge was  widespread  that  Mr.  Gompers  had  tried  to  have 
the  strike  postponed. 

Three  attitudes  were  distinguishable,  at  the  end  of  the 
strike,  concerning  labor  unity.  One  was  that  of  Mr.  Fitz- 
patrick  and  Mr.  Foster,  that  "  the  strike  had  wonderful  sup- 
port from  unions  all  over  the  country ;  Mr.  Gompers  and  the 
A.  F.  of  L.  did  everything  that  could  have  been  expected  in 
view  of  all  the  other  strikes  and  troubles  at  the  same  period ; 
the  steel  workers  appreciate  how  the  unions  stood  by  them." 

A  second  view  was  that  expressed  by  an  International 
president  not  involved  in  the  strike :  "  The  A.  F.  of  L.  doesn't 
control  strikes  and  the  International  Unions  are  primarily 
business  organizations  for  carrying  on  constructive  negotia- 
tions for  workers.  Why  should  they  bankrupt  themselves  for 
immigrants  who  originally  took  the  steel  jobs  away  from 
Americans  and  who  wouldn't  go  on  strike  for  Americans  in 
the  next  trouble  ?  " 

A  third  view  was  put  by  a  local  strike  leader,  an  experi- 
enced American  unionist,  without  bitterness,  as  follows: 
"  The  A.  F.  of  L.  was  not  '  massed  behind  this  strike.'  The 
A.  F.  of  L.  didn't  even  hold  a  mass-meeting  that  I  know  of. 
When  the  hunkies  tell  me  they  were  let  dovTU,  I  know  it. 
The  unions  say  they're  '  always  on  the  firing  line '  for  labor 
and  one  reason  they're  always  there  is  because  they've  never 
learned  to  fire  together.    If  the  railwaymen  in  the  steel  plant 


ORGANIZING  FOR  CONFEEENCE  181 

yards  had  struck,  this  strike  would  have  been  won.  In 
October  the  railway  men's  locals  near  Pittsburgh  voted  to 
strike  but  they  got  no  assurance  of  support  from  their 
Brotherhoods.  In  the  Calumet  district  the  Switchmen  re- 
fused to  pull  out  their  men  because,  the  organizer  said,  '  trade 
control  was  at  stake.'  The  Switchmen  were  rivals  of  the 
Trainmen  for  the  men  in  the  plant  yards  and  if  they'd  have 
struck  the  Trainmen  would  have  stuck,  filled  up  the  places, 
broke  the  strike  and  the  Switchmen  could  never  have  got 
back.  The  Amalgamated's  stand  made  them  strike  breakers. 
When  Mike  Tighe  [President  of  the  Amalgamated  Associa- 
tion of  Iron,  Steel  and  Tin  Workers]  ordered  back  his  men  at 
that  mill  near  Cleveland,  he  started  an  avalanche.  One  Amal- 
gamated organizer  got  four  hundred  men  into  one  big  union 
with  an  Amalgamated  charter  at  a  miU  near  Steubenville 
and  they  all  struck.  Mike  ordered  them  all  back  and  tore 
up  that  organizer's  card. 

"  At  Wheeling,  after  the  gun  riot  there,  some  hunkie 
strikers  went  to  their  A.  F.  of  L.  organizer  for  a  lawyer  to 
get  their  fellows  out  of  jail.  He  told  them  he  wouldn't  use 
union  funds  for  that;  let  them  hire  their  own  lawyer. 
Foster,  I  believe,  made  him  move.  At  Gary,  Central  Union 
officials,  jealous  of  the  Steel  Council,  made  speeches  advising 
the  men  to  go  back.  At  Sparrows  Point  a  big  Amalgamated 
official  did  the  same  thing.  I've  heard  Electrical  Interna- 
tional officers  say  their  people  didn't  want  steel  organized, 
because  electrical  workers,  during  slack  times  in  union  shops, 
like  to  be  free  to  get  steel  jobs,  which  they  couldn't  if  steel 
was  organized. 

"  All  these  old  habits  of  our  unions  played  hob  with  the 
strike.  There's  no  use  denying  it — the  Steel  Corporation 
knows  these  things  and  counts  on  them.  And  all  the  remedies 
for  them,  like  having  all  contracts  date  from  the  same  day, 
get  tied  up  with  radical  proposals,  like  May  Day.     During 


182  EEPOET  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

the  strike,  Cleveland  foreigner  locals  tried  to  get  together  in 
one  separate  steel  industrial  union.  They  got  jumped  on  by 
the  Internationals  there.  After  the  strike  half  a  dozen  towns' 
Steel  Councils  met  in  Gary  to  start  an  independent  Steel 
Industrial  Union.  They'll  get  nowhere.  If  they  take 
I.W.W.  leadership,  or  W.I.I.U.,  they'll  he  outlawed.  If 
they  go  it  alone,  secessionist,  they'll  be  fought  tooth  and  nail 
by  the  A.  F.  of  L.,  with  more  success  than  the  A.  F.  of  L. 
fought  the  Amalgamated  Clothing  Workers. 

"  And  all  the  while  the  twenty-four  Internationals  won't 
install  the  universal  transfer  card  or  the  low  re-installment 
fee  or  remit  dues  or  do  any  of  the  things  they've  got  to  do  to 
keep  these  new  steel  locals  alive.  They'll  let  'em  slide  because 
there'd  be  no  money  in  it. 

"  These  selfish  narrow  habits  wreck  the  movement.  But 
we've  got  to  take  things  as  they  are.  Still  there's  no  use 
being  just  optimistic  like  Foster.  We'd  better  admit  it  since 
the  steel  companies  just  bank  on  our  making  the  same  mis- 
takes." 

The  above  is  cited  as  a  temperate  statement  of  what  many 
strikers  and  strike  leaders  expressed  savagely. 

The  fourth  cause  of  defeat  was  labor's  failure  to  state  its 
war  aims,  meaning,  in  the  narrower  aspect,  the  steel  workers' 
plight  and  the  unions'  intentions  in  regard  to  steel  jobs. 
Those  most  involved  were  the  steel  workers;  they  did  the 
fighting;  they  seemed  sometimes  totally  forgotten  as  workmen. 
The  facts  about  their  lives,  their  earnings,  their  jobs,  were 
not  set  forth.  The  press  may  or  may  not  have  been  hostile 
to  such  facts,  but  the  facts  were  not  prepared  by  the  leaders 
and  were  not  offered  to  the  press.  The  facts  mostly  were  not 
known  to  the  leaders.  Particularly  when  it  came  to  actual 
knowledge  of  steel  jobs  and  what  changes  might  be  necessary 
to  make  steel  under  union  conditions  and  how  the  country's 
steel  consumers  might  fare,  such  research  had  not  been  made 


ORGANIZING  FOE  CONFERENCE  183 

by  the  unions.  It  was  consciously  ignored,  partly  on  tlie 
ground  that  '^  the  press  and  public  opinion  never  count  in  a 
strike,"  and  partly  on  the  ground  that  the  whole  problem 
was  not  their  business,  which  was  solely  "  to  organize  the 
workers  as  they  found  them  and  any  business  can  stand  hav- 
ing its  workers  organized."  But  even  this  position  was 
never  clearly  published.  The  leaders'  overwhelming  concern 
was  with  their  strikers  as  union  men.  But  the  strike  was 
to  force  a  conference :  that  "  public  opinion  "  which  might 
have  helped  to  force  it,  never  had  an  oversupply  of  facts  on 
which  to  proceed ;  not  even  "  workmen's  opinion,"  outside  of 
steel  areas,  was  furnished  with  the  facts. 

As  to  the  effects  of  unions  on  the  steel  industry,  and  labor's 
"  failure  to  state  its  war  aims,"  it  is  necessary  to  turn  to  the 
wider  aspects  of  the  strike,  to  that  greater  war  in  which  the 
steel  strike  became  engulfed  and,  in  the  public  mind,  almost 
forgotten  as  a  separate  entity  after  October. 

This  greater  war  was  the  clash  between  employer  and  em- 
ployed experienced  by  each  belligerent  nation  in  the  "  read- 
justments "  after  the  war,  marked  in  America  by  more  un- 
thinking simplicity  than  in  most  countries.  In  England,  for 
example,  this  clash  was  pressed  by  the  workers,  organized 
both  economically  and  politically;  in  this  country  the  drive 
seems  to  have  been  made  by  big  industrial  interests,  bent  on 
halting  the  unions'  development  or  "  encroachments."  Par- 
ticularly, big  business  associations  were  determined  to  end 
what  they  termed  the  "  unfair  gifts  to  labor  in  war  time." 
The  result  was  that  a  pretty  solid  association  of  manufac- 
turers caught  the  inchoate  body  of  labor  at  a  time  of  crisis, 
split  everywhere  by  a  gulf  between  leadership  and  rank  and 
file,  split  between  old  ideas  and  new,  without  a  unifying  pro- 
gram in  terms  of  public  service  such  as  it  had  during  the 
war,  or  even  a  plan  of  fighting  for  things  that  had  been 
"  given "  to  it  during  the  war.     Despite  organized  labor's 


184  EEPORT  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

boasts  of  power  it  was  rather  handily  beaten  everywhere  in 
the  fall  of  1919. 

Why  did  "  public  opinion "  apparently  join  with  the 
nation's  employers  generally  to  support  a  corporation,  which 
in  time  past  it  had  often  attacked  as  the  "  menacing  steel 
trust "  ? 

First,  because  of  the  size  and  ramifications  of  the  Steel 
Corporation.  By  its  root  connection  with  other  businesses 
and  especially  with  the  sources  of  money-control,  the  Cor- 
poration has  been,  and  is,  naturally  fitted  to  head  the  coun- 
try's private  producing  employers.  Its  business  ramifications 
lead; 

(1)  into  the  "  independent "  steel  companies.  Corporation 
men  frequently  head  the  "  independents." 

(2)  into  railroads.  The  Corporation  operates  thousands  of 
miles  of  railroads,  primarily  for  the  transportation  of 
ore.  Also  its  directors  are  heavily  involved  in  the  di- 
rectorates of  the  large  railroads. 

(3)  into  mines.  The  Corporation  owns  vast  coal  fields  and 
limitless  metal  mines. 

(4)  into  shipbuilding  and  ships.  The  Corporation  owns 
ship  lines,  docks,  etc. ;  it  owns  great  ship-building  yards. 

(5)  into  general  industries.  The  Corporation  owns  cement 
works,  many  by-product  plants,  and  its  regular  product 
goes  into  a  dozen  basic  utilities  from  railroads  and  build- 
ings to  farm  implements  and  household  utensils. 

(6)  into  banks.  The  Corporation,  primarily  a  great  finance 
concern,  is  most  closely  tied  into  the  country's  financial 
reservoirs  and  in  a  directing  capacity. 

The  Corporation  owns  towns.  In  many  localities  institu- 
tions, such  as  churches,  schools  and  newspapers,  are  depen- 
dent on  it  for  existence.    Through  its  very  size  its  social  in- 


ORGANIZING  FOR  CONFERENCE  185 

fluence  is  enormous.  Its  power  over  national  legislation  in 
the  past  has  been  the  text  of  voluminous  criticism.  During 
the  war  it  paid  no  more  attention  to  the  national  labor  policies 
as  enunciated  by  the  "War  Labor  Board  than  as  if  the  govern- 
ment had  never  made  awards  based  on  the  "  right  to  organ- 
ize in  trade  and  labor  unions  "  and  the  "  right  to  collective 
bargaining." 

Apart  from  its  size,  what  ideas  obtained  for  the  Corpora- 
tion such  support  ?  x\nalysis  indicates  why  so  many  smaller 
business  men,  employers  who  had  "  scorned  to  take  their  labor 
policy  from  trusts,"  and  representatives  of  public  opinion, 
generally  supported  Mr.  Gary  in  all  sincerity. 

In  the  first  place,  employers  all  over  the  country  were 
paying  higher  wages  than  they  were  used  to  before  the  war 
and  as  consumers  were  paying  prices  which  seemed  to  them 
unreasonable,  for  all  sorts  of  commodities  from  "  labor  "  to 
laundry.  Especially  was  this  true  of  little  employers  and 
what  may  be  called  middle  business  men. 

These  new  wage  scales,  insofar  as  they  were  set  by  the 
action  of  labor,  resulted  from  the  operation  of  Mr.  Gompers' 
theory  of  pure  and  simple  trade  unionism.  The  theory  con- 
sidered nothing  but  wages,  hours  and  conditions,  and  jacked 
these  up  as  high  as  the  traffic  would  stand,  having  little 
regard  to  comparisons  with  other  industries,  or  to  the  inherent 
value  of  the  service  rendered,  or  to  any  standard  (with  the 
exception  of  roughly  approximating  rises  in  the  cost  of  liv- 
ing).    Comparative  standards  were  "not  labor's  business." 

Moreover,  organized  labor  was  showing  no  disposition  to 
share  responsibility  for  production,  nor  had  it  had  oppor- 
tunity to  demonstrate  marked  ability  to  "  share  industrial 
control,"  an  ambition  newly  proclaimed  by  it.  Labor  was 
emphatically  refusing  the  kind  of  "  responsibility "  advo- 
cated by  employers,  that  is,  incorporation  of  trade  unions  and 
making  them  subject  to  the  courts,  whose  tradition,  rooted  in 


186  REPOET  ON  THE  STEEL  STEIKE 

the  old  conspiracy  laws,  is  far  from  friendly  to  labor  unions. 
For  all  that,  labor  was  showing  no  disposition  to  supply  any 
other  schemes  for  assuming  responsibility  for  production  or 
responsible  share  in  control.  As  the  steel  strike  broke,  the 
American  labor  movement  was  definitely  opposed  to  any  har- 
ness of  "  responsibility."  This  was  a  big  fact  in  the  con- 
sciousness of  the  country's  employers  and  of  the  public. 

Then  came  (1)  the  threat  of  the  steel  strike,  and  the  strike 
itself;  (2)  a  month  later  the  great  coal  strike;  (3)  all  along 
the  threat  of  great  railroad  strikes.  The  upshot  was  that 
the  country's  employers  as  a  class  took  fright  at  what  seemed 
to  be  the  rolling  up  of  uncontrolled  power  by  trade  unions. 
Because  the  government  after  the  war,  as  before,  had  shown 
no  ability  to  formulate  any  plan  for  having  labor  share 
responsibility  and  control,  employers  were  afraid  of  the  gov- 
ernment.   They  saw  no  leadership  there. 

The  only  leadership  they  saw  was  Mr.  Gary's.  Employers 
who  feared  the  sweeping  character  of  his  statements  about 
labor,  men  who  were  getting  along  very  well  with  trade 
unions  in  their  own  businesses,  "  supported  Mr.  Gary  "  be- 
cause they  could  not  see  where  it  would  all  end  if  labor  won 
the  steel  strike,  the  coal  strike,  the  railroad  strike  and  every 
other  strike. 

Moreover,  all  through  the  country,  the  middle  classes,  or 
great  body  of  consumers  outside  of  organized  labor,  were 
mainly  conscious  that  prices  of  everything  consumed  were 
getting  beyond  reach.  In  considerable  part  they  accepted  the 
explanation  that  labor  was  partly  to  blame ;  "  high  wages, 
high  prices."  They  too  "  supported  Mr.  Gary,"  though 
many  expressed  fear  as  to  what  the  outcome  would  be  if  they 
supported  Mr.  Gary  to  the  hilt.  Against  him  they  saw  only 
Mr.  Gompers;  they  never  really  saw  the  steel  workers  or 
learned  anything  about  the  hunkies  and  the  twelve-hour  day. 

It  is  quite  true  that  "  public  opinion,"  especially  in  these 


ORGANIZING  FOE  CONFERENCE  187 

days  of  organized  propaganda,  may  be  a  singularly  meaning- 
less, vague  and  artificial  thing.  It  is  notorious  that  public 
opinion  is  ordinarily  "  roused  "  in  behalf  of  strikes  chiefly 
by  murder,  preferably  murder  of  women  and  children,  by 
flame  and  machine  gun  for  choice,  as  at  Ludlow,  Colorado. 
In  this  sense  too  few  strikers  were  killed,  or  those  killed 
were  not  young  enough  or  not  the  right  sex  to  "  rouse  public 
opinion  "  for  the  steel  strikers.  So  far  labor  leaders  of  the 
old  type  merely  retort, ''  When  unions  are  strong  enough  we'll 
take  care  of  public  opinion." 

On  the  other  hand  it  is  possible  that  the  unions'  present 
lack  of  strength  is  caused  considerably  by  failing  to  take 
thought  for  the  public  now.  "When  labor  thinks  out  where  it 
purposes  to  go  and  publishes  its  fair  intent  and  even  its  clear 
ambition,  it  may  demolish  much  adverse  public  opinion. 
Otherwise  another  300,000  strikers  in  another  industry  may 
find  their  justified  cause  hopelessly  entangled  in  another  lost 
battle  over  the  "  open  shop  "  or  some  even  more  indefinite 
shibboleth. 

In  England,  in  the  same  week  in  which  the  steel  strike 
started,  the  labor  unions,  far  more  powerfully  organized  than 
the  American  unions,  spent  $100,000  in  six  days  for  pub- 
licity to  "  care  for  public  opinion  "  and  by  forcing  that  pub- 
lication of  their  case  they  added  a  weight  sufficient  to  save 
their  national  railroad  strike  against  the  government  itself. 
The  steel  strike  leaders  in  108  days  did  not  spend  100,000 
cents  to  present  the  steel  workers'  case  to  "  public  opinion." 
In  taking  care  of  public  opinion,  moreover,  the  British 
leaders  were  automatically  informing  and  fortifying  their 
own  forces,  the  workingmen's  public  opinion,  which  now- 
adays is  becoming  decisive.  The  American  steel  leaders  tried 
to  maintain  their  strikers'  morale  with  a  lonely  weekly  bul- 
letin, which  however  good,  was  not  good  enough  to  offset  the 
same  strikers'  reading  of  hostile  newspapers. 


188  EEPOET  ON  THE  STEEL  STEIKE 

Conclusions,  which  are  not  so  remote  as  they  seem  from 
the  hunky  in  the  steel  towns,  may  be  summed  up  as  follows ; 

Causes  of  defeat,  which  were  second  in  importance  only  to 
the  fight  waged  by  the  Steel  Corporation,  lay  in  the 
organization  and  leadership,  not  so  much  of  the  strike 
itself,  as  of  the  American  labor  movement. 

The  immigrant  steel  worker  was  led  to  expect  more  of  the 
twenty-four  Internationals  than  they,  through  indiffer- 
ence, selfishness  or  narrow  habit,  were  ready  to  give. 

"  Public  opinion  "  cannot  reasonably  demand  consideration 
or  generosity  from  trade  unions  as  long  as  trade  unions 
are  kept  fighting  for  existence  or  for  ordinary  human 
rights,  denied  them  under  the  sanction  of  "  public 
opinion." 


ORGANIZING  FOR  CONFERENCE  189 

APPENDIX  TO  SECTION  VI 

Organized  hy  the  National  Committee 

The  following  extracts  from  the  duly  audited  and  approved 
final  report  and  accounting  of  the  Secretary-Tteasurer  of  the 
National  Committee  give  illuminating  statistics  on  the  strike. 

The  first  tabulates,  "by  districts  and  by  crafts,  the  recruits  oh- 
tained  by  the  National  Committee  directly,  based  on  the  financial 
accounting.  That  is,  each  direct  recruit  is  represented  in  the 
Committee's  finance  accounts  by  $1,  the  Committee's  share  of 
the  $3  initiation  fee.  The  Committee  claims  that  the  number 
of  workers  "  swept  out "  with  the  walkout  of  new  union  mem- 
bers was  100,000.  It  seems  probable  that  half  that  number  was 
nearer  correct. 

The  first  extract  reads: 

"  250,000  members  enrolled  by  the  National  Committee  for  Organiz- 
ing Iron  and  Steel  Workers  during  the  American  Federation  of  Labor 
organizing  campaign  in  the  steel  industry,  from  August  1,  1918,  to 
January  21,  1920.' 


190 


EEPORT  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 


Location 


South  Chicago 

Chicago  Heights   

Misc.   Chicago.  Dist , 

Pittsburgh    

Johnstown    

Butler   , 

Monessen,  Donora 

New  Castle    • 

Homestead    

Braddock,  Rankin 

Clairton    

McKeesport    

Gary    

Indiana  Harbor 

Joliet    

Milwaukee    

Waukegan     

De  Kalb   

Aurora    

Pullman    

Kenosha    

Hammond 

Wheeling  District   

Farrell,  Sharon   

Cleveland    

Sparrows'   Point    

Brackenridge,  Natrona  .  . 

East   Pittsburgh    

East    Liverpool    

Warren,   Niles    

Minnesota   Dist 

Pueblo 

Coatesville    

Steuben,    Mingo,   Wlerton 

Birmingham 

Canton,  Massillon 

Vandergrift    

Buffalo,  Lackawanna   . . . 

Youngstown    

Peoria    

Decatur     

Total  by  Trades   . . . 


Black- 
smiths 


153 

41 

128 

571 

503 

75 

145 

18 

136 

91 

39 

109 

129 

161 

52 

4 

8 

1 

1 

157 

4 

62 

38 

106 

2,230 

'23 


Boiler 
Makers 


143 

'23 
99 

137 

30 

25 

3 

63 

110 
48 
33 

285 

95 

50 

2 


1 

3 

*ii 

57 

231 

35 


37 

17 

3 

40 

41 

35 

36 

13 

65 

56 

37 

2 

91 

101 

389 

336 

3 

3 

12 

5,699 


2.097 


Brick 
and 
Clay 

Wkrs. 


1 
3 

18 


187 


Brick 
Layers 


21 

2 

22 

43 

122 


1 

2 
10 
21 

4 
95 
11 
48 


4 

2 

22 

1 


40 

'io 


16 
67 


1 

"ii 


581 


Coopers 


1 
71 


65 


138 


ORGANIZING  FOR  CONFERENCE 


191 


Elect. 

Foundry 

Hod 

Iron, 
Steel 

Iron 

Machin- 

Metal 
Polish- 
era 

Mine. 
Mill  and 

Wkrs. 

Employees 

Carriers 

and  Tin 
Workers 

Workers 

ists 

Smelter 
Workers 

1,078 

139 

2.112 

326 

676 

798 

16 

27 

. . . 

145 

2 

148 

4 

73 

228 

212 

1,673 

657 

"5 

3 

402 

444 

787 

4,089 

280 

965 

320 

719 

108 

4.452 

731 

1,131 

437 

21 

26 

290 

15 

126 

238 

320 

7 

5.543 

103 

451 

792 

12 

"60 

1.116 

6 

317 

221 

21« 

iis 

71 

2.307 

144 

237 

8 

148 

184 

102 

1,265 

276 

853 

1,022 

136 

11 

105 

947 

70 

166 

1.158 

91 

14 

2,452 

69 

249 

500 

761 

121 

83 

2,855 

353 

929 

534 

270 

407 

26 

1,494 

235 

473 

. . . 

212 

152 

66 

1,814 

180 

142 

444 

21 

.    *    . 

547 

16 

19 

11 

i39 

758 

9 

73 

'21 

'22 

4 

1 

"2 

256 

24 

3 

13 

31 

3 

'is 

119 

193 

12 

106 

4 

255 

*    5                .'.'. 

42 

17 

187 

34 

165 

7 

207 

6 

2 

34 

... 

127 

3,109 

28 

226 

226               535 

150 

16 

2,386 

22 

118 

403 

434 

33 

7,820 
93 

38 

1,296 

85           2,599 

i54 

-22 

492 

1,007 

'is 

ios 

146 

'.'.'.               '63 
... 

! !! 

■56 

22 

•  •  • 

240 

'27 

"36 

;;• 

24 

185 

*6i 

2,281 

26 

i43 

279 

48 

632 

21 

32 

238 

•  •  • 

2,499 

288 

.319 

26 

115 

i74 

195 

691 

397 

63 

1,929 

208 

335 

16 

92 

■3 

13 

1,560 

16 

87 

60 

539 

191 

2,242 

242 

477 

1,033 

1,273 

443 

10,364 

449 

1,019 

.  .  . 

2,305 

23 

ii 

746 

17 

71 

. . . 

1 

45 

3 

120 

8,481 

2,406 

2,335 

70,026 

5,829 

12.406 

349 

15,223 

192 


REPOET  ON  THE  HTEEL  STRIKE 


Location 


South  Chicago 

Chicago  Heights    

Misc.  Chicago  Dist 

Pittsburgh    

Johnstown    

Butler    

Monessen,  Donora 

New   Castle    

Homestead    

Braddocli,  Ranl^ln 

Clairton    

McKeesport    

Gary    

Indiana  Harbor 

Joliet     

Milwaulsee    

Wauljegan     

De  Kalb    

Aurora    

Pullman    

Kenosha    

Hammond     

Wheeling  District 

Farrell,  Sharon   

Cleveland    

Sparrows'   Point    

Brackenridge,   Natrona  . . 

East   Pittsburgh    

East   Liverpool    

Warren,   Niles    

Minnesota   Dist 

Pueblo     

Coatesville    

Steuben,   Mingo,    Wlerton 

Birmingham     

Canton,    Masslllon    

Vandergrift    

Buffalo,  Laclsawanna   . . 

Youngstown   

Peoria   

Decatur     

Total  by  Trades 


United 
Mine 
Wl£rs. 


1,427 


11 


1,538 


Holders 


46 
13 
94 
168 
71 

■51 

11 

3 

56 
2 
31 
98 
211 
12 

*i4 

1 

4 

11 

1 

17 

2 

6 

319 

'i4 


1 
41 
14 
38 
31 


1,382 


Pat- 
tern 
Makers 


Plumb- 
ers 


195 

8 

38 


24 


210 

78 
39 


103 

23 

2 

6 

21 

25 


19 
'87 

■45 


84 

354 

4 

2 


1,369 


Quarry 
Wkrs. 


616 


725 


Rail- 
way 
Carmen 


38 

17 

267 

22 

566 

329 


20 

'it 

'26 

42 
2 


,819 
751 


30 

50 


17 


38 


5,045 


ORGANIZING  FOE  CONFEEENCE 


193 


Sea- 
men 

She 
Met 
Wki 

et       Station- 
al       ary  En- 
's,      gineers 

Station- 
ary Fire- 
men 

Steam 
Shovel- 
men 

Switch- 
men 

Unclassi- 
fied 

Totals   by 
Localities 

1 

9               116 

585 

68 

94 

6,616 

6 

i                   4 

6 

1 

71 

569 

1 

4                   7 
43 

18 
196 

408 
541 

3,871 
8,970 

324 

441 

207 

314 

11,846 

1 

9 

1,337 

2,519 

32 

52 
41 

'  i 

1,144 

287 

8,865 
2,710 

'47 

118 

10 

11 

3.571 

19 

300 

108 

4,044 

66 

73 

111 

2,970 

20 

64 

327 

3,963 

2t 

1 

i                  99 
5               105 
)                 84 

250 
298 
255 

'34 
40 
14 

210 

487 

45 

7,092 
4,654 
3,497 

1] 

L                   3 

2 
1 

27 
50 

22 

2 
2 

29 
98 
20 

681 

1,212 

332 

"i( 

1               ... 

6 

30 

242 

3? 

i                 48 

48 

269 

4,073 

i                   3 
3 

12 

88 
3 

585 
1,102 

287 

233 

152 

5,028 

156 

10 

12.S 

3,794 

28 

509 

'  "4 

1,734 

17,305 
93 

'ie 

'78 
"5 

'19 

'9i 

'56 

2,110 
146 

50 
474 
185 

*77 

'so 

"i4 

3,113 

52 

828 

205 

206 

iso 

4,108 

u 

»                 64 

7 

1,470 

V 

r                 32 

30 

148 

'i5 

20 

366 

"4 

8 

2,527 

43 

627 

5,705 
1,986 
6,179 

in 

71 

900 

'25 

804 

19,040 

1 

26 

1 

73 

984 

le 

2 

119 

320 

371 

2,194 

5,321 

2 

440 

12,552 

156,702 

194  REPOET  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

"  This  detailed  report  includes  only  those  members  signed  up  by  the 
National  Committee  for  Organizing  Iron  and  Steel  Workers  and  from 
whose  initiation  fees  $1.00  each  was  deducted  and  forwarded  to  the 
general  office  of  the  National  Committee.  It  represents  approximately 
50  per  cent,  to  60  per  cent,  of  the  total  number  of  steel  workers  organ- 
ized during  the  campaign  and  is  a  minimiun  report  in  every  respect. 

"  The  report  does  not  include  any  of  the  many  thousands  of  men 
signed  up  at  Bethlehem,  Steelton,  Reading,  Apollo,  New  Kensington, 
Leechburg  and  many  minor  points  which  felt  the  force  of  the  drive  but 
where  the  National  Committee  made  no  deductions  upon  initiation  fees. 
In  Gary,  Joliet,  Indiana  Harbor,  South  Chicago  and  other  Chicago  Dis- 
trict points,  the  National  Committee  ceased  collecting  on  initiation  fees 
early  in  1919,  hence  this  report  makes  no  showing  of  the  thousands  of 
men  signed  up  in  that  territory  during  the  last  few  months  of  the 
campaign  before  the  strike.  Likewise,  at  Coatesville  and  Sparrows' 
Point,  during  only  a  short  space  of  the  campaign  were  deductions  made 
for  the  National  Committee.  Many  thousands  more  men  were  signed  up 
directly  by  the  multitude  of  local  unions  in  the  steel  industry  that 
were  not  reported  to  the  National  Committee.  These  do  not  show  in 
this  calculation.  Nor  do  the  great  number  of  ex-soldiers  who  were 
taken  into  the  unions  free  of  initiation  fees — in  Johnstown  alone  1,300 
ex-soldier  steel  workers  joined  the  unions  under  this  arrangement.  Of 
course  no  accounting  is  here  included  for  the  army  of  workers  in  out- 
side industries  who  became  organized  as  a  result  of  the  tremendous 
impulse  given  by  the  steel  campaign. 

"  In  view  of  these  exceptions  it  may  be  conservatively  estimated  that 
well  over  250,000  actual  steel  workers  joined  the  unions  during  the 
campaign,  notwithstanding  the  opposition  of  the  Steel  Trust,  which 
discharged  thousands  of  its  workers,  completely  suppressed  free  speech 
and  free  assembly  in  Peimsylvania  and  used  every  known  tactic  to  pre- 
vent the  organization  of  its  employees." 

In  publishing  this  report,  Mr.  Jay  G.  Brown,  who  suc- 
ceeded Mr.  Foster  as  Secretary-Treasurer,  made  the  follow- 
ing claims  (undiscouraged,  to  say  the  least)  : 

"  It  represents  an  accomplishment  without  a  parallel  in  the  history 
of  the  labor  movement.  This  report  will  forever  silence  if  not  shame 
the  class  of  men  who  are  fond  of  saying,  '  The  steel  industry  cannot  be 
organized.'  It  was  organized.  It  also  furnished  a  crushing  answer  to 
Judge  Gary  who  asserted  that  only  about  10  per  cent,  of  the  steel 
workers  were  organized.  This  report  represents  an  irreducible  minimum. 
Local  unions  when  organized  did  not  as  a  rule  make  accounting  to  the 
National  Committee  for  additional  members  enrolled." 

"  The  National  Committee  began  its  work  on  the  theory  that  any  men 
in  any  industry  could  be  organized  if  they  could  be  reached  with  the 
message  of  unionism.  This  report  proves  the  correctness  of  this  theory. 
This  report  should  convey  a  lesson  and  furnish  an  inspiration  to  the 
labor  movement  of  this  country.  It  means  that  with  the  application 
of  those  same  principles  any  industry  in  America  can  be  organized. 

"  The  report  of  the  Relief  Fund  is  equally  noteworthy.  It  must  be 
remembered  that  at  the  beginning  of  the  steel  strike,  there  were,  as 
nearly  as  could  be  calculated,  367,000  men  involved.  100,000  of  these 
men  were  still  on  strike  when  it  was  called  off." 


ORGANIZING  FOR  CONFERENCE 


195 


Another  extract  is  from  the  twenty-foiir-page  printed 
financial  account  dealing  with  strike  relief.  It  includes  the 
following  summaries  of  the  moneys  contributed  through  the 
A.  F.  of  L.  officials  to  the  steel  strikes.  Note  the  late  date 
at  which  efforts  to  raise  a  fund  were  inaugurated ;  six  weeks 
after  the  strike  began  (September  22). 

"  Repoet  on  Receipts  and  Disbursements. 
"  All  moneys  contributed  to  the  undersigned  for  the  Steel  Strike 
Relief  Fund,  except  those  from  organizations  regularly  affiliated  with 
the  National  Committee  for  Organizing  Iron  and  Steel  Workers,  were 
forwarded  to  Mr.  Frank  Morrison,  Secretary  of  the  American  Federa- 
tion of  Labor,  and  appear  in  his  report.  The  moneys  contributed  by 
the  affiliated  organizations  are  duly  accounted  for  in  the  regular 
monthly  reports  of  the  Secretary-Treasurer  of  the  National  Committee 
for  Organizing  Iron  and  Steel  Workers. 


1919 


Nov. 


Dec 


RECEIPTS 

From  Frank  Morrison  per  John  Fitzpatrick   $     2 

5, 

17 

13 

57 


11 

15 

26 

27 

1920 

Jan.      3 

8 

"      30 


107 
17 
45 

9 
10 

8 
12 
19 

9 
24 

9 


400.00 
000.00 
665.13 
783.50 
835.70 
387.53 
.067.39 
438.56 
,208.82 
,658.47 
,807.28 
,522.03 
,845.73 
918.10 
,519.12 
147.04 
,738.92 


15,125.76 
11,043.30 
12,028.76 


Total  Receipts   $418,141.14 

DISBURSEMENTS 

Meat  and  Groceries    $178,695.64 

Commissary  Checks  for  points  outside  Pittsburgh  District  . .  93,082.82 

Labor  and  Expenses   3,612.44 

Freight  and  Drayage   3,757.24 

Bread    46,739.54 

Potatoes 22,622.04 


Total $348,509.72 


196  REPORT  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

RECAPITULATION 

Total  Receipts  from  Nov.  4,   1919,  to  Jan.  31,   1920    (com- 
prising total  fund)    $418,141.14 

Total  Disbursements  from  Oct.  27,  1919,  to  Jan.  31,  1920 348,509.72 


Bal.  Deposited  in  Gen'l  Fund  of  Natl  Com.  for  Organizing 

Iron  and  Steel  Workers   $  69,631.42 

In  addition  to  the  above  extracts  it  may  be  noted  that  the 
bulk  of  the  strike  relief  fund  came  from  the  Jewish  clothing 
and  furriers'  unions,  principally  of  New  York,  some  of  these 
unions  being  outside  the  A.  F.  of  L  and  long  opposed  by  it. 

Approximately  $100,000  additional  to  the  above  was  con- 
tributed by  the  twenty-four  unions  affiliated  with  the  Committee. 
The  year's  organizing  campaign  cost  the  Committee  approx- 
imately $75,000.  It  was  reported  that  the  financial  cost  of  the 
year's  work  to  one  or  two  of  the  twenty-four  unions  of  the 
Committee,  in  maintaining  organizers,  contributions,  meetings, 
etc.,  approximated  $200,000  apiece. 


VII 

SOCIAL  CONSEQUENCES  OF  AEBITRAKY 
CONTROL 

In  this  section  are  analyzed  the  data  obtained  by  the 
Commission  on  the  second  or  larger  phase  of  control,  i.e. 
industrial  relations,  outlined  in  Section  V.  Analysis  war- 
rants the  following  conclusions : 

Inasmuch  as  the  Steel  Corporation  never  offered  plans  or 
developed  a  working  substitute  for  arbitrary  control, 
present  conditions  in  the  industry  constitute  the  actually 
existent  alternative  to  "  the  kind  of  conference  the  labor 
unions  wanted." 

Maintenance  of  this  non-unionism  alternative  entailed  seri- 
ous social  consequences  for  steel  communities  and  for 
the  nation.  The  consequences  were  normal  in  the  in- 
dustry; they  became  pronounced  and  grave  during  the 
strike. 

Maintaining  the  non-unionism  alternative  entailed,  for  the 
employers,  (1)  discharging  workmen  for  unionism,  (2) 
blacklists,  (3)  espionage  and  the  hiring  of  "  labor  de- 
tective agencies'  "  operatives,  (4)  strike  breakers,  prin- 
cipally negroes. 

Maintaining  the  non-unionism  alternative  entailed,  for  com- 
munities, (1)  the  abrogation  of  the  right  of  assembly, 
the  suppression  of  free  speech  and  the  violation  of  per- 
sonal rights  (principally  in  Pennsylvania)  ;  (2)  the  use 
of  state  police,  state  troops  and  (in  Indiana)  of  the  U.  S. 
Army;  (3)  such  activities  on  the  part  of  constituted 
authorities  and  of  the  press  and  the  pulpit  as  to  make 
the  workers  believe  that  these  forces  oppose  labor. 

197 


198  EEPOKT  ON  THE  STEEL  STEIKE 

In  sum,  the  actually  existent  state  of  the  steel  industry  is 
a  state  of  latent  war  over  rights  of  organization  con- 
ceded by  public  opinion  in  other  civilized  countries. 

The  analysis  centers  around  the  Steel  Corporati^on  because 
"  independents  "  such  as  the  Midvale-Cambria,  Youngstown 
Sheet  &  Tube,  Inland  Steel,  Harvester  and  Colorado  Fuel 
&  Iron,  have  offered  or  developed  other  alternatives  to  arbi- 
trary control  in  the  shape  of  shop  committees  or  company 
unions ;  and  smaller  "  independents "  have  signed  trade 
unionist   agreements. 

The  analysis  attempts  to  investigate  to  what  extent  the 
Steel  Corporation's  policy  of  non-unionism  modifies  American 
social  institutions.  The  following  problem,  at  once  larger 
and  more  specific,  is  not  dealt  with:  the  relation  between  the 
facts  that  (1)  America's  trade  union  movement  is,  relative  to 
industrial  populations,  the  smallest,  with  the  possible  excep- 
tion of  that  of  France,  among  the  Atlantic  industrial  nations ; 
(2)  America's  private  industrial  monopolies  or  trusts  are  the 
largest  among  the  western  industrial  nations. 

The  social  consequences  of  arbitrary  control  by  corpora- 
tions are  set  forth  in  the  present  Main  Summary  Section, 
which  attempts  to  analyze  the  subject  as  a  whole,  and  in  the 
following  sub-reports : 

1.  Civil  Liberties,  in  western  Pennsylvania;  including  an 

analysis   of   some   300    affidavits   or   statements    from 
strikers. 

2.  Blacklists,  Elections  and  Discharges  for  Unionism;  in- 

cluding several  hundred  signed  statements  from  strikers 
and  letters  and  lists  sent  out  by  steel  companies. 

3.  "  Undercover  "  Mei};  being  a  study  of  600  reports  in  the 

"  labor  file  "  of  a  steel  company,  together  with  affidavits, 
interviews  and  revelations  by  "  labor  detectives." 


SOCIAL  CONSEQUEi^CES  199 

4.  The  Press  and  the  Strike;  being  an  intensive  analysis  of 

the  Pittsburgh  newspapers. 

5.  The  Pulpit  and  the  Strike;  an  analysis  of  the  Pittsburgh 

Protestant  churches,  including  the  answers  to  a  question- 
naire sent  out  during  the  strike. 

6.  History  of  Steel  Corporation's  Labor  Relations,  in- 
cluding developments  during  preceding  strikes. 

To  be  considered  with  these  are  many  separate  interviews 
or  observations  made  by  the  Commission  or  its  investigators 
and  public  records,  etc. 

Consideration  of  social  consequences  is  consideration  of 
that  larger,  decisive  aspect  of  industrial  relations  outlined  in 
Section  V  on  "  Grievances  and  Control."  Two  aspects  of 
control  were  distinguished;  one,  the  problem  of  personnel 
management,  lying  largely  within  the  plant  and  centering  in 
the  separate  jobs;  the  second,  the  problem  of  industrial  rela- 
tions, extending  outside  the  plant,  decisively  influencing  the 
first  problem,  and  concerned  with  the  relation  of  the  mass  of 
workers  to  the  sum  of  jobs.  Bringing  this  distinction  to  a 
statement  of  conclusions  (a)  hitherto  discussed  and  (b) 
treated  in  the  present  section,  the  following  is  warranted  by 
the  analysis: 

The  system  of  arbitrary  control — the  actually  existent  alter- 
native to  trade  union  collective  bargaining — resulted 
in — 

(a)  markedly  excessive  hours  for  half  the  workers,  under- 
payment for  three  quarters  of  the  workers  and  daily 
grievances  due  to  arbitrary  management  of  personnel; 
and — 

(b)  opposition  and  repression,  exerted  primarily  by  the  com- 
panies and  secondarily  by  governmental  officers  and 
social  institutions,  against  workers'  organization  for 
change  of  their  industrial  relations. 


200  REPOET  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

Viewed  chronologically,  in  normal  times  the  Steel  Corpora- 
tion's system  of  industrial  relations  functioned  under  the 
dominating  idea  of  opposition  to  workers'  organization.  In 
strike  times  the  Corporation's  opposition  was  more  actively 
supplemented  by  similar  repression  by  organized  society. 
This  section,  then,  concerns — 

1.  The  causes  and  characteristics  of  the  Steel  Corporation's 

opposition  to  trade  union  collective  bargaining ; 

2.  The  effects  of  such  opposition  on  the  worker  as  citizen 

and  on  executive  and  judiciary  authorities  and  pulpit 
and  press,  particularly  during  the  strike. 

A  record  of  the  minutes  of  the  Corporation's  Executive 
Committee  meetings  preceding  and  during  the  strike  would, 
of  course,  shed  much  light  on  the  personal  character  of 
arbitrary  control.  Lacking  such  data  it  is  necessary  to  use 
the  Executive  Committee  minutes  which  the  Government  ob- 
tained and  published  ten  years  ago,  giving  the  financial  con- 
trol's ideas  and  debates  in  adopting  the  Corporation's  labor 
policy  in  1901 ;  comparison  seems  to  indicate  that  the  same 
ideas  govern  the  present-day  execution  of  that  policy. 

The  minutes  ^  record  the  Corporation's  manner  of  adopt- 
ing a  labor  policy  (previously  quoted)  in  the  following  reso- 
lution : 

That  we  are  unalterably  opposed  to  any  extension  of  union 
labor  and  advise  subsidiary  companies  to  take  firm  position  when 
these  questions  come  up  and  say  that  they  are  not  going  to 
recognize  it;  that  is,  any  extension  of  unions  in  mills  where 
they  do  not  now  exist;  that  great  care  should  be  used  to  pre- 
vent trouble  and  that  they  promptly  report  and  confer  with 
this  corporation. 

*  Printed  in  Senate  Document  110,  Vol.  Ill,  pp.  497-506. 


SOCIAL  CONSEQUENCES  201 

The  following  extracts  from  the  minutes  give  the  ideas 
adopted  by  the  Committee.  (The  names,  of  course,  are  the 
names  of  the  original  financial  control  whose  formulation 
of  policies  has  since  been  followed  by  the  Steel  Corporation.) 

April  20,  1901. 

Mr.  Edenborn  thinks  it  expedient  to  inform  the  newspapers 
and  the  public  generally  that  the  United  States  Steel  Corpora- 
tion is  not  the  one  employer,  but  that  the  individual  companies 
are  distinct  and  separate  for  themselves  ^;  that  the  labor  troubles 
of  any  one  company  must  be  settled  by  that  particular  company 
as  an  individual  company,  and  a  strike  in  one  must  be  settled 
independently  of  any  other  company. 

Attention  was  called  to  the  fact  that  certain  newspapers 
seem  to  publish  any  and  everything  that  will  create  sufficient 
sentiment  to  influence  newspaper  sales;  that  we  ought  to  do 
all  we  reasonably  can  to  keep  public  sentiment  right  and  the 
facts  before  the  public.  It  was  the  opinion  of  one  member 
that  he  would  like  to  have  the  workmen  understand  that  we  do 
not  purpose  to  allow  them  to  run  our  mills,  but  that  we  do  pur- 
pose always  to  treat  the  men  fairly  as  individuals  and  give  them 
good,  liberal  wages. 

At  the  close  of  this  whole  discussion  it  was  decided  that  the 
sense  of  this  iCommittee  is  that  the  general  policy  should  be 
to  temporize  for  the  next  six  months  or  year  until  we  get  fuUy 
established,  and  that  the  prevalent  conditions  of  labor  and  labor 
unions  at  the  different  plants  should  be  undisturbed,  and  that 
if  any  changes  do  occur  later  they  cam,  he  handled  indi- 
vidually. 

Three  members  of  the  Committee  have  very  positive  ideas  on 
the  expediency  of  permitting  any  change  in  the  labor  relations 
now  prevailing  at  the  different  plants.  They  insist  that  they 
believe  we  must  accept  whatever  conditions  now  exist  at  our 
plants;  that  it  is  not  wise  at  this  time  to  institute  any  change 
ourselves;  that  any  attempt  on  the  part  of  anyone  else  to  bring 
about  an  alteration  in  a  certain  direction  should  be  promptly 
^Italics  are  the  editor's. 


202  EEPORT  ON  THE  STEEL  STEIKE 

discouraged  hy  the  ordinary  means;  that  if  it  is  found  and  de- 
sired that  changes  he  brought  about  later  hy  our  companies  they 
can  be  done  when  business  reasons  would  permit.  These  gentle- 
men further  maintain  that  long  experience  in  these  matters  has 
taught  them  that  if  certain  situations  which  naturally  arise 
from  time  to  time  be  not  quickly  disposed  of  on  the  spot  with 
a  firm  hand,  you  will  then  witness  the  beginning  of  the 
end. 

They  favored  the  prompt  reporting  here  of  any  trouble  and 
stated  that  matters  that  were  serious  or  are  likely  to  cause 
trouble  should  be  handled  upon  the  advice  of  this  Committee. 
They  do  not  approve  of  the  local  manager  attempting  to  decide 
any  and  all  questions  of  this  kind  that  may  arise  at  the  plant, 
but  these  small  affairs  that  require  nipping  in  the  bud  should 
be  disposed  of  by  him  and  then  reported  here. 

One  gentleman  thinks  this  whole  question  is  so  big  and  grave 
in  its  possible  effect  to  the  United  States  Steel  Corporation  that 
we  ought  to  proceed  with  great  caution  and  if  necessary  consult 
with  some  of  our  associates  on  the  suljject. 

He  believes  that  it  would  he  a  great  mistake  if  it  were  under- 
stood we  had  adopted  a  policy  of  antagonism:  that  the  effect 
might  be  disastrous ;  that  we  must  not  lose  sight  of  the  financial 
interests  of  the  corporation  and  must  endeavor  to  keep  clear  of 
anything  that  might  be  prejudicial  to  these  interests. 

June  17,  1901. 
The  next  question  is,  Should  we  establish  a  rule  and  announce 
that  rule  to  presidents,  viz.,  that  they  are  authorized  to  take 
up  the  question  and  dispose  of  it  promptly  on  the  basis  that 
under  no  circumstances  ivill  any  union  he  recognized  where  there 
are  no  unions  ?  ...  It  has  been  suggested  in  this  Committee 
that  when  that  question  comes  up  the  president  of  the  sub- 
sidiary company  should  reply  that  he  wished  to  consider  and 
would  make  answer  the  next  day,  and  in  the  meantime  could 
take  it  up  with  the  president  of  this  company,  and  then  finally 
report  to  the  representative  that  the  matter  had  been  carefully 
considered  and  the  decision  reached  is  so  and  so. 


SOCIAL  CONSEQUENCES  203 

To  this  last  proposition  the  president  commented  that  it  would 
then  be  perfectly  clear  that  such  president  had  taken  it  up  with 
this  corporation. 

Mr.  Converse  feels  .  .  .  that  public  opinion  would  he  with  us 
inasmuch  as  we  had  not  attempted  to  crush  unions,  bu)t  had 
simply  accepted  the  various  situations  as  they  were;  that  we 
had  left  the  management  at  the  individual  plants  just  as  here- 
tofore and  advised  the  local  officers  to  use  their  judgment.  He 
pointed  out  that  we  are  assured  by  certain  presidents  that  they 
can  run  everything  in  their  non-union  plants. 

(The  following  lines  in  the  minutes  occur  immediately  after 
an  expression  by  the  one  member  of  the  Finance  Committee 
expressing  any  toleration  for  unions.) 

The  president  informs  the  Committee  that  there  is  in  the 
air  a  well  defined  feeling  that  the  corporation  is  indifferent  as 
to  fighting  the  extension  of  the  labor  unions. 

(The  situation  before  the  Board  on  June  17,  1901,  was  tPte 
threat  of  a  strike  by  the  Amalgamated  Association  of  Iron, 
Steel  and  Tin  Workers.  In  this  the  labor  union  for  the  first 
time  grappled  with  the  new  conditions  of  consolidation  brought 
about  by  the  formation  of  the  Steel  Corporation.  This  Asso- 
ciation had  agreements  in  about  one-third  of  the  Corporation's 
mills.) 

Mr.  Converse  put  this  proposition  that  as  a  matter  of  fact 
it  is  not  a  question  of  finessing  the  situation  except  up  to  a  cer- 
tain point;  that  the  very  worst  the  Association  can  do  is  with 
about  33  1-3  per  cent.,  and  he  believes  it  will  not  do  it  with 
that  low  percentage;  that  if  our  president  says  to  the  presidents 
that  they  will  please  understand  that  the  United  States  Steel 
Corporation  is  a  large  financial  institution  and  it  expects  you 
to  go  ahead  now  and  handle  this  situation  just  exactly  as  if  the 
United  States  Steel  Corporation  did  not  exist,  they  will  he  very 
careful  not  to  get  into  trouble. 

This  met  the  unqualified  approval  of  the  president,  Mr. 
Steele,  and  Mr.  Eeid. 

(The  following  from  the  minutes  of  July  3  refer  to  the 
growing  threat  of  a  strike  by  the  Amalgamated  Association  and 


204  REPOET  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

the    specific   statement   of   the   understood   remedy   hinted   at 
throughout  the  minutes.) 

The  chairman  stated  that  he  would  be  willing  to  concede 
two  mills  as  union  mills,  to  sign  the  scale  for  the  McKeesport 
mill  and  to  keep  it  shut  down. 

July  2,  1901. 

The  chairman  stated  that  probably  the  men  would  be  satis- 
fied if  they  gained  a  point;  that  while  it  is  very  humiliating, 
nevertheless  it  is  a  critical  period  and  we  had  better  temporize 
if  it  can  be  done. 

(After  a  decision  to  send  representatives  to  confer  with  the 
Amalgamated  Association.) 

The  chairman  stated  that  it  should  be  clearly  understood  that 
the  United  States  Steel  Corporation  has  nothing  whatever  to 
do  with  it ;  that  the  representatives  of  the  three  subsidiary  com- 
panies are  not  to  state  that  they  are  acting  in  concert,  or  even 
hy  consultation,  with  any  of  the  officials  of  the  United  States 
Steel  Corporation. 

The  chairman  explained  his  opinion  that  the  men  who  go 
should  be  pretty  big  men  and  able  men,  who  if  necessary  might 
be  competent  to  decide  pretty  promptly  what  to  do ;  they  should 
be  men  with  sense  enough  not  to  he  wntagonistic  to  the  views 
here  without  full  consultation  with  New  York. 

In  response  to  an  inquiry  from  the  chairman,  the  president 
stated  that  he  had  been  assured  hy  the  head  of  the  financial 
house  that  he  will  stand  by  whatever  action  the  president  thinks 
best.  The  president  has  also  stated  that  the  junior  partners 
expressed  themselves  as  very  anxious  to  have  this  matter  set- 
tled, but  did  not  at  any  time  state  that  it  should  be  settled. 

The  chairman  called  attention  to  the  fact  that  it  seems  from 
the  statements  made  to  be  clearly  understood  what  policy  ought 
to  be  pursued. 

(The  tense  situation  between  the  Amalgamated  Association 
and  the  Corporation  over  signing  the  new  scale  was  greatly 
increased  by  the  episode  recorded  in  the  minutes  of  July  8, 
1901.) 


SOCIAL  CONSEQUENCES  205 

The  president  reported  that  the  superintendent  of  the  Wells- 
ville  sheet  mill  down  on  the  Ohio  Eiver  had  discharged  twelve 
men  who  were  endeavoring  to  institute  a  lodge.  Later  in  the 
meeting  the  chairman  read  an  Associated  Press  dispatch  refer- 
ring to  this  and  stating  that  the  men  were  discharged  on  Sat- 
urday last  and  that  Shaffer  ^  had  announced  that  the  men  would 
have  to  be  reinstated  before  any  conference  could  be  had. 

Mr.  Edenborn  believes  that  we  have  the  matter  well  in  hand 
and  that  even  if  we  have  to  face  a  tin-plate  strike  we  should 
not  give  in  to  labor. 

The  mill  is  not  a  union  mill  because  it  has  not  been  recog- 
nized by  the  owners  as  a  union  mill. 

The  president  would  now  approve  of  meeting  the  people  and 
making  the  best  arrangement  possible  and  learn  what  they 
wanted. 

The  chairman  stated  that  we  all  labored  under  the  impres- 
sion based  on  the  statement  of  the  president  that  we  could  keep 
so  close  track  that  we  would  know  pretty  well  what  the  men 
were  doing;  but  that  if  this  union  at  McKeesport  mill  had  been 
formed  between  last  April  and  the  time  the  presidents  were  here 
we  did  not  have  the  information. 

July  12,  1901. 
Mr.  Steele  reported  to  this  meeting  that  an  informal  talk 
over  the  labor  situation  had  taken  place  this  morning  between 
Buch  of  the  directors  as  could  be  reached  at  that  time,  and  there 
were  present  Messrs.  J.  P.  Morgan,  H.  H.  Rogers,  Eobert  Bacon, 
Abram  Hewitt,  Charles  Steele,  and  the  president  of  this  com- 
pany; that  during  this  talk  the  whole  labor  situation  was  again 
gone  over;  .  .  .  that  it  was  the  unanimous  opinion  of  those 
present  that  we  should  say  we  were  willing  to  sign  the  scales 
in  all  of  our  union  mills  as  we  had  last  year  as  submitted,  but 
that  we  refuse  to  negotiate  with  the  association  in  any  particular 
for  the  mills  known  as  non-union  mills. 

Analyzed,  these  minutes  indicate  that — 
*  President  of  the  Amalgamated  Association. 


206  EEPORT  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

1.  The  Executive  Committee  (financiers)  control  absolutely 

the  Steel  Corporation's  labor  policy. 

Mr.  Gary  told  the  Senate  Investigating  Committee  that 

this  was  true  today. 

2.  The  nature  and  extent  of  the  Executive  Committee's  con- 

trol was  to  be  kept  secret  from  the  public  and  the  an- 
nouncement made  that  each  subsidiary  company  con- 
trolled its  own  labor  policy. 

3.  Opposition  to  labor  unions  by  the  financial  control  was 

instinctive  and  complete.  The  bases  of  opposition  were 
pride  and  fear ;  e.g.  "we  do  not  purpose  to  allow  the 
workmen  to  run  our  mills."  "  If  certain  situations 
which  naturally  arise  be  not  disposed  of  with  a  firm 
hand,  you  will  then  witness  the  beginning  of  the  end." 
Fear  of  colleagues'  opinion  existed,  e.g.  the  president's 
reference  to  the  feeling  in  the  air  that  "  the  Corporation 
is  indifferent  as  to  fighting  the  extension  of  labor 
unions." 

4.  Opposition  to  labor  unions  was  to  be  kept  secret  and  not 

avowed ;  e.g.  "  public  opinion  would  be  with  us  inas- 
much as  we  had  not  attempted  to  crush  labor  unions  but 
had  simply  accepted  the  various  situations  " ;  and  "  it 
would  be  a  great  mistake  if  it  were  understood  that  we 
had  adopted  a  policy  of  antagonism." 

6.  Opposition  to  labor  unions  was  to  be  through  "  the  ordi- 
nary means  "  with  final  reliance  on  shutting  down  union 
mills  where  agreements  had  to  be  signed  and  turning  the 
production  over  to  the  corporation's  non-union  mills; 
e.g.  "  to  sign  the  scale  for  McKeesport  mill  and  to  keep 
it  shut  down." 

6.  Subsidiary  presidents  and  superintendents  were  respon- 
sible for  any  methods  of  their  own,  which  must  "  not  be 
antagonistic  to  the  views  "  of  New  York  and  which  in- 
cluded discharge  of  workers  for  forming  labor  unions. 


SOCIAL  CONSEQUENCES  207 

Method;;  were  questioned  only  when  the  results  threat- 
ened to  be  "  disastrous/'  i.e.  strikes. 

7.  Opposition    to    union    labor    included    "  temporizing," 

"  finessing  "  and  opportunistic  reliance  on  subordinates 
with  concern  only  for  "  results." 

8.  Workmen  were  not  consulted  and  no  systematic  above- 

board  means  of  hearing  workmen's  views  was  considered. 
Workmen's  right  to  organize  was  considered  a  "  natu- 
ral "  thing,  to  be  repressed. 

9.  Final  decision  on  labor  policy  rested  with  Wall  Street 

which  was  ready  to  support  the  anti-union  policy. 

The  sole  concern  of  the  Steel  Corporation  was  whether 
the  anti-union  policy  could  be  carried  out,  without  too  great 
damage  to  immediate  profits.  The  decision  was  on  a  weigh- 
ing of  chances;  the  decision  did  not  concern  the  rights  of 
man. 

The  history  of  the  Steel  Corporation's  dealings  with  labor 
since  1901  shows  a  consistent  and  successful  carrying 
out  of  the  anti-union  policy.  Largely  by  shutting  down 
mills  "  conceded "  to  be  "  union"  and  by  discharging 
workmen  for  forming  other  unions  this  result  has  come 
about:  whereas  in  1901  one-third  of  the  Corporation's  mills 
dealt  with  unions,  in  1919  these  and  all  other  unions  had 
been  ousted ;  no  unions  were  dealt  with.  Besides  the  stock- 
holders' report  of  1912  hitherto  quoted,  which  "  justifies  " 
the  Corporation's  "  repression  of  the  workmen,"  Mr.  Gary 
made  plain  to  the  Senate  Investigating  Committee  that  the 
same  ideas  and  the  same  methods  held  all  along. 

He  told  the  Senate  Committee  that  "  unionism  is  not  a 
good  thing  for  employer  or  employee."  At  the  same  time  he 
declared  that  the  Corporation  did  not  carry  this  belief  into 
practice  by  "  opposing  labor  unions  as  such  " ;  that  no  work- 
man "  was  discriminated  against  because  he  was  a  union 


208  REPORT  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

man  " ;  that  the  Corporation  did  not  attempt  to  crush  unions. 
All  this  was  in  accord  with  the  principles  of  1901  of  disclaim- 
ing the  opposition,  in  the  belief  that  "  it  would  be  a  great 
mistake  if  it  were  understood  that  we  had  adopted  a  policy  of 
antagonism." 

Decisions  in  1919  were  made  the  same  as  in  1901,  on  the 
basis  of  what  the  Corporation  might  have  to  do,  not  what 
ought  to  be  done.  Mr.  Gary  said,  "  Now  of  course  when 
there  is  only  one  thing  to  do  or  when  there  are  various  evils 
confronting  us,  the  position  to  take  is  the  one  least  unfavor- 
able." His  judgment  on  the  vastly  different  conditions  in 
England  in  no  way  concerned  whether  labor  had  reached 
power  there  because  of  any  justice  in  labor's  position j  "I 
think  England  is  inclined  to  go  further  than  the  people  of 
this  country  would  go,  simply  because  she  is  compelled  to." 
So  far  the  Steel  Corporation  has  not  been  "  compelled  to ;  " — 
"  we  are  not  obliged  to  contract  with  unions  if  we  do  not 
choose  to  do  so." 

It  is  necessary  to  keep  in  mind  the  distinction  between  Mr. 
Gary's  arguments  based  on  possible  evils, — the  "  closed  shop  " 
argument, — and  his  arguments  based  on  the  Corporation's 
actual  practice.  The  difference  was  illustrated  in  this  state- 
ment by  Mr.  Gary  to  members  of  the  Commission  of  Inquiry 
on  December  5  :  "  I  am  just  as  much  opposed  to  one  big  union 
of  all  the  steel  companies  of  the  country  as  to  one  big  union 
of  all  the  steel  workmen.  Both  would  be  bad  for  the  nation." 
Mr.  Gary  was  not  brought  to  a  discussion  based  on  the  actual 
fact:  whether  one  big  union  of  half  the  steel  companies  of 
the  country,  with  no  recognized  union  among  that  half's  steel 
workmen,  was  "  bad  for  the  nation."  An  analysis  of  fact, 
such  as  attempted  in  this  report,  must  deal  with  the  badness 
or  justice  of  what  actually  exists, — with  the  alternative  en- 
forced by  the  Corporation's  practice. 

In  sum,  then,  Mr.  Gary  could  tell  the  Senate  Committee 


SOCIAL  CONSEQUENCES  209 

in  the  same  breatli  that  "  of  course  workmen  had  a  right  to 
belong  to  unions  "  but  that  "  it  is  my  policy  and  the  policies 
of  the  Corporation  not  to  deal  with  union  labor  leaders  at 
any  time."  The  Corporation  never  proposed  any  plan  be- 
tween the  horns  of  this  dilemma.  The  dilemma  was  actually 
resolved  by  the  Corporation's  practice.  "What  the  Corpora- 
tion actually  did,  and  does,  is  dealt  with  here. 

The  Commission's  data  show  that  the  practice  of  the  anti- 
unionism  alternative  by  the  Corporation  and  by  a  large  num- 
ber of  independents  entailed  in  1919 — 

1.  Discharging  workmen  for  unionism,  just  as  the  twelve  men 
were  discharged  at  Wellsville  in  1901  "  for  forming  a  lodge"; 
also  the  eviction  of  workmen  from  company  houses  and  sim- 
ilar coercions. 

2.  Blacklisting  strikers. 

3.  Systematic  espionage  through  '^  under-cover  men." 

4.  Hiring  strike-breaking  spies  from  "  labor  detective  agencies." 

These  will  be  considered  before  passing  on  to  the  wider  social 
consequences  affecting  governmental  and  social  institutions. 
In  1919  the  Corporation  had  no  further  need  for  the  practice 
of  signing  up  agreements  with  unions  in  certain  mills  and 
then  shutting  those  mills  down.  The  threat  of  this  practice, 
however,  was  well  understood  in  1919.  In  half  a  dozen  towns 
investigators  found  evidences  of  it ;  for  example,  this  remark 
made  by  a  roller  in  New  Kensington,  once  a  union  man  but, 
in  October,  1919,  no  union  man  and  no  striker,  "  If  the 
union  is  started  again  you've  got  to  remember  that  there  is 
nothing  to  keep  the  company  from  starting  its  old  policy  of 
shutting  down  the  mills.  Then  where'd  you  be  with  your 
better  wages  and  shorter  hours  ?  " 
1.    Discharge  for  unionism. 

The  Commission's  special  evidence  consists  of  hundreds  of 
signed  statements  by  steel  workers  who  were  discharged. 


210  REPORT  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

Mr.  Gary  flatly  denied  to  the  Senate  Committee  that  such 
was  the  practice.    lie  said : 

"  If  that  has  been  done  in  a  single  case  or  a  few  cases,  if  it 
has  ever  been  done,  which  I  deny,  it  has  been  contrary  to  our 
positive  instructions  and  would  not  have  been  permitted,  and 
the  man  would  be  disciplined  if  he  disobeyed  these  instructions 
the  second  time.  .  .  . 

"  Now,  it  is  quite  possible  that  a  man,  or  more  than  one  man, 
who  is  a  member  of  a  labor  union,  unknown  to  us  or  known  to 
us — that  is  unimportant — has  gotten  up  some  proposition,  has 
built  up  some  straw  man,  for  the  purpose  of  making  trouble, 
and  of  reporting  that  he  was  discriminated  against  because  he 
was  a  union  man.  Or,  it  is  possible,  though  I  do  not  think 
probable,  that  some  foreman  may  in  some  instances  have  shown 
some  feeling  against  a  union  man  when  he  discovered  it.  I  do 
not  know  of  any  such  case.  It  would  be  directly  contrary  to 
our  orders,  contrary  to  all  our  reports  and  contrary  to  the  in- 
formation I  have.  I  have  denied  the  proposition  emphatically. 
It  is  not  true."  ^ 

It  is  true  and  Mr.  Gary's  subordinates  explained  one  phase 
of  how  it  works.  Mr.  Buffington  of  the  Illinois  Steel,  also 
Mr.  Williams'  representative  for  the  Carnegie  Steel  and  other 
officers  put  it  uniformly  in  these  words :  "  We  don't  discharge 
a  man  for  belonging  to  a  union,  but  of  course  we  discharge 
men  for  agitating  in  the  mills." 

Who  settles  what  constitutes  agitating  in  the  mills?  The 
foreman.  Two  men  during  a  breathing  spell  in  the  mill  con- 
verse for  a  moment.  One  has  been  found  out  to  be  a  union 
man.  That  talk,  a  word  in  passing,  a  gesture  (which  may  be 
a  union  lodge  secret  sign  in  the  foreman's  belief)  is  sufficient 
for  the  foreman's  judgment,  once  he  has  learned  that  the  com- 
pany wants  the  man  got  rid  of. 

•  Senate  Document  No.  202.     Vol.  I,  p.  166,  p.  174. 


SOCIAL  CONSEQUENCES  211 

Mr.  Burnett,  assistant  to  the  President  of  Carnegie  Steel, 
volunteered  the  information  in  a  conversation  that  the  dis- 
charge of  eight  men  at  a  shears  in  their  works  was  because 
"  they  were  agitating  in  the  mill  "  by  having  invited  labor 
leaders  to  come  and  organize  them.  The  practice  varied 
widely:  it  was  worst  in  the  Pittsburgh  District.  And  this 
fact  must  be  borne  in  mind  in  considering  the  number  of  men 
discharged :  the  discharge  of  a  single  man  in  a  department 
may  be  enough  to  stop  unionizing  among  the  five  hundred 
men  left.  The  spectacle  of  one  old  employee  summarily  fired, 
and  the  union  he  belongs  to  helpless  to  give  him  a  job,  may 
settle  the  fate  of  that  union  for  a  whole  works.  Only  where 
"  examples "  fail  to  deter  was  discharge  by  the  hundred 
resorted  to,  as  at  Johnstown. 

The  statements  of  discharged  workers  included  eases  where 
the  foreman  admitted  the  cause  of  the  discharge  and  told  who 
gave  the  order ;  cases  of  men  secretly  elected  officers  in  a  new 
union  local  and  fired  the  next  day ;  cases  of  men  thirty-five 
years  in  companies'  employ  and  fired  after  admitting  joining 
to  some  man  later  proved  a  spy. 

These  are  specific  cases.  More  important  is  the  feeling 
throughout  the  Corporation's  workmen  that  the  price  of  join- 
ing a  union  may  he  discharge  at  any  minute.  All  workmen 
know  it.  Their  first  concern  after  secretly  signing  up  is 
"  protection."  Moreover  discharge  is  only  the  symbol  for  a 
whole  system  of  opposition  just  as  persistent  and  almost  as 
effective  as  the  more  drastic  act.  The  system  works  in  dis- 
charge from  a  job,  but  not  from  the  plant,  i.e.  in  transfer  of 
known  union  men  from  good  jobs  to  worse  ones,  even  from 
skilled  jobs  to  common  labor,  until  the  man  discharges  him- 
self from  the  industry.  Finally,  discharge  is  peculiarly  ef- 
fective in  steel  towns  because  generally  no  other  jobs  exist 
there.  The  discharged  man  must  move  himself  and  his 
family. 


212  REPORT  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

"  Agitating  in  the  mill "  may  include  the  mail  a  man 
receives  at  his  home.  At  the  Jones  &  Laughlin  plant  in 
Woodlawn,  Pa.,  one  department  had  twenty-four  Finns. 
Finns  are  known  as  especially  intelligent  workmen  and  espe- 
cially likely  to  join  unions.  In  February,  1919,  the  plant 
management  learned  that  these  Finns  were  visiting  a  great 
deal  with  each  other  at  night,  meeting  in  the  cellars  of  their 
own  houses.  Finally  it  was  observed  that  the  Finns  seemed 
to  be  getting  more  mail  than  the  other  "  foreigners,"  includ- 
ing newspapers  and  pamphlets.  The  twenty-four  were  called 
up  one  morning  and  fired  without  explanation.  In  Sep- 
tember, 1919,  the  plant  management  were  congratulating 
themselves:  they  observed  in  the  list  of  union  workers  de- 
ported by  plant  guards  from  Weirton  the  names  of  some  of 
their  Finns.     The  plant  had  "  spotted  'em  all  right." 

Discharges  for  joining  the  union  were  so  common  in  the 
months  before  the  strike  that  the  union  organizers  did  not 
even  keep  records  of  the  cases.  Cases  were  too  common  to 
need  proving  and  the  organizer  could  only  say  to  the  victim, 
"  After  we're  recognized  you'll  get  your  job  back." 

Pencil  marks  on  a  typewritten  slip  of  paper  in  the  Mones- 
sen  "  labor  file  "  illustrated  the  principle  of  discharge.  The 
paper  was  the  report  of  a  spy,  plainly  inside  the  union,  and 
contained  a  list  of  names  which  were  referred  to  in  a  letter, 
also  in  the  file,  from  a  labor  detective  agency.  The  appear- 
ance of  the  paper  with  the  first  five  names  crossed  out,  was 
as  follows : 

MONONGAHELA  LODGE  NO.  127,  PA. 

The  employees  of  the  Page  Steel  and  Wire  Fence  Company, 
Monessen,  Pa.,  have  formed  a  strong  lodge  of  the  A.  A.  Or- 
ganizer M.  E.  Donehue  acted  as  master  of  ceremonies  in  insti- 
tuting this  new  addition.  The  officers  of  Monongahela  Lodge 
No.  127,  Pa.,  are : 


SOCIAL  CONSEQUENCES  313 

President,  AnthonV  Paulaj^ski,  wire  mill. 
Vice-President,  Josqsh  Tirer,  wire  mill. 
Eccording  Secretary,  Vudy  Gladysz,  wire  mill. 
Financial  Secretan/^Joeeph  Kissell,  wire  mill. 
Treasurer,  Frany^tockiiS,  wire  mill. 
Guide,  Nick  Bachovcliese,  open. hearth. 
Inside  Guard,  John  Uring,  page. 
Outside  Guard,  Akym  Cymbale,  page. 
Journal  Agent,  John  Baran,  wire  milL 
Corresponding  I^cpresentative,  Paul  KisSell,  31G  Knox  Ave., 
Monessen,  Pa.  

It  is  the  Capuan  punishment  principle — strike  off  the  heads 
of  the  leaders.  The  "  examples  "  will  take  care  of  the  rest 
of  the  would-be  unionists. 

In  Johnstown  where  unionism  spread  through  the  entire 
Midvale-Cambria  works,  including  even  the  office  force, 
"  examples  "  were  not  sufficient  and  literally  thousands  of 
men  were  summarily  discharged.  An  investigator  in  Novem- 
ber, 1919,  obtained  in  two  days  ahout  two  hundred  signed 
statements  and  sworn  affidavits  of  discharged  workmen  who 
had  been  told  or  who  believed  that  the  cause  was  union  af- 
filiation. The  forty  pages  of  these  statements  make  monoto- 
nous reading;  specimens  follow: 

Joseph  Yart,  216  Woodville  Ave.,  Johnstown,  was  em- 
ployed by  the  Cambria  Steel  Company  for  forty  years  in  the 
car  works  and  was  never  discharged  before.  He  became  a  mem- 
ber of  the  union  on  February  3rd,  and  was  discharged  on  May 
12th  by  Superintendent  Hill.  When  Mr.  Yart  asked  him  for 
the  reason  of  his  discharge,  he  was  told  "  there  is  no  more  work 
for  you  here."  He  went  to  the  employment  agency  to  apply 
again  in  June  and  was  told  by  Agent  McGrew,  "  You  can't  work 
for  Cambria  any  more,  better  look  for  something  outside."  Mr. 
Yart  protested  that  he  had  worked  there  for  forty  years,  that 
he  is  now  54  years  of  age  and  can't  work  very  well  on  the  out- 


214  jJEPORT  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

side  and  the  only  reply  he  got  was  "  You  can't  work  here  any 
more — you  are  an  agitator  and  a  disturbance  maker  in  the  car 
department."  Mr.  Yart  denied  this  charge  and  protested  that 
he  never  spoke  to  anyone  there  about  his  union  aihliations,  but 
no  attention  was  paid  to  his  protest.  Mr.  Yart  has  been  unable 
to  find  another  job  ever  since  and  has  been  out  of  work  now  for 
the  past  eight  months,  as  every  place  he  goes  to  his  age  handi- 
caps him  in  securing  a  job.  Mr.  Yart  was  born  and  lived  all 
his  life  in  Johnstown  and  was  one  of  the  first  employees  that 
helped  to  organize  the  Cambria  Employees'  Beneficial  Associa- 
tion. One  of  Mr.  Yart's  sons  was  in  the  army  of  occupation,  and 
Mr.  Yart  now  complains :  ''  My  son  went  to  fight  for  democracy 
and  I  am  thrown  out  on  the  streets  without  any  means  of  live- 
lihood." 

(Signed)  Joseph  Yart. 


Charles  Bacha,  811  Virginia  Ave.,  Johnstown,  was  employed 
by  the  Cambria  Steel  Company  for  seven  years  and  never 
discharged  before.  On  April  1st  he  participated  in  the  miners' 
parade,  and  although  he  was  not  a  member  of  the  union  at  that 
time,  he  was  discharged  on  the  2nd  of  April  by  Superintendent 
Donk  May.  The  foreman,  May,  gave  him  no  explanation  for 
his  dismissal.  He  tried  to  find  further  employment  with  the 
Cambria  and  when  he  saw  Mr.  Lumpkin,  the  General  Superin- 
tendent, he  was  told,  "  My  boy,  if  you  want  union  work,  go  down 
to  a  union  town  and  get  it — no  work  for  you  here." 

Mr.  Bacha  applied  again  four  times,  but  was  refused  work 
continuously.  Mr.  Bacha  is  a  U.  S.  citizen  and  has  been  out 
of  a  job  now  for  eight  months,  as  he  could  not  find  another 
job. 

(Signed)  Charles  Bacha. 


William  Barnhart,  50  Messenger  St.,  Johnstown.  On  Oc- 
tober 24,  1918,  he  was  hired  by  Telford  &  Jones  Coal  Company 
and  started  to  work,  when  the  foreman  came  over  and  said,  "  I'm 
sorry,  I'll  have  to  take  you  off — they  telephoned  me  from  the 


SOCIAL  CONSEQUENCES  215 

main  office  to  take  you  off/*  He  asked  the  foreman  whether  this 
was  because  he  belonged  to  the  union,  to  which  the  foreman 
replied,  "  I  have  nothing  against  the  union,  but  I  got  to  be  on 
the  other  side."    Mr.  Barnhart  is  a  U.  S.  citizen. 

(Signed)  William  Barnhart. 


Bernard  Heeney,  336  Honnan  Ave.,  Johnstown,  worked  for 
the  Cambria  Steel  Company  for  seven  years  and  was  never  dis- 
charged before.  He  Joined  the  union  on  March  2-1,  1919,  and 
was  discharged  on  June  6th  by  Assistant  Superintendent  F.  W. 
Bryan.  When  he  asked  the  Assistant  Superintendent  why  he 
was  laid  off  and  explained  to  him  that  he  was  in  charge  of  about 
twelve  men  and  was  the  oldest  employee  in  the  department, 
Bryan  said,  "  I  don't  know — we  have  orders  here  to  take  you 
off."  When  he  asked  him  where  these  orders  came  from  he 
said,  "  They  may  have  come  from  New  York,  Philadelphia  or 
Chicago."    Mr.  Heeney  is  a  native  of  the  U.  S. 

(Signed)  Bernard  Heeney. 


Joe  Mandorgotz,  1320  Virginia  Ave.,  Johnstown.  Worked 
for  the  Cambria  Steel  Company  on  and  off  for  about  twenty 
years.  He  joined  the  union  about  March,  1919,  and  took  part  in 
the  miners'  parade  on  April  1st.  About  April  7th,  Davie  Mal- 
comb,  foreman,  asked  him  whether  he  belonged  to  a  union.  He 
admitted  he  did  and  was  discharged  two  days  later.  Mr.  Man- 
dorgotz is  a  IT.  S.  citizen,  lived  in  Johnstown  for  twenty-seven 
years  and  has  a  wife  and  three  children  to  support.  He  could 
not  find  another  job  for  four  months. 

(Signed)  Joe  Mandorgotz. 


Theodore  Salitski,  206  Broad  Ave.,  Johnstown,  Pa.,  worked 
for  Cambria  seven  years — never  discharged  before.  Was  dis- 
charged by  foreman,  Donk  May.  Joined  the  union  March  17th 
and  was  discharged  April  7th.  Took  part  in  parade  held  April  1, 
1919.     When  asked  for  reason,  told  him  "  Because  you  stayed 


216  REPOET  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

home  April  1st."  Applied  again  and  was  told  by  May  that 
"There  is  no  work  for  a  Bolshevist."  Out  of  work  six  weeks. 
Married  man — wife  and  one  child.  Lived  in  Johnstown  eight 
years. 

(Signed)  Theodore  Salitski. 


I,  the  undersigned,  do  hereby  testify  that  I  have  been  employed 
by  the  Cambria  Steel  Company  for  almost  eight  (8)  years  in 
the  capacity  of  unloading  steel. 

I  have  at  all  times  been  an  eflBcient  and  reliable  employee. 

W.  H.  Walter,  the  Foreman  of  the  stockyard  Department 
called  me  into  his  office  this  morning  and  then  he  asked  me  if 
I  belonged  to  the  Union.  I  answered  "  Yes."  He  then  asked 
why  I  joined  the  Union.  I  told  him  the  men  were  joining  and 
I  thought  I  should  belong.  Mr,  Walters  then  asked  "  If  the 
men  jumped  into  the  furnace  would  you  follow  them  ? "  I 
answered  "  Yes,  if  they  would  I  would."  I  did  not  believe  it 
was  any  of  his  business,  as  I  believe  I  have  a  right  to  join  a 
labor  organization  for  my  protection. 

I  asked  Mr.  Walters  why  he  discharged  me.  He  answered 
"Because  you  joined  the  Union." 

The  foregoing  occurred  the  forenoon  of  February  22nd,  1919. 

his 
(Signed)  Nick  (X)  Poppovich. 
mark 


Witness  to  mark:    Thos.  A.  Daley. 
State  of  Pennsylvania, 


ss 
County  of  Cambria, 

Before  me,  a  Notary  Public,  in  and  for  said  County  personally 

came  Nick  Poppovich,  who  being  by  me  duly  sworn  according 

to  law  deposed  and  said  that  the  foregoing  statement  is  true 

and  correct.  bis 

(Signed)  Nick  (X)  Poppovich. 

mark 

Witness  to  mark:     Thos.  A.  Daley  (Signed). 


SOCIAL  CONSEQUENCES  217 


Sworn  and  subscribed,  before  me 
this  22nd  day  of  February,  1919. 
Eay  Patton  Smith  (Signed), 
Notary  Public  (Seal). 
My  commission  expires  March  12,  1921. 
Paper  not  drafted  by  Notary. 


State  of  Pennsylvania, 
County  of  Cambria, 

Personally  appeared  before  me.  Myrtle  E.  Johnston,  a  Notary 
Public  in  and  for  said  County  and  State,  John  Kubanda,  per- 
sonally known  to  me,  who  being  by  me  first  duly  sworn  deposes 
and  says: 

That  I  worked  for  the  Cambria  Steel  Company  for  nine 
(9)  years,  the  1st  two  (2)  years  in  the  blast  furnace  department, 
always  was  a  steady  and  dependable  man.  On  Thrusday,  Feb- 
ruary 13th,  1919,  Peter  Eiley,  Foreman,  sent  a  man  to  tell  me 
to  come  and  get  my  time.  I  went  in  to  the  office  and  asked 
him  why  I  was  laid  off.  He  said  "  I  got  my  orders  from  the 
office.*'  I  told  him  I  don't  belong  to  the  Union.  He  said, 
"  What  were  you  doing  at  the  meeting  ?  "  I  said,  "  Anyone 
can  go  over  to  the  meeting."  He  said  "  go  down  to  the  general 
office  and  fix  it  up  with  them." 

I  verily  believe  that  it  was  through  Union  affiliations  that 
I  was  discharged. 

(Signed)  John  Kubanda  (Seal). 
Sworn  and  subscribed,  before  me 

this  24th  day  of  February,  A.  D.  1919. 
(Signed)     Myrtle  E.  Johnston, 
Notary  Public  (Seal). 

My  commission  expires  February  27th,  1921. 


Affidavit  on  affidavit,  the  cases  prove  incontestibly  the  ter- 
rorism, sometimes  with  purpose  avo"wed,  more  often  with 
purpose  disavowed,  so  that  the  discharged  man  has  nothing 
left  even  for  arg-ument  if  argument  would  be  heard.     The 


218  REPORT  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

nameless  terror  was  more  commonly  applied,  the  answer, 
"  You  know  why,"  as  if  the  cause  were  some  secret  unspeak- 
able disease  in  the  victim,  like  leprosy. 

It  was  much  the  same  in  Corporation  miUs : 

Joe  Mayor,  440  Beach  Way,  Homestead — Aug.  15,  1919. 

Mayor  said  that  he  had  worked  for  the  Carnegie  Steel  Co. 
in  the  car  wheel  shop  12  years  and  had  never  been  discharged 
before. 

He  joined  the  union  on  August  5th,  He  was  discharged 
August  15th  by  Supt.  Munle,  who  called  him  into  his  office 
but  said  "Were  you  at  the  meeting  Tuesday  night?" 

M. — I  was.     How  do  you  know? 

Supt. — Somebody  turned  your  name  in  and  I  am  going  to 
discharge  you. 

M. — What's  matter?  what  I  do,  rob  company  of  couple  of 
dollars  ? 

Supt. — We  don't  want  you  to  attend  union  meetings.  I  don't 
want  union  men  to  work  for  me. 

When  the  Superintendent  inquired  what  they  had  told  him 
at  the  meeting,  he  refused  to  answer  and  further  refused  to 
answer  when  the  Superintendent  asked  him  for  the  names  of 
others  present  at  the  meeting.  The  Superintendent  then  called  a 
policeman  and  he  was  taken  out  of  the  shop. 

M.  got  a  job  for  two  weeks  under  a  different  name,  as  he 
knew  himself  to  be  blacklisted.  Is  a  citizen  and  married;  has 
lived  in  Homestead  14  years. 


John  Dablonski,  320%  Syria  St.,  Duquesne,  Pa. 

Dablonski  said  that  he  had  worked  three  years  in  the  Carnegie 
Steel  Plant  and  had  never  before  been  discharged.  Early  in 
September,  he  attended  a  Sunday  meeting,  at  which  Mother 
Jones  spoke,  in  Duquesne,  a  few  days  later,  Mr.  Buswick,  a 
foreman  of  the  Carnegie  Steel  Co.,  told  him  he  was  discharged. 
D.  asked  why  but  Mr.  Buswick  would  not  tell  him. 

He  is  married  and  has  taken  out  his  first  papers. 


SOCIAL  CONSEQUENCES  219 

These  are  examples.  The  range  of  the  Commission's  data 
is  given  in  a  sub-report.  The  Pittsburgh  District  saw  the 
most  extensive  use  of  this  weapon. 

2.    Blacklists. 

Blacklists  as  an  integral  part  of  the  anti-union  alternative 
of  course  are  ordinarily  kept  secret  by  the  companies.  The 
steel  plant  in  Monessen,  however,  which  freely  lent  its  "  labor 
file  "  to  an  investigator  to  study,  included  among  the  detec- 
tives' reports,  etc.,  several  blacklists.  To  most  actual  plant 
managers,  as  distinguished  from  Mr.  Gary,  blacklists  seem 
after  all  too  common  to  be  deeply  concealed.  With  the  lists 
examined  by  the  Commission  are  evidences  of  the  system  of 
inter-company  exchange  like  the  detective  reports  where  the 
names  of  "  independent "  and  Corporation  mills  were  mixed 
together. 

Pittsburgh  Steel  Products  Company 
Mill  Office 
M.  Wikstrom, 
Gen'l  Supt. 
Jas.  H.  Dunbar, 
Ass't  to  Gen'l  Supt. 

Monessen,  Pa.,  November  7th,  1919. 
George  A.  Paff,  Supt., 

Page  Steel  and  Wire  Company, 
Monessen,  Pa. 
Dear  Sir: 

Attached  hereto  is  list  of  former  employees  who  have  failed 
to  return  to  work  in  our  Plant. 

This  list  is  forwarded  to  you  so  that  proper  action  can  be 
taken — should  they  apply  for  employment  at  your  Plant. 
We  would  ask  that  you  kindly  consider  this  as  confidential. 
Yours  very  truly, 
Pittsburgh  Steel  Products  Company, 

(Signed)     M.  Wikstrom, 
SW/F  Gen'l  Superintendent. 


320  EEPORT  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

November  20,  1919. 
Mr.  M.  Wikstrom,  General  Superintendent, 
Pittsburgh  Steel  Products  Company, 
Monessen,  Pa. 
Dear  Mr.  Wikstrom: 

In  compliance  with  your  request,  we  are  submitting  herewith 
a  complete  list  of  our  employees  who  have  not  as  yet  returned 
to  work. 

Naturally,  we  expect  to  re-employ  the  larger  portion  of  these 
men,  although  we  have  underscored  the  names  of  some  radicals 
who,  I  believe,  nobody  would  want  around  a  plant. 
Very  truly  yours. 

Page  Steel  and  Wire  Company, 
GAP/M  General  Superintendent. 


Monessen  Foundry  and  Machine  Company 

Monessen,  Pa.,  November  4th,  1919. 
Mr.  Geo.  Paff, 

Page  Steel  and  Wire  Co., 
Monessen,  Pa. 
Dear  Sir: 

We  attach  herewith  list  of  former  employees,  who  are  striking 
for  Closed  Shop.  This  list  is  forwarded  to  you  at  this  time,  as 
we  understand  several  of  these  men  are  applying  for  work  at 
your  plant. 

Very  truly  yours, 
Monessen  Foundry  &  Mach.  Co., 

(Signed)  Louis  X.  Ely, 
LXE/OH  Secretary. 

Copy  to  PMW  11/15 


It  is  a  regular  system ;  "  in  compliance  with  your  re- 
quest." It  is  secret;  "consider  confidential."  It  is  dis- 
ingenuous ;  "  striking  for  closed  shop."     The  attached  lists, 


SOCIAL  CONSEQUENCES  221 

principally  "  hunkies,"  nm  from  fifty  to  two  hundred  names 
apiece.  A  sub-report  gives  the  range  of  the  Commission's 
data,  of  which  the  above  are  samples. 

3.    Espionage.     ("  Under-cover  "  men.) 

Great  systems  of  espionage  are  an  integral  part  of  the  anti- 
union alternative;  spies  are  integral  to  warfare. 

Espionage  was  of  two  general  classes :  spies  directly  in  the 
employ  of  the  steel  companies;  and  spies  hired  from  profes- 
sional "  labor  detective  "^  agencies.  The  Steel  Corporation 
plants  have  their  own  detective  forces ;  one  case  of  hiring  ont- 
side  agencies  by  a  Corporation  subsidiary  was  charged  pub- 
licly during  the  strike. 

Espionage  was  of  two  general  characters:  spies  pure  and 
simple  who  merely  furnished  information;  and  spies  who 
also  acted  as  propagandist  strike  breakers,  mingling  with  the 
strikers  and  whispering  that  the  strike  was  failing,  that  the 
men  in  other  towns  had  gone  back,  that  the  union  leaders  were 
crooks,  etc.  The  Monessen  "  labor  file  "  contained  some  six 
hundred  daily  reports  by  "  under-cover  "  spies  of  both  char- 
acters, mere  detectives  and  strike-breaking  propagandists. 

These  company  spy-systems  carry  right  through  into  the 
United  States  Government. 

Federal  immigration  authorities  testified  to  the  Commis- 
sion that  raids  and  arrests,  for  "  radicalism,"  etc.,  were  made 
especially  in  the  Pittsburgh  District  on  the  denunciations  and 
secret  reports  of  steel  company  "  under-cover  "  men,  and  the 
prisoners  turned  over  to  the  Department  of  Justice. 

The  Monessen  "  labor  file  "  enabled  the  student  to  follow 
one  such  paper  through  to  the  government.  It  is  given  here 
as  offering  light  upon  the  question  why  many  workingmen, 
especially  steel  workers,  have  come  to  suspect  that  the  gov- 
ernment, as  govemnuent,  has  taken  sides  in  industrial  war- 
fare; has  taken  sides  against  workingmen. 


223  REPORT  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

In  this  freely  offered  "  file/'  among  the  blacklists,  detec- 
tive agency  contracts,  "  under-cover  men's  "  reports,  typed 
letters  of  big  concerns  on  high  grade  paper  with  luxurious 
letter-heads,  there  was  a  scrap  of  dirty  paper  the  size  of  one's 
palm.     Scribbled  on  both  sides  it  read  exactly  as  follows : 

Charleroi,  Pa.,  Oct.  13th,  1919. 
Dear  Sir: 

I  am  an  employee  of  the  Pitts  Steele  Proct  of  Allenport  I 
went  to  work  last  Fri  and  would  like  to  work  so  I  will  give  you 
some  names  of  some  Belgian  dogs  that  made  it  so  hard  for  me 
and  my  family  I  had  to  quite  they  are  a  menace  to  our  country 
so  Please  keep  there  names  in  mind 

Yours  truly 

Over 

Charle  Ballue 

209  Shady  ave     Charleroi  Pa 
Arthur  Ballue 

Oakland  ave  between  3  and  4  st    Charleroi  Pa 
Tony  Jarruse 

208  Shady  ave     Charleroi  Pa 
Gus  Vanduzene 

312  Shady  ave     Charleroi  Pa 
Albert  Balue 

3  st     Charleroi  Pa 

Make  these  suffer  as  they  are  making  other  just  now  when 
you  start  your  mills. 

The  investigator  of  the  file  wondered  what  happened  to 
spiteful  scraps  of  paper  in  the  steel  industry.  Beside  the 
scrap  was  a  letter  as  follows : 


SOCIAL  CONSEQUENCES  223 

Pittsburgh  Steel  Products  Company 

Mill  Office 

Monessen,  Pa.,  October  15,  1919. 
M.  Wikstrom,  Gen'l  Supt. 
Jas.  H.  Dunbar, 

Ass't  to  Gen'l  Supt. 
Messrs : 

George  A.  Paff, 

C.  J.  Mogan, 

U.   S.   Smiley, 

W.  S.  Bumbaugh, 

W.  C.  Sutherland, 

J.  W.  Connery, 
Gentlemen : 

We  are  in  receipt  of  an  anonjmious  communication  under  date 
of  October  13th,  which  reads  as  follows: 

"  I  am  an  employee  of  the  Pittsburgh  Steel  Products  Company 
of  Allenport.  I  went  to  work  last  Friday  and  would  like  to 
work,  so  I  will  give  you  some  names  of  some  Belgian  Dogs  that 
made  it  so  hard  for  me  and  my  family,  I  had  to  quit.  They 
are  a  menace  to  our  country — so  please  keep  these  names  in 
mind  when  you  start  your  mill. 
Charles  Ballue, 

209  Shady  Ave.,  Charleroi,  Pa., 
Arthur  Ballue, 

Between  3rd  and  4th  Sts.,  Charleroi,  Pa. 
Tony  Jarouse, 

208  Shady  Ave.,  Charleroi,  Pa., 

(Formerly  worked  in  our  mill  under  Check  No.  5321). 
Gus  Vanduzen, 

312  Shady  Ave.,  Charleroi,  Pa. 
Albert  Ballue, 

3d  St.,  Charleroi,  Pa. 

Make  these  men  suffer  as  they  are  making  me  suffer  just  now 
when  you  start  your  mill." 


224  EEPORT  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

This  is  for  your  information  and  files. 
Yours  very  truly, 
Pittsburgh  Steel  Products  Company, 

(Signed)     Malcolm  Wikstrom, 
JDH/W  General  Superintendent. 

The  list  at  the  top  of  the  letter  represented  every  steel 
concern  in  Monessen.  The  promptness  with  which  the  list 
of  names  was  speeded  back  and  forth  among  the  companies 
was  illustrated  in  another  letter  in  the  file,  sent  out  the  same 
day  the  above  was  received. 

Pittsburgh  Steel  Company 
Mill  Office 
Monessen,  Pa.,  October  15,  1919. 

C.  J.  Mogan,  Gen'l  Supt. 

D.  P.  King,  Ass't  Gen'l  Supt. 
A.  Allison,  Ass't  Gen'l  Supt. 
Messrs., 

M.  Wikstrom,  Pgh.  Steel  Products. 

U.  S.  Smiley,  American  Sheet  &  Tin  Co. 

F.  D.  Bumbaugh,  Monessen  Fdry.  &  Mach.  Co. 
J.  L.  Hoffman,   Carnegie  Steel  Co. 

G.  A.  Paff,  Page  Steel  &  Wire  Co. 
Dear  Sirs: 

Enclosed  is  a  list  of  men  who  are  some  of  the  leading  agitators 
in  keeping  the  men  from  going  to  work  by  all  kinds  of 
threats. 

Yours  very  truly, 

(Signed)     C.  J.  Mogan, 
CJM/C  General  Superintendent. 

Attached  to  this  letter  was  a  copy  of  the  same  little  list, 
with  one  additional  name.  Of  the  mills  catalogued,  beneath 
the  letterhead,  as  on  the  circuit  of  vital  information,  two 
were  Corporation  subsidiaries, — American  Sheet  &  Tin,  and 


SOCIAL  CONSEQUENCES  225 

Carnegie  Steel, — the  rest  "  independents."  The  letters 
crossed  and  recrossed,  so  that  the  Pittsburgh  Steel  Products 
Co.  officer  who  started  the  list  out  got  the  same  list  back 
from  the  Pittsburgh  Steel  Co.  (another  "  independent  ")  the 
same  day. 

Finally  in  the  file  was  the  carbon  of  a  letter  transmitting 
the  same  list  to  the  Department  of  Justice  at  Washington, 
asserting  that  the  men  named  were  "  leading  radicals." 

From  a  scrap  of  dirty  paper,  rising  through  stages  of 
typed  and  embossed  letterhead  dignity,  to  those  dossiers, 
marked  "Important — very  secret,"  in  Government 
Bureaus  in  Washington!  The  circumstances  at  either  end 
of  the  chain  were  not  investigated. 

The  testimony  of  a  Federal  officer  of  long  official  experi- 
ence, made  at  a  hearing  of  the  Commission  of  Inquiry  in 
November  in  Pittsburgh  was : 

...  90  per  cent,  of  all  the  radicals  arrested  and  taken  into 
custody  were  reported  by  one  of  the  large  corporations,  either 
of  the  steel  or  coal  industry.  I  mean  by  that,  that  these  cor- 
porations are  loaded  up  with  what  they  call  "  under-cover " 
men  who  must  earn  their  salaries,  and  they  go  around  and  get 
into  these  organizations  and  report  the  cases  to  the  detectives 
for  the  large  companies.  The  detectives  in  turn  report  to  the 
chief  of  police  of  the  city.  Generally,  the  chiefs  of  police  in 
these  small  cities  around  Pittsburgh  were  placed  there  by  the 
corporations. 

The  corporation  orders  an  organization  raided  by  the  police 
department,  the  members  are  taken  into  custody,  thrown  into 
the  police  station  and  the  department  of  justice  is  notified.  They 
send  a  man  to  examine  them  to  see  if  there  are  any  extreme 
radicals  or  anarchists  among  them.  They  usually  let  all  but  a 
few  go.  In  one  instance  seventy-nine  were  taken.  The  Depart- 
ment of  Justice  let  all  go  but  three;  of  those  we  asked  for 
warrants  for  two,  and  at  the  hearing  we  made  a  case  against 
one  of  them, 


226  EBPOET  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

The  Steel  Corporation  has  been  using  every  possible  endeavor 
for  the  last  20  years  to  fill  its  mills  with  foreigners,  and  to 
a  large  extent  has  done  so ;  then  you  must  see  why  the  foreigner 
is  taking  the  front  of  the  stage  in  this  conflict.  When  the  large 
corporations  put  these  foreigners  in  they  thought  they  had  a 
class  of  men  who  wouldn't  strike.  Now  they  want  to  get  rid 
of  some  of  them. 


During  the  war  a  number  of  able  patriotic  American  citi- 
zens, lawyers,  etc.,  as  officers  in  the  army  or  as  Federal  of- 
ficials under  the  Department  of  Justice,  became  acquainted 
with  this  widespread  intimate  connection  between  "  under- 
cover "  systems  and  Federal  authorities  and  became  seriously 
disquieted,  partly  because  of  the  possibility  that,  in  such  a 
system,  governmental  power  might  be  put  at  the  mercy  of 
mercenary  and  interested  men,  or  might  lead  to  the  flagrant 
misuse  of  such  influence  in  behalf  of  private  ends.  Since 
the  armistice  several  of  these  ex-officials  have  publicly  criti- 
cized the  whole  system,  without  visible  reform  resulting. 
During  the  steel  strike  the  same  system,  a  year  after  the 
armistice,  "was  worked  hard.  The  undoubted  existence  of 
a  fractional  percentage  of  "  alien  radicals  "  was  capitalized, 
with  Government  assistance,  in  order  to  disorganize  bodies 
of  strikers  whose  loyalty  was  of  unquestionable  legal  stand- 
ing. 

Before  considering  the  data  on  this  phase  of  the  inquiry, 
reference  should  be  made  to  the  character  of  the  under-cover 
organizations. 

Two  extensive  labor-detective  strike-breaking  corporations, 
with  offices  in  a  dozen  cities,  had  a  hand  in  fighting  the  steel 
strike.  Documents  and  reports  from  one  of  the  concerns 
filled  half  the  Monessen  "  labor  file."  Affidavits  and  docu- 
ments were  obtained  from  the  other,  which  operated  chiefly 
in  the  Chicago  District.    Also  in  the  Monessen  "  labor  file  " 


SOCIAL  CONSEQUENCES  237 

were  the  reports  furnished  by  two  other  "  detective  "  agencies. 
In  the  file  were  the  forms  of  contracts  under  which  these 
concerns  were  hired  and  operate.  Their  "  operatives  "  re- 
ports run  from  the  illiterate  scribblings  of  professional  para- 
sites to  the  most  accurate  transcriptions  of  union  locals'  secret 
meetings.  Interviews  with  the  officers  of  these  strike-break- 
ing concerns  gave  further  insight  into  the  range  of  their 
"  work  "  in  the  steel  strike.  A  sub-report  furnishes  the  ma- 
terial for  building  up  a  day  by  day  story  of  the  strike  in 
Monessen.  The  other  documents  and  the  interviews  show 
the  extent.  It  is  all  of  a  piece  and  it  is  the  least  noble 
side  of  the  war  waged  for  the  "  open  shop  "  in  steel. 

The  manager  of  the  detective  strike-breaking  corporation 
whose  reports  and  contracts  appeared  in  the  Monessen  "  labor 
file,"  when  interviewed  spoke  fairly  freely  of  his  concern's 
views  and  activities.  He  had  over  five  hundred  "  operatives  " 
at  work  in  the  steel  strike.  Some  of  his  operatives  had  been 
injected  into  the  steel  plants  a  year  before.  Many  of  his 
operatives  had  become  officers  of  labor  unions.  He  said  that 
there  was  on  the  National  Strike  Committee  a  labor  leader 
who  took  his  money.  He  denied  that  his  concern  was  a  mere 
detective  or  strike-breaking  concern. 

He  used  the  same  arguments  as  Mr.  Gary  in  explaining 
why  he  supported  Mr.  Gary.  He  said  workmen  had  a  right 
to  organize  but  the  "  open  shop  "  must  be  preserved.  He  said 
that  labor  unions  had  rights  but  that  the  unions  had  fallen 
into  the  hands  of  radical  leaders. 

Like  Mr.  Gary  he  denied  that  he  wanted  to  crush  unions. 
He  denied  that  his  operatives  were  really  strike  breakers; 
though  the  "  labor  file  "  contained  full  details  of  his  opera- 
tives' strike  breaking  activities  and  the  following  letter: 


228  REPORT  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

New  York  Office,  680  Hudson  Terminal. 
Chicago  Office,  1051  Peoples'  Gas  Bldg. 
Cleveland  Office,  1835  Euclid  Ave. 
Pittsburgh  Office,  Wabash  Bldg. 
St.  Louis  Office,  Chemical  Bldg. 
Cincinnati  Office,  Union  Trust  Bldg. 
Detroit  Office,  Book  Bldg. 


The  Corporations  Auxiliary  Company 

Wabash  Building, 

Pittsburgh,  Pa. 

J.  H.  Smith,  Pres.  &  Treas. 

John  Weber,  Secy. 

D.  G.  Ross,  Gen.  Mgr. 

H.  C.  Breton,  Res,  Mgr. 

,  Gen'l  Mgr.,1  October  11th,  1919. 

Co., 

Pittsburgh,  Pa. 
Dear  Sir: 

Confirming    conversation    between    your    Mr.    ■* 

and  the  writer  on  3^esterday,  we  will  furnish  5'-ou  as  quickly  a3 
possible  with  two  Slavish  speaking  operatives  to  work  along  the 
lines  as  agreed  between  the  writer  and  Mr. on  yesterday. 

This  is  as  per  the  terms  of  our  regular  $225  monthly  contract 
with  the  usual  wage  credits  of  $3.00  per  day  allowed  as  per 
the  copy  of  attached  contract,  with  the  exception  that  it  is  under- 
stood that  this  service  will  terminate  at  the  end  of  30  days  from 
commencement  of  same  unless  otherwise  extended. 

We  wish  to  thank  you  very  much  for  this  business  and  will 
endeavor  to  make  same  as  valuable  to  you  as  possible  and  trust 
that  it  will  be  instrumental  in  having  the  morale  of  your  foreign 
strikers  broken. 

We  will  thank  you  very  much  for  your  cooperation  in  the 


*  Deleted  names  are  in  original  letter ;   copy  in  possession  of  Com- 
mission. 


SOCIAL  CONSEQUENCES  229 

handling  of  this  service  and  will  appreciate  your  calling  upon 
us  at  any  time  we  can  be  of  special  service  to  you. 
Yours  very  truly, 
The  Corporations  Auxiliary  Company, 

By     (Signed)   S.  Dewson, 
Resident  Manager. 
B-W:  P-11 


ISTo  other  country  in  the  world  has  such  large  widespread, 
well-financed,  strike-breaking  corporations,  making  money 
out  of  "  labor  trouble  "  as  America.  Their  existence  is  an 
integral  part  of  the  industrial  corporations'  policy  of  "  not 
dealing  with  labor  unions."  The  steel  strike  was  harvest- 
home  for  them.  Outside  the  plants  and  inside,  outside  the 
strikers  and  inside  the  labor  unions,  their  "  operatives " 
spied,  secretly  denounced,  engineered  raids  and  arrests,  and 
incited  to  riot.  The  concerns'  managers  spoke  the  same  argu- 
ments as  Mr.  Gary  in  justification  of  their  activities.  The 
companies  concealed  but  were  not  ashamed  of  hiring  "  opera- 
tives " ;  it  was  a  customary  inevitable  part  of  the  anti-union 
alternative. 

ISTor  was  it  the  custom  of  certain  strike-breaking  concerns 
to  wait  for  "  labor  trouble."  When  business  was  slack  they 
made  "  trouble."  The  sub-report  details,  from  affidavits  of 
former  operatives,  how  certain  concerns  provoked  strikes  in 
peaceful  shops  in  the  past  to  create  "  business,'*  set  union  to 
fighting  union,  organized  unions  in  order  to  be  called  in  to 
break  the  unions.  They  bled  both  sides;  and  the  Federal 
Government  files  contained  their  patriotic  reports. 

In  the  Chicago-Gary  District  one  such  great  strike-break- 
ing concern  became  so  active  in  the  steel  strike  that  its  offices 
were  raided  and  one  of  its  officers  was  indicted  for  "  intent 
to  create  riots  "  and  for  intent  to  "  kill  and  murder  divers 
large  numbers  of  persons."    This  officer  after  five  months  had 


330  EEPOET  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

still  not  been  brought  to  trial.  A  sample  of  the  riot-inciting 
instructions  given  to  this  concern's  operatives  in  the  South 
Chicago  steel  mills  follows : 

A  563-D  October  2,  1919. 

Rep. 

Dear  Sir: 

We  have  talked  to  you  and  instructed  you.  We  want  you 
to  stir  up  as  much  bad  feeling  as  you  possibly  can  between 
the  Serbians  and  Italians.  Spread  data  among  the  Serbians  that 
the  Italians  are  going  back  to  work.  Call  up  every  question  you 
can  in  reference  to  racial  hatred  between  these  two  nationalities ; 
make  them  realize  to  the  fullest  extent  that  far  better  results 
would  be  accomplished  if  they  will  go  back  to  work.  Urge  them 
to  go  back  to  work  or  the  Italians  will  get  their  jobs. 
Daily  Maxim — Send  to  every  representative  today: 
Conserve  your  forces  on  a  set  point — ^begin  before  the  other 
fellow  starts. 

Eemail. 

This  operative's  duties,  according  to  The  New  Majority 
(November  11,  1919),  were  as  follows: 

He  was  assigned  to  the  client  whose  code  was  A  536  D,  the 
number  appearing  at  the  top  of  the  Italian-Serbian  letter.  This 
code  means  the  South  Chicago  plant  of  the  Illinois  Steel  Com- 
pany. 

Then  he  received  the  regular  course  of  instruction  given 
"  representatives."  He  was  told  to  move  around  among  the 
strikers  and  get  them  to  go  back  to  work.  He  was  told  to  go 
to  Indiana  Harbor,  Ind.,  and  get  strikers  from  the  Inland  Steel 
Company  plant  there  to  go  to  South  Chicago  and  go  to  work  as 
strike  breakers  for  the  Illinois  Steel  Company.  He  was  told 
to  go  to  the  vicinity  of  employment  agencies  and  get  strike 
breakers  and  to  take  them  into  the  plant  by  automobile  or 
otherwise,  at  night. 


SOCIAL  CONSEQUENCES  231 

He  was  also  instructed  to  move  around  among  the  strikers 
for  the  purpose  of  reporting  what  conversations  he  heard,  as 
well  as  urging  them  to  go  to  work.  He  was  given  a  union 
card  in  a  local  of  one  of  the  international  unions  affiliated  with 
the  American  Federation  of  Labor,  and  told  to  use  it  to  pass 
himself  off  as  a  union  man. 

The  Hlinois  Steel  Company  is  the  Steel  Corporation's  big- 
gest western  subsidiary.  Its  president,  Mr.  Buffington,  de- 
clared to  the  Commission  of  Inquiry  that  the  first  he  had 
heard  of  the  matter  was  when  he  saw  it  in  the  Chicago 
papers;  that  the  Illinois  Steel  Co.  did  not  hire  this  strike- 
breaking concern ;  that  he  was  "  confident  that  at  the  trial 
no  evidence  involving  the  Illinois  Steel  Co.  would  be  brought 
out." 

The  manager  of  the  strike-breaking  concern,  with  offices 
in  the  same  building  as  Mr.  Buffington,  declared  to  Com- 
mission investigators  that  their  operatives  were  hired  by  the 
Illinois  Steel  Co. 

Meanwhile  the  raided  concern  was  defending  itself  in  page 
advertisements  in  papers  in  many  cities  as  follows: 

WHY  IS  SHERMAN  SERVICE  BEING  ATTACKED? 

Sherman  Service  is  a  national  institution  composed  of  men 
and  women  who  have  made  Industrial  Kelationship  their  life 
work     . 

They  cause  the  employer  (their  client)  to  recognize  and  prac- 
tice the  basic  principles  of  "  square  dealing "  in  his  relations 
with  his  employees.  A  spirit  of  sympathetic  understanding 
follows — the  result  is  harmony,  cooperation,  maximum  produc- 
tion, high  quality  and  lessened  waste. 

The  community,  which  comprises  both  employee  and  employer 
and  invested  capital,  is  able,  through  such  harmonious  and  pro- 
ductive rplfitionRhiji,  to  provide  the  greatest  opportunities  af- 
forded under  our  free  form  of  government,  to  the  advantage  of 


233  EEPOET  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

all  agreeably  concerned.  Americanization,  in  its  fullest  sense, 
is  made  possible  and  does  follow;  our  national  structure  is  pre- 
served and  enforced,  and  we  are  all  better  off  for  it. 

SHERMAN    SERVICE,   INC. 

John  Francis  Sherman,  Chairman  Executive  Board  New  York 
City  Boston  St.  Louis  Chicago  Philadelphia  Cleveland  New 
Haven  Providence  Detroit  Toronto. 

Postscript:  Sherman  Service  is  not  a  detective  agency.  It 
renders  no  detective  service  of  any  description  whatsoever. 

Concerning  the  last  line,  investigators  noted  that  the  Sher- 
man Service  Co.  was  elsewhere  carr^'ing  on  suit  in  court  to 
protect  its  "  rights  as  a  detective  agency."  According  to  the 
private  "  house  organ  "  of  this  concern  it  also  serves  the  gov- 
ernment ;  for  this  purpose  its  operatives  become  "  apparent 
reds." 

"Wherever  such  organizations  exist  in  the  community  and 
try  to  influence  the  workers  it  becomes  the  duty  of  the  Sherman 
representatives  to  pretend  sympathy  and  join  so  as  to  learn  who 
the  leaders  are.  Such  information  is  then  supplied  to  the 
government." 

Some  steel  companies  placed  implicit  confidence  in  the 
reports  and  advice  of  these  strike-breaking  spy-corporations. 
Other  companies  were  skeptical  and  dissatisfied  but  puzzled 
as  to  what  else  to  do.  But  no  managers  doubted  what  they 
wanted  the  detective  agencies  to  accomplish — to  keep  work- 
men from  organizing  and  if  they  organized  to  break  up  or 
nullify  the  organizations.  The  attitude  of  steel  company 
managers  was  the  same ;  it  was  illustrated  by  the  reply  of  a 
general  superintendent  in  Monessen  to  an  investigator's  re- 
quest to  be  allowed  to  talk  with  the  men  in  the  plant  (during 
the  strike).  He  said:  "We've  got  about  300  men  in  there 
now ;  generally  we  have  3,000.    And  those  300  men  have  cost 


SOCIAL  CONSEQUENCES  233 

us  just  about  $500  apiece  to  get.  Now  if  you  go  in  there  and 
ask  them  questions  they  may  all  get  nervous  and  walk  out 
again." 

Just  as  in  this  plant  in  Monessen  where,  as  the  superin- 
tendent and  the  investigator  knew,  two  "  detective  agencies  " 
had  propagandist-spies  mixed  with  the  real  workers,  so 
throughout  the  domain  of  steel,  watchers — from  subsidized 
workers  to  hired  detectives — ^peek  and  glower  at  the  labor 
force  and  try  to  guess,  by  the  way  men  walk  or  look  or  talk 
or  stay  silent  or  spit,  what  they  are  thinking. 

The  reach  of  the  industrial  spy  system  and  the  reliance 
placed  on  it  were  brought  home  to  the  Commission  of  Inquiry 
by  the  spy  report  on  the  Commission  which  was  sent  to  Mr. 
Gary.  It  has  been  referred  to  before;  the  Commission  in 
November  read  the  report,  knew  that  it  was  being  distributed 
in  the  territory  of  the  Steel  Corporation's  plants,  and  dis- 
regarded so  amusingly  false  a  document;  in  December  when 
the  Commission  made  its  effort  to  settle  the  strike,  Mr.  Gary 
exhibited  it  and  cross-examined  the  Commissioners  on  its 
charges.  Someone  had  set  a  spy  on  the  Commission 
and  on  the  Interchurch  World  Movement.  The  anonymous 
"  special  report "  was  dated  November  12.  The  Commis- 
sion's first  interview  with  Mr.  Gary  had  been  on  November 
10. 

The  "  special  report "  names  (misspelling  the  names)  some 
of  the  Commission's  investigators,  names  others  as  investi- 
gators who  were  not,  and  calls  all  named  "  radicals,"  "  mem- 
bers of  the  I.W.W.,"  "  Keds  "  and  "  active  in  the  organiza- 
tion known  as  the  People's  Print  .  .  .  formerly  known  as 
the  People's  Peace  Council,  better  known  as  the  National 
Civil  Liberties  League."  N^o  statement  made  about  the  in- 
vestigators was  true.  The  capacity  of  the  spy  and  the  pur- 
poses of  the  persons  who  hired  him  are  indicated  in  the 
following  excerpt: 


234  REPOET  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

In  fact  none  of  these  people  that  are  now  here  in  Pittsburgh 
investigating  for  this  Church  movement  should  be  told  anything 
at  all,  nor  should  they  be  allowed  to  get  any  information  from 
the  Mills  in  any  manner. 

After  paying  a  visit  to  their  offices  in  New  York  and  talking 
to  a  large  number  of  the  officials  there  I  find  that  this  organiza- 
tion could  be  used  to  a  very  good  advantage  if  handled  by  the 
right  parties.  This  organization  could  become  a  power  in  both 
the  Industrial  Field  and  the  Church  Field. 

There  are  a  large  number  of  the  men  and  women  connected 
with  this  organization  that  are  know  as  Pink  Tea  Socialists 
and  Parlor  Reds,  and  are  not  considered  dangerous.  I  would 
suggest  that  these  kind  of  people  be  weeded  out  of  the  organiza- 
tion. These  are  the  worst  kind  of  Reds  to  be  connected  with 
as  they  are  to  a  certain  extent  high  up  in  circles  that  are  hard 
to  reach  and  they  can  spread  propaganda  that  hurts  the  work 
of  others. 

I  found  that  this  Organization  is  now  making  a  canvass  for 
money  among  the  rich  and  the  Corporation  in  the  East,  and 
that  they  have  already  had  a  Committee  see  Judge  Gary,  asking 
for  money  to  carry  on  their  work  with. 

A  Mr,  Blacenhorn  will  arrive  in  Pittsburgh  on  Thursday 
morning  to  assist  the  ones  that  are  already  here  on  the  Steel 
Strike  investigation. 

No  money  should  be  given  or  any  assistance  granted  this 
organization  until  they  recall  all  of  the  ones  that  they  have  in 
the  Pittsburgh  District,  and  furthermore  if  there  is  any  way 
at  all  of  forcing  them  to  get  rid  of  the  ones  that  I  have  mentioned 
they  should  be  let  go. 

The  literary  qualities  of  this  report  can  be  profitably  studied 
by  comparison  with  the  reports  in  the  Monessen  "  labor  file." 
The  maintenance  of  the  non-unionism  alternative,  there- 
fore, entailed  for  the  steel  companies  activities  running  from 
spies  in  church  offices  in  New  York  to  sealed  carloads  of 
negroes  shipped  into  Pittsburgh  plant  yards  at  night.     For 


SOCIAL  CONSEQUENCES  235 

communities  and  for  states  the  alternative  entailed  activities 
of  greater  import  and  greater  menace.  These  affected  civil 
liberties  in  whole  communities,  local  legislative  bodies,  police 
authorities,  judges,  state  police  troops,  Federal  government 
departments  and  the  U.  S.  Army. 

The  consequences  (which  are  studied  in  sub-reports)  are 
perhaps  most  important  in  regard  to  the  abrogation  of  civil 
liberties.  War-experiences  especially  have  accustomed  the 
American  people  to  the  thought  that  the  right  of  assembly, 
the  right  of  free  speech,  and  traditional  personal  rights  can 
be  abrogated  when  the  cause  is  deemed  sufficiently  great. 
The  practise  of  western  Pennsylvania  proved  that  these  rights 
were  abrogated  for  the  purpose  of  preventing  the  organiza- 
tion of  trade  unions  among  steel  workers,  or  of  defeating 
organized  unions.  The  abrogations  largely  persist  four 
months  after  the  strike. 

The  salient  fact  is  as  follows : 
Denial  of  the  rights  of  assemblage  and  free  speech  did  not 
primarily  grow  out  of  the  strike  but  was  a  precedent 
fact,  directly  related  to  the  policies  of  preventing  labor 
organization  maintained  by  the  Steel  Corporation  and 
certain  "  independents."  It  was  for  years  the  rule  in 
towns  about  Pittsburgh  that  labor  organizers  could  not 
hold  meetings. 

To  quote  from  the  sub-report :  ^ 

Local  public  officials  assert  that  it  was  necessary  to  prohibit 
meetings  in  order  to  prevent  violence.  This  statement  is  open 
to  question,  but  if  it  is  accepted,  still  the  connection  between 
labor  policy  and  absence  of  civil  liberty  remains.  Whatever 
danger  of  violence  there  was,  arose  from  the  industrial  conflict. 
On  account  of  the  long-continued  refusal  of  the  employers  to  deal 
with  organized  labor,  industrial  conflict  became  inevitable  the 

*  From  "Civil  Liberties,"  in  Western  Pennsrlvaiiia,  by  Oeorge  Soule. 


236  REPOET  ON"  THE  STEEL  STEIKB 

moment  workmen  began  to  assemble  for  the  purpose  of  forming 
unions.  If,  therefore,  the  right  to  assemble  led  to  the  forming 
and  strengthening  of  unions,  and  unions  led  to  industrial  conflict, 
and  industrial  conflict  led  to  breaches  of  the  peace,  the  only  way 
to  prevent  violence  was,  in  the  minds  of  the  local  officials,  to 
prevent  meetings.  In  other  words,  if  the  officials  were  right, 
the  industrial  situation  was  such  that  civil  peace  could  be  pre- 
served only  by  interference  with  the  exercise  of  ordinary  civil 
liberties  on  the  part  of  a  large  proportion  of  the  population. 

To  maintain  steel  companies'  non-union  policies,  communi- 
ties lost  their  rights  of  assembly  so  completely  that  in  some 
towns  government  agents,  sent  to  give  patriotic  lectures,  were 
denied  the  right  to  hold  meetings ;  one  such  was  arrested. 

The  extent  to  vs^hich  rights  were  abrogated  depended  largely 
upon  the  extent  to  which  non-unionism  was  endangered.  If 
labor  organizers  were  aggressive  and  local  restrictive  ordi- 
nances were  insufficient  the  most  arbitrary  executive  acts  were 
resorted  to.  During  the  strike  the  repression  was  complete. 
Legally  the  Interchurch  Commission  of  Inquiry  being  com- 
posed of  "  three  or  more  persons  "  broke  the  Sheriif's  orders 
by  the  simple  act  of  assembling  and  "  loitering  "  in  the  streets 
of  Pittsburgh.  A  Commissioner  conversed  with  strikers  in 
the  office  used  as  their  headquarters  in  Braddock;  five  min- 
utes after  his  departure  State  troopers  broke  into  the  place 
demanding  "  that  speaker  "  and  started  to  close  down  the 
office  because  "  a  meeting  "  had  been  held. 

Concerning  the  "  violence  "  justification  for  such  abroga- 
tions the  following  facts  were  noted : 

The  argument  that  the  right  of  assembly  would  lead  to  violence 
met  this  contradiction  in  McKeesport ;  a  riot  there,  the  only  one, 
resulted  from  the  authorities'  cancellation  of  a  meeting  for  which 
a  permit  had  been  granted. 

In  Johnstown  no  restriction  was  ever  laid  on  meetings  and  no 


SOCIAL  CONSEQUENCES  237 

violence  ever  resulted;  the  only  attempt  at  violence  was  the 
action  of  a  Citizens'  Committee,  led  by  a  Y.  M.  C.  A.  secretary, 
which  drove  labor  organizers  out  of  town. 

In  Sharon  and  Farrell  the  workers,  prohibited  from  assembly 
marched  weekly  across  the  state  line  into  Ohio  where  they  held 
great  mass  meetings  without  a  sign  of  violence. 

Comparison  of  the  Pittsburgh  District  with  Wlieeling,  West 
Va.,  and  Ohio  districts  proves  that  the  reasons  given  by  the 
Pennsylvania  authorities  were  without  basis  in  fact. 

The  progressive  nature  of  the  restrictions  imposed  was  illus- 
trated in  the  South  Side  of  Pittsburgh  where  labor  organizers 
obtained  a  hall  after  every  pressure  had  been  put  on  the  owner 
to  cancel  the  lease.  Thereupon  the  Mayor  of  Pittsburgh  forbade 
outright  all  meetings  on  the  South  Side. 

The  whole  case  for  the  abrogations  is  epitomized  in  the 
preamble  to  the  Sheriff's  proclamation  issued  September  20 
(two  days  before  the  strike)  : 

Whereas  I,  William  S.  Haddock,  sheriff  of  Allegheny  County, 
have  been  formally  notified  by  many  citizens,  industrial  cor- 
porations, and  employers  that  printed  inflammatory  circulars  and 
other  information  have  been  distributed  and  disseminated  among 
the  people  calling  a  general  strike  of  all  employees  of  various 
industrial  manufactories  throughout  Allegheny  County,  with  the 
request  that  they  cease  work  and  leave  their  places  of  employment 
and  by  reason  thereof  there  now  exists  among  the  people  great 
unrest,  uncertainty,  and  doubt  as  to  the  safety  of  life,  liberty, 
and  property:    Therefore    .     .     . 

Now  Sheriff  Haddock  has  admitted  that  he  never  saw  the 
"  printed  inflammatory  circulars  "  alleged  to  have  been  dis- 
tributed ;  neither  did  any  "  citizens,  industrial  corporations 
and  employers  "  produce  any  such  circulars  issued  by  the 
strike  leadership  in  the  period  immediately  preceding  Sep- 
tember 20. 


238  REPOKT  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

These  abrogations,  before,  during  and  after  the  strike, 
must  be  considered  with  this  fact : 

"  Free  elections  "  were  customarily  impossible  in  steel  towns 
in  Western  Pennsylvania  due  to  clearly  understood  manipulations 
by  steel  company  officials  or  by  steel  company  officials  who  were 
also  public  officials. 

That  is,  democratic  practises  as  well  as  constitutional  rights 
are  decisively  modified  by  the  steel  companies  in  western 
Pennsylvania  and  the  "  modifications  "  are  for  the  purpose  of 
defeating  labor  organization. 

During  the  strike  violations  of  personal  rights  and  personal 
liberty  were  wholesale ;  men  were  arrested  without  warrants, 
imprisoned  without  charges,  their  homes  invaded  without 
legal  process,  magistrates'  verdicts  were  rendered  frankly  on 
the  basis  of  whether  the  striker  would  go  back  to  work  or 
not.  But  even  these  things  would  seem  to  be  less  a  concern 
to  the  nation  at  large  than  the  degradation,  persistent  and 
approved  by  "  public  opinion,"  of  civil  liberties  in  behalf  of 
private  concerns'  industrial  practices. 

To  the  steel  workers  the  import  of  the  violations  of  civil 
and  personal  rights  resulted  as  follows : 

Great  numbers  of  workers  came  to  believe — 

that  local  mayors,  magistrates  and  police  officials  try  to 
break  strikes; 

that  state  and  Federal  officials,  particularly  the  Federal 
Department  of   Justice,  help   to   break  strikes,   and  that 
armed  forces  are  used  for  this  purpose ; 
that  most  newspapers  actively  and  promptly  exert  a  strike- 
breaking influence ;  most  churches  passively. 

Workers  generally  attributed  such  strike  breaking  to  the 
men  filling  the  offices  rather  than  to  the  Governmental  and 
social  institutions  per  se. 


SOCIAL  CONSEQUENCES  239 

The  above  beliefs  were  imdoubtedly  widespread  among 
steel  workers ;  many  expressed  the  beliefs  with  ferocity;  many 
more  in  a  dumb,  deep-seated  suspiciousness  of  everything  and 
everybody  connected  with  public  executives,  courts.  Federal 
agents,  army  officers,  reporters  or  clergy.  The  steel  strike 
made  tens  of  thousands  of  citizens  believe  that  our  American 
institutions  are  not  democratic  or  not  democratically  admirir 
istered. 

The  basis  of  such  beliefs  (detailed  in  sub-reports)  will 
be  hastily  summarized  here.  The  data  concern  chiefly  west- 
ern Pennsylvania,  secondarily  Indiana  and  Illinois. 

Local  magistrates,  police  authorities,  etc.,  around  Pitts- 
burgh were  very  frequently  steel  mill  officials  or  relations 
of  mill  officials.  In  other  cases  steel  mill  officials  exercised 
police  authority  without  the  excuse  of  having  been  previously 
elected  to  public  office.  For  example,  besides  Sherifi  Had- 
dock of  Allegheny  County  whose  brother  was  superintendent 
of  an  American  Sheet  &  Tin  Plate  plant  (Corporation  sub- 
sidiary), Mayor  Crawford  of  Duquesne  was  the  brother  of 
the  President  of  the  McKeesport  Tin  Plate  Co. ;  President 
Moon  of  the  Borough  Council  of  Homestead  was  chief  of  the 
mechanical  department  of  the  Homestead  mill ;  Burgess  Lin- 
coln of  Munhall  was  a  department  superintendent  in  the  same 
mill.  The  Burgess  of  Clairton  was  a  mill  official ;  etc.,  etc. 
When  a  striker  was  taken  before  mill-official  public-officials 
he  was  likely  to  suspect  connections  between  his  fate  and  the 
steel  company's  desires.  In  many  other  cases  officials  of 
mills  only,  personally,  gave  the  orders  for  arrests,  and  the 
decisions  as  to  whether  the  arrested  should  be  jailed  or  not, 
generally  after  learning  whether  the  striker  would  return  to 
work  or  not. 

The  charges  on  which  strikers  were  arraigned  before  local 
magistrates,  then  imprisoned  or  fined,  were  often  never 
recorded   and   never  learned  by  the   prisoners.     Recorded 


340  REPORT  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

formal  specifications  included  "  stopping  men  from  going  to 
work,"  "  cursing  "  (the  state  police  or  deputies),  "  abusing," 
"  refusing  to  obey  orders  "  (to  move  on,  etc.),  "  going  out  of 
his  house  before  daylight,"  "  laughing  at  the  police,"  "  throw- 
ing strike  cards  out  on  the  street,"  "  smiling  at  the  state 
police."  Fines  ran  from  $10  to  $50  or  $60.  Imprisonment 
terms  ran  up  to  months.  Arrested  men  were  frequently 
taken,  not  to  jail,  but  inside  the  steel  mill  and  held  there. 
The  charges  of  beatings,  clubbings,  often  substantiated  by 
doctors'  and  eye-witnesses'  affidavits,  were  endless  and 
monotonous;  in  most  communities  the  only  public  official  to 
appeal  to  turned  out  to  be  another  mill  official. 

Federal  officials*  active  intervention  concerned  chiefly  (1) 
the  Department  of  Justice,  whose  connections  with  steel  com- 
pany "  under-cover  men  "  were  referred  to  earlier,  and  whose 
public  activities  dealt  with  raids  in  search  of  "  reds  "  and 
Attorney  General  Palmer's  statements  about  "  reds  "  in  the 
steel  strike;  and  (2)  the  IT.  S.  Army.  Both  cases  contrib- 
uted to  steel  workers'  beliefs  about  strike-breaking  activities. 
The  Administration  left  the  field  to  the  Department  of  Justice 
and  the  Army,  so  far  as  the  steel  workers  could  see.  Con- 
gressional intervention  in  the  shape  of  the  investigation  and 
report  of  the  Senate  Committee  on  Labor  and  Education  filled 
the  strikers  with  a  bitterness  only  to  be  understood  by  de- 
tailed comparison  of  the  Committee's  report  and  the  facts. 

The  principal  use  of  armed  forces  outside  of  Pennsylvania 
was  at  Gary,  Ind.,  occupied  first  by  the  State  militia,  then  by 
the  U.  S.  Army  under  General  Leonard  Wood.  Previous  to 
these  occupations  newspapers  throughout  the  country  printed 
stories  of  "bloody  riots"  in  Gary  and  that  the  city  was  a 
"  hotbed  of  reds."    The  facts  were  as  follows : 

The  walkout  on  September  22  at  Gary  was  almost  com- 
plete. Agreements,  subject  to  various  disputes  over  interpre- 
tation, were  reached  with  the  city  authorities   concerning 


SOCIAL  CONSEQUENCES  241 

picket  line  rules.  Huge  mass-meetings  were  held  in  the  ojien 
air.  The  strikers  made  frequent  complaints  of  violent  raids 
carried  out  by  bands  of  citizens  calling  themselves  "  Loyal 
American  Leaguers  "  who  were  charged  with  clubbing  groups 
of  strikers  on  street  corners  at  nights.  A  crowd  of  strikers 
leaving  a  mass-meeting  tried  to  pull  a  negro  strike  breaker  off 
a  street  car :  the  negro  was  slightly  injured  and  a  number  of 
strikers  were  clubbed.  On  this  case  of  "  mob  violence,"  the 
only  one  alleged,  Indiana  state  guards  were  sent  in.  Parades 
were  forbidden.  Ex-service  men  among  the  strikers,  inde- 
pendently of  the  strike  leadership,  put  on  their  old  army 
uniforms  and  started  a  march  to  exhibit  the  uniforms  to  the 
guardsmen.  There  were  about  two  hundred  of  these  ex- 
soldiers  and  about  ten  thousand  strikers  in  the  streets  fell 
in  behind  the  procession  which  wound  through  the  town  in 
disregard  of  the  guardsmen  and  quietly  disbanded  in  the 
park  where  meetings  were  held.  On  this  second  case  of 
"  mob  violence,"  known  as  the  "  outlaw  parade,"  the  U.  S. 
regulars  occupied  Gary,  with  General  Wood  in  personal 
charge,  proclaiming  martial  law.  The  regulars  were 
equipped  with  bayonets  and  steel  helmets  and  the  force  in- 
cluded many  trucks  mounting  machine  guns  and  bringing 
field  artillery. 

General  Wood  declared  that  "the  army  would  be  neutral." 
He  established  rules  in  regard  to  picketing.  These  rules 
were  so  interpreted  and  carried  out  as  to  result  in  breaking  up 
the  picket  line.  One  picket,  for  example,  would  be  permitted 
at  a  certain  spot;  if  the  striker  who  came  up  to  relieve  the 
picket  stopped  to  converse  with  him  and  to  receive  reports 
and  instructions,  both  strikers  would  be  arrested.  Delays  and 
difficulties  would  attend  the  release  of  these  men  from  jail 
or  "  bull  pen."  The  picket  line  thus  dwindled  and  its  dis- 
appearance signalled  to  the  Gary  workers  that  the  strike  was 
breaking.    Army  officers  sent  soldiers  to  arrest  union  oflScers 


243  REPORT  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

in  other  trades,  for  example,  for  threatening  to  call  a  strike 
on  a  local  building  operation.  Workers  throughout  the  city 
believed  that  the  Federal  Government  opposed  them  and  that 
the  regulars  would  stay  as  long  as  the  steel  workers  remained 
on  strike.  The  army  was  not  withdrawn  until  the  strike  was 
declared  off. 

The  maintenance  of  the  Steel  Corporation's  non-union 
policy  in  Gary,  therefore,  entailed  the  use  of  the  Federal 
army  and  the  expenditure  of  public  money  with  results  which 
helped  to  break  the  strike. 

The  feeling  of  the  steel  workers,  then,  might  be  summed  up 
thus:  that  local  and  national  government  not  only  was  not 
their  government  (i.e.  in  their  behalf)  but  was  government  in 
behalf  of  interests  opposing  theirs ;  that  in  strike  times  govern- 
ment activities  tended  to  break  strikes.  So  far  the  steel 
workers'  suspicions  concern  the  administrators,  rather  than 
the  institutions,  of  government. 

Finally  the  press  in  most  communities,  and  particularly 
in  Pittsburgh,  led  the  workers  there  to  the  belief  that  the 
press  lends  itself  instantly  and  persistently  to  strike  breaking. 
They  believed  that  the  press  immediately  took  sides,  printed 
only  the  news  favoring  that  side,  suppressed  or  colored  its 
records,  printed  advertisements  and  editorials  urging  the 
strikers  to  go  back,  denounced  the  strikers  and  incessantly 
misrepresented  the  facts.  All  this  was  found  to  be  true  in 
the  case  of  the  Pittsburgh  papers  (as  analyzed  in  a  sub- 
report).  Foreign  language  papers  largely  followed  the  lead 
of  the  English  papers.  The  average  American-born  discrimi- 
nating citizen  of  Pittsburgh  could  not  have  obtained  from  his 
papers  sufficient  information  to  get  a  true  conception  of  the 
strike ;  basic  information  was  not  in  those  papers.  The  steel 
worker-reader,  moreover,  gave  attention  not  only  to  the  omis- 
sions of  the  press  but  to  commissions  plainly  directed  against 
the  strike.    In  the  minds  of  workingmen  outside  steel  areas 


SOCIAL  CONSEQUENCES  243 

the  newspapers'  handling  of  the  steel  strike  added  weight  to 
the  conviction  that  the  press  of  the  country  is  not  the  work- 
ingmen's  press. 

The  pulpit  as  carefully  analyzed  in  the  Pittsburgh  district 
proved  itself  largely  dependent  on  the  press.  The  sub-report 
finds  that  a  fair  and  comprehensive  history  of  the  strike 
would  not  require  mention  of  either  the  Protestant  Church  or 
Catholic  Church  as  organizations  in  Allegheny  County.  In 
one  or  two  communities  individual  clergymen  were  the 
heart  of  either  the  support  of  the  strike  or  of  the  opposition 
to  it.  Research  among  clergymen  revealed  a  large  minority 
deeply  suspicious  of  the  newspaper  version  of  the  strike  but 
ineffective  for  organizing  concerted  action,  even  for  purposes 
of  self-information.  The  workers'  attitude  to  the  church 
followed  mainly  these  few  individuals,  deeming  the  church 
another  strike  breaker  where  some  clergyman  preached  or 
wrote  against  the  strike  or  where  another  gift  to  a  local 
church  by  a  steel  company  became  public,  or  deeming  it  a 
comfort  at  least,  where  some  clergyman  worked  for  the 
strike.  The  great  mass  of  steel  workers  paid  no  heed  to  the 
church  as  a  social  organization. 

This  difference  in  workers'  attitudes  to  press  and  to  pulpit 
was  noted:  after  the  strike  workers  generally  were  making 
no  effort  to  make  the  church  their  church;  but  workers  in 
many  sections  of  the  nation,  in  steel  towns  and  out,  redoubled 
efforts  to  set  up  their  own  press  and  inaugurated  their  own 
federated  news  service. 

To  sum  up  the  social  consequences  of  a  non-union  labor 
policy,  especially  that  of  the  Steel  Corporation,  is  plainly 
difficult;  the  manifestations  were  so  wide  and  so  various. 
The  Corporation's  policy  dominated  the  industry.  The  in- 
dustry's practise  entailed  discharge  for  unionism,  coercion, 
espionage,  the  use  of  under-cover  men  and  strike-breaking 
detective  agencies.     Maintenance  of  the  industry's  practise 


244  EEPOET  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

changed  the  complexion  of  governmental  and  social  institu- 
tions. In  the  eyes  of  the  strikers  and  a  host  of  their  fellow- 
workingmen  these  changed  governmental  and  social  institu- 
tions tended,  in  greater  or  less  degree,  more  or  less  promptly, 
to  strike  breaking.  In  the  eyes  of  less  interested  observers 
the  facts  at  least  raised  the  questions : 

Whether  there  is  any  influence  at  present  more  powerful  in 
American  civilization  than  the  influence  of  great  industrial  cor- 
porations or  trusts? 

Whether  any  single  influence  works  more  effectively  on  our 
national  life  than  the  non-union  policy  of  our  greatest  Cor- 
poration for  vicious  or  beneficial  results  ? 

For  the  great  part  of  the  country^s  beaten  steel  strikers  the 
answer  was  over-simplified.  The  steel  worker  went  back  to 
the  twelve-hour  day,  earnings  under  a  living  "wage,  ruthlessly 
arbitrary  anti-organization  control.  For  escape  he  had 
turned  to  the  A.  F.  of  L.  and  in  1920  the  A.  F.  of  L.  was 
not  succeeding  in  freeing  him.  He  hesitated  to  turn  to  the 
I.W.W.,  for  the  I.W.W.  was  "outlawed.''  He  could  not 
turn  to  the  Steel  Corporation  or  the  other  great  companies  for 
they  were  standing  pat.  He  did  not  turn  to  the  press. 
Among  American  democratic  institutions  he  found  none  to 
fit  his  need,  no  Federal  body  or  machinery  for  acting  on  his 
case  nor  even  any  governmental  institution  of  inquiry,  which 
in  1920  was  reaching  out  to  learn  his  grievances. 

The  beaten  steel  worker  displayed  little  interest  in  govern- 
mental institutions;  instead  he  had  acquired  a  rather  active 
distrust  of  them.  While  many  of  the  "  foreigners  "  began 
piling  up  money  to  get  themselves  out  of  America  the  great 
majority  began  waiting  for  "  the  next  strike."  That  was  the 
only  resource  thoughtfully  provided  for  them  among  the 
democratic  American  institutions. 


CONCLUDING 

The  Summarized  Conclusions  and  Recommendations  of  the 
Eeport  have  been  transferred  for  convenience  to  pages  11-19 
in  Chapter  I  (Introduction)  from  the  end  of  the  book,  where 
they  belong  naturally,  inasmuch  as  they  were  formulated 
after  all  the  foregoing  analyses  and  discussion  had  been 
drafted. 

The  gist  of  the  Conclusions  is  that  conditions  in  the  steel 
industry  "  gave  the  workers  just  cause  for  complaint  and 
for  action "  and  that  "  these  unredressed  grievances  still 
exist." 

The  gist  of  the  Recommendations  is  that  the  Federal  Gov- 
ernment set  up  a  commission  for  the  industry,  in  order  to 
initiate  free,  open  conference  between  those  who  must  always 
be  chiefly  responsible  for  settlement  of  the  industry's  prob- 
lems:— its  owners  and  its  workers.  To  this  is  added  recom- 
mendation for  persistent  investigation  and  publicity. 

In  pursuit  of  its  recommendations  and  in  concluding  its 
immediate  task,  the  Commission  put  this  report  before  the 
American  people  and  the  American  people's  government,  in 
the  person  of  President  Wilson.  The  action  of  the  Commis- 
sion virtually  raised  this  question  of  fundamental  impor- 
tance : 

Is  the  nation  helpless  before  conditions  in  a  basic  industry 
which  promise  a  future  crisis  ?  Can  our  democratic  society 
be  moved  to  do  industrial  Justice  without  the  pressure  of 
crisis  itself? 

As  a  part  of  the  task  of  publishing  the  facts  and  as  a 
means  of  expressing  their  judgment  as  Christians,  the  Com- 
missioners requested  a  committee  to  draw  up,  for  separate 
free  distribution,  if  possible,  a  compact  form  of  General 

245 


246  EEPORT  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

Findings  based  on  the  Conclusions  of  the  Report.  Necessar- 
ily they  are  in  part  repetitious,  but  they  were  designed  to  in- 
clude expressions  of  moral  judgment,  such  as  were  not  the 
first  concern  of  the  Report.  A  sub-committee,  of  which  Dr. 
Alva  W.  Taylor  was  chairman,  drafted  these  findings,  which 
were  presented  to  the  Executive  Committee  of  the  Inter- 
church  Movement  with  the  Report  on  May  10,  1920,  as 
adopted  by  the  Commission. 

FINDINGS 

1.  The  fundamental  grievances  were  found  to  be: 

(a)  Excessive  hours. 

(b)  The  "  boss  system." 

(c)  No  right  to  organize  or  to  representation. 

2.  The  remedies  desired  were: 

(a)  Shorter  day  and  week  with  a  living  wage. 

(b)  Representation  and  conference,  and  an  end  to  the 
"  boss  system "  which  so  often  subjects  common 
labor  to  petty  tyrannies. 

(c)  Right  to  unionize  and  a  substitution  of  industrial 
democracy  for  industrial  autocracy. 

3.  These  grievances  were  of  long  standing,  but  had  found  no 
expression  because: 

(a)  They  were  limited  largely  to  foreigners  of  many 
races  and  languages  without  industrial  tradition, 
education  or  leadership  to  organize. 

(b)  Race  prejudice  effectually  kept  the  more  skilled, 
more  intelligent  and  better  paid  American  workmen 
from  taking  up  the  cause  of  the  foreign-speaking 
workmen. 

(c)  Labor  unions  have  been  accustomed  to  look  upon  the 
foreigner  as  an  actual  or  potential  strike  breaker. 

(d)  The  steel  companies  have  most  effectually  deterred 
men  from  joining  labor  organizations. 

4.  These  long-standing  grievances  were  brought  to  expres- 
sion by: 


CONCLUDING  247 

(a)  The  part  these  workingmen  played  in  the  war  and 
the  treatment  afforded  them  for  the  sake  of  war 
production  which  gave  them  a  new  sense  of  worth 
and  independence. 

(b)  The  fight  for  democracy  and  news  of  a  larger  work- 
ingmen's  freedom  in  their  native  lands  together  with 
a  growing  sense  of  real  Americanism,  which  brought 
a  spirit  of  democracy  to  their  ranks. 

(c)  The  decision  of  the  American  Federation  of  Labor 
to  organize  them  and  its  actual  work  of  organizing 
them  into  Craft  Unions. 

We  found: 

(a)  That  the  strike  was  regularly  conducted  in  orthodox 
fashion  according  to  the  A.  F.  of  L.  rules  and 
principles. 

(b)  That  while  radicals  sympathized  with  the  strikers, 
as  was  natural,  they  were  effectually  debarred  by 
the  strike  leaders  and  that  far  from  having  influence 
in  it,  they  often  denounced  and  opposed  those  who 
conducted  the  strike. 

We  find  the  grievances  to  have  been  real: 

(a)  The  average  week  of  68.7  hours,  the  twelve-hour 
day,  whether  on  a  straight  twelve-hour  shift  or  on 
a  broken  division  of  11-13  or  10-14  hours,  the  un- 
broken 24-hour  work  period  at  the  turn  of  a  shift 
and  the  underpayment  of  unskilled  labor,  are  all 
inhuman. 

(b)  It  is  entirely  practicable  to  put  all  processes  requir- 
ing continuous  operation  on  a  straight  eight-hour 
basis  as  is  illustrated  by  the  Colorado  Fuel  and  Iron 
Company.  These  processes  require  the  services  of 
only  a  fraction  of  the  workers. 

(c)  The  "  boss  system  "  is  bad,  the  plant  organization 
is  military  and  the  control  autocratic.  The  com- 
panies' claims,  that  they  accord  the  right  to  join 
unions  and  the  opportunity  of  conference,  are 
theoretical;  neither  is  allowed  in  practice. 

(d)  The  use  of  "  under-cover "  men  is  severely  con- 
demned.   It  breeds  distrust,  breaks  down  morals  and 


248  KEPOET  ON  THE  STEEL  STRIKE 

Btimulates  ill-will;  it  is  imdemocratic  and  un- 
American. 
(e)  The  refusal  of  the  United  States  Steel  Corporation 
to  confer,  to  accept  mediation  and  its  attitude  of 
hauteur  as  shown  by  its  refusal  to  follow  the  recom- 
mendations of  the  War  Labor  Board  incited  labor 
strife  and  because  of  the  strength  and  influence  of 
this  Corporation,  forms  one  of  the  greatest  obstacles 
to  a  just  settlement  of  industrial  grievances  and 
unrest  at  this  time. 

7.  The  Strike  was  defeated  by : 

(a)  The  strike-breaking  methods  of  the  steel  companies 
and  their  effective  mobilization  of  public  opinion 
against  the  strikers  through  the  charges  of  radical- 
ism, bolshevism,  and  the  closed  shop,  none  of  which 
were  justified  by  the  facts;  and  by  the  suppression 
of  civil  rights. 

(b)  The  hostility  of  the  press  giving  biased  and  colored 
news  and  the  silence  of  both  press  and  pulpit  on  the 
actual  question  of  justice  involved;  Vhich  attitudes 
of  press  and  pulpit  helped  to  break  the  strikers' 
morale. 

(c)  Public  fear  of  a  general  labor  war,  to  the  coincidence 
of  the  coal  strike  and  threat  of  the  railroad  strike, 
together  with  labor's  failure  to  formulate  and  ex- 
plain its  purposes  with  regard  to  public  service. 

(d)  The  prevailing  prejudice  in  the  steel  towns  and  in 
the  general  public  mind  and  among  the  English- 
speaking  workingmen  against  the  foreigners  who 
constituted  the  overwhelming  number  of  the  strikers. 

(e)  The  ineffective  support  given  the  strike  by  most  of 
the  twenty-four  affiliated  Craft  Unions  through 
which  it  was  organized,  and  by  the  A.  F.  of  L. 

8.  Recommendations : 

1.  The  adoption  of  the  eight-hour  shift  on  all  contin- 
uous processes. 

2.  Limiting  of  the  day  to  not  more  than  ten  hours  on 
duty,  with  not  more  than  a  six-day  and  a  fifty-four 
hour  week,  with  at  least  a  minimum  comfort  wage. 


CONCLUDING  249 

3.  Eecognition  of  right  to  join  regular  Craft  Unions 
or  any  other  freely  chosen  form  of  labor  organiza- 
tion; recognition  of  right  to  open  conference,  either 
through  shop  conunittees  or  union  representatives; 
recognition  of  right  of  collective  bargaining. 

4.  A  vast  extension  of  house  building — by  the  com- 
munities where  possible;  by  the  steel  companies 
where  community  building  is  inadequate  or  im- 
possible. 

5.  That  organized  labor: 

(a)  Democratize  and  control  the  unions,  es- 
pecially in  regard  to  the  calling,  conduct 
and  settlement  of  strikes. 

(b)  Eeorganize  unions  with  a  view  of  sharing  in 
responsibility  for  production  and  in  control 
of  production  processes ;  to  this  end : 

1.  Eepudiating  restriction  of  production 
as  a  doctrine. 

2.  Formulating  contracts  which   can  be 
lived  up  to. 

3.  Finding   a  eubstitute   for   the   closed 
shop  wherever  it  is  a  union  practice. 

(c)  Scrupulously  avoid  all  advocates  of  violence. 

(d)  Accept  all  possible  proffers  of  publicity  and 
conciliation. 

(e)  Promote  Americanization  in  all  possible 
ways  and  insist  upon  an  American  standard 
of  living  for  all  workingmen. 

(f)  Prepare  more  adequate  technical  informa- 
tion for  the  public  in  regard  to  all  condi- 
tions bearing  upon  the  calling  and  the  con- 
duct of  a  strike. 

(g)  Seek  alliance  and  council  from  the  salaried 
class  known  as  brain  workers. 

6.  That  the  President's  Industrial  Conference's  plan 
for  standing  tribunals  of  conciliation  and  publicity 
be  given  a  fair  trial.  We  believe  that  the  most  ef- 
fective step  to  be  taken  for  the  obtaining  of  justice 
in  a  strike  situation  is  through  publicity,  concilia- 
tion and  a  voluntary  system  of  arbitration ;  and  as 
a  beginning  we  recommend  the  fullest  publication 


350  REPOET  ON  THE  STEEL  STEIKE 

of  these  findings  and  of  our  more  complete  reports. 

7.  That  minimum  wage  commissions  be  established 
and  laws  enacted  providing  for  an  American  stan- 
dard of  living  through  the  labor  of  the  natural 
bread-winner  permitting  the  mother  to  keep  up  a 
good  home  and  the  children  to  obtain  at  least  a 
high  school  education. 

8.  That  the  Federal  Government  investigate  the  re- 
lations of  Federal  authorities  to  private  corpora- 
tions' " under-cover "  men  and  to  "labor  detective 
agencies." 

9.  That  the  eight-hour  day  be  accepted  by  labor,  capi- 
tal and  the  public  as  tlie  immediate  goal  for  the 
working  day  and  that  government  provide  by  law 
against  working  days  that  bring  over-fatigue  and  de- 
prive the  individual,  his  home  and  his  community  of 
that  minimum  of  time  which  gives  him  an  oppor- 
tunity to  discharge  all  his  obligations  as  a  social 
being  in  a  democratic  society. 


We  recommend  to  the  press  that  it  free  itself  of  the  all  too 
well  founded  charge  of  bias,  favoring  capital  as  against  labor 
and  redeem  its  power  as  a  promoter  of  truth  and  a  formulator  of 
public  opinion  by  searching  out  all  the  facts  in  regard  to  indus- 
trial questions  and  publishing  them  without  fear  or  favor. 

We  plead  with  the  pulpit  that  it  be  diligent  to  discharge  its 
legitimate  prophetic  role  as  an  advocate  of  justice,  righteousness 
and  humanity  in  all  such  conflicts  of  human  interest  as  those 
involved  in  industrial  strife. 

We  condemn  unsparingly  those  authorities  who  suspended  the 
right  of  free  speech  and  peaceful  assemblage  before,  during  and 
after  the  steel  strike. 

We  recommend  that  the  Industrial  Department  of  the  Inter- 
church  World  Movement  and  the  Social  Service  Commission  of 
the  Federal  Council  of  Churches  continue  this  type  of  impartial 
investigation  of  industrial  strife  and  unrest  and  extend  it  to 
studies  of  general  conditions  in  industry  affecting  the  life,  peace, 
and  welfare  of  all  concerned  and  that  their  findings  be  published 


CONCLUDING  251 

as  a  means  of  enlightening  public  opinion,  begetting  impartial 
judgment,  and  promoting  industrial  justice  and  peace. 

Conclusion. 

All  the  conditions  that  caused  the  steel  strike  continue  to 
exist.  We  feel  that  unless  changes  are  made  approximating  in 
some  degree  the  findings  here  presented,  further  unrest  is  in- 
evitable and  another  strike  must  come.  In  the  measure  that 
workingmen  become  intelligent  and  Americanized,  will  they 
refuse  to  labor  under  such  conditions. 


APPENDICES 


Appendix  A 

MINIMUM     OF     SUBSISTENCE     AND 
MINIMUM  COMFORT  BUDGET 

From  report  made  for  this  Inquiry  by  the  Bureau  of  Applied 
Economics,  Washington,  D.  C.     (November,  1919.) 

Various  students  of  the  subject  have  endeavored  to  establish 
the  amount  of  income  necessary  to  support  a  family  in  health  and 
decency.  In  doing  so  several  budget  levels  of  living  have  been 
analyzed.     The  two  most  clearly  distinguished  are: 

1.  The  Minimum  of  Subsistence  Level.  This  level  is  based 
essentially  on  animal  well  being  with  little  or  no  attention  to 
the  comforts  or  social  demands  of  human  beings. 

2.  The  Minimum  of  Comfort  Level.  This  represents  a  level 
somewhat  above  that  of  mere  animal  subsistence  and  provides  in 
some  measure  for  comfortable  clothing,  insurance,  a  modest 
amount  of  recreation,  etc.  This  level  provides  for  health  and 
decency  but  for  very  few  comforts,  and  is  probably  much  below 
the  idea  had  in  mind  in  the  frequent  but  indefinite  expression 
"The  American  Standard  of  Living." 

All  of  the  studies  have  taken  as  a  basis  a  family  of  five — 
husband,  wife  and  three  children.  This  is  done  (1)  because 
the  average  American  family  is  of  this- size  and  (2)  because  it 
is  necessary  that  marriage  should  be  practically  universal  and 
result  in  a  minimum  of  three  children  of  the  race  is  to  perpetuate 
itself. 

The  results  of  the  various  studies  are  closely  similar  and 
indicate  that  the  annual  cost  of  maintaining  a  family  of  five  at 
a  mifaimum  of  subsistence  level  at  prices  prevailing  in  the  latter 
part  of  1919  was  approximately  $1,575.  This  would  be  equiv- 
alent in  purchasing  power  to  approximately  $885  in  1914. 

The  cost  of  maintaining  the  minimum  of  comfort  level  has 
not  been  so  thoroughly  studied.     Prof.  Ogburn's  estimate  as  of 

255 


256  APPENDICES 

June,  1918,  was  $1,760,  With  an  increase  of  15  per  cent,  in 
living  costs  since  that  time  the  cost  of  this  budget  would  now  be 
approximately  $2,000.  This  sum  would  be  equivalent  in  pur- 
chasing power  to  approximately  $1,125  in  1914.  Prof.  Ogburn's 
conclusions  miay  be  taken  as  a  conservative  minimum,  as  it  is 
much  below  the  estimate  recently  put  forth  by  the  U.  S.  Bureau 
of  Labor  Statistics  as  to  the  cost  of  maintaining  a  government 
employee's  family  in  Washington  at  a  level  of  health  and  decency. 
This  budget,  at  August,  1919,  prices,  cost  $2,262. 

All  of  the  studies  referred  to  dealt  with  larger  Eastern  cities, 
chiefly  New  York.  The  costs  would,  therefore,  not  be  strictly 
applicable  to  all  cities  and  towns  of  the  country.  The  differences, 
however,  except  in  a  few  exceptional  cases,  would  not  be  very 
great. 

A  more  detailed  analysis  of  these  studies  is  made  in  the  fol- 
lowing paragraphs: 


1.      THE    COST    OF    A    MINIMUM    OF    SUBSISTENCE    BUDGET. 

Professor  W.  F.  Ogburn,  of  Columbia  University,  and  one  of 
the  best  known  authorities  on  cost  of  living,  in  a  recently  pub- 
lished article  made  a  very  careful  analysis  of  all  preceding 
studies  of  minimum  of  subsistence  levels  and  also  submits  a 
carefully  prepared  budget  of  his  own.^  Professor  Ogburn's 
calculations  are  all  based  on  prices  prevailing  in  June,  1918. 
Prices  between  that  time'and  the  Autumn  of  1919  have  advanced 
about  15  per  cent.,  and  these  changes,  of  course,  would  have  to 
be  taken  into  consideration  in  arriving  at  the  cost  of  the  budgets 
at  the  present  time.  In  order,  however,  to  make  the  reasoning 
entirely  clear  the  details  of  the  various  studies  are  first  sum- 
marized from  Professor  Ogburn's  article. 

*  Published  in  "Standards  of  Living,"  Bureau  of  Applied  Economics, 
Washington,  1919. 


APPENDICES  257 

(a)     Professor  Oghurn's  Budget 

Food  $615 

Clothing: 

Man    76 

Woman 55 

11  to  14  years   40 

7  to  10  years 33 

4  to  6  years   30 

Rent    180 

Fuel  and  light    62 

Insurance 40 

Organizations   12 

Eeligion   7 

Street-car  fare  40 

Paper,  books,  etc 9 

Amusements,  drinks,  and  tobacco    50 

Sickness   60 

Dentist,  occulist,  glasses,  etc 3 

Furnishings 35 

Laundry  4 

Cleaning  sxipplies 15 

Miscellaneous    20 

Total $1,386 

This  budget  is  for  a  large  eastern  city  and  is  the  result  of 
etudies  of  GOO  actual  budgets  of  shipyard  workers  in  the  New 
York  shipbuilding  district. 

(b)    Professor  Chapm's  Bvdget  Brought  Up  to  Date 

Another  way  of  estimating  a  minimum  budget  for  the  Amer- 
ican subsistence  level  in  1918  is  to  take  minimum  budgets  of 
past  years  that  have  been  accepted  as  standard  and  apply  the 
increases  from  the  date  of  the  budget  to  the  present  time  in 
the  prices  of  the  various  items  of  the  budget,  thus  bringing  them 
up  to  date.  This  method  assumes  no  change  in  minimum 
standards.  It  is  of  course  subject  to  possible  inaccuracies  in 
measuring  the  rising  cost  of  living  between  specific  dates  for 
specific  places.    This  inaccuracy  is  thought  to  be  slight,  however. 

For  instance,  one  of  the  most  famous  and  perhaps  most  gen- 
erally accepted  budget  estimates  is  that  of  Prof.  Chapin,  who 
made  a  study  lasting  several  years  of  New  York  families,  pub- 
lishing his  result  in  1907.  He  said,  "  An  income  under  $800 
is  not  enough  to  permit  the  maintenance  of  a  normal  standard. 
An  income  of  $900  or  over  probably  permits  the  maintenance 


258  APPENDICES 

of  a  normal  standard  at  least  as  far  as  the  physical  man  is 
concerned."  If  we  take  the  increase  in  the  cost  of  living  from 
1907  to  June,  1918,  to  be  55  per  cent.,  then  Chapin's  $900  be- 
comes $1,395.  If  we  take  the  increase  to  be  60  per  cent,  then 
Chapin's  $900  becomes  $1,440.  Probably  the  best  estimates  of 
increasing  cost  of  living  place  the  increase  from  January  1,  1915, 
to  June  1,  1918,  as  55  per  cent. 

(c)     Mvnvmum    Budget    of   New    York    Factory    Commission 
Brought  Up  to  Date 

In  1915  the  New  York  State  Factory  Investigation  Com- 
mission set  a  minimum  budget  for  1914  in  New  York  City 
at  the  figure  $876.  Applying  increases  in  items  of  the  budget 
by  classes  from  January  1,  1915,  to  June  1,  1918,  we  get,  as 
seen  from  the  following  table,  a  budget  of  $1,356. 

Budget             Increase   in   cost  New  York  Factory 

New  York  Factory       of  living  to  Budget  Brought 

Commission  1914        June  1,  1918  Up  to  Date 
Per  cent. 

Food   $325                               65  $536 

Rent    200                                29  258 

Fuel  and  light 20                              44  28 

Clothing 140                              76  246 

Sundries 191                              51  288 


$876  $1,356 

MINIMUM   BUDGET   OF  THE   NEW   YORK   FACTORY    INVESTI- 
GATING COMMISSION,  1915 

Estimate  of  Cost  of  Living  of  Normal  Family  of  Five  in  New  York  City 

Food    $325.00 

Rent 200.00 

Fuel  and  light    20.00 

Clothing    140.00 

Car  fare   31.20 

Insurance : 

Man  20.00 

Family 15.60 

Health  22.00 

Furnishings    700 

Education,  newspaper   5,63 

Recreation  and  amusement   50.00 

Miscellaneous 40.00 


Total   $876.43 


APPENDICES  259 

(d)     Minimum    Budget    of    New    York    Board    of    Estimate 
Brought  Up  to  Date 

In  February,  1915,  the  Bureau  of  Personal  Service  of  the 
Board  of  Estimate  and  Apportionment  of  New  York  City  made  a 
minimum  budget  estimate  for  an  unskilled  laborer's  family  in 
New  York  City  of  $845.  Applying  increases  in  items  of  the 
budget  by  classes  from  January  1,  1915,  to  June  1,  1918,  we 
get,  as  seen  from  the  following  table,  a  budget  of  $1,317. 

Budget  Increase   in  New  York  Board 

New  York   Board    cost  of  living  to    of  Estimate  Budget 
of  Estimate,   1915     June   1,    1918      Brought  Up  to  Date 

Food  $384  65  $634 

Rent    168  29  217 

Fuel  and  light 43  44  62 

Clothing 104  76  183 

Sundries 146  51  221 


Total     $845  $1,317 

It  is  possible  to  criticize  this  budget  as  being  too  low  in 
allowances  for  health,  furniture,  and  education,  and  very  low 
indeed  in  other  sundries. 

BUDGET  OF  NEW  YORK  BOARD  OF  ESTIMATE  FOR  1915 

Housing    $168.00 

Car  fare   30.30 

Food    383.81 

Clothing    104.20 

Fuel  and  light    42.75 

Health 20.00 

Insurance    22.88 

Papers  and  other  reading  matter  5.00 

Recreation 40.00 

Furniture,  utensils,  fixtures,  moving  expenses,  etc 18.00 

Church  dues 5.00 

Incidentals — soap,  washing  material,  stamps,  etc 5.00 


Total    $844.94 

(e)    Estimating  the  Budget  from  Food  Expenditure 

It  is  generally  accepted  that  a  man  at  moderate  physical  labor 
needs  3,500  calories  a  day  and  Atwater  has  estimated  the  needs 
of  the  individual  members  of  his  family  in  per  cents  of  his  needs. 
Thus  his  wife  consumes  0.8  as  much;  a  boy  of  16  years  of 


260  APPENDICES 

age,  0.9  as  much;  a  girl  15  to  16,  0.8;  a  child  from  6  to  9 
years,  0.5;  and  so  on.  We  thus  express  a  family  in  terms  of 
adult  males.  We  say  that  a  family  of  five — man,  wife,  and  three 
children — will  equal  3.3  adult  males  when  the  children  are  at 
a  certain  age. 

The  average  food  budget  of  600  families  of  shipyard  workers 
in  the  New  York  district  collected  by  the  Bureau  of  Labor 
Statistics  was  found  to  cost  $607  for  3.6  equivalent  adult  males. 
This  was  submitted  to  calory  analysis  and  yielded  3,115  calories 
of  energy  for  man  per  day,  not  including  any  waste.  This 
means  that  $607  did  not  furnish  enough  food  for  the  New  York 
families.  A  food  expert  might  have  bought  the  necessary 
amount,  but  the  families  in  actual  practice  did  not. 

Dietaries  should  be  well  balanced  also,  but  this  analysis  was 
not  undertaken.  So  the  important  conclusion  results  that  in 
the  New  York  shipbuilding  area  $607  is  not  enough  of  an 
allowance  for  food. 

Prof.  Chapin's  study  shows  that  at  the  point  where  the 
families  cease  to  be  undernourished,  food  is  44  per  cent,  of 
the  total  budget.  Now,  if  the  low  figure  of  $615  is  taken  as 
the  food  allowance  for  a  family  of  3.3  or  3.4  equivalent  adult 
males  and  estimated  at  44  per  cent,  of  the  budget,  we  get  a 
minimum  budget  of  $1,396. 

Summary  of  Estimates  on  Minimum  Budgets  for  American 
Subsistence  Level  in  1918 

From  three  angles,  therefore,  an  estimate  may  be  formed  of 
a  minimum  budget:  (1)  from  study  of  actual  budgets,  (2) 
from  applying  increased  costs  of  living  to  recognized  standard 
budgets,  (3)  from  estimates  of  adequate  food  allowance  and  its 
percentage  of  expenditures. 

These  estimates  for  New  York  district  in  1918  are  as  follows : 

1.  Prof.  Ogburn's  detailed  budget  from  family  studies   $1,386 

2.  Chapin's  budget  brought  to  date  . .     1,395 

New    York    Factory    Investigation    Commissions*    Budget 

brought  to  date 1,356 

New  York  Board  of  Estimate  budget  brought  to  date 1,317 

3.  From  food  allowance    1,396 


APPENDICES  261 

The  Above  Studies  Brought  Up  to  1919 

The  above  estimates  were  all  made  as  of  June,  1918,  or,  if 
made  at  an  earlier  date,  were  brought  up  only  to  that  date  in 
Professor  Ogburn's  analysis.  Between  June,  1918,  and  the 
present  time  (i.e.  the  latter  part  of  1919)  figures  compiled  by 
the  IT.  S.  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics  show  an  increase  of 
about  15  per  cent,  in  general  cost  of  living.  Applying  this 
percentage  increase  to  the  figures  compiled  by  Professor 
Ogburn  in  the  preceding  table,  the  following  results  are  ob- 
tained : 

VARIOUS  AUTHORITATIVE  ESTIMATES  OF  THE  ANNUAL  COST 
OF  MAINTAINING  A  FAMILY  AT  A  MINIMUM  OF  SUB- 
SISTENCE LEVEL,  BROUGHT  UP  TO  AUGUST,  1919 

June  August 
1918  1919 

Ogburn's  Budget   $1,386  $1,594 

Chapin's  Budget    1,395  1,604 

New  York  Factory  Investigation  Commission   ....      1,356  1,559 

New  York  Board  of  Estimate  Budget 1,317  1,515 

Budget  compiled  from  food  allowance    1,396  1,605 

Average  of  all  five  estimate   $1,370  $1,575 

Inasmuch  as  these  various  estimates  are  so  closely  similar,  the 
average  of  the  five — namely  $1,575 — may  be  taken  as  the  ap- 
proximate amount  necessary  to  maintain  a  family  of  five  at  a 
minimum  of  subsistence  level  at  prices  prevailing  in  the  latter 
part  of  1919. 

2.    THE  COST  OF  A  MINIMUM  OP  COMFORT  BUDGET 

(a)  Professor  Ogburn's  Budget 

Professor  W.  F.  Ogburn  prepared  in  1918,  for  the  consid- 
eration of  the  National  War  Labor  Board  and  of  Judge  Samuel 
Alschuler,  arbitrator  in  the  Chicago  Packing  house  industries, 
a  budget  for  an  average  workingman's  family  of  five  which 
would  include  not  only  subsistence  requirements  but  a  minimum 
of  comfort  and  recreation.  The  cost  of  this  budget  was  placed 
at  $1,760.    This  was  at  prices  prevailing  in  June,  1918,     Since 


262  APPENDICES 

that  date  the  cost  of  living,  as  above  noted,  has  increased  15 
per  cent.  This  would  make  the  present  cost  of  the  budget 
$2,024.  By  major  items,  this  budget  was  distributed  as  fol- 
lows: 

Cost  June         Cost  August 
1918  1919 

Food    $625.00 

Clothing    313.50 

Rent,  fuel  and  light   295.00 

Sundries   527.00 

Total $1,760.50  $2,024.00 

(b)   V.  S.  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics'  Budget  for 
Government  Employee's  Family 

The  TJ.  S.  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics  has  just  published, 
after  very  considerable  investigation,  a  quantity  and  cost  budget 
for  a  Government  employee's  family  in  Washington,  D.  C. 
The  budget  level  aimed  at  is  one  of  heMth^.and  decency — that 
is  to  say — a  level  at  which  the  family  will  have  just  enough 
to  maintain  itself  in  health  and  decency,  but  with  none  of  the 
"trimmings"  and  very  few  of  the  comforts  of  life.  This 
budget  had  in  mind  primarily  the  clerical  employee,  but  except 
possibly  in  the  matter  of  clothes  there  seems  no  reason  why  the 
levelof  a  clerical  worker  should  be  more  costly  than  that  of  a 
'Mechanic  or  l^OTer!  On  Ihe  other  ^and,  Washington  prices 
"~were  undoubtedly  above  the  average  for  the  country  as  a  whole. 

This  budget,  at  August,  1919,  prices,  cost  $2,263.  The  dis- 
tribution of  its  principal  items  is  shown  in  the  following  table: 

'^U  SUMMARY  OF  BUDGET 

Cost  of  Quantity  Budget  at  Market  Prices 

^:^^:^0    I.    Food    $773.93 

II.    Clothing: 

,L    '?„  Husband $121.16 

^'^      ^  Wife 166.46 

Boy    (11   years)    96.60 

Girl  (5  vears)    82..50 

,  Boy    (2  Vears)    47.00        513.72 

(  ,  f  >        III.    Housing,  fuel  and  light   428.00 

"  IV.    Miscellaneous    546.82 

tV;  (,  V  Total  budget  at  market  prices  $2,262.47 


^Ji-A 


APPENDICES  263 

Possible  saving  upon  market  cost  by  a  family  of  extreme 
thrift,  of  high  intelligence,  great  industry  in  shopping, 
good  fortune  in  purchasing  at  lowest  prices,  and  in  which 
the  wife  is  able  to  do  a  maximum  amoiuit  of  home  work. 

I.    Food  (71/2  per  cent. )    $58.04 

II.    Clothing    (10  per   cent.)     51.37 

III.    Housing 30.00 

IV.    Miscellaneous 97.50 

Total  economies  236.91 

Total  budget  minus  economies  $2,025.56 

Savings. — No  provision  is  made  in  this  budget  for  savings, 
other  than  the  original  cost  of  household  furniture  and  equip- 
ment, which  would  average  about  $1,000  in  value.  No  definite 
estimate,  of  course,  can  be  made  as  to  the  amount  which  a  low- 
salaried  Government  employee  should  be  expected  to  save.  But 
an  average  saving  of  12%  per  cent,  of  yearly  salary  during  an 
employee's  single  and  early  married  life  would  seem  to  be  the 
maximum  which  could  be  expected.  Over  a  period  of,  say,  15 
years  this  would  result  in  a  total  accumulation  of  about  $2,000. 
Assuming  $1,000  of  this  to  be  invested  in  household  equipment, 
there  would  be  a  net  sum  of  $1,000  available  for  investment 
in  a  home  or  in  other  direct  income-producing  form.  In  any 
case,  it  would  represent  an  annual  income  of  approximately  $50 
per  year. 

Eecognizing  the  high  prices  prevailing  in  Washington,  and 
recognizing  also  that  the  Government  employee's  family  may 
have  certain  necessary  expenses  not  falling  upon  the  working- 
man's  family,  it  would  seem  that  the  fact  that  this  budget  cost 
$2,662  would  tend  to  confirm  the  $2,000  minimum  comfort 
budget  of  Professor  Ogburn  as  conservative  for  workingmen's 
families  generally  in  the  country  as  a  whole. 


Appendix  B 

Wi^GES  IN  IRON  AND  STEEL  AND  OTHER 
INDUSTRIES 

From  report  made  for  this  inquiry  by  the  Bureau  of  Applied 
Economics,  Washington,  D.  C. 

Information  regarding  hourly  earnings  and  full  time  hours 
per  week  in  the  iron  and  steel  industry  is  presented  in  consid- 
erable detail  in  an  article  in  the  Monthly  Labor  Review  of  the 
U.  S.  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics  for  October,  1919.  Similar 
information  of  recent  date  is  not  available  for  many  other  in- 
dustries, but  there  is  sufficient  to  make  possible  a  valuable  com- 
parison of  earnings  and  hours  of  labor  in  the  steel  industry 
with  conditions  in  other  lines  of  emplo3rment. 

The  data  presented  below  are  divided  into  four  groups: 

1.     WAGES  AND  HOURS  IN  THE  STEEL  INDUSTRY  COMPARED  WITH 
OTHER  INDUSTRIES,  FOR  THE  COUNTRY  AS  A  WHOLE 

The  following  table  gives  the  hourly  earnings,  full  time  hours 
per  week  and  full  time  earnings  per  week,  for  specified  classes 
of  labor  in  the  steel  industry  and  in  all  other  important  indus- 
tries for  which  information  in  comparable  form  is  available. 
All  figures  are  for  1919,  and,  with  few  exceptions,  for  the  latter 
part  of  1919.  The  sources  of  the  information  are  given  on  a 
later  page. 

The  full  time  hours  per  week,  it  is  important  to  note,  are 
the  regular  weekly  working  hours  for  the  occupation.  The 
actual  hours  worked  by  individuals  and,  in  consequence,  their 
weekly  earnings  may  be  considerably  less, 

264 


APPENDICES 


265 


AVERAGE  HOURLY   EARNINGS  AND  HOURS  PER  FULL  TIME 
WEEK  IN  VARIOUS  INDUSTRIES 

Average   Full  Time  Earnings 

Hourly  Hours    per  Full 
Rate      per  Week    Week 
IRON  AND  STEEL 

All  employeej   68.1  68.7  $46.78 

Common  labor  46.2  74.0  34.19 

Other  labor    (including  skilled  and 

semi-skilled)    78.4  66.0  51.74 

MINING 

1.  Anthracite: 

Company  miners 58.1  51.6  29.98 

Contract  miners   84.2  51.6  43.45 

Company  miners'  laborers   52.6  51.6  27.14 

Contract  miners'  laborers 63.9  51.6  32.97 

Laborers    51.9  52.2  26.90 

Average  for  all  inside  occupations  . .  67.3  52.0  35.00 

2.  Bituminous : 

Miners,  hand   78.4  47.3  37.08 

Miners,  machine   94.7  48.1  45.55 

Loaders  80.2  47.4  38.01 

Laborers    57.5  52.0  29.90 

Average  for  all  inside  occupations  . .  74.4  51.9  38.42 

UNITED  STATES  ARSENALS: 

Common  labor   46.0  4.80  22.08 

All  other  employees,  average 76.1  48.0  36.53 

BUILDING  TRADES: 

Average  for  all  building  trades 85.4  44.0  37.58 

Common  labor  52.0  44.0  22.88 

Bricklayers    89.3  44.2  39.47 

Carpenters    78.2  44.2  34.56 

Cement  workers  and  finishers 80.8  44.9  36.28 

Wiremen,  inside   79.9  44.3  35.40 

Painters    76.2  42.8  32.61 

Plasterers  89.5  43.6  39.02 

Plumbers    92.4  44.0  40.66 

Sheet-metal  workers    80.9  44.0  35.60 

Steam  fitters  92.8  44.0  40.83 

Structural  iron  workers 94.2  44.0  41.45 

New  York,  N.  Y. 

Average  for  all  building  trades 83.5  44.0  36.74 

NAVY  YARDS: 

Laborers,  common    44.5  48.0  21.36 

All  other  occupations   79.9  48.0  38.35 

Boilermakers   80.0  48.0  38.40 

Coppersmiths 86.0  48  0  41.28 

Electricians    80.0  48.0  38.40 

Machinists    80.0  48.0  38.40 

Machinists,   electrical    80.0  48.0  38.40 

Molders   80.0  48.0  38.40 

Patternmakers 86.6  48.0  41.57 

Pipefitters    80.0  48.0  38.40 


266 


APPENDICES 


Average 
Hourly 
NAVY  YARDS  (cont.)  i  Rate 

Plumbers   80.0 

Riveters    80.0 

Shipfitters    80.0 

Shipsmitha  80.0 

Toolmakers 86.0 

Holders-on    60.6 

PRINTERS:  Various  Cities. 
Linotype  Operators 

Newspapers,  day 

Book  and  job   

Compositors 

Newspapers,  day 

Book  and  job    

RAILROAD  EMPLOYEES: 

Shopmen 

Machinists    72.0 

Blacksmiths     72.0 

Boilermakers    72.0 

Road  freight 

Engineers  and  motormen 82.5 

Firemen    60.0 

Conductors  69.2 

Road  passenger 

Engineers  and  motormen 98.7 

Firemen 88.0 

Conductors   83.3 

Yard  Service 

Firemen    52.0 

Hostlers    53.1 

Laborers 

Mechanics'  helpers  and  apprentices  47.1 

Section  men 37.2 

Levermen    49.6 

Yard  switch  tenders 34.7 

Other  yard  employees 37.4 

Enginehouse  men   42.3 

Other  unskilled  laborers 41.3 

SHIPYARDS: 

Pacific  Coast  District 

Laborers   52.0 

Other  occupations 75.8 

Atlantic  Coast  District 

Laborers   36.0 

All  occupations  (including  laborers)  72.7 

STREET  RAILWAY  EMPLOYEES: 
Average  for  various  cities 

North  Atlantic   49.8 

South  Atlantic   39.8 

North  Central   49.6 

Western    49.4 

*  5  hours  per  day. 


Full  Time 

Earnings 

Hours 

per  Full 

per  Week 

Week 

48.0 

38.40 

48.0 

38.40 

48.0 

38.40 

48.0 

38.40 

48.0 

41.28 

48.0 

29.09 

35.72 

... 

30.50 

35.59 

... 

26.28 

48.0 

34.56 

48.0 

34.56 

48.0 

34.56 

48.0 


30.0 


48.0 
48.0 


28.80 


26.40 


24.96 
25.49 


48.0 
48.0 

24.96 
36.38 

48.0 
48.0 

17.28 
34.90 

56.4 
56.4 
56.4 
56.4 

28.09 
22.45 
27.97 
27.86 

APPENDICES  267 


3.  PITTSBURGH  DISTRICT.  WAGES  AND  HOURS  OF  LABOR  IN  THE 
IRON  AND  STEEL  INDUSTRY  COMPARED  WITH  WAGES  IN 
OTHER   INDUSTRIES   IN   THE   PITTSBURGH   DISTRICT. 

The  next  table  compares  hourly  earnings,  full  time  hours  per 
week,  and  full  time  weekly  earnings  in  the  iron  and  steel  in- 
dustry with  other  industries  in  the  Pittsburgh  District  for 
which  information  was  available.  As  available  information  is 
not  very  extensive  the  comparison  was  necessarily  limited,  but 
is  believed  to  be  sufficient  to  indicate  how  wage  rates  and  hours 
of  employees  in  the  steel  industry  compare  with  other  lines  of 
employment. 

Inasmuch  as  the  primary  comparison  desired  is  one  which  will 
bring  out  the  extent  to  which  the  relatively  high  full  time  weekly 
earnings  in  the  steel  industry  may  be  due  to  long  hours,  there 
is  added  to  a  table  a  column  showing  how  much  would  be 
earned  by  each  group  for  44  hours  per  week,  at  the  prevailing 
hourly  rates.  In  doing  so,  44  hours  is  used  as  a  base  simply 
because  a  number  of  trades  in  the  table  were  already  working 
44  hours  per  week.  For  the  purpose  of  the  comparison,  of 
course,  it  would  make  no  difference  what  base  were  chosen. 

Again,  it  Is  important  to  emphasize  that  the  weekly  hours 
here  presented  are  the  regular  full  time  hours  per  week  of  the 
occupation,  not  the  actual  hours  worked  by  individuals. 


COMPARISON  OF  EARNINGS  PER  HOUR,  REGULAR  FULL  TIME 
HOURS  PER  WEEK,  AND  EARNINGS  PER  FULL  TIME  WEEK 
IN  VARIOUS  INDUSTRIES  AND  OCCUPATIONS  IN  THE 
PITTSBURGH    (PA.)    DISTRICT 

Average     Regular  Earnings      Earn- 
Hourly    Hours  per  per  Full     Inga  for 
Rate          Week  Week      44  Hours 

per  Week 
IRON  AND  STEEL: 

All  employees  ,  72.8            T4.2  54.02            32.03 

Common  labor    48.0             77.8  37.34             21.12 

Other  labor  (including  skilled 

and  semi-skilled)    87.1             72.1  62.80            38.32 


368 


APPENDICES 


Average     Regular 

Hourly    Hours  per 

Rate  Week 


BITUMINOUS  COAL  MINING: 

Miners,  hand 78.4 

Miners,  machine    94.7 

Loaders    80.2 

Laborers 57.5 

Average  for  all  inside  occupa- 
tions    74.4 

METAL  TRADES: 

Blacksmiths    70.0 

Boilermakers 66.0 

Molders,  iron   75.0 

RAILROAD  EMPLOYEES: 

Shopmen 

Machinists 72.0 

Blacksmiths    72.0 

Boilermakers 72.0 

Road  freight 

Firemen  60.0 

BUILDING  TRADES: 
Laborers 

Building  laborers 50.0 

Hod  carriers 70.0 

Plasterers'   laborers    70.0 

Average  for  laborers 63.3 

Bricklayers    112.5 

Carpenters 90.0 

Cement  finishers    82.5 

Granite  cutters,  inside 84.4 

Wiremen,  inside 90.0 

Painters     87.5 

Plasterers    97.5 

Plumbers   93.8 

Sheet-metal  workers   90.0 

Structural  iron  workers 100.0 

STREET  RAILWAY  EMPLOYEES: 

Motormen  and  conductors 54.0 

PRINTERS: 
Linotj^De  operators 

Newspapers,  day   87.5 

Book  and  job  68.8 

Compositors   . . 

Newspapers,  day  77.0 

Book  and  job 60.4 


Earnings     Earn- 
per  Full     ings  for 
Week     44  Hours 
per  Week 


47.3 
48.1 
47.4 
52.0 

51.9 


48.0 
50.0 
48.0 


48.0 
48.0 
48.0 

48.0 


56.4 


48.0 
48.0 

48.0 
48.0 


37.08 
45.55 
38.01 
29.90 

38.61 


33.60 
33.00 
36.00 


34.56 
34.56 
34.56 

28.80 


30.46 


42.00 
33.02 

36.96 
28.99 


34.50 

41.67 
35.29 
25.30 

32.74 


30.80 
29.04 
33.00 


31.68 
31.68 
31.68 

26.40 


48.0 

24.00 

22.00 

44.0 

30.80 

30.80 

44.0 

30.80 

30.80 

45.3 

28.67 

27.85 

44.0 

49.50 

49.50 

44.0 

39.60 

39.60 

44.0 

36.30 

36.30 

44.0 

37.14 

37.14 

44.0 

39.60 

39.60 

44.0 

38.50 

38.50 

44.0 

42.90 

42.90 

44.0 

41.27 

41.27 

44.0 

39.60 

39.60 

44.0 

44.00 

44.00 

23.76 


38.50 
30.27 

33.88 
26.58 


APPENDICES 


269 


SOURCES   OF   DATA   USED   IN   COMPILING   DATA   ON   WAGES 
AND  HOURS  USED  IN  THIS  STUDY 


Iron  and  Steel; 
Mining: 


United  States 
Arsenal : 
Building  Trades 


Navy  Yards: 
Printers : 


Railroad 
Employees: 
Shipyards : 


Street  Railway 
Employees : 


Monthly  Labor  Review,  U.  S.  Department  of  Labor, 
Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics,  October,  1919. 
Press   Report  of  U.   S.   Bureau  of   Labor   Statistics, 
entitled  "  Hours  and  Earnings  of  Employees  in  the 
Coal  Mining  Industry,"  dated  Nov.  2,  1919. 
Monthly  Labor  Review,  U.  S.  Department  of  Labor 
Statistics,  October,  1910. 
;    (1)  Union  wages  for  various  trades  for  most  of  the 
larger  cities  of  the  country,  as  compiled  by  the  United 
States  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics  and  supplemented 
by  data  furnished  by  union  officials; 

(2)  Wage  rates  of  building  laborers  under  the  scales 
of  the  Hod  Carriers'  and  Building  Laborers'  Union,  and 

(3)  Prevailing  wages  in  the  building  trades  of  New 
York  as  published  by  the  Building  Trades  Council  of 
that  city. 

Data  supplied  by  United  States  Navy  Department. 
The  data  presented  were  obtained  from  the  wage  scales 
and  advances  as  published  in  the  journals  and  Bul- 
letins of  the  Typographical  Union  and  from  computa- 
tions made  by  the  United  States  Bureau  of  Labor 
Statistics. 

From  a  Statement  prepared  by  the  U.  S.  Railroad 
Administration  under  date  of  April  8,  1919. 
From  the  award  of  the  Shipbuilding  Labor  Adjust- 
ment Board  in  October,  1918,  still  in  effect.  This 
award  provided  for  two  general  scales  of  shipyard 
wages — one  for  the  Atlantic  Coast  and  one  for  the 
Pacific  Coast. 

The  compilation  gives  the  hourly  maximum  rates  of 
motormen  and  conductors  in  representative  cities. 
The  information  was  compiled  from  trade  and  labor 
publications  and  is  believed  to  be  closely  accurate. 
The  data  for  full  time  hours  per  week  is  based  on  an 
estimate  made  by  Arthur  Sturgis  in  his  "Analysis 
of  Electric  Railway  Operating  Costs  and  the  Cost  of 
Living  as  Related  to  Wages  of  Conductors,  Motormen, 
and  Other  Trainmen  "  and  presented  to  the  Electric 
Railway  Commission,  Washington,  D.  C,  in  October, 
1919. 


APPENDIX  C 

CLASSIFICATION   ACCORDING  TO   SKILL 

The  classification  of  unskilled,  semi-skilled  and  skived  fol- 
lowed in  this  report  is  that  used  by  the  government  survey  in 
1910  (Senate  Document  110,  4  vols.),  and  is  based  primarily  on 
wage  rates.  That  division  made  all  earnings  under  18  cents 
an  hour,  unskilled;  all  25  cents  an  hour  or  over,  skilled;  and 
those  between,  semi-skilled.  The  percentages  of  the  three  classes 
for  the  industry  were  derived  from  the  table  for  a  typical  estab- 
lishment.    (S.  D.  110,  vol.  Ill,  p.  80.) 

These  percentages  were,  in  Section  IV  of  this  report,  applied 
to  the  exhaustive  tables  of  full  time  earnings  (S.  D.  110,  vol. 
Ill,  pp.  550-551)  in  order  to  discover  the  corresponding  per- 
centages of  total  payrolls.  The  percentages  thus  applied  and 
carried  over  to  the  column  of  weekly  earnings  made  all  below 
$12  weekly,  unskilled  (median  wage  $10.25)  ;  all  over  $15.50 
weekly,  skilled  (median  wage  $19.10) ;  all  between,  semi-skilled 
(median  wage  $13.50). 

It  is  perfectly  understood  that  this  three-fold  classification, 
with  dividing  lines  drawn  at  percentages  in  decimal  points,  rep- 
resents no  corresponding  precision  of  classification  in  the  in- 
dustry itself,  either  as  organized  or  as  possible.  The  gradations 
according  to  pay  were  used  by  the  government  (and  by  this 
report)  solely  because  they  formed  the  only  accurate  measure- 
ment existent  of  relative  skill,  a  measurement  which  is  very 
exact  in  the  industry,  meaning  a  hundred  gradations  in  typical 
departmental  payrolls.  The  usefulness  of  any  precise  classifica- 
tion is  obvious ;  the  use  of  the  threefold  classification  is  a  make- 
shift, partly  to  conform  to  industry  nomenclature,  partly  to  dis- 
tinguish the  three  chief  differing  types  of  worker,  who  may  be 
described  as  being  found  clearly  recognizable  in  the  middle  of 
each  class.  At  the  two  edges  of  the  semi-skilled  class  there  is 
no  definable  dividing  line  in  points  of  observable  skill.     These 

270 


APPENDICES  271 

three  clear  types  are  (a)  common  labor,  learning  in  a  day  how 
to  do  something;  (b)  skilled  labor,  unreplaceable  by  men  who 
have  not  had  many  years  of  training;  (c)  semi-skilled  labor, 
men  of  months  or  years  of  training,  potentially  able  to  do  skilled 
work,  but  never  having  had  opportunity  actually  to  do  it. 

It  is  an  indication  of  the  backwardness  of  steel  as  an  industry 
that  no  exact  classifications  of  jobs  have  been  generally  worked 
out  in  it.  Observation  indicates  that  a  classification  much  closer 
to  facts  would  be  five-fold,  as  follows: 

(a)  common   labor; — shiftable,   replaced   by   "anybody,"   learning  the 

"  know  how  "  in  from  1  day  to  2  months. 

(b)  low-skilled; — common  labor,  but  assigned  steadily  to  set  jobs  re- 

quiring   considerable    "  knack  "    and    some   responsibility. 

(c)  semi-skilled; — trained  men,  potentially  able  to  take  over  a  job,  or 

occasionally  doing  it;   of  the  next  higher  class    (d). 

(d)  skilled; — men  not  only  of  many  years'  training  but  long  experience 

on  set  jobs   involving  adeptness,  judgment  and  responsibility. 

(e)  high-skilled; — long-experienced    men,    characterized    by    judgment 

amounting  to  "  genius,"  and  by  executive  ability. 

That  is  a  gamut  of  (a)  yard  labor;  (b)  "skip"  operators;  (c) 
melters'  third  helpers;  (d)  melters'  first  helpers;  (e)  rollers, 
blowers,  etc. 


INDEX 


Absenteeism,  148 

Accidents  in  steel  industry,  66-67 

A.  F.  of  L.,  157;  steel  department 
wanted,  176;  strike  support, 
180;  strikers'  attitude  towards, 
244;  unions  involved,  145 

Agents — provocateurs,  230,  232 

Agitators,  43,  210,  212 

"  Anonymous  report  "  on  Commis- 
sion of  Inquiry,  28,  233,  234 

Amalgamated  Association  of  Iron, 
Steel  and  Tin  Workers,  164,  169, 

175,  179,  181 
Amalgamated    Clot"hing    Workers, 

176,  182 
Americanization,  12,  82,  179,  249 
Americans,  distrust  foreigners,  30, 

ers;  distrust  foreigners,  30, 
179;  as  trade  unionists,  162-164 

Arbitration  and  conciliation  rec- 
ommended, 249 

Armour,  Mr.,  Conference  with 
John  Fitzpatrick,  165-167 

Blacklists,  15,  27,  74,  121,  198, 
209,  219-221 

Blast  furnace,  hours  of  labor,  52; 
continuous  operation,  57;  job 
description,  62-63 ;  seven-day 
week,  69 

Bolshevism,  15,  20-42 

"Boring  from  within,"  156,  158, 
159 

Braddock,  Pa.,  104 

British  experience,  41,  56,  57,  187 

Brown,  Jay  G.,  194 

Budgets,  see  Family  Budgets 

BufSngton,  E.  J.,  210;  on  Bol- 
shevism of  strikers,  33;  on 
John  Fitzpatrick,  165;  on  labor 
detectives,  231;  on  twelve-hour 
day,  59 

Bureau  of  Applied  Economics,  6; 
study  of  family  budgets,  255- 
263;  study  of  hours  of  labor, 
55-56,  264-268 

Bureau  of  Industrial  Research,  6 

Burnett,  H.  D.,  211 


Carnegie  Steel  Co.,  32,  49,  60,  64, 

76 

Chapin,  Prof.,  family  budget,  257- 
258 

Churches,  see  Pulpit 

Civil  liberties,  denied,  15,  235, 
238,  239,  240,  248;  inquiry  rec- 
ommended, 17-18,  250;  sub-re- 
port cited,  198 

Classification  of  steel  workers, 
270-271 

Clergy,  see  Pulpit 

Close,  Charles  L.,  22-23 

Collective  bargaining,  in  packing 
industry,  165-167;  U.  S.  War 
Labor  Board  policy,  149 

Colorado  Fuel  and  Iron  Company, 
shop  committees,  10-11;  eight- 
hour  day,  49,  57,  247 

Communism,  31,  36,  38,  151 

Company  houses,  103-104 

Company  unions,  10,  19 

Corporations  Auxiliary  Company, 
228-229 

Cost  of  living,  see  Family  bud- 
gets. Standard  of  living 

Debs,  Eugene  V.,  criticises  steel 
strike,  36 

Detectives  and  spies,  15;  co-opera- 
tion with  Department  of  Justice, 
221,  225-226;  investigation  rec- 
ommended, 18,  250;  used  by 
Corporation,  26 

Dickson,  W,  B.,  on  twelve-hour 
day,  46 

Discharge  for  unionism,  171,  205, 
209-218 

Dorchester  laborers'  case,  41-42 

Eight-hour  day,  see  Hours  of  labor 
Employment  management,  22,  120, 

121 
Employment  managers,  137 
Espionage,  see  Detectives  and  spies 

Family  budgets,  86,  100,  101,  105- 
118;  Chapin's  budget,  257;  mini- 


273 


274 


INDEX 


mum     comfort     level,     261-263; 

minimum  subsistence  level,  256- 

261;   Ogburn's  budget,  256,  257, 

262;    N.  Y.   Board  of  Estimate, 

259-260;  U.  S.  Bureau  of  Labor 

_  Statistics,   262-263;    N.  Y.  Fac- 

"  tory  Commission,  258 

Family  life,  effect  of  twelve-hour 

day,  65-66 
Farrell,  James  A.,  24,  25 
Fatigue,    65,    82,    147.      8ee    also 

Hours 
Federal  Council  of  Churches,  250 
Federal    government,    see    United 

States 
Financial   control   of    Corporation 

labor  policy,  11,  125,  201-206 
Findings,  Christian,  246 
Finns,  socialism  of,  150 
Fitzpatrick,    John,    145,    147;    or- 
ganizes   packing    workers,    157, 
165-168 
Foreigners,  see  Immigrants 
Foremen,    handle    grievances,    24, 

26;  power  of  discharge,  210 
Foster,  William  Z.,  145,  169;  and 
Bolshevism,  33 ;  boring  from 
within  policy,  156-159;  Elbert 
H.  Gary  on,  33,  165;  on  immi- 
grants as  trade  unionists,  161- 
164;  on  strike  causes,  147-148; 
on  strike  support,  180 
Freedom  of  speech,  173,  235 

Gary,  Elbert  H.,  Bolshevism  of 
strikers,  33;  conferences  with 
employees,  122;  handles  griev- 
ances, 23-26;  Interchurch  Com- 
mission interview,  28-29;  job  of 
steel  worker,  63-64;  John  Fitz- 
patrick, 33;  no-conference  pol- 
icy, 23-26;  quotes  spy  reports, 
233-234;  right  to  organize,  210; 
seven-day  week,  68-69,  74,  75; 
spokesman  of  steel  industry,  8-9, 
47;  testimony,  23-25,  43,  46-49, 
78,  79,  87,  88,  123-124,  206-210; 
twelve-hour  day,  47-51,  55,  56, 
58,  59,  75,  76;  wages,  86;  Will- 
iam Z.  Foster,  33,  165 

Gary,  Indiana,  38,  170,  240,  241, 
242 

General  strike,  31 

Gompers,  Samuel,  156,  160,  161, 
164;   asks  strike  postponement. 


174-175;    defends    strike    at    in- 
dustrial conference,  180;   organ- 
ization policy,  160 
Great  Britain,  see  British  experi- 
ence 

Haddock,     William     S.,     sheriff's 
proclamation,  237,  239 

Herd-psychology,  154 

Homestead,   Pa.,   49,   50,   60,    133, 
148 

Hours  of  labor,  blast  furnaces,  72; 
building  trades,  268;  coal  min- 
ers, 268 ;  continuous  industries, 
55;  eight-hour  day,  45,  57,  76, 
79,  80,  81,  83;  Elbert  H.  Gary 
on,  58;  independent  steel  com- 
panies, 49 ;  open-hearth  fur- 
naces, 72;  printers,  268;  rail- 
road workers,  268;  shipyard 
workers,  268;  sources  of  data, 
269;  steel  industry.  Great  Brit- 
ain, 56;  steel  workers  compared 
with  others,  264-268;  twelve- 
hour  day,  5,  12,  44,  47,  55,  57, 
59-63,  71,  72,  78,  81,  84;  eight- 
hour  day  recommended,  248 
Housing  of  steel  workers,  14,  103- 
107,  249 

Illinois  Steel  Co.,  28,  33;  use  of 
labor  detectives,  231 

Immigrants,  246;  as  trade  union- 
ists, 161-164;  Bolshevism  of, 
150-155,  161-164;  favored  indus- 
trial unionism,  160;  housing, 
104-118;  job  discrimination,  14, 
136-143;  nationality  of  steel 
workers,  132-133;  segregation, 
30;  twelve-hour  day  wanted  by 
some,   78-79,  99 

Independent  steel  companies,  hours 
of  labor,  49,  65;  labor  repre- 
sentation, 198 

Industrial  conference,  Washington, 
165,  180,  249 

Industrial  unionism,  37,  158,  159- 
161,  182;  favored  by  immi- 
grants, 161-164;  of  immigrants, 
16;  opposed  by  Wm.  Z.  Foster, 
35 

Interchurch  World  Movement, 
Commission  of  Inquiry,  6-11,  28, 
29,  236;  industrial  relations  de- 
partment, 250 


INDEX 


275 


International  Harvester  Co.,  in- 
dustrial councils,  11 

International  unions  in  steel  in- 
dustry, 145,  146,  168,  172,  174, 
175 

Intimidation,  43,  154,  178 

I.  W.  W.,  36,  155,  156,  158,  161; 
strikers'  attitude  towards,  244 

Johnstown,  Pa.,  65,  164,  213,  236 

Kazinci,  Father  A.,  on  Sunday 
work,  70-71,  83,  84 

Labor  autocracy,  167 

Labor  contracts,  179-180 

Labor  file,  27-28,  222-229;  black- 
lists in,  219-221 

Labor  press,  37,  151,  152 

Labor  representation,  10,  19;  in 
independent  steel  mills,  198 

Labor  shortage,  76 

Labor  turnover,  148 

Lackawanna  Steel  Co.,  on  eeven- 
day  week,  75 

Mediation,  7-8,  28 
Midvale-Cambria  Co.,  10,  46,  198 
Ministers,  see  Pulpit 
Molnar,     (Rev.)     Charles    V.,    on 

Sunday  work,  70 
Monotony,  134 

National  Association  of  Corpora- 
tion Schools,  82 

National  Civil  Liberties  Bureau, 
233 

National  Committee  for  Organiz- 
ing Iron  and  Steel  Workers,  36, 
153,  159,  169,  170,  174,  175, 
176;  affiliated  unions,  145-146; 
strike  report,  188-196 

National  Red  Cross  Association, 
100 

Negroes,  as  strike  breakers,  177, 
178 

New  Majority,  quoted  on  labor- 
detectives,  230-231 

Newspapers,  see  Press 

N.  Y.  Board  of  Estimate  family 
budget,  259-260 

N.  Y.  Factory  Commission  family 
budget,  258 

New  York  Sun,  88-89 

New  York  Times,  31 

Night  schools,  82 


Ogburn,  W.  F.,  on  standards  of 
living,  93,  255-263 

One  Big  Union,  36,  160-161 

Open-hearth  furnaces,  hours  of  la- 
bor, 52;  job  description,  61-62; 
wages  of  gang,  98 

Organize,  right  to,  see  Right  to 
organize 

Oursler,  Sup't,  48 

Overtime,  98 

Packing   industry,   157,    165-167 

Palmer,  Mitchell,  149;  on  agi- 
tators, 43 

Parker,  Carleton  H.,  95,  96, 
125 

Picketing,  240-241 

Pittsburgh  Survey,  housing,  104 

Polakov,  W.  N.,  on  inefficient 
management  of  steel  industry, 
77-78 

Postponement  of  strike,  171,  174, 
175,  180 

Press,  see  also  Labor  press,  182, 
183,  199;  as  strike  breaker, 
242;  ignorance  concerning  in- 
dustrial relations,  29,  30,  31; 
recommendations  to,  250;  sub- 
report  cited,  199 

Prices,  effect  on  public  opinion, 
185-186 

Production,  57,  77,  177;  trade 
union  responsibility  for,  168, 
185,  186,  249 

Profits,  13,  14 

Promotion,  favoritism,  136;  skilled 
workers,  129;  semi-skilled 
workers,  132;  unskilled  workers, 
136 

Psychology  of  strikers,  "bound  to 
fail"  idea,  155;  eff"ect  of  charge 
of  Bolshevism,  39-40;  fear  of 
discharge,  163;  fear  of  strike 
breakers,  178;  sense  of  labor's 
importance,  148-149;  "some- 
thing doing  "  idea,  154 ;  William 
Z.  Foster  on,  161-164 

Public  opinion,  206;  Ignorance 
concerning  industrial  relations, 
20-21 ;  ignored  by  trade  unions, 
182-184,  187;  influenced  by  high 
prices,  185-186;  influence  of  U. 
S.  Steel  Corporation,  184-185; 
might  aid  collective  bargaining, 
183;     on    collective    bargaining, 


276 


INDEX 


167-168;  and  hours  of  labor,  46; 
roused  by  atrocities,  187 
Pulpit,  243;  sub-report  cited,  199; 
recommendations,  250 

Radicalism,  see  Bolshevism 
Rail  mills,  hours  of  labor,  53 
Railroad  Brotherhoods,  162 
Rank  and  file,  170,  172,  174 
Red  Cross,  see  National  Red  Cross 

Association 
Red  book  (Foster's),  34 
Right  to  organize,  249;  denied  by 
Corporation,    10,    29,    122,    123; 
Elbert  H.  Gary  on,  210;  on  rail- 
roads, 163;   recognized  in  Great 
Britain,  41;    U.   S.   War  Labor 
Board  policy,  149;  see  also  dis- 
charge for  unionism 
Russia,  150,  152 

Safety  devices  and  measures,  66 

Schiller,  W.  B.,  on  twelve-hour 
day,  59,  68 

Secret  service  men,  see  Detectives 
and  spios 

Semi-skilled  workers,  classifica- 
tion, 270-271;  distrust  skilled, 
179;  housing,  104-118;  increas- 
ing in  steel  industry,  134;  pro- 
motion, 132;  wages  compared 
with  family  budget,  93-101 

Seven-day  week,  11-12,  68-75 

Sherman  Service,  230-232 

Shop  committees,  19,  198 

Skilled  workers,  classification, 
270-271 ;  distrust  semi-skilled, 
179;  favored  by  Corporation, 
128;  grievances,  129-132;  wages, 
13,  85,  91-92 

Spies,  see  Detectives  and  spies 

Standard  of  living,  12,  13,  256; 
definition,  93;  minimum  com- 
fort level,  85;  minimum  sub- 
sistence level,  85;  steel  workers, 
45,  79,  93-101;  see  also  Family 
budgets 

State  police,  240 

Steel  Workers'  Council,  170,  176 

Stewart,  Ethelbert,  Civil  liberties 
report,  18 

Strike-ballot,  154 

Strike  breakers,  197,  248;  detec- 
tives, 29,  209,  226,  235;  federal 
officials,    240-242;    local    magis- 


trates, 239;  negroes,  177;  press, 
242;  pulpit,  243;  state  police, 
240;  U.  S.  army,  241-242; 
U.  S.  department  of  justice,  240; 
U.  S.  Steel  Corporation,  177; 
strike  bulletin,  179 
Sunday  work,  see  Seven-day  week 


Times,  London,  on  steel  strike,  41, 
42 

Trade  unions,  democratization, 
249 ;  Elbert  H.  Gary  on,  208 ;  ig- 
nore public  opinion,  182-184, 
187;  in  U.  S.  weak,  198;  oppose 
twelve-hour  day,  57;  responsi- 
bility for  production,  19,  168, 
185-186,  249;  see  also  American 
Federation  of  Labor,  Company 
unions.  Industrial  imionism 


Under-cover  men,  26,  27,  29,  38, 
228;  see  also  Detectives  and 
spies 

Unemployment,  46 

Union  button,  171 

Union  fee,  170,  189,  194 

U.  S.  Army,  240-242 

U.  S.  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics 
family  budget,  262-263 

U.  S.  Department  of  Justice,  18, 
149;  co-operation  with  indus- 
trial spies,  27,  221,  225,  226;  as 
strike  breaker,  240-242 

U.  S.  government,  civil  rights  in- 
quiry recommended,  17-18;  steel 
commission  recommended,  17 ; 
investigation  of  detective  agen- 
cies recommended,  18 

U.  S.  Senate  Committee,  18;  steel 
investigation,  29 

U.  S.  Steel  Corporation,  division 
of  wage  budget,  91-92,  96,  98; 
dominates  steel  industry,  8-9, 
13;  financial  control,  200-207; 
finance  committee  quoted,  201- 
207 ;  influence  on  public  opinion, 
184-185;  labor  policy,  5-6,  23-30, 
51,  99,  197,  241;  sub-report 
cited,  199 ;  military  organization, 
128-129;  minutes,  126,  200-207; 
rejects  Interchurch  mediation, 
7-8;  report  of,  123;  seven-day 
week,  68-75;  shut  down  of  union 


INDEX 


377 


mills,  204;  size,  84;  twelve-hour 
day,  44-84;  use  of  spies,  26-30; 
wages,  85-118 

U.  S.  War  Labor  Board,  149,  185, 
248 

Unskilled  workers,  backbone  of 
strike,  8,  44;  classification,  270- 
271;  mistrust  skilled,  179; 
grievances,  135-143 ;  housing, 
104-118;  job  description,  132- 
134;  job  discrimination,  128; 
promotion,  136;  standard  of 
living,  85;  wages,  5,  12,  13,  90, 
92,  93,  101 

Violence,  30,  236,  241 

Wages,  annual  average,  97;  build- 
ing trades,  102;  coal  miners, 
102;  compared  with  family 
budgets,  93-101 ;  compared  with 


wages  of  other  trades,  101-102, 
264-268;  metal  trades,  103; 
printers,  103,  268;  railroad 
workers,  103,  268;  shipyard 
workers,  268;  skilled  workers, 
12-13;  sources  of  data,  269;  un- 
skilled workers,  5,  12,  90 

War  aims  (Labor's),  182-183 

Welfare  work,  22,  39,  120,  126, 
127,  137 

West,  George  F.,  steel  strike  re- 
port, 18 

Williams,  H.  D.,  49,  66,  76;  on 
Bolshevism  of  strikers,  32;  on 
twelve-hour  day,  59 

Wilson,  Woodrow,  182;  asks  strike 
postponement,  174-175;  attempts 
to  mediate,  165,  166 

Wood,  Leonard,  240-242 

Youngstown  Sheet  and  Tube  Co., 
hours  of  labor,  49 


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